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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the implications of Thailand’s multi-pillar pension system and its 
capacity of inclusion for informal workers since 2009. The study then seeks out the causal 
factors behind the system’s partly successful outcomes, with particular focus on barriers 
at the local level.  
The introduction of a new multi-pillar pension model for Thailand was promoted by the 
World Bank. The core objectives for this included the alleviation of poverty and 
expansion of social protection to all citizens. The new model marked the first time that 
informal workers were included in the formal system. However, while non-contributory 
pension scheme participation is at a record high, many informal workers have not yet 
joined the voluntary savings scheme. This thesis argues that implementation of the 
pension reform has shaped not only a broader institutional framework of the pension 
system, which indirectly affected the reform’s outcomes, but also a new type of welfare 
state regime. 
To substantiate these arguments, a combination of different approaches is employed – 
both in welfare state analysis and comparative-historical analysis – to examine the 
reform’s barriers of implementation and subsequent outcomes. The typology and macro-
configurational aspect of welfare state institutions are used as analytical tools to examine 
the causal factors and outcomes of the reform. Meanwhile, the characteristics of a hybrid 
welfare state regime are used to explore the welfare state in Thailand. 
Using the results of questionnaires and interview data, this thesis found that informality 
and decentralisation are central to the institutional framework and functioning of the Thai 
pension system. However, the government has overlooked how both factors constrain the 
extension of the pension scheme coverage to the informal sector, unintentionally forming 
a vulnerable group within the current pension system. The thesis argues that developing 
the pension system alone is not sufficient to effectively extend pension and savings 
scheme coverage. Instead, the development of other institutions within the country’s 
system of governance as a whole is also required. This thesis further highlights how the 
nature of the five-pillar pension model has shaped a new role for the state, market, and 
family, thus forming a new Thai welfare hybrid, a combination of three welfare regimes: 
conservative, liberal, and social-democratic. In addition, this thesis concludes that the 
multi-pillar pension model is more practical and realistic in high-income countries with 
a small informal labour market. It is not feasible to successfully achieve the core 
objectives of this model in low- and middle-income countries with large informal labour 
markets like Thailand.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
This paper examines the implication of the multi-pillar pension system and its capacity 
for inclusion of informal workers in Thailand since 2009. This examination involves 
discussing the constraints on the effectiveness and outcomes of the pension and savings 
scheme coverage for informal workers and the influence of the five-pillar pension reform 
on the Thai pension system’s institutional framework and its welfare state regime. 
Thailand has attempted to implement full-fledged pension coverage for all citizens, 
including informal workers, by implementing the World Bank’s multi-pillar pension 
model. This paper asks, ‘How well does the multi-pillar pension model work in Thailand?’ 
and ‘To what extent has the Thai government achieved the aim of extending pension 
coverage to the informal sector since the reform?’ 
The pension system in Thailand was first introduced only to civil servants. However, in 
the late 1990s, the system shifted to the World Bank’s multi-pillar pension paradigm 
(Government Pension Fund, 2012). The first multi-pillar pension system, which is also 
known as the three-pillar pension model, included formal employees in the private sector 
and elderly citizens in rural areas (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:36). The Thai government began 
to pay increased attention to economic security issues in low-income senior citizens in 
1993 and initially offered a targeted allowance for selected elderly citizens (Suwanrada, 
2008:50). Although the pension system in Thailand was reformed, the informal working 
population, which represents 70% of the country’s emerging market economy, remained 
without pension coverage and was exposed to economic risk arising from socio-economic 
and individual shock without governmental support (Cook and Picus, 2001).  
Over the past two decades, increased awareness in Thailand of pension issues faced by 
poor people working in the informal sector has fuelled efforts to expand social protections. 
These efforts have largely focused on the poor elderly in the informal sector, which 
includes those who do not work in the formal labour market or who earn less than 12,500 
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Baht (£250) per month and do not have to pay tax, as these individuals have traditionally 
been given low priority. Thailand is one of many countries now facing an ageing 
population. Therefore, the government is now focusing on the association between old 
age and poverty among informal workers. A key concern surrounding the social 
protection programme in Thailand is that senior citizens in the informal sector now have 
the least economic security (Cook and Picus, 2014:3). Concerns over the economic 
security of Thai senior citizens in the informal labour market have led the government to 
attempt to include citizens in the informal sector in a formal pension system. The Thai 
pension system was therefore reformed by adopting the World Bank’s new multi-pillar 
pension design, the five-pillar pension model.  
The core objectives of the World Bank’s pension conceptual framework are protection 
against the risk of poverty in old age and consumption smoothing from work to retirement 
(Holzmann et al., 2005:8). The Thai government has adopted the World Bank’s core 
objectives. The core objectives of the Thai five-pillar pension reform objectives are to 
ensure that the pension coverage and savings scheme sufficiently covers Thai citizens, 
guarantee that every Thai elderly will have income security and live above the poverty 
line, promote savings to the informal working population, help citizens be more self-
reliant upon reaching retirement age, and reduce the financial burden of the government’s 
future budget (Fiscal Policy Office, 2015:15). The government’s aims focus on increasing 
the capacity for inclusion, alleviating poverty, expanding social protection, strengthening 
the system’s sustainability, increasing the national savings, and developing the financial 
market. Therefore, this paper asks, ‘To what extent have the Thai pension reform’s aims 
been met?’ and ‘To what extent have the core objectives of the World Bank’s pension 
reform been met in Thailand?’ 
The government has offered universal basic income to all Thai senior citizens to improve 
the capacity for inclusion. To ensure economic security for Thai senior citizens in the 
informal sector, the government aims to have these citizens join both a universal non-
contributory pension scheme and a voluntary contributory savings scheme. The 
government believes that this programme will ensure income security, or life above the 
poverty line, for the informal working population (Prachachat, 2009). However, while 
non-contributory pension scheme participation is at a record high, the number of informal 
workers who have joined the voluntary savings scheme is significantly lower than 
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expected. This low participation rate implies that the government has only partly achieved 
its aims. If the number of informal workers who contribute to a savings scheme remains 
low, it will be difficult for the government to fully achieve its aims. Some have argued 
that informality and decentralisation are the causes for these distinct pension scheme and 
savings scheme outcomes (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011). This paper builds on this 
argument to examine the relationship between the informal labour market, the 
decentralisation process and the Thai pension system following five-pillar pension reform. 
The paper pays particular attention to the experience of informal sector workers.  
Some studies have argued that the social protection programme first adopted in Thailand 
in 1932 maintained low levels of public expenditure on social policies and encouraged 
families and employers to handle welfare provisions (Cook and Kwon, 2007:12; Park and 
Jung, 2009:69). Chalamwong and Meepien (2012) claim that the development of social 
protection in the early 2000s, through provisions such as the Health Care Scheme and the 
Compulsory Education Act, ushered the country into to a universal social protection 
period. Based on this assertion, the question is raised as to the typology of the welfare 
state in Thailand since the five-pillar pension reform. Rhodes and Natali (2003:6) argue 
that the multi-pillar pension designs represent complex hybrid welfare state regimes, 
more than just a combination of liberal and conservative models – such as the 
combination employed in Esping-Andersen’s hybrid regime (1997). Thus, the 
implementation of the five-pillar pension model may have formed yet another new type 
of model in the Thai welfare state regime.  
It is worth noting, aside from the core objectives to be considered, the conceptual 
framework of the five-pillar pension reform should start with the assessment of the initial 
conditions (i.e. an inherited system, the reform needs, and an enabling environment) that 
establish both the motivation for and the constraints on feasible reform options. The 
framework should then consider the feasible options of modalities for achieving 
objectives and evaluation goals. The primary goal is to provide adequate, affordable, 
sustainable, and robust retirement income; the secondary goals are to lower labour market 
distortions, increase the number of people contributing savings, and to develop the 
financial market (Holzmann, et al., 2008:3; World Bank, 2008:7). Therefore, this paper 
asks ‘How well have the initial conditions been evaluated against the reform? It appears 
that initial conditions have a significant effect on the reform’s outcome. Therefore, the 
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paper also asks, ‘How well have the goals of pension system and reform been evaluated?’. 
It should be noted that, based on the Thai pension reform’s objectives, minimising the 
potential negative impact of the labour market is the only secondary goal that has been 
ignored. It is therefore necessary to determine if this ignorance impacts the reform needs 
of initial conditions and the effectiveness of the savings scheme coverage.  
Thailand is one of the few developing countries that has implemented pension and savings 
schemes for informal workers and provided all components of the five-pillar model, 
though the World Bank only recommends the full breadth of pillars for high-income 
countries (Holzmann et al., 2005:9). Therefore, the Thai version of the multi-pillar model 
is more comprehensive than the World Bank’s model recommended for middle-income 
countries. As such, Thai pension reform is relevant in understanding the general scope of 
multi-pillar pension models in generating inclusion and coverage. Therefore, aside from 
more accurately understanding the development of the Thai pension system, the Thai 
five-pillar pension system offers a useful guideline, not only for other researchers 
exploring the five-layered design in other middle-income countries, but also for middle-
income countries in confronting a large informal working population, many of whom are 
low-paid. 
In light of the issues around the current pension system and the concerns raised by 
previous studies, this thesis adopts five foci. First, this paper focuses on how well the 
Thai five-pillar pension system incorporated the informal labour market – with informal 
workers being understood as a vulnerable group in the labour market system – into the 
formal pension system. Second, this thesis examines how well the Thai five-pillar pension 
system has incorporated the structure of decentralisation – a system that existed before 
five-pillar pension reform – into the new pension scheme design. Third, in terms of the 
interactions between the informal labour market of the labour market system, the 
decentralisation of the public administration system, and the Thai pension system, this 
thesis discusses how vulnerable labour market groups may be due to the nature and 
interaction of the three systems. Specifically, this study investigates how this interaction 
causes obstacles in implementation and outcomes. Fourthly, this thesis examines whether 
the implication of the five-pillar pension system has formed a new type of welfare state 
in Thailand. Finally, this thesis examines the requirements of the World Bank’s five-pillar 
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pension model in middle-income countries with a large informal labour market like that 
of Thailand, focusing on pension and savings scheme coverage.  
This paper uses a combination of typology of social insurance institutions (Korpi and 
Palme, 1998) and macro-configurational aspect (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015) to test the 
Thai pension reform’s capacity in implementing comprehensive coverage and social 
inclusion. This approach allows the thesis to clarify the welfare challenge and problems 
with the labour market and public administration influences, which extends and changes 
the institutional framework of the Thai pension system by examining further populations 
and institutions. Meanwhile, the typology of welfare state regimes is used to comprehend 
the development of the Thai welfare state regime after this five-pillar pension reform. The 
thesis draws on a 2015 survey conducted in Thailand to test the constraints on potential 
beneficiaries of different pension and savings schemes for informal workers within the 
pension reform using the experiences of informal sector workers at the local level and 
understand the pension system’s outcomes following this reform. This survey investigates 
the experiences of Thai senior citizens in both formal and informal sectors via 
questionnaires and interviews and the experience of local and national bureaucrats via 
interviews. The questionnaire data reveals whether the labour market system’s 
informality constraint has had any indirect impact on informal workers’ decisions to join 
the voluntary savings scheme. In addition, the interviews principally investigate the 
capacity for implementing the decentralisation process of public administration within 
the five-pillar model. The survey is a strength of this paper because, without the empirical 
study, it would be difficult to understand Thai pension reform at the local level. More 
specifically, the empirical data from the survey identifies barriers to the system’s capacity 
for inclusion and development, highlighting vulnerable groups in the current pension 
system following this reform. These concerns are unique challenges at the local level in 
Thailand and may not be foreseen by general suggestions from the World Bank’s pension 
conceptual framework. 
This chapter is broken into five sections. The next section presents a brief background of 
how this research emerged. It also stresses why Thailand was chosen as a case study as 
well as how empirical concerns form the main research questions. The third section 
briefly presents this study’s theoretical framework. It also explains how this research 
differs from that of previous studies and how it advances knowledge in the area of welfare 
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state and comparative-historical analysis. The fourth section outlines the thesis’s 
methodology. Finally, it provides an outline of each chapter. 
1.2  Background: How did this research emerge? 
When the pension system in Thailand emerged, it was initially only introduced for 
government officials, which known as the Government Pension (GP). The aim of it was 
to ensure well-being for all government officials after their retirement (GPF, 2012). The 
GP was fully financed from general tax revenue, and the sum was transferable to 
recipients’ children or relatives (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:273). Government expenditure 
on the GP grew dramatically, increasing pressure on the government budget. In response, 
in the 1990s the Thai government adopted the World Bank’s Multi-Pillar Old Age 
Security system, also known as the three-pillar pension model, as a solution to solve the 
financial burden issue and provide better pension coverage (GPF, 2012). 
The World Bank (1994) claims that this three-pillar pension model is suitable for any 
country and capable of providing more flexibility than the mono-pillar model. This is as 
it is much more effective in addressing the needs of the main target groups of a population 
and providing more security against economic, demographic and political risk (Willmore, 
2000:3). In 1997, the Thai government strengthened the system’s financial sustainability 
by replacing the GP programme with the Government Pension Fund (GPF). The benefit 
of the GPF relates to member contributions, and it covers any government official who 
was in service after March 1997; those who were in service before March 1997 have the 
option of either staying with the GP or joining the GPF. Apart from civil servants, the 
Thai three-pillar pension system also included formal employees in the private sector and 
the elderly poor in rural areas (Jitsuchon, Skoufias and Wiener, 2012:36). In 1993, the 
Thai government began paying more attention to economic security issues for the elderly 
poor by introducing a targeted Old Age Allowance (OAA). Although the government 
initially offered the 200 Baht OAA (£4), it was only for selected members of the older 
population (Suwanrada, 2008:50). The process of selecting beneficiaries of the OAA 
targeted elderly Thai citizens, who lacked a consistent and permanent source of income, 
was criticised by both academics and receivers (Kanjanaphoomin, 2004:15; Sakunphanit 
and Suwanrada, 2011:409; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2012:197). The many issues 
in the targeted allowance programme for the elderly poor resulted in needy citizens not 
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receiving government subsidies, while corruption and favouritism in the selection of 
beneficiaries also became major problems (Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013).  
Even though the three-pillar pension system provided better pension coverage to Thai 
citizens, the pension coverage issue was still criticised. Some scholars point out that 
Thailand’s three-pillar pension design did not provide most of its elderly citizens with 
better pension coverage and did not facilitate adequate post-retirement living standards 
(Lloyd-Sherlock and Schröder-Butterfill, 2008:14). Specifically, this three-pillar system 
covered only about 10.5 million workers, or around 30% of the labour force, leaving two-
thirds of the 36 million workers in Thailand’s informal labour force out of the system for 
many years (MacKellar, 2009:21). This implies that even though the pension system in 
Thailand had been reformed and, arguably, transformed, the informal working population, 
which makes up a large share of Thailand’s emerging market economy, remained without 
any pension coverage and thus exposed to the economic risks arising from socio-
economic and individual shocks, without any support from the government (Chandoewit, 
2014; Chudasri, 2014; Sangwongwanich, 2014).  
In 2009, the Thai government introduced a new form of multi-pillar pension system, again 
from the World Bank, called a five-pillar pension model. The World Bank explains that 
the main objectives of introducing a five-pillar pension model are the alleviation of 
poverty and the expansion of social protection to all vulnerable groups, including workers 
in the informal sector (Holzmann et al., 2005:1). Accordingly, the implementation of a 
five-pillar pension system in Thailand marked the first time that informal workers were 
included in the formal pension system. There are three pillars that workers in the informal 
sector are eligible to join, including: the Old Age Allowance (OAA) of a non-contributory 
zero pillar; voluntary savings programmes of a voluntary savings scheme as a third pillar; 
and informal financial and non-financial assets as a fourth pillar. However, only pension 
programmes in the zero and third pillars are supervised by the state. This thesis thus 
focuses on the zero and third pillars. 
The 2009 Thai government emphasises its aim of seeing informal workers join both the 
universal OAA of the non-contributory zero pillar and the saving pension programme of 
the voluntary third pillar to ensure economic security above the poverty line. This 
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secondary goal ensures promoting savings contributions to informal workers, 
strengthening the system’s financial sustainability, and increasing national savings 
(Apinunmahakul, 2011:4; Prachachat, 2009). It appears that the government has 
attempted to solve not only issues of pension coverage and savings contribution for all 
Thai senior citizens, especially those working in the informal labour market, but also the 
system’s economic sustainability. According to the National Economic and Social 
Development Board’s 2009 report, over 5 million, or almost 80%, of the Thai elderly 
aged 60 and above from both formal and informal labour markets had registered for the 
OAA in 2009 (NESDB, 2009). The savings scheme, on the other hand, appeared to face 
a number of obstacles during the development process. In 2009, government introduces 
the National Savings Fund (NSF) as a savings programme for informal workers and the 
universal OAA before enacting the NSF Act in 2011 (Chalamwong and Meepien, 
2012:241). However, NSF registration did not start due to the delayed process of setting 
NSF rules and regulations (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Therefore, no workers joined the 
programme (Chandoewit, 2013). In 2011, the government ignores the NSF and introduces 
the Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40) as another savings programme for informal workers 
(Jitsuchon et al., 2012:9). Approximately 590,000 of 24.6 million informal workers 
joined the SSA 40 (Prapha, 2013). As such, the number of savings contributors in the 
informal labour market was significantly low. In 2013, the SSA 40 was expanded from 
one savings option to four different options. In 2015, the SSA 40 was again changed from 
four different savings options to just one (SSO, 2015d), while the NSF was reintroduced 
by the 2015 government. Over a short period of time, the savings scheme has been 
reformed several times, and these reforms appear to have generated much confusion. 
After several reforms, the development of the OAA non-contributory pension scheme and 
the NSF and SSA 40 contributory savings scheme caused a number of positive and 
negative criticisms. On one hand, scholars have praised the positive effects of local 
governance’s decentralisation process on the achievements of OAA coverage 
(Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:409; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). On the 
other hand, other scholars have highlighted a number of significant challenges of the NSF 
and SSA 40. Firstly, being workers in an informal labour market puts considerable strain 
on citizens’ financial capability to make savings contributions for later life (Brustard, 
2011; Jitsuchon et al., 2012; Chandoewit, 2013, 2014). Some have added that, although 
some informal workers may be able to contribute to savings, the governmental savings 
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programmes may not offer an attractive enough option compared to other alternatives 
(Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011; Jitsuchon et al., 2012). This participation rate implies 
that citizens’ financial status has a strong impact on their savings contribution. 
Furthermore, the design of the savings scheme is another issue that has been criticised. 
Some studies have argued that explanations of the different savings programmes in the 
third-pillar are unclear enough for Thai citizens in the informal sector to easily understand 
(Jitsuchon et al., 2012; Chandoewit, 2013, 2014).  
Because of the development of several social security, social insurance, and social safety 
nets after the financial crisis in 1997, some scholars have categorised social protection in 
Thailand in the 1990s as the development of a paternalistic welfare state (Schramm, 2015; 
Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012). Aside from promoting the well-being of Thai senior 
citizens, civil servants also concentrate on protecting their personal interests, which has 
led to the civil service being in a privileged position in terms of welfare entitlement 
(Schramm, 2015:15). Meanwhile, other scholars have highlighted that low levels of 
public expenditure on social policies and strong families and employers’ welfare 
provisions in Thailand are characteristic of a liberal welfare state regime (Ramesh and 
Asher, 2001; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002:696) and a developmental welfare state (Kohler, 
2014). However, after the development of social protection in the early 2000s, 
particularly the universal coverage of the 30 Baht Health Care Scheme, the free twelve-
year compulsory education scheme and the old age allowance of the non-contributory 
pension scheme, Chalamwong and Meepien (2012:226) and Lloyd-Sherlock and 
Schroder-Butterfill (2008:1) emphasise that this period was the turning point for the Thai 
welfare state in becoming a universal social protection state. The following question is 
proposed by this paper: ‘To what extent has the implication of the five-pillar pension 
reform formed a new Thai welfare state regime?’  
In summary, based on criticisms in previous studies, it appears that the design and purpose 
of pension and savings programmes (OAA, NSF, and SSA 40) in the current Thai five-
pillar pension system, informality, decentralisation and complexity of the policy designs 
constraints are main factors that might have impacted on the effectiveness of the pension 
and savings schemes coverage for informal workers, either positively or negatively. 
Accordingly, this research is keen to find out whether these factors are the causes for 
extending pension and savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. As this thesis 
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focuses on the implication of the five-pillar pension system in Thailand and its capacity 
for inclusion of informal workers, it is worth taking a close look at the World Bank’s 
reform conceptual framework and how it links to the effect of informality, 
decentralisation and policy designs on the informal workers’ interests and decisions over 
joining the pension programmes, as well as the formation of this vulnerable group in the 
current Thai pension system. Perhaps the transformation of this five-layered design might 
be forming a new shape of institutional framework, unexpectedly reflecting the system’s 
effectiveness of coverage and the typology of the Thai welfare state regime. 
Why Thailand is interesting as a multi-pillar approach case study? 
Aside from existing studies’ criticisms of the development of Thai pension reform and 
the effectiveness of pension and savings schemes’ coverage in the informal sector, the 
World Bank’s five-pillar pension reform conceptual framework notes four interesting 
points that demonstrate how Thailand is a valuable practical case.  
Firstly, to satisfy country-specific conditions and the reform’s needs and objectives, an 
assessment of initial conditions must be conducted before the five-pillar pension reform 
(Holzmann, et al., 2008:4). These factors include the inherited system, reform needs, and 
the enabling environment, which may or may not be conducive to a reform process, such 
as administrative capacity and the development of financial markets (Holzmann, et al., 
2005:9). Initial conditions can establish both the motivation for and constraints on the 
feasible reform options (Holzmann, et al., 2008:4). It is debatable whether the Thai 
government carefully considered these features before implementing the five-pillar 
pension model. It is possible that not having performed a thorough assessment of initial 
conditions before implementation may have significantly impacted the reform’s 
performance outcome.  
Secondly, to achieve the core objectives of pension systems, having evaluated the initial 
conditions and the capacity to improve the enabling environment are first required. The 
Thai government’s core objectives in implementing the five-pillar pension model were 
poverty reduction among the elderly, the expansion of social protection to all vulnerable 
groups, financial sustainability, and the incentivisation of saving behaviours among 
informal sector workers (Paitoonpong et al., 2010; Fiscal Policy Office, 2015). The core 
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objectives of the five-pillar pension reform appear to match those of the World Bank. 
This thesis assumes that the Thai government has focused on the core objectives of the 
five-pillar pension reform and pension development but did not pay attention to the 
relationship between the pension system and other institutions functioning in the pension 
system. Accordingly, it is important to determine how efficiently the five-pillar pension 
model worked in the Thai case, and whether the government considered the initial 
conditions and the capacity to improve the enabling environment before the reform.  
Thirdly, the World Bank emphasises that how the multi-pillar pension system is reformed 
depends on country-specific factors in terms of development status and income level 
(World Bank, 2008:5). For instance, high-income countries can feasibly provide the full 
breadth of all pillars (Holzmann et al., 2005:9). The Thai government has offered a full 
breadth of all five pillars, but Thailand is not a high-income country. Rather, Thailand is 
a middle-income country with a large informal labour market (World Bank, 2017). 
Therefore, it has been suggested that Thai government has clearly reached beyond its 
capacity, making it is questionable as to whether the full five-pillar pension model is 
appropriate for Thailand.  
Finally, to effectively reform the pension system, the design should be evaluated against 
the dual goals of evaluation criteria (Holzmann et al., 2005:6). The primary goal of reform 
is maintenance of adequacy, affordability, sustainability, and robustness. The secondary 
evaluation criteria, which include minimisation of labour market distortion and 
contribution to savings mobilisation and financial market development, should be 
considered in fulfilling the primary goal (World Bank, 2008). Based on the initial 
conditions and secondary criteria, it appears that the World Bank is aware of the 
interactions between the pension system and other institutions’ impacts on the pension 
system following the reform. Accordingly, it is essential to determine if the Thai 
government has taken these concerns into account before implementing the five-pillar 
pension model. This thesis investigates whether the Thai government has considered the 
possible negative impact of informality and administrative and implementation issues 
before the reform.  
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In summary, Thailand is one of the few middle-income countries confronting a large 
informal labour market and offering a full five-pillar pension model. With its unique 
background and the five-pillar pension reform options, Thailand is a clear example to 
investigate the capacity of the five-pillar pension model in generating inclusion and 
coverage for the informal sector. It is necessary to determine the requirements of the five-
pillar pension model to succeed in middle-income countries such as Thailand. 
Furthermore, although some researchers have already discussed the Thai pension system, 
there are complex, unexplained dynamics within the Thai case. Both the unique 
characteristics and reform options of the Thai pension system mean that it is useful as a 
guideline for both Thailand and other case studies. 
Main research questions 
Regarding puzzles in the current pension system and concerns raised by previous studies, 
this thesis’s main research questions are as follows: 
1) ‘What are the constraints on the effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme 
coverage to informal workers?’ 
Once the five-pillar pension model was implemented in Thailand, the informal working 
population became eligible to join two new pension and savings schemes: the non-
contributory scheme in the zero pillar and the voluntary savings scheme in the third pillar. 
However, a number of informal workers have yet to join pension and savings schemes, 
specifically the voluntary savings scheme. This thesis question thus seeks the causal 
factors behind the citizens’ decisions to join the pension scheme(s). In previous studies, 
scholars argue that the informal economy causes informal workers’ low participation in 
retirement savings, while the decentralisation process of local governance is significantly 
compatible with the universal coverage of pension provision (Suwanrada and 
Sakunphanit, 2013). Accordingly, this thesis aims to determine the positive and negative 
impacts of informality and decentralisation of public administration on citizens’ decisions 
to join schemes. Moreover, as the Thai government introduced a non-contributory zero-
pillar and a voluntary third-pillar following the transformation to entice informal workers 
to join formal pension and savings schemes, this thesis attempts to find out whether the 
design of the pension and savings schemes for informal workers affects inclusiveness. An 
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empirical study is therefore required. The above research question focuses on the causal 
factors behind the effectiveness of extending pension scheme coverage, which is the main 
focus of Chapters 4 and 5. 
2) ‘To what extent has the nature of the five-pillar pension reform influenced the 
institutional framework of the Thai pension system?’ 
The informal working population is one of the main target groups included in this new 
multi-pillar pension model (Holzmann et al., 2005:10). The informal labour market has 
never been involved in the Thai formal pension system before the reform. Accordingly, 
this thesis argues that since the 2009 five-pillar pension reform, the informal labour 
market now functions in the system’s institutional framework. The World Bank (2008:1) 
emphasises that, to achieve the core objectives of the reform and country-specific 
conditions and needs, a government must consider initial conditions, the capacity to 
improve the enabling environment, and evaluation criteria of the reform conceptual 
framework. The initial conditions come with a two-sided coin; they establish the 
motivations for and constraints on feasible reform options (Holzmann et al., 2008:3). This 
implies that the nature of the five-pillar pension reform can positively or negatively 
impact the reform’s outcome, depending on the factors functioning in the design. Both 
the initial conditions and secondary criteria of the World Bank’s conceptual framework 
demonstrate how the World Bank foresees the interaction between the pension system 
and other institutions and their effects on the outcome of pension reform; these include 
labour market efficiency and administrative and implementation issues (Holzmann et al., 
2005:114; World Bank, 2008:4). The nature of the five-pillar pension reform and the 
impact of informality and decentralisation perhaps might be causal factors for successful 
and unsuccessful coverage of non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes. 
Accordingly, this thesis presumes that the nature of the five-pillar pension reform has 
formed a broad and complex institutional framework that requires a positive correlation 
between or among the pension system and other institutions functioning in the design. 
Again, an empirical study is required to investigate this assumption. This question is 
mainly analysed and discussed in Chapter 6. 
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3) “To what extent has the implication of the five-pillar pension reform formed a new 
Thai welfare state regime?” 
Chalamwong and Meepien (2012) categorise the development of social protection in 
Thailand into five periods. Some scholars have argued that the social protection in the 
1990s was the fourth period of a paternalistic welfare state (Chalamwong and Meepien, 
2012:233; Schramm, 2015). Meanwhile, others have defined it as a liberal welfare state 
(Asher, 2001) and a developmental welfare state (Kohler, 2014). However, though the 
1990s social protection system was characterised into different types of welfare states, 
scholars have argued that the development of social protection in the early 2000s – 
including health scheme and free compulsory education – has shifted away from the trend 
of the 1990s and is moving towards a universal social protection period (Lloyd-Sherlock 
and Schroder-Butterfill, 2008; Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012). Regardless of previous 
studies emphasising the changes in social protection development to a means of universal 
social protection since 2000, this thesis examines whether the implication of the five-
pillar pension system in 2009 has formed a new type of Thai welfare state regime. 
This thesis presumes that, after the 2009 transformation, the roles of the state, market, 
and family have changed, forming a new type of welfare state regime. Specifically, the 
state began to take action on providing a universal Old Age Allowance (OAA) of the non-
contributory zero pillar to all Thai senior citizens, including informal workers, who had 
not previously been covered by state provision. Additionally, the state also began to 
contribute to the contributory savings scheme in the third pillar for informal workers. The 
contributory savings scheme gives informal workers a chance to contribute for their own 
retirement. This implies that since the five-pillar pension reform, both the state and 
citizens play more important roles in the development of the Thai pension system. 
Interestingly, Schramm (2015:17) argues that the Thai government’s plan of promoting 
self-help and voluntarism may signal a shift to a new regime of welfare capitalism. Arts 
and Gelissen (2002:149) and Rhodes and Natali (2003:6) assert that multi-layered 
pension design tends to be a complex version of the hybrid regime proposed by Esping-
Andersen in 1997. From this assertion, this thesis presumes that the nature of the multi-
pillar pension design might lead to a complex Thai interpretation of a welfare mix, which 
is a different direction from being a universal social protection provision. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that, aside from a new form of institutional framework for the Thai pension 
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system, the five-pillar pension model design has also formed a new type of welfare state 
regime. However, in order to determine that this assumption is correct, an analysis of the 
development of the Thai pension system is required. 
4) ‘What would be required for the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model to work in 
middle-income countries like Thailand?’ 
This question is discussed in the final chapter (Chapter 7) after analysing and answering 
the first three questions in the data analysis chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) and discussion 
chapter (Chapter 6). This thesis views Thailand’s unique example as a useful case study 
from which other middle-income countries can learn. The study of the current Thai multi-
pillar pension system not only sheds light on what the Thai government may have missed, 
but also provides suggestions for other middle-income countries with large informal 
labour markets wishing to implement this five-pillar pension model and extend pension 
and savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
To aid the researcher in determining the barriers to implementation and outcomes of the 
multi-pillar pension reform and examining the capacity for inclusion of informal workers, 
a combination of different approaches in welfare state analysis and comparative-historical 
analysis are employed.  
This paper uses the macro-configurational aspect of comparative-historical analysis and 
the typology of social insurance institutions by Korpi and Palme (1998) to evaluate causal 
factors forming the broad and complex institutional framework of the Thai five-pillar 
pension system and influencing the effectiveness of pension scheme coverage to informal 
workers. Furthermore, to understand whether the nature of the five-pillar pension reform 
has led to a new type of welfare state in Thailand, the welfare state regime approach is 
employed. As the welfare state theory was in use before macro-configurational aspect 
literature was introduced, this thesis begins by reviewing the welfare state literature, 
followed by a discussion of the typology of social insurance institutions and macro-
configurational aspect.  
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This paper employs the welfare state regime approach found in welfare state literature to 
evaluate the development of the welfare state in Thailand since the 2009 implementation 
of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model. To understand how the nature of the five-
pillar pension model has influenced the Thai welfare state regime, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism (1990) and Hybrid or Unique?: The Japanese Welfare State between 
Europe and America (1997) by Esping-Andersen are key literature. Esping-Andersen’s 
three welfare state regimes (1990) are commonly cited and used in welfare state debates 
and consist of the following three regime types: liberal, conservative, and social 
democratic. Many scholars have further developed their ideas based on these three 
regimes to define the welfare state regimes of different case studies in developed and 
developing countries (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Holiday, 2000; Gough, 2001; Bambra, 
2007; Choi, 2007; Cook and Kwon, 2007a, 2007b; Park and Jung, 2009).  
Some studies (Cook and Kwon, 2007:12; Park and Jung, 2009:69; Gough, 2001:174; 
Choi, 2007:2) have argued that, as the social protection programme was first adopted in 
Thailand, the state has maintained low levels of public expenditure on social policies and 
encouraged families and employers to handle welfare provisions. Historically, aside from 
the state, the family and community have played a vital role in financial support and the 
development of the welfare state system in Thailand (Choi, 2007; Park and Estrada, 2011; 
Knodel and Teerawichitchainan, 2017). Accordingly, the 1990s Thai welfare state regime 
was characterised into many different types of welfare state, such as a paternalistic 
welfare state (Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012; Schramm, 2015), a liberal welfare state 
regime (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002:696; Ramesh and Asher, 2001), or a developmental 
welfare state (Kohler, 2014). However, scholars have claimed that the development of 
social protection in 2000s has shifted to a universal social protection period due to the 
universal coverage of the 30 Baht health care scheme, the Compulsory Education Act of 
free twelve years compulsory education, and old age pension scheme (Lloyd-Sherlock 
and Schroder-Butterfill, 2008; Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012).  
In 2009, the informal working population was included in the formal five-pillar pension 
model, suggesting that the Thai government was prepared to act for the informal working 
population. The government currently offers not only an allowance to all of Thai’s elderly, 
but also contributions to savings programmes under the voluntary savings scheme at a set 
rate. It is worth noting, the universal social protection is a principle form of the social-
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democratic regime, which may be an indication of the development of the welfare state 
in Thailand. Schramm (2015:17) also argues that the Thai government promoting self-
help and voluntarism to citizens may signal a shift from the 1990s paternalistic welfare 
state to another type of welfare capitalism. The question then raises: ‘Perhaps, the 
implication of the five-pillar pension reform may have switched the Thai pension system 
to a new form of welfare state regime?’ 
Esping-Andersen (1997:179), in revisiting his own paper on the three types of welfare 
state regimes (1990), points out that the welfare state model in Japan is an example of a 
hybrid welfare state system because it is conservative and liberal instead of just a 
conservative model as stated in the earlier paper. In this revision (1997:187), Esping-
Andersen concludes that the Japanese welfare state system, and perhaps those of other 
East Asian and South-East Asian countries, represents a hybrid regime. Arts and Gelissen 
(2002:149) assert that modern welfare states tend to be hybrid regimes instead of the pure 
classic welfare state as introduced by Esping-Andersen. Rhodes and Natali (2003:6) 
argue that the multi-pillar pension designs represent complex hybrid welfare state regimes. 
Accordingly, it is essential to comprehend whether the welfare state in Thailand has 
retained the same typology or has moved on due to the environment in which it is situated 
since the five-pillar pension reform. The three classic types of welfare state regime not 
only sparked an ongoing debate in the welfare state literature from the 1990s onwards, 
but also received much criticism in terms of case selection, the possibility of outdated 
data, and methodological issues. Therefore, this research reviews these criticisms and 
examines welfare state studies outside of Thailand in order to fill in the gaps in this area 
and understand where Thailand stands in the welfare state debate. 
To understand how the nature of the five-pillar pension reform might have influenced the 
Thai pension system’s institutional framework and the effectiveness of the extending 
pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers, this thesis employs the ideal-
typical models of social insurance institutions by Korpi and Palme (1998) and the macro-
configurational aspect of comparative-historical analysis (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015) as 
analytical tools. Korpi and Palme’s ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions 
(1998:665) examine the effects of welfare state institutions on the citizens’ interests, 
preferences, and identities; and in return, scrutinise citizens’ interests and preferences 
affecting the institutional structures of old-age pension and sickness insurance 
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programmes, and the degree of poverty and inequality in a society. Accordingly, Korpi 
and Palme’s typology of social insurance institutions is employed to examine whether the 
institutional structures of pension programmes for informal workers have any influence 
on informal workers’ interests and decisions regarding joining the OAA of the non-
contributory pension scheme and the savings programmes of the voluntary savings 
scheme or not, thus explaining the effectiveness of pension and savings schemes coverage. 
As there are five types of institutional structure: the targeted model, voluntary state-
subsidised model, corporatist model, basic security model and encompassing model 
(Korpi and Palme, 1998), in order to understand whether the institutional structures of 
pension programmes affect informal workers’ interests and decision making or not, it is 
important to first know which type of social insurance institution is being used. 
Nevertheless, the five different ideal types of institutional structure cannot explain 
whether the informal labour market and decentralisation system is affecting citizens’ 
interests and decisions about joining the schemes. Hence, the concept of macro-
configuration is used. 
Mahoney and Thelen (2015:5) stress that the macro-configurational orientation of 
comparative-historical analysis links to a concern about explaining large-scale and 
political-economic outcomes that helps researchers analyse a case focusing on the large-
scale causal factors of complex organisational-institutional arrangements, such as welfare 
regimes (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney Thelen, 2015). Mahoney and 
Thelen (2015:5) explore how comparative-historical analysis might be incorporated into 
other approaches. In other words, they consider that a combination of comparative-
historical analysis and other approaches might help compensate for weaknesses in the 
alternative approaches. They (2015:20) also stress that to understand how multiple factors 
combine to form larger combinations and complexes of causal packages, with interaction 
of more than two variables, individual factors must be analysed as parts of large 
combinations at a macro level. This is because such analysis might be a key to the 
processes, choices and behaviours of individuals at a micro level. Accordingly, this thesis 
combines the macro-configurational aspect with the typology of welfare state institutions 
as an alternative approach for exploring the impact of the five-pillar pension reform on 
the institutional framework of the Thai pension system and the effectiveness of extending 
pension scheme coverage to informal workers.  
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This thesis presumes that five-pillar pension reform in the Thai case has formed a broader 
and more complex institutional framework and has influenced the effectiveness of 
extending pension and savings schemes coverage to informal workers. Some scholars 
emphasise that the nature of other variables interacting with institutional arrangements 
might also affect the overall outcome (Doyle, 2013:11; Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:7). 
From this assertion, this thesis presumes that there are three systems (labour market 
system, public administration system and pension system) functioning in the institutional 
framework of the Thai five-pillar pension system; the nature of each institution has 
impacted on informal workers’ interests and decisions to join such schemes. This is 
because of the nature of each institution involved in the institutional framework of the 
Thai pension system can either facilitate or constrain the development of the Thai pension 
system. Here, we presume that the Thai government has paid attention only to the 
development of the pension system, remaining unaware of the effect of the nature of other 
institutions functioning in the system. Hence, the performance outcome of old age 
pension provision in the non-contributory pension scheme has been far more successful 
than the results of the savings programmes of the voluntary savings scheme for informal 
workers. Nevertheless, these assumptions remain unclear unless the empirical data can 
be analysed and discussed. 
1.4 Methodology 
Some scholars point out that mixed methods design is an alternative way for researchers 
to combine the strengths and cover the weaknesses of each method, and thus scrutinise 
the case (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Bryman, 2006; Johnson and Christensen, 2008). This 
research uses a mixed-method approach involving both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
Mixed-method design is a suitable method for this thesis as it allows us to understand the 
case study and examine the main research questions. The questionnaire survey is an 
instrument used to investigate data in a broad context, while interview data, on the other 
hand, offers in-depth detail (Cameron, 2009). In this thesis, whilst the questionnaire 
survey data were analysed using the quantitative method, the interview data were 
analysed via the qualitative method to gain the in-depth detail that quantitative tools might 
miss. Collecting data through different groups of participants can augment the validity 
and reliability of the data and interpretation, pulling out both similar and different 
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information from groups of participants, which might be very useful to this research study 
(Zohrabi, 2013). Thus, the empirical part of the thesis begins with the collection of 
questionnaire survey data from Thai senior citizens, followed by interviews with three 
groups of interviewees (Thai senior citizens, local bureaucrats, and national bureaucrats). 
Questionnaire survey data were gathered from 204 respondents. The number of the 
participants was set at 7% of the infinite population, equalling 204 (Yamane, 1967). This 
sample included Thai migrants and residents in Bangkok aged 50 and over from both 
formal and informal sectors, as well as those who joined and not joined pension 
programmes offered by the two pension and savings schemes. This sampling ensures the 
representation of specific groups with significant characteristics and provides greater 
precision than a random sample of the same size. The author acknowledges that 
probability sampling, also known as random sampling, is a methodological approach 
wherein all persons have a chance of being selected, meaning that results are more likely 
to accurately reflect the entire population (NSO, 2012c). However, the researcher was 
unable to access the official government information of the of Lumpini sub-district local 
resident household system nor migrant data. Therefore, the non-probability sampling 
technique was the most suitable sampling technique. The non-probability method is a 
sampling method that may or may not adequately represent the whole population (Bhat, 
2018). Trochim (2006) argues that most researchers prefer probability sampling method 
over non-probability sampling. However, in some social research projects, there may be 
circumstances where it is not feasible, practical, or theoretically sensible to perform 
random sampling. Therefore, a wide range of non-probability methods should be 
considered. The methods of non-probability sampling include convenience sampling, 
quota sampling, purposive sampling, and snowball sampling. In this study, convenience 
sampling was employed for the questionnaire survey, whereas purposive and snowball 
sampling were used for interviews. 
The sampling method of questionnaire survey data collection corresponds to 
‘convenience sampling’. Convenience sampling is a technique in which a sample is drawn 
from that part of the population available to the researcher (Bhattacherjee, 2012:69). The 
limitation of convenience sampling is that it is difficult for the researcher to obtain a 
sample that adequately represents all people from other locations (Bornstein, et al., 
2013:361). The researcher is aware that information from the chosen sample may reflect 
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the unique characteristics of the population and be less representative of the opinions of 
the population at large. However, the target groups of the questionnaire survey are not 
just the senior residents officially registered in urban areas, but also the rural migrants. 
Some researchers have argued that homeless people, drug users, or migrants are difficult 
to reach in research due to their physical and geographical location or their socioeconomic 
status (Shaghaghi et al., 2011:86). Migrants are a hard-to-reach population that have 
always been a major challenge to researchers in terms of systematic sampling and data 
collection (Agadjanian and Zotova, 2012:132). To minimise potential errors, common 
solutions for sampling frame and data collection issues are convenience and snowball 
sampling (Organista and Kubo, 2005:279). In existing studies, convenience sampling 
method has been employed in investigating migrants in Russia (Agadjanian and Zotova, 
2012), Northern California (Organista and Kubo, 2005), and Thailand (Wangroongsarb 
et al., 2016). To understand the impact of citizens, from both formal and informal sectors 
and from both urban and rural areas, on joining pension and savings schemes, migrants 
are one of the target groups. Because, neither the government nor the researcher was able 
to state the accurate number of migrants in the area. The researcher has experienced the 
same difficulty as most researchers faced. Therefore, convenience sampling was the most 
appropriate technique in questionnaire data collection.  
The questionnaire survey data were analysed with quantitative tools, including 
descriptive statistics analysis (frequency and percentage, mean score, and standard 
deviation) and inferential statistics analysis (cross tabulation and chi-square test). The 
cross-tabulation and chi-square are the most commonly used in political surveys 
(Amuyunzu, 2016). Cross-tabulation and chi-square were used to determine the 
interrelationships and interactions between the dependent and independent variables. The 
combination of these two is the most commonly used method in political surveys, as they 
strengthen the weaknesses in one another. Though the combination of cross-tabulation 
and chi-square method might not be sufficient enough to analyse the intercorrelations 
between the respondents’ personal characteristic variables and savings behaviour, the 
combination of these two methods is sufficient enough to analyse the indirect influence 
of respondents’ personal characteristic variables on their savings behaviour. Most 
specifically, they were able to underline the influence of the relationship between income 
and informal workers’ personal characteristics on shaping individuals’ positions within 
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the labour market and thereby impacting their savings behaviour. Hence, these two 
inferential statistics analysis tools were employed. 
Cross-tabulation aids researchers in obtaining initial insights by investigating the 
relationships between two or more variables or measuring how different variables are 
related to one another (Grover, 2014). However, the method’s significant limitations are 
that it can lead to a high number of tables in cases of multiple responses, because variables 
are cross-tabulated with each other in many different ways. This means that it may not be 
clear which responses are meaningful until cross-tabulation (Michael, 2001:1). Also, 
Ogee et al. (2012) highlight that although the cross-tabulation table is able to review an 
association between and among different variables, the count data alone cannot tell us if 
there is really a statistical association. Thus, using cross-tabulation together with chi-
square is recommended. The chi-square, hence, was employed in this thesis.  
The chi-square’s significant advantages are its robustness in terms of distribution of data 
and flexibility in handling data from both two-group and multiple-group studies 
(MacHugh, 2013:143). Chi-square is used when variables are measured at the categorical 
variable. It is used to test a correlation between two variables. If there is an association, 
the distribution of one variable will differ depending on the value of the second variable. 
However, if the two variables are independent, the distribution of the first variable will 
be similar for all values of the second variable (Ogee et al., 2012). It is worth noting that 
chi-square is highly sensitive to sample size. As sample size increases, absolute 
differences represent a smaller proportion of the expected value. A reasonably strong 
association may not be significant if the sample size is small. Generally, the data must be 
frequency data greater than 5 for each class for the most appropriate use (Mount Holyoke 
College, 2018).  
To study the relationship between citizens’ savings behaviour and economic security or 
informal economy, some previous studies employed the frequency, percentage, mean 
scores, and standard deviation, chi-square, and cross-tabulation as data analysis methods 
(Hirunsathaporn et al., 2013; Brindha and Priya, 2017; Preecha and Lakkanawanit, 2018). 
This thesis follows along the same lines, also conducted the questionnaire survey and 
interviews and used the frequency, percentage, mean scores, and standard deviation of 
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the descriptive statistics analysis tools. Cross-tabulation and chi-square were used as 
inferential statistics analysis tools. 
As the thesis examines how well Thailand’s five-pillar pension model can incorporate the 
informal working population, pension and savings schemes for informal workers are 
studied. The data from the questionnaire outline the broader context of informal workers’ 
situations and how the informality of the labour market affects their ability to make 
pension contributions. Moreover, it provides Thai senior citizens’ attitudes and 
satisfaction towards each pension programme. The data from the questionnaire reveals 
the causal factors behind the results pointing to the effectiveness of extending pension 
and savings schemes coverage to informal workers. The data then sketch a broader picture 
of the institutional framework of the Thai five-pillar pension system and explain the 
evolutionary process of the Thai welfare regime, while also investigating the vulnerable 
group that exists in the current pension system.  
Apart from the questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions were also conducted. The purposive and snowball sampling methods were the 
interview data collection method used. The researcher acknowledged that both the 
purposive and snowball sampling methods might introduce a sampling bias. Thus, in 
order to limit any disadvantages regarding using these two sampling methods, the 
researcher collected interviewee data from different groups of interviewees. The key 
informants for the interviews were categorised into three groups: Thai senior citizens, 
local bureaucrats and national bureaucrats. Only those identified as potential participants 
and willing to take part in the in-depth interviews were selected. For the in-depth 
interviews, once the interviewee began repeating the same answers or points of view, the 
interview ended. There were 27 key informants in total, including 19 senior citizens, 5 
local bureaucrats and 3 national bureaucrats. Each group included participants in different 
positions or at different levels. The participants in the Thai senior citizens’ group included 
Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above, from both the formal and informal sectors. Some 
of the key respondents were official residents of Bangkok Lumpini sub-district, whilst 
others were migrants from other rural areas. Not all respondents had joined these two 
pension and savings schemes. The differences of personal characteristics and labour 
market conditions among the respondents helped clarify the case study more clearly. The 
participants in the local bureaucrats and staff group included those in charge of working 
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with citizens regarding the universal non-contributory pension scheme (OAA) in the zero 
pillar and the savings programmes (RMF, NSF, and SSA 40) under the wing of voluntary 
savings schemes in the third pillar. The participants in the national bureaucrats’ group 
included those overseeing programmes under non-contributory and voluntary savings 
schemes, such as bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour. 
Unlike most existing studies on the inclusion of Thai informal workers in the pension 
system (Paitoonpong et al., 2010; Jitsuchon et al., 2012), which have mainly analysed the 
effect an informal economy on informal workers’ participation in retirement savings, this 
thesis focuses on not only the effect of personal characteristics and labour market 
conditions, but also the that of administrative and implementation issues. Hence, 
alongside the questionnaire survey, this thesis took in-depth interviews from citizens and 
local and national bureaucrats. Both instruments were conducted in a manner closely 
resembling the experiences of the target group at the local level.  
Apart from the primary data gathered from the empirical research, secondary sources 
were also used. The secondary data were predominantly drawn from the government’s 
official data sources, including the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), the 
Thai Gerontology Research and Development Institute (TGRI), the National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB), the National Statistical Office (NSO), the 
National Savings Fund (NSF), Social Security Office (SSO), the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, and published 
academic papers. The results of quantitative and qualitative methods were compared 
using the triangulation technique to identify similarities and differences. The secondary 
data were also analysed and triangulated with the primary data. This thesis employs the 
triangulation technique in order to integrate different methods, different types of 
informants and different data sources; this is as it reduces any bias, giving greater 
credibility in the eyes of the reader (Shenton, 2004:66,73). 
In summary, this research employed a mixed-method research design. Both primary 
sources and secondary sources were used. The primary data bridged the gap between the 
secondary data and answers not provided from secondary sources. The triangulation 
technique was used to increase the study’s reliability and validity.  
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of three parts and seven chapters. The first part encompasses three 
chapters: an introduction (Chapter 1); a theoretical review of previous studies and a 
historical background of Thailand’s pension system (Chapter 2); and the methodological 
tools used in this study (Chapter 3). The second part includes a presentation of the 
findings and analysis (Chapter 4 and 5) and a discussion on the main research questions 
(Chapter 6). The final chapter includes a conclusion and recommendations for future 
research (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework that helps evaluate the questions addressed 
in this research and examines the empirical concerns of the case study. This chapter 
presents a theoretical review of welfare state analysis and macro-configurational aspect. 
Detailed explanations about welfare state theory, the main features of welfare state 
regimes, critiques of welfare state typologies and limitations of welfare state theory are 
first presented. The first presentation concerns the concept of the three classic welfare 
state regimes from Esping-Andersen (1990), and how other scholars moved beyond these 
to propose new types of welfare state regimes, using the different lenses of various case 
studies. It then reviews how Esping-Andersen (1997) revisited the Japanese welfare state 
regime and introduced a fourth welfare state regime, and how other previous studies 
characterised the Thai welfare state regime. It also explains how this research engages 
with previous studies in the welfare state literature. Apart from the welfare state in the 
Thai context, the welfare state in both Western and East-Asian contexts are presented so 
as to examine where Thailand stands in the world debate. This chapter also presents the 
typology of social insurance institutions by Korpi and Palme (1998) and the macro-
configurational aspect of comparative-historical analysis (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015). It 
explains why neither of these two approaches on their own is sufficient for analysing the 
case study. An explanation of different types of institutional structures in Korpi and 
Palme’s paper (1998) and how they can help the researcher explain the case study is 
presented. The outline of the macro-configurational aspect of the comparative-historical 
analysis and its main features are later presented to confirm that, to investigate obstacles 
of the effectiveness of pension coverage for informal workers and the outcomes of the 
Thai pension system following the five-pillar pension reform, it is important to look at 
the case study in a broader context, not just the pension system itself.  
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Apart from the theoretical framework, the historical background of the Thai pension 
system is presented. The background of the Thai pension system before and after it was 
fully restructured to accommodate the five-pillar pension model is presented. Later, this 
chapter reviews the characteristics of different pension programmes in different pillars, 
but mainly focusing on the zero and third pillars. Reviewing the historical background of 
the Thai pension system not only gives us a brief idea of the Thai context, but also 
compares the institutional design of the Thai five-pillar pension system to the World 
Bank’s model. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in this research. It describes the mixed methods 
used for the case study and how these increase the validity and reliability of this research. 
It explains why the triangulation technique is the most suitable technique for this research 
design. It also highlights why the Thai five-pillar pension system is interesting as a case 
study. Before explaining the instruments used in the fieldwork, this chapter summarises 
the results from the pilot study and reviews how important it was to include a small 
sample size before the real questionnaire survey and interviews took place. Later, the 
units of analysis and participant recruitment of the questionnaire survey, construction of 
the questionnaire and the tools which the questionnaire data analysis are reviewed. In the 
same token, the units of analysis, interview selection and participant recruitment are also 
reviewed, before explaining how the semi-structured interviews were conducted and what 
approaches were used to analyse the interview data. This chapter explains that the data 
from both the questionnaire survey (quantitative method) and interviews (qualitative 
method) are primary sources from the fieldwork, while the official statistics and previous 
studies are secondary sources. These are then merged during the interpretation and 
analysis in the findings and discussion chapters. 
Chapter 4 presents a questionnaire survey data analysis. This chapter explores causal 
factors behind the performance outcome of both the non-contributory pension scheme 
and voluntary savings scheme. More specifically, it pays particular attention to the effects 
of the informal economy on informal workers’ decisions to join the savings programmes. 
This chapter mainly focuses on the association between the personal characteristics of the 
respondents and their financial status and labour market conditions, and on how this 
relationship might constrain the informal workers’ savings contributions. This chapter 
also attempts to point out that due to the informality constraint in Thailand, senior 
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informal workers are categorised as a vulnerable group in the current pension system. To 
understand the relationships between the informal workers’ personal characteristics and 
their savings contributions, this chapter analyses the respondents’ characteristics from the 
questionnaire and their savings behaviours by using descriptive statistics analysis and 
inferential statistics analysis. The data analysis in this chapter sheds light on how the 
effect of informality is relevant to the World Bank’s reform conceptual framework, before 
discussing this concern again Chapter 6. Moreover, this chapter also presents data on the 
participants’ satisfactions and attitudes, both towards the non-contributory and voluntary 
savings. It aims to shed light on how the process of decentralisation and local governance, 
and the policy designs of different programmes under these two pension and savings 
schemes, are relevant to citizens’ interests and decisions on whether to join the schemes.   
Chapter 5 presents data analysis of the in-depth interviews. The data analysis in this 
chapter not only further explores the link between informality and the informal workers’ 
decisions to join the schemes, but also explores whether the decentralisation process used 
in public administration is another causal factor affecting the citizens’ interests and 
decision making. More specifically, this chapter examines whether the process of 
decentralisation has influenced the citizens’ decisions regarding joining the pension and 
savings schemes. As some previous studies point out that migrants from rural areas to 
urban cities are a vulnerable group (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007; Warunsiri, 
2011), thesis thus provides a brief background into the differences of local bureaucratic 
structures across both rural and urban areas to explore whether the aforementioned 
concern occurred in the Thai pension system or not. In other words, this chapter also 
explores the existence of vulnerable groups in the pension system following this five-
pillar pension reform, and attempts to find out whether the decentralisation is one of the 
causal factors that forms a vulnerable group in the system. The in-depth interviews not 
only provide in-depth details on how Thai citizens perceive the pension and savings 
schemes, but also fill in any gaps left by the questionnaire survey data. The data in this 
chapter are analysed and discussed to determine whether they lead to the same description 
as the questionnaire survey data in Chapter 4, and whether they review any significant 
interaction between the World Bank’s reform conceptual framework and the effect of 
decentralisation. Apart from analysing the interview data from the Thai senior citizens, 
data from the interviews of local and national bureaucrats are also presented and analysed 
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so as to explore any interesting comments before they are triangulated with the interview 
data from the citizens and the questionnaire survey.  
Chapter 6 further analyses the data analysis from Chapters 4 and 5 so as to explore the 
effect of pension programmes’ institutional structures on informal workers’ interests and 
decisions, then answers the first three main research questions. The last two chapters 
mainly focus on the effect of informality and decentralisation on informal workers’ 
interests and decision-making related to joining pension and savings schemes. This 
chapter examines whether the institutional structures of pension programmes offered by 
both pension and savings schemes are also causal factors affecting the coverage of 
pension and savings schemes to the informal sector. To understand the case study more 
clearly, other pension programmes from the first and second pillars are also discussed. 
Later, this chapter answers the thesis’s main research questions. It first discusses the 
major causal factors affecting informal workers’ inclusion. It then investigates any 
significant correlation among those constraints. The clarification of that correlation then 
explains whether the nature of the five-pillar pension reform has influenced the 
institutional framework of the Thai pension system and automatically affected the 
capacity of inclusiveness. Finally, this chapter discusses whether the nature of the five-
pillar pension model has formed a new type of Thai welfare state regime. It briefly traces 
the historical background of the Thai welfare state regime before comparing and 
analysing similarities and differences between the Thai case and other case studies.  
Chapter 7 is the final chapter of this thesis. It once again reviews the historical background 
of the pension system in Thailand and the puzzles in the Thai case before summarising 
the research’s main purpose, focus, research questions, theoretical framework and 
research methodology. The results from the empirical research and main ideas of the 
thesis discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are also presented. The final main research 
question is discussed. It suggests some explanations about how the World Bank’s five-
pillar pension model can possibly work well in middle-income countries with a large 
informal labour market like Thailand. The suggestions are based on the experience of the 
Thai case. This chapter also discuss the outcomes of the multi-pillar pension approach 
(three-/four-/five) in other national systems regarding the capacity for informal workers’ 
inclusion in contributory savings scheme. The significant contributions and limitations of 
 29 
this research study are also presented in this chapter. Lastly, some suggestions for future 
research are presented. 
Having outlined the overall structure of the thesis, the next chapter reviews the theoretical 
framework used in the study of the Thai five-pillar pension system. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS AND 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE THAI 
PENSION SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main elements of welfare state analysis and 
the comparative-historical analysis used in this thesis. The chapter also presents the 
background of the Thai pension system before and after its transformation to the five-
pillar pension model. The background will aid the author in determining the barriers to 
implementation and outcomes of the multi-pillar pension system reform in Thailand. In 
order to aid this clarification, the focus of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, the chapter 
presents a literature review of the welfare state analysis and comparative-historical 
analysis. Secondly, the chapter presents the historical background of the Thai pension 
system. 
To understand whether the five-pillar pension model has led to a new type of Thai welfare 
state regime, this paper employs the welfare state regime approach. This research employs 
the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism by Esping-Andersen (1990) and the fourth hybrid 
welfare regime from Hybrid or Unique?: The Japanese Welfare State between Europe 
and America (1997) as key readings from welfare state literature to explore the welfare 
state regime of the Thai pension system. The thesis also reviews other types of welfare 
state regime presented in existing literature to identify the similarities and differences 
among different types, describing how arguments can aid the researcher in explaining the 
transformation of the Thai welfare regime since the 2000s. Existing studies have 
described the 1990s social protection in Thailand as a paternalistic welfare state, a liberal 
welfare state, and a developmental welfare state (Asher, 2001; Chalamwong and Meepien, 
2012; Kohler, 2014; Schramm, 2015). However, scholars have also noted that the welfare 
state type in the early 2000s has shifted away from the 1990s welfare state type to a 
universal social protection programme (Schröder-Butterfill, 2008:1; Chalamwong and 
Meepien, 2012:233). Interestingly, existing studies have asserted that the multi-pillar 
pension design is a complex hybrid welfare regime (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Rhodes and 
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Natali, 2003). From this assertion, this thesis assumes that, after the 2009 multi-pillar 
pension reform, the welfare state in Thailand became a mixed welfare state. Hence, this 
paper aims to determine whether the implication of the five-pillar pension reform has 
formed a new Thai welfare state regime. It should be noted that it is necessary to examine 
welfare state studies outside of Thailand so as to understand where the country stands in 
the welfare state debate, and whether the five-pillar pension model requires an alternative 
approach to explain its welfare regime.  
To evaluate the transformation of the Thai five-pillar pension system and its influence on 
the institutional framework of the Thai pension system and the effectiveness of extending 
pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers, this thesis points out that 
neither the typology of social insurance institutions nor the macro-configurational aspect 
of comparative-historical analysis can solely explain the nature of this transformation and 
the performance outcomes of the two pension and savings schemes for informal workers. 
The welfare state institutional structures of Korpi and Palme (1998) explain types of 
social insurance institutions and the causal factors affecting citizens’ interests and 
preferences that are relevant to the effectiveness of pension and savings schemes coverage. 
However, this typology cannot explain whether other institutions are also causal factors 
behind citizens’ decisions and pension and savings schemes coverage. The macro-
configurational aspect allows the researcher to capture the broad and complex 
organisational-institutional causes in large-scale outcomes (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015). 
In other words, it entails a concern with large-scale outcomes of system’s institutional 
framework that exist beyond the limited scope of the institutional structure of pension 
programmes in the Thai pension system. This thesis hence contributes the macro-
configurational aspect to be studied alongside the typology of social insurance institutions, 
so as to examine another main focus of this thesis.  
This chapter is broken into five sections. In the second section, previous welfare state 
research is presented. This section first reviews the classic three welfare state regimes 
used in welfare state analysis and how the regimes used to describe the former pension 
system in Thailand. It also reviews how other scholars in welfare state literature have 
shifted away from the three welfare state regimes to explore case studies through different 
lens of welfare state regimes. This section also emphasises the concept of the hybrid 
regime of Esping-Andersen (1997) and how it can be used to describe the Thai case. Next, 
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in the third section, the typology of social insurance institutions of Korpi and Palme (1998) 
is presented, followed by the macro-configurational aspect of comparative-historical 
analysis. This section explains how important it is to employ both institutional structures 
and the macro-configurational approach when analysing the case study. The fourth 
section presents a historical background of the Thai pension system. It reviews the 
background of the Thai pension system before and after it was fully restructured 
according to the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model. It then considers the 
characteristics of each pension programme in the current pension system for both formal 
and informal labour markets. Finally, the concluding remarks of this chapter are 
summarised.  
2.2 Varieties of welfare state regime 
To understand the nature of the five-pillar pension reform in Thailand and its influence 
on the welfare state regime of the Thai pension system, it is important to review different 
types of welfare state regime before examining the history of social protection in Thailand. 
This thesis pays significant attention to Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes, 
building on the concept of the fourth hybrid regime. Before looking at how Esping-
Andersen revisited and relocated the Japanese hybrid model in the welfare state regime 
debate, it is important to consider the three classic welfare state regimes and other types 
of welfare state regime proposed after the original three. 
2.2.1 Three worlds of classic welfare state regimes 
In the prior literature, social scientists and social reformers long debated on welfare state 
analysis, in particular, the typology of welfare state regimes. The classic welfare state 
study offered in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, by Esping-Andersen (1990), is 
one of the most influential attempts to create a welfare state typology. Esping-Andersen 
(1990:33) analysed welfare state regimes of 18 member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) based on three basic criteria: de-
commodification (the extent to which an individual’s welfare is reliant upon the market 
regarding pensions, unemployment benefits and sickness insurance), social stratification 
(the role of welfare states in maintaining or breaking down social stratification), and the 
private-public mix (the relative roles of the state, the family, the voluntary sector and the 
market in welfare provision) and the three principal actors: family self-servicing, market 
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activity and government provision (Esping-Andersen, 1997:182). By considering the 
basic criteria for evaluating regimes, the typologies of welfare state regimes were 
categorised into three types: social democratic, conservative and liberal. These three types 
of welfare regimes represent the concept that welfare state regimes characterise and 
describe the complex relationships that exist across the state, the labour market and the 
family (p.141). Esping-Andersen (1990:32) states that the social democratic regime, 
mainly existent in Scandinavian nations, is built on universalistic principles, which means 
citizens are less dependent on family support and the community, whilst the role of the 
state is more dominant in welfare provision. The conservative regime, on the other hand, 
mainly involving European countries with strong Catholic parties, is segmented by 
employment status and contributions. Family members, specifically women, are quite 
dependent on male breadwinners. The liberal welfare regime is the last type of welfare 
regime, mainly found in Anglo-Saxon nations, which encourages market dependency by 
offering very low levels of de-commodification. In other words, it heavily relies on 
markets as the main institutions for addressing social protection, with the sense of 
favouring selectivity and targeting approach. Esping-Andersen’s three welfare state 
regimes have been famously cited and used in the welfare state debate. Despite the 
concept’s remarkable achievement, there are still criticisms of it, some of which are 
particularly relevant to this research. 
First, scholars point out that since the case studies in Esping-Andersen’s paper covered 
only a deliberate selection of 18 OECD countries, these three welfare states are not a 
worldwide phenomenon (Bambra, 2007; Ebbinghaus, 2012; Talme, 2013; Isakjee, 2017). 
Therefore, it is argued that Esping-Andersen’s regime approach was a too narrow 
research project, focusing on high-income countries, mostly in Europe, and thus is 
insufficient to illustrate the global welfare state regime (Bambra, 2007; Ebbinghaus, 2012; 
Talme, 2013). From this assertion, it is interesting to find out whether these three regimes 
are able to be applied to the Thai case, which is a case of an immature welfare state system 
in a middle-income country, unlike in the western world. Second, the data used in Esping-
Andersen’s paper might be out of date. The data used was from the 1980s (Bambra, 
2007:1098) and the world of the welfare state has developed consistently since then. 
Accordingly, the question to be raised is whether, in the modern world, these regimes are 
still able to reflect the case study. The third substantial criticism argues that Esping-
Andersen’s de-commodification concept is unaware of the role of women and the family 
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in the provision of the welfare state. Some previous studies stress that Esping-Andersen’s 
de-commodification criterion is not only lacking consideration in terms of women’s 
discriminatory treatment by welfare states, but also fails to take account of households 
and the family in its account of welfare provision (Bonoli, 1997:351; Bambra, 2007:1100; 
Isakjee, 2017:8). This thesis thus pays particular attention on the role of family and female 
status in the Thai pension system. Finally, the last criticism attacks the methodology. 
Ebbinghaus (2012:4) criticises Esping-Andersen’s methodology, emphasising on how 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is more suitable for analysing typologies than 
Quantitative Medium-N Analysis. The researcher of this thesis asks if it is time to look at 
the case study with different methodological tools that might be powerful enough to 
analyse other modern welfare regimes. Based on these four concerns, many scholars have 
moved on and introduced new types of welfare regimes.  
2.2.2 Going beyond the three worlds of the welfare state regime 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology sparked debate in the welfare state 
literature from the 1990s onwards, shedding light on the process of welfare state 
development in terms of alternative typologies. Scholars have extended the typology of 
welfare state regimes by analysing a range of different countries and considering gender, 
the role of public services, family, and the voluntary sector (Bambra, 2007:1103). 
With regard to the selected case studies, Esping-Andersen’s typology has been 
consistently criticised. Ferrera (1996:17) proposes a fourth ‘Southern model’ welfare 
state regime, based on studies of a South European welfare state. As well as Italy, which 
was included in the 18 OECD countries listed in Esping-Andersen (1990), Ferrera 
(1996:17) identifies four South European countries, namely Italy, Spain, Portugal, and 
Greece, as a separate welfare regime in the realm of welfare states. The Southern welfare 
state model can be described as embodying the ‘rudimentary’ character of welfare 
programmes in Southern European countries because it is characterised by countries’ 
fragmented systems of welfare state provision. These systems consist of diverse income 
maintenance schemes that provide only limited welfare provision to those operating in an 
irregular or non-institutional market and are instead reliant on family and the voluntary 
sector (Ferrera, 1996:19; Bambra, 2007:1102). Ferrera’s empirical data suggests that 
Southern European countries exist as ‘a group of hyper-protected beneficiaries’ for 
 35 
employees in the formal sector (Ferrera, 1996:19). Workers in the informal sector, who 
have no contributory entitlements and no source of income, on the other hand, are not 
covered by any benefit, instead being faced with conditions of severe hardship (p.20). 
Therefore, the responsibility of caring for irregular income workers falls on family 
members (p.30). Ferrera concludes that, due to socio-economic and cultural-political 
factors and the historical configurations of Latin countries, the Southern model is a 
modification of Esping-Andersen’s conservative corporatist model (1990), signalling the 
formation of a new regime, suggesting that Ferrera disagrees with Esping-Andersen’s 
statements on the characterisation of Italy.   
Similarly, scholars in the East-Asian welfare state debate have also disagreed with 
Esping-Andersen’s statement and argued for a new type of welfare state that suits case 
studies in this region more readily, stating that each regime is unique (Holiday, 2000; 
Gough, 2007; Goodman and Peng, 1996 cited in Isakjee, 2017:6). Scholars have 
suggested that East Asian countries, notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Vietnam, and Singapore, form a unique cluster of welfare regimes (Cook and Kwon, 
2007a; Holiday, 2000; Low, 2006). Due to their unique socio-economic and cultural-
political factors, welfare states in East Asian countries have been categorised by scholars 
as ‘Confucian welfare states’ (Choi, 2007:3; Choi, 2012:277; Low, 2006:393), 
‘developmental welfare states’ (Cook and Kwon, 2007b:7; Gough, 2007; Park and Jung, 
2009:67), and ‘productivist welfare states’ (Holiday, 2000:706; Choi, 2012:276). 
Confucian welfare state involves a strong reliance on the family as a main care provider 
(Cook and Kwon, 2007:223), whereas the notion of the welfare state developmentalism 
has seen social policy as an instrument for economic development. Holiday (2000:706) 
argues that the productivist welfare state, which focuses on considering the implications 
of the East Asian experience for comparative social policy analysis, stands alongside the 
Esping-Andersen’s three classic welfare regimes. In other words, this programme should 
be considered the fourth regime in the world of welfare capitalism (708). However, 
although welfare states in the East Asian region have been categorised using different 
dimensions, some scholars have argued that this regime is a combination of different 
classic welfare regime types. Bambra (2007:1111) emphasises that the East Asian welfare 
model is a mix of liberal, conservative, and Southern models.  
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Both Italy and Japan were in Esping-Andersen’s cluster of 18 OECD countries 
categorised by three welfare state regime worlds. However, after some scholars had 
revisited the case studies and analysed them to account for differences through a new 
welfare state lens, which represents the concept of welfare mix, Esping-Andersen 
revisited the Japanese case and recast it as a fourth welfare state regime or hybrid regime 
(1997:180).  
2.2.3 Esping-Andersen’s fourth regime: A hybrid regime 
After a lot of criticism over concerns about the typology of a welfare state and suggestions 
about the combination of welfare state typologies on other case studies beyond just the 
European and OECD countries, many commentators proposed different types of welfare 
regimes to describe different cases from different backgrounds; these used the lens of a 
fusion welfare model. Esping-Andersen himself also proposed a new welfare typology, a 
combination of more than just one regime in his classic welfare model (Esping-Andersen, 
1997)  
Esping-Andersen (1997:179) revisited his own paper on three types of welfare state 
regime (1990), pointing out that the welfare state model in Japan actually exists as a fourth 
regime. He revisited the Japanese case and filled in the limitations of his previous study 
that included an unawareness of the role of women and family provision. He also 
considered the core element of Confucianism, arguing for it being the same concept as 
the Catholic-conservative welfare state, because of the notion that the family and the local 
community are the main providers of welfare provision. Apart from the role of the family 
in the Japanese welfare state, corporate occupational welfare state is another key element 
that Esping-Andersen considered as a component in the Japanese welfare mix. As 
outlined in his previous study The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), he 
continued to point out that market-provided welfare in Japan is very similar to that in 
America, as Japanese private firms are substantial and comprehensive social-welfare 
providers, for example, in terms of health care, private pensions and housing, whilst social 
expenditure on welfare state provision is very low (p.181). Because of high scores in 
liberalism (a low level of de-commodification) and conservatism (privileging welfare 
state employees and familialism), Esping-Andersen (1997:187) went on to conclude that 
the Japanese welfare state system, and perhaps that of other East Asian and South-East 
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Asian countries, represents a fourth regime, a hybrid welfare state system: conservative 
and liberal.  
Nevertheless, some scholars in the East-Asian welfare state literature strongly suggest 
that the Confucian welfare state, such as the Japanese welfare state, is a combination of 
all three welfare state regimes, conflating liberal, conservative and social-democratic 
models (Isakjee, 2017:6; Walker and Wong, 2005:31). Meanwhile, some scholars in this 
current welfare state debate assert that the welfare state in this modern world, exclusively 
the multi-layered pension design, is a complex version of a Esping-Andersen’s hybrid 
regime (Arts and Gelissen, 2002:139; Rhodes and Natali, 2003:6). From this assertion, 
the question once again is raised as to what typology of the welfare state in Thailand after 
the five-pillar pension reform? Esping-Andersen revisited a case study in his own paper 
almost a decade later and recategorised the case study. This is perhaps sensible for the 
Thai case as well.  
Although many previous studies have focused on the development of the welfare state in 
the East Asian region, Thailand tends to be remised (Low, 2006:393). As little research 
has been conducted to investigate the development of the Thai welfare state compared to 
other East Asian countries, this research may make a valuable contribution to existing 
literature. To conduct this research, a background of the social protection development in 
Thailand is provided.  
2.2.4 The development of the welfare state in Thailand 
Chalamwong and Meepien (2012:231) divide the development of social protection in 
Thailand into five periods. Following a transition from an absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy, the first pension system was introduced in 1932 for the well-
being of government officials after their retirement. This first period is called ‘the 
promulgation and recognition of social protection’. The second period is ‘the beginning 
of social protection scheme’. In the late 1970s, the first basic guarantees and protection 
scheme, called the Workmen’s Compensation Fund (WCF), for workers in public and 
private sector workers in the formal labour market, was introduced to protect them from 
risks at the workplace. This fund included industrial medical care and cash benefits for 
sick workers. 
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In the late 1980s, ‘the turning point of social protection’ was acknowledged in Thailand 
as the third social protection period. The government initiated the Social Security Act 33 
and 39 (SSA 33 and SSA 39), which offered social protection to employees in the event 
of accidents, sickness, disability, or death unrelated to the workplace. The beneficiaries 
of the SSA 33 are employees of private companies that have contributed to the WCF for 
no less than 12 months. The SSA 39, on the other hand, is a programme for those formerly 
insured under the SSA 33 (SSA, 1990). 
The fourth period is ‘the development of paternalistic welfare state’. After the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, the government attempted to reduce vulnerability from the 
financial crisis and expand social protection schemes to different groups of people (p.234). 
The majority of civil servants were still in a privileged position with welfare entitlements, 
whereas the informal working population remained out of coverage. The combination of 
power, welfare interests, and the traditional paternalistic attitude towards welfare 
recipients led to the limited participation of employers and employees in guaranteeing 
social protection (Schramm, 2015:15). Because of the government’s low levels of 
expenditures and family and community support, the Thai welfare state regime was 
categorised into different types of welfare state, such as a liberal welfare state (Asher, 
2001), paternalistic welfare state (Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012) and a developmental 
welfare state (Kohler, 2014:4). However, even if these scholars have described the 1990s 
Thai welfare state using different terms, they have all highlighted that the social 
protection in the 2000s was a universal social protection period. 
In the early 2000s, schemes of universal coverage of healthcare, education, and basic 
income were introduced. These schemes include the universal 30 Baht (£6) health care 
programme, the free twelve-year compulsory education programme and the universal Old 
Age Allowance (OAA) scheme. Accordingly, the 2000s is referred to as ‘the universal 
social protection era’ (Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012:233). Universal coverage is a 
basic principle of social-democratic regime, which suggests that the social-democratic 
regime has been introduced in Thailand. Before the 2000s, the government pushed the 
family, the community, and employers to support welfare provision for Thai citizens 
(Gough, 2001:170; Cook and Kwon, 2007a:226, 2007b:12). However, after the 
implementation of the five-pillar pension reform, the principle of universal social security 
for all Thai citizens was approved, and the Thai government’s plan of promoting self-
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help and voluntarism to informal workers, it is thus interesting to explore what type of 
welfare state in Thailand since the five-pillar pension reform actually is it? Some scholars 
have argued that the multi-layered pension design is a complex version of a hybrid regime 
(Arts and Gelissen, 2002:139; Rhodes and Natali, 2003:6). The Thai case may actually 
represent a complex version of a hybrid regime that syncs the expression of liberalism, 
conservatism and social democratism.  
It appears that the Thai pension system shares similarities with those in Italy and Japan. 
These systems are characterised by limited social provisions from the government and an 
informal system of social and economic exchange within families as the main support for 
maintaining the well-being of the elderly. This thesis uses the hypotheses of Esping-
Andersen (1997) in revisiting the Japanese welfare state regime. The Thai welfare state 
regime has been characterised by Esping-Andersen’s three-world framework of welfare 
regimes and the suggestion of a fourth regime. Esping-Andersen revisits the Japanese 
welfare regime by affording greater attention to the roles played by the state, market, and 
family, considering how these elements combine in such a way as to lift the Japanese 
welfare state regime (p.183) from a conservative to a hybrid model. Meanwhile, some 
scholars have argued that the multi-layered pension design is a complex version of a 
hybrid regime (Rhodes and Natali, 2003:6). This body of literature has inspired the 
current paper to determine whether, following the five-pillar pension reform, the Thai 
welfare regime actually shifted to a new type of regime. Also, Thailand is not a Confucian 
country nor a Southern European nation. Therefore, it is notable if Thailand shares any 
similarities with these two models in implementing a hybrid regime. 
2.3 A Combination of typology of social insurance institutions and 
macro-configurational aspect as an alternative approach 
Aside from analysing the influence of the five-pillar pension reform on the Thai welfare 
state regime, examining the system’s capacity for the inclusion of informal workers and 
seeking the causal factors behind the system’s partly successful outcomes are the main 
focuses of this paper. To explore the causal factors behind the performance outcomes of 
this reform, the typology of welfare state institutions and the macro-configurational 
aspect are examined. 
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This section explains how the ideal institutional types of welfare state institutions by 
Korpi and Palme (1998) and macro-configurational aspect of the comparative-historical 
analysis (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015) strengthen the weaknesses of one another, thus 
employed as an alternative approach. The combination of these two approaches will help 
analyse the nature of the five-pillar pension reform and its influences on the institutional 
framework of the Thai pension system, along with the effectiveness of extending pension 
and savings scheme coverage to informal workers. To do this, this section first reviews 
the concept of five different types of welfare state institutions and how these are relevant 
to this thesis, followed by a consideration of the macro-configurational aspect.  
2.3.1 Five different types of social insurance institutions 
Korpi and Palme’s idea of welfare state institutions, outlined in their paper, The Paradox 
of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and 
Poverty in the Western Countries (1998:662), focuses on the effects of different 
institutional types of welfare states on poverty and inequality, leading to unexpected 
outcomes and redistribution paradoxes. In this paper, Korpi and Palme (1998:664) aim to 
examine the different types of social policy programmes of old-age pensions and sickness 
cash benefits in democratic capitalist countries, evaluating their effectiveness in reducing 
inequality and poverty. They explain that this allows researchers to study the effect of 
these institutional structures as causal factors in the formation of citizens’ interests and 
preferences; and in return, examine citizens’ interests and preferences affecting the 
institutional structures of the programmes, and the degree of poverty and inequality in a 
society (p.664). This implies that Korpi and Palme believe that the institutional structures 
of pension programmes and citizens’ interests and preferences affect one another. As this 
thesis focuses on understanding the causal factors affecting citizens’ interests and 
decisions as to whether to join non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes, and 
comprehending to what extent  has the nature of the five-pillar pension reform influenced 
the institutional framework of the Thai pension system, the researcher thus employs Korpi 
and Palme’s ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions to examine whether the 
institutional structures of pension programmes in the Thai five-pillar pension system have 
impacted on citizens’ interests and decision to join pension and savings schemes, thus 
affecting the effectiveness of extending pension scheme coverage to informal workers. 
The clarification of the causal factors affecting the informal workers’ interests and 
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decisions may then link to the explanation of the institutional framework of the Thai five-
pillar pension system at the macro level.
Korpi and Palme (1998) proposed five different types of social insurance institutions, as 
follows: 
 (i) Targeted model: Based on means-tested benefits, which generate a horizontal 
line to reveal those who fall below a poverty line or are in need. 
(ii) Voluntary state-subsidised model: Based on voluntary contributions that give 
membership in the respective schemes. This model uses tax money to provide insurance 
to protect members against loss with flat-rate or earning-related benefits, due to relatively 
low ceilings for earning replacements. The target groups are the skilled workers and the 
middle class, not the unskilled and the poor. 
 (iii) Corporatist model: Based on the combination of contributions between 
employers and employees with the state presents as a minor third party. This model 
includes separate social insurance programmes for different occupational categories; thus, 
rules of benefits can be different among the programmes. Being limited to the 
employment status, this model excludes housewives and others outside the formal labour 
force. 
 (iv) Basic security model: Based on contributions or citizenship. This model has 
flat-rate benefits or low ceilings on earnings replacement to leave room for high-income 
groups to protect their standard of living through private insurance programmes. This 
model aims to achieve wide or universal coverage to ensure that everyone is covered 
under the same programme. 
 (v) Encompassing model: Based on contributions and citizenship. It gives basic 
security and combine with earnings-related benefits to everyone within the same 
programme universally. This model not only reduces the demand for private insurance, 
but also has the potential of encompassing all citizens within the same programmes. 
 (Korpi and Palme, 1998:667-9)
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The Thai five-pillar pension system operates using a multi-layered design. It provides 
different pension and savings schemes, utilising different pillars for different groups of 
people, in order to offer the most suitable model for everyone in Thai society. It is not a 
straightforward answer to assert which institutional model represents the Thai case. Korpi 
and Palme (1998:669) suggest that “we must expect to find crossbreeds, not purebreds; 
alloys not elements”. Mkandawaire (2005:1) also stresses that a pension system’s social 
policies aimed at reducing poverty for the elderly tend to lie somewhere between the two 
different social insurance models and are often hybrids. The question then raised is ‘Does 
the institutional structure affect citizens’ interests and decision making on whether or not 
to join a pension scheme? Specifically, how does it affect the informal working 
population?’ and ‘Perhaps the institutional structure of the Thai five-pillar pension system 
is a hybrid model among these social insurance institutions?’ 
Nevertheless, the five ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions by Korpi and 
Palme (1998) only define the institutional structures of the pension programmes on 
citizens’ interests and decision making; it cannot describe whether the informal labour 
market or decentralisation structure are also causal factors. Korpi and Palme (1998:679) 
point out that the institutional structures of social insurance institutions are only one of 
many factors affecting total income inequality among the elderly; other factors are also 
important, such as political traditions, labour force participation and demographic 
composition. In other words, welfare state institutions must be seen as embedded in larger 
social settings and structures of power (Kopi and Palme, 2003:431). From this assertion, 
this thesis engages comparative-historical analysis to help the researcher explore the case 
study beyond the effect of the institutional structure. 
2.3.2  Macro-configuration in comparative historical analysis  
Comparative-historical analysis has a long distinguished history in the social science 
debate. These prior studies are united through historically grounded large-scale 
explanations and a useful consideration of change in historical trajectories (Doyle, 
2013:11). Since the 1990s, studies of institutions and organisations using comparative-
historical analysis have become increasingly visible (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; 
Doyle, 2013; Mahoney and Thelen, 2015), indeed, researchers in this field were at the 
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forefront of an effort to rework the role of states as actors and institutions, a development 
that reoriented agendas across the social sciences (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:1).  
Mahoney and Thelen (2015:2) highlight that there are three features of comparative-
historical analysis: macro-configurational research, case-based research and temporally 
oriented research; choosing the right aspect of comparative-historical analysis to help 
analyse the main research question is one of the main concerns. Mahoney and Thelen 
(2015:5) stresses that the comparative-historical analysis’s macro-configurational aspect 
generates an examination of the case study by explaining large-scale political and 
political-economic outcomes. The case-based research aspect, on the other hand, explains 
observed outcomes in particular times and places. This aspect defines the causal 
mechanisms that enable and generate outcomes via two components: a focus on real-
world puzzles and the use of mechanism-based explanation. The temporally oriented 
aspect studies temporal processes that are essential for the valid understanding and 
explanation of real-world political outcomes. The temporally oriented research aspect can 
be broken into two components: 1) study of temporal location shapes the effects of 
individual variables, and 2) study of how temporal structure of causes and outcomes 
matters for explanation and analysis. To describe the Thai pension system case, this thesis 
employs the macro-configurational aspect. The thesis pays much attention to Mahoney 
and Thelen’s (2015) study and definition of the macro-configurational aspect. 
The macro-configurational aspect 
Some scholars explain that the macro-configurational research focuses on large-scale 
causal factors, such as broad political-economic structures (e.g. colonialism) and complex 
organisational-institutional arrangements (e.g. welfare regimes studies) (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer, 2003:4; Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:6). Mahoney and Thelen (2015:7) 
emphasise that macro-configurational aspect is an approach that assumes individual 
factors in a specific case are complex and therefore must be analysed as parts of a larger 
combination so as to review the causal factor of the case. This confirms that even though 
the current thesis aims to understand the nature of the transformation of the five-pillar 
pension model in Thailand, it is necessary to also consider other institutional factors that 
function in the design.  
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Mahoney and Thelen (2015:5) highlight that researchers cannot understand the interests 
and actions of key actors without appreciating the macro-structural environment in which 
they are situated. Even though researchers are interested in studying the effect of a single 
factor on an outcome, the nature of other variables that interact with a whole structure 
might affect the overall outcome as well (p.7). From this assertion, and regarding our own 
concerns regarding the transformation of the Thai five-pillar pension, it is necessary to 
analyse the interaction between labour markets, the decentralisation process, the 
institutional structure of the pension programme, and the nature of each of these. 
Mahoney and Thelen (2015:6) suggest that looking at case studies at a macro level, where 
structural features play a key causal role, can direct our attention to micro-level processes 
or individual-level choices and behaviours. Accordingly, this implies that the macro-
configurational aspect might not only be able to explain the institutional framework of 
the Thai five-pillar pension system at the macro level, but also evaluate the causal factors 
affecting the informal workers’ interests and decisions on whether or not to join these 
pension and savings schemes at a micro level, which links to the effectiveness of 
extending pension scheme coverage to informal workers. This appears to be similar to 
Korpi and Palme’s typology of social insurance institutions in explaining the effect of 
institutional structures on citizens’ interests and decision making. Mahoney and Thelen 
(2015:7) suggest researchers explore how comparative-historical analysis can be 
incorporated with other approaches so as to strengthen one another’s weaknesses. From 
this suggestion, exploring the Thai five-pillar pension system through the lens of macro-
configuration and welfare state institutional structures might help the researcher explain 
the performance of the pension system in a broader context beyond just the welfare state 
perspective.  
2.3.3 An alternative approach for exploring the institutional framework of the 
Thai five-pillar pension system 
Based on the ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions and the macro-
configurational aspect, this thesis asserts that since Thailand’s five-pillar pension reform 
in 2009, the institution of the labour market, public administration and the Thai pension 
system are the three institutions which have become embodied in the institutional 
framework of the Thai pension system.   
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Figure 2.1 presents a diagram of how this thesis views the institutional framework of the 
Thai five-pillar pension system.  
Mahoney and Thelen (2015:7) give an example of macro-configuration so that the effect 
of X on Y normally involves the context in which X operates. In other words, the other 
variables that interact with X possibly shape its effect on Y. From this assertion, this 
thesis presumes that other factors, or variables, that interact with the informal labour 
market and at play in the decentralisation of public administration might be influencing 
the effectiveness of the pension and savings schemes. More specifically, based on 
previous studies’ arguments, this thesis presumes that the financial constraint experienced 
by informal workers might be the cause of savings contribution results; the 
decentralisation process of local governance might be a result of decentralisation 
affecting the outcome of OAA coverage; finally, the institutional characteristics of the 
pension programmes in the current five-pillar pension system might entice more informal 
workers to join pension and savings schemes. Moreover, Mahoney and Thelen (2015:7) 
emphasise that large-scale processes play a crucial role in shaping the interests of 
individual agents; Korpi and Palme (1998:667) highlight that institutional structures of 
pension programmes are the causal factors that influence citizens’ interests and 
preferences. Accordingly, it is worth exploring whether the informality, decentralisation, 
and institutional structure of each pension programme can explain citizens’ interests and 
 
Figure 2.1: The institutional framework of the Thai five-pillar pension system 
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decisions regarding joining the pension and savings schemes. To find out whether the 
nature of the Thai five-pillar pension reform has formed a new institutional framework, 
and whether the nature of each institution functioning within this framework has 
influenced the extension of pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers, 
this alternative approach analyses four aspects. 
 
First, this thesis examines whether the nature of the informal labour market impacts the 
effectiveness of informal workers’ savings contributions. Many articles highlight that the 
informal economy is a constraint on the labour market system and that the informal 
working population is a vulnerable group within the labour market system due to its very 
low and irregular income (Warunsiri, 2011:451; Jitsuchon et al., 2012:35). Meanwhile, 
some scholars emphasise that personal characteristics of the informal working population 
– gender, age, educational background, and hometown – and the labour-market 
conditions – job types and income levels –significantly impact the success of pension 
savings over long-term participation (Tuesta, 2014:12). Therefore, this thesis presumes 
that the informal economy, an element involved in the informal labour market, and the 
personal characteristics of informal workers may indirectly impact Thai informal workers’ 
decisions to join the voluntary savings scheme.  
Second, this thesis presumes that the nature of the decentralisation of the public 
administration system is another causal factor indirectly impacting the extension of 
pension scheme coverage. Many prior studies praise how local governance’s 
decentralisation process has successfully extended OAA programme coverage after the 
programme was reformed from targeted to universal coverage (Suwanrada, 2009:59; 
Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:409; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that some scholars emphasise that decentralisation 
can be positive or negative, depending on designs, implementations, and other contextual 
factors (Scott, 2009; Dufhues, et al., 2011). Holzmann et al. (2005:115) highlight that 
administrative and implementation issues are linked with pension reform and the 
introduction of a multi-pillar pension scheme. They emphasise that cash flow could be 
decentralised and data flow remain partially or fully centralized tin order o reduce 
administrative and implementation issues. Accordingly, this thesis explores whether the 
decentralisation of the public administration system exerts a wholly positive effect or if 
it comes with downsides. 
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Third, this thesis presumes that the institutional structure of the pension programme is 
another institution that functions in the institutional framework of the Thai pension 
system and is a causal factor affecting citizens’ interests and decisions to join pension and 
savings schemes. Korpi and Palme (1998:669) point out that the institutional structure of 
social insurance institutions possibly impacts the formation of citizens’ interests and 
preferences. This thesis thus presumes that the characteristics of each pension programme 
in the current five-pillar pension model might be additional causal factors influencing 
citizens’ interests and decision-making. Some previous studies comment on the 
complexity of the savings programmes of voluntary savings schemes for the elderly and 
praise the achievement of OAA coverage (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:38; Chandoewit, 2013; 
Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013); accordingly, this thesis explores whether the 
institutional structure of each pension programme might be relevant to citizens’ interests 
and decisions regarding the schemes. Mahoney and Thelen (2015:7) propose ‘causal 
packages’, or a combinational approach, which assumes that the complex interactions 
between two or more variables and other interacting variables might shape the nature of 
those variables’ effects on other variables that also interact in complex organisational-
institutional arrangements and in determining the results of macro outcomes. To test this 
assumption and whether five-pillar pension reform in Thailand has formed a broad and 
complex institutional framework, this thesis presumes that both informality and 
decentralisation work together in a causal package that affects the citizens’ feedbacks 
toward and experiences of pension programme policy design for informal workers and 
the capacity for inclusiveness. 
Finally, this thesis posits that if those previous three assumptions are correct, the nature 
of the five-pillar pension reform and unique background of the Thai case have shaped a 
broader and more complex institutional framework. This thesis presumes that the 
interaction between the labour market, public administration, and pension systems is a 
macro outcome of the nature of five-pillar pension reform and a unique element of the 
Thai case. The interaction between the informal labour market and the Thai pension 
system is shaped by the nature of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model, which 
suggests making informal workers one of the target groups in the zero and third pillars. 
Meanwhile, the interaction between the public administration system and Thai pension 
system is a result of the Thai case’s unique outcome: the Thai government chose to 
implement the decentralisation process of local governance into the policy design of the 
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OAA household registration system. Accordingly, the nature of the multi-pillar pension 
model and unique background of the Thai case may explain this broad and complex 
institutional framework at the macro level following the reform. At the same time, the 
nature of the variables – informal labour market, decentralisation, and pension system – 
combined in causal package has indirectly impacted informal workers’ decisions on and 
interests in pension participation at the local level, automatically impacting the 
effectiveness of expanding pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers.  
To analyse the Thai pension system case study, it is necessary to briefly look its historical 
background. 
2.4 The historical background of the Thai pension system 
This section reviews the historical background of the development of the Thai pension 
system since it was first introduced in Thailand. It is broken into two parts. First, it 
reviews the development of the Thai pension system before and after it was fully reformed 
by the five-pillar pension design. Second, it reviews the characteristics of each pension 
programme for different groups according to employment status. 
2.4.1 The evolution of the Thai pension system 
This section reviews the evolution of the Thai pension system before and after it reformed 
according to the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model. 
2.4.1.1 The Thai pension system before five-pillar pension reform 
The Thai pension system was first initiated in 1902 by King Rama V for the well-being 
of all government officials after their retirement (GPF, 2012). The Government Pension 
(GP), or Old Civil Service Scheme, is known as the first pension programme that existed 
in Thailand. This programme was fully financed from general tax revenue, and the sum 
was transferable to recipients’ children or relatives (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:273). 
However, the GP increased the pressure on the government budget, and in response, the 
government reformed the GP and eventually replaced it with the Government Pension 
Fund (GPF) in 1997, after adopting the World Bank’s Multi-Pillar of Old Age Security, 
known as the three-pillar pension model (GPF, 2012). It is interesting to note that the first 
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pension system before reforming to the World Bank’s three-pillar pension model, was a 
mono-pillar design, with only civil servants included. In other words, state employees 
received privileged pension provision, while the rest of the working population received 
no welfare state provision at all. 
In 1994, the World Bank’s multi-pillar model was first proposed as a three-pillar pension 
system that aimed at addressing the needs of diverse populations facing financial risk 
after retirement (Wang, et al., 2014:7). The World Bank (1994) claims that the multi-
pillar design model (three-pillar model) is suitable for any country and capable of 
providing more flexibility than the mono-pillar model, as it is typically far more effective 
in addressing the needs of the main target groups in the population, whilst providing more 
security against economic, demographic and political risks (Willmore, 2000:3). This 
three-pillar pension model was adopted in the early 1990s, after the Thai government 
were urged to strengthen the financial sustainability of their system and provide a basic 
safety net to meet its citizens’ needs (GPF, 2012).  
The three-pillar pension design of the World Bank is broken into three different pillars:  
(i) A public pension ‘first pillar’: a form of old-age poverty alleviation, which 
comes with three alternative forms: 1) means-tested programme for the poor 
of all ages, 2) minimum pension guarantee to a mandatory savings pillar, 3) 
universal or employment flat-rate benefit that covers a broader group. 
 
(ii) A private pension ‘second pillar’: a fully funded and privately managed 
pension programme, which comes with two alternative forms: 1) personal 
saving accounts, 2) occupational plan. 
 
(iii) A personal pension ‘third pillar’: additional saving protection for anyone who 
wishes to save more for better financial insurance in their old age. 
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Figure 2.2: The pillars of old age income security. 
Source: World Bank, 1994:15  
In the World Bank’s Averting the Old Age Crisis article (1994:15), it reviews that the 
World Bank leaves each government to choose a different alternative form of pillar that 
is most suitable for the particular country. Hence, it is worth finding out what the three-
pillar pension model in Thailand looked like. 
 
Mandatory publicly 
managed pillar
Mandatory privately 
managed pillar Voluntary pillar
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Table 2.1: Thai three-pillar pension system 
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 1994:15; Government Pension Fund, 2012 
Table 2.1 shows an obvious difference between the former pension system and the Thai 
three-pillar pension system. The former (mono-pillar pension) system included only 
government officials; however, the three-pillar model included both public and private 
employees from the formal labour market and the Thai underprivileged elderly, 
specifically from rural areas. Apart from the GP in the first pillar, the means-tested Old 
Age Allowance (OAA) programme is another pension programme in the first public pillar 
sponsored by the government’s tax revenue. In the second pillar, there are two significant 
pension programmes for two different groups of employees. The Government Pension 
Fund (GPF) was the reformed pension programme of the GP. The GPF relates to 
contributions by government and civil servants who served the government after 1997, 
whilst the Old Age Pension (OAP) is a mandatory occupational pension scheme for 
formal workers in the private sector. The third pillar covers the citizen’s personal savings. 
Its inclusion in the three-pillar model shows the government’s efforts to not only 
strengthen the financial sustainability of the system, but also provide better inclusion for 
citizens. These few new pension programmes and new target groups in the Thai three-
Pillar
Characteristic 
(World Bank’s 
classification)
Thailand’s 
programmes
Funding/ 
Contribution Target group Benefit type
1
Public pensions; 
mandatory publicly 
managed pillar
1) Government 
Pension (GP)
2) Old Age 
Allowance 
(OAA)
Government budget: 
general tax revenue
1) Civil servants 
served the 
government 
before 1997
2) Underprivileged 
Thai elderly 
1) Pension
2) Means-tested 
benefit- minimum 
pension guarantee
2
Occupational 
pensions; mandatory 
privately managed 
pillar
1) Government 
Pension Fund 
(GPF)
2) Old Age Pension 
(OAP)
Contribution: 
workers, employers, 
and government
1) Civil servants 
served the 
government after 
1997
2) Private 
employees 
1) Defined benefit
2) Defined 
contribution
3 Personal pensions; voluntary pillar Individual savings
Privately-financed 
and non-financed 
provision
All workers Return to investment
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pillar pension system represent a new aspect of welfare regime in the Thai case. The Thai 
pension system used to focus on just state employees, casting the family and employers 
as welfare supporters. The development of the Thai pension system towards the three-
pillar pension model perhaps implies a radical move away from the previous welfare state 
of the former pension system.  
A decade later, after the World Bank introduced a new multi-pillar pension design, known 
as the five-pillar pension model, the Thai pension system was again reformed to 
accommodate this five-pillar pension model.  
2.4.1.2 The Thai pension system after five-pillar pension reform 
In its 2005 report, the World Bank presents the latest pension conceptual framework, 
known as the five-pillar pension model. The Bank occupied itself with restructuring the 
system’s design so as to adapt the model to the principal conditions and needs of diverse 
populations looking to manage the risks of an aging demographic, the erosion of informal 
and traditional family support systems, and weaknesses in the governance and 
administration of existing pension systems (World Bank, 2008:2). This framework is 
based on the importance of individual country conditions and the flexible application of 
pension systems in formulating its analysis and policy recommendations (World Bank, 
2008:1). The Thai pension system, by the same token, was reformed once again and can 
now be explained via this five-pillar pension model (Wiriyanupong, 2015:4).  
The five-pillar pension conceptual framework includes initial conditions, core objectives 
of pension systems, modalities for objectives, and primary and secondary evaluation 
criteria. Though there are no universal solutions to the complex array of pension issues 
and there is no simple reform model that can be applied in all system designs, the World 
Bank has developed principles of analysis and a conceptual framework to guide its work 
(World Bank, 2008). This framework suggests first beginning with an assessment of the 
initial conditions, followed by and setting out core objectives and evaluating potential 
modalities of pension reform designs for pension systems. These possible designs should 
be evaluated against a set of primary and secondary evaluation criteria (Holzmann et al., 
2008). The question then raised is the following: Has the Thai government endorsed the 
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principles of the five-pillar system initiated by the World Bank? To answer this question, 
it is important to begin by taking a closer look at the assessment of these key principles. 
1. Initial conditions 
The reform conceptual framework starts with the initial conditions, which ‘establish the 
motivation for and constraints on feasible reform options’ (Holzmann et al., 2008:4; 
World Bank, 2008:2). This implies that the reform design of the five-pillar pension model 
is a two-sided coin. The assessment of initial conditions inspired the researcher to find 
out whether considering initial conditions is mandatory. If the government does not pay 
careful attention to the initial conditions, the reform’s outcome be restrained. The initial 
conditions include inherited systems, reform needs of such systems, and the enabling 
environment.  
(i) Inherited systems deal with the existing mandatory and voluntary pension systems, the 
acquired rights of workers and retirees, related social security schemes, existing family 
and community support of retirees, old age vulnerability, and poverty prevalence.  
(ii) Reform needs deal with fiscal costs, multiplicity of systems, labour market issues, and 
extended coverage. The reform needs of such systems are determined against the primary 
and secondary evaluation criteria. 
(iii) Enabling environment deals with the demographic transition; macro-economic 
environment; capacity of administrative, regulatory, and supervisory institutions; and 
strong willingness to reform long-term instruments.  
Holzmann et al. (2008:4) emphasise that once the initial conditions and the capacity to 
improve the enabling environment have been evaluated, the policy framework then 
focuses on the system’s core objectives and how to achieve them. Based on criticisms in 
previous studies, it appears that the informality, decentralisation process and design, and 
purpose of pension and savings programmes are main factors that might have impacted 
the effectiveness of the pension and savings schemes coverage for informal workers, 
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either positively or negatively (Suwanrada and Sakunphanit, 2013). The question then 
raised is as follows: Has the Thai government carefully considered the initial conditions 
and its capacity to improve the enabling environment before the five-pillar pension reform?  
2. Core objectives 
The core objectives of introducing the five-pillar pension model include: 
(i) Protection against the risk of poverty in old age  
(ii) Consumption smoothing from work to retirement in informal sector  
In setting out the core objectives of the pension system, Holzmann et al. (2005:1) suggest 
considering broader questions of social protection and social policy which consider 
poverty and vulnerabilities among citizens with different income levels. For instance, 
“What measures should be taken to strengthen the enabling environment that are 
conducive to reform options best satisfying the core objectives?” (Holzmann et al., 
2005:11). The enabling environment of the initial conditions include demographic profile, 
macroeconomic environment, institutional capacity, and financial market status. This 
implies that in order to achieve the core objectives, the government has to consider the 
interaction between the pension system and other systems, such as demographic transition, 
labour market, and financial market systems.  
The core objectives of the Thai five-pillar pension reform objectives are to ensure that 
the pension coverage and savings scheme sufficiently cover Thai citizens, guaranteeing 
income security and reducing poverty for Thai seniors. The pension reform also sought 
to promote savings among the informal working population, helping citizens to become 
more self-reliant upon reaching retirement age, and reducing the financial burden of the 
government’s future budget (Fiscal Policy Office, 2015:15). The core objectives of the 
Thai five-pillar pension reform appear to match those core objectives of the Bank’s five-
pillar pension conceptual framework. However, the Thai five-pillar pension reform was 
only partly successful. It is thus important to explore how well the Thai government has 
considered strengthening the enabling environment so as to best satisfy the core 
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objectives of the Thai five-pillar pension system. More specifically, it is vital to 
understand the interaction between the pension system and the labour market, public 
administration, and financial market systems. 
3. Modalities for achieving core objectives 
The World Bank (2008:2) explains that the multi-pillar designs provide more flexibility 
than the mono-pillar model. Whilst providing more security against economic, 
demographic and political risks, it is also far more effective in addressing the needs of 
the main target groups (Willmore, 2000:3). The five pillars are as follows: 
(i) A non-contributory ‘zero pillar’: a form of pension or social assistance financed by 
the local or national government that provides all elderly with a minimal level of 
protection with the aim of poverty reduction. 
(ii) A mandatory ‘first pillar’: a form of replacing the portion of lifetime pre-retirement 
income. It is typically financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
(iii) A mandatory ‘second pillar’: an individual savings account with a wide set of design 
options, either fully funded defined benefit or fully funded defined contribution. 
(iv) A voluntary ‘third pillar’: a compensation for rigidities in the design of other pillars. 
It is essentially flexible and discretionary in nature. It can either be partially or fully 
funded defined benefit or funded defined contribution. 
(v) A non-financial ‘fourth pillar’: a personal savings pillar that includes both formal and 
informal workers and provides senior citizens with access to informal intra-family or 
intergenerational sources of both financial and non-financial support (e.g. home 
ownership and reverse mortgages). This pillar also includes other formal social welfare 
provision (e.g. health care etc.). 
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Table 2.2 : The World Bank’s five-pillar pension paradigm 
Source: Holzmann et al., 2005:82
The World Bank’s pension reform conceptual framework is sufficiently flexible to 
address diverse country conditions (The World Bank, 2008:1). Table 2.2 shows that the 
target groups of each pillar are various; it implies that different pillars come with different 
aims. With this pension design, informal workers are eligible to join three pillars: the zero 
pillar, the third pillar and the fourth pillar. The inclusion of informal workers is a 
significant difference to the three-pillar design. This implies that every employment status 
is now included in the formal pension system. The World Bank provides options for every 
pillar of the multi-pillar pension model; any country wishing to implement this model can 
then choose the most suitable option. Thus, it is again worth finding out what the Thai 
five-pillar pension model looks like. 
 
Table 5.1. Multipillar Pension Taxonomy
Target groups Main criteria
Lifetime Informal Formal Funding or 
Pillar poor sector sector Characteristics Participation collateral
0 X X x “Basic” or “social pension,” at least social assistance Universal Budget or 
(universal or means tested) or residual general revenues
1 X Public pension plan, publicly managed (defined Mandated Contributions, 
benefit or notional defined contribution) perhaps with some
financial reserves
2 X Occupational or personal pension plans (fully Mandated Financial assets
funded defined benefit or fully funded defined 
contribution)
3 x X X Occupational or personal pension plans (partially Voluntary Financial assets
or fully funded defined benefit or funded defined 
contribution)
4 X X X Access to informal support (family), other formal Voluntary Financial and 
social programs (health care), and other individual nonfinancial assets
financial and nonfinancial assets (homeownership)
Note: The size and appearance of x reflect the importance of each pillar for each target group in the following increasing order of importance: x, X, X.
8
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Table 2.3: Thai five-pillar pension system 
 
Source: Adapted from Holzmann et al. (2005:10); Jitsuchon, et al. (2012:34); Fiscal Policy 
Office (2015:4) 
Even though Thailand adopted the World Bank’s five-pillar pension design, some 
components of the Thai model are different from those of the World Bank’s design in an 
effort to make the system more suitable for the Thai case.  
Table 2.3 shows that there are two pension programmes in the zero pillar. The first 
programme is the GP, which was the first pension programme in Thailand. The second 
programme is the OAA, which is a reformed means-tested old age pension provision 
programme from the three-pillar pension system. In the current Thai five-pillar pension 
system, the government offers the universal OAA programme to all Thai senior citizens 
at the age of 60 and above who are not in elderly public facilities or do not currently 
receive a permanent income from the government (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 
2011:401). Next, the first pillar is a mandatory pension scheme with an earnings-related 
benefit pension programme for those private employees in the formal labour market, and 
known as the Old Age Pension (OAP). The second pillar is a mandatory savings scheme 
Pillar
Characteristic 
(World Bank’s 
classification)
Thailand’s programmes Funding/ Contribution Target group Benefit type
0
Public pensions; 
mandatory publicly 
managed pillar
1) Government Pension 
(GP) 
2) Old Age Allowance 
(OAA)
Government budget/ 
general tax revenue
1) Civil servants served 
the government 
before 1997 
2) Thai elderly at the 
age of 60 who is not 
in elderly public 
facilities 
1) Pension 
2) Universal coverage 
with multiple-rate 
benefit- minimum 
pension guarantee
1
Occupational 
pensions; 
mandatory privately 
managed pillar
1) Old Age Pension 
(OAP)
Contribution: workers, 
employers, and 
government
Formal employers in 
private sector Defined benefit
2
Occupational or 
personal pension 
plans
1) Government Pension 
Fund (GPF)
Workers and 
government
Civil servants/ 
government officials Defined contribution
3
Occupational or 
personal pension 
plans
1) National Savings Fund 
(NSF)  
2) Social Security Act 40 
(SSA 40) 
3) Retirement Mutual 
Fund (RMF)
1) Workers and 
government (NSF, 
SSA 40) 
2) Workers commission
1) Workers in informal 
sector (NSF, SSA 40) 
2) All workers (RMF)
Defined contribution 
4
Personal pensions; 
financial and non-
financial assets
Individual savings
Voluntary personal 
savings plan; privately-
financed and non-
financed provision
All workers Return to investment
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with defined contribution benefits for those government officials who served the 
government after 1997, and known as the Government Pension Fund (GPF). The third 
pillar is the voluntary savings scheme. The World Bank (2008:3) explains that the 
voluntary third pillar can take various forms. In the Thai case, there are indeed several 
forms of savings programmes offered to different groups of people; three of these 
programmes are the Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF), National Savings Fund (NSF) and 
Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40). These three programmes are the savings programmes 
that informal workers are eligible to join. Finally, the fourth pillar includes all private 
savings insurances and other types of social security, including health insurance, social 
service and social assistance, plus a social safety net (Chalamwong and Meepien, 
2012:231; Jitsuchon et al., 2012:34; Wiriyanupong, 2015). Only the zero pillar and the 
third pillar are formal pension and savings schemes to the informal sector offered by the 
government; the fourth pillar is a pillar that includes informal financial support and non-
financial assets.  
Holzmann et al. (2008:17) suggest different stylised reform choices for different types of 
countries to match specific reform needs with their constraints and opportunities. These 
considerations are linked with the development status or income level of each country. 
For instance, low-income countries’ experience has brought into focus the need for a zero 
non-contributory pillar in its primary focus on poverty alleviation to extend old-age 
security to all senior citizens. Meanwhile, experience in low- and middle-income 
countries has shed light on the importance of the design and implementation of the third 
voluntary pillar, which can effectively supplement the basic financial elements of pension 
systems or reduce fiscal costs and provide fiscal replacement rates for high-income 
countries. Thus, the World Bank suggests that low-income countries include the zero non-
contributory pillar in systems, whilst the third voluntary pillar is suggested for low- and 
middle-income countries. Thailand followed the Bank’s suggestion for middle-income 
countries, providing both the zero and the third pillars (World Bank, 2017).  
Holzmann et al. (2005:9) further suggest that only high-income countries can feasibly 
provide the full breadth of all pillars. However, Thailand is a middle-income country with 
a large informal labour market that offers a full breadth of all five pillars. The question 
then raised is whether the Thai government has clearly reached beyond its capacity. It is 
worth exploring whether the full five-pillar pension model is appropriate for middle-
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income countries like Thailand. The study of the Thai case is a useful guideline for other 
case studies. 
4. Evaluation criteria 
Apart from the initial conditions, core objectives and modalities for achieving objectives, 
the World Bank suggests that reform designs shall be evaluated against a set of primary 
and secondary evaluation criteria. 
(i) The primary criteria include the reform’s ability to maintain adequacy, affordability, 
sustainability, and robustness while achieving welfare-improving outcomes. 
(ii) The secondary criteria are linked to the pension system’s ability to support economic 
stability and development. This includes minimisation of labour market distortion, 
contribution to savings mobilisation, and contribution to financial market development. 
The World Bank (2008:4) emphasises that the capacity of any pension system, including 
the five-pillar pension, to provide effective sources of retirement income is ‘inextricably 
linked’ to its ability to support the labour and capital market, reinforce measures to 
improve savings, and facilitate financial market development. This implies that, to 
achieve the five-pillar pension reform, the government has to consider the interaction 
between pension systems and other institutions. It is interesting to note that both the initial 
conditions and criteria evaluation emphasise the importance of the interaction between 
the pension system and the development of other institutions, specifically the financial 
market, labour market, and public administration system. Two questions then again arise: 
Has the government considered the initial conditions and evaluation criteria before the 
implementation? And has the government considered the function between other 
institutions and the Thai pension system? 
2.4.1.3 The pension diagnostic assessments and designing reform options in Thailand 
Based on the criticisms in previous studies and this conceptual framework’s pension 
diagnostic assessments (Holzmann et al., 2008:3), this thesis asserts that the Thai 
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government did not pay enough attention the World Bank’s five-pillar pension reform 
framework.  
First, this thesis posits that the Thai government did not carefully assess the initial 
conditions and the capacity to improve the enabling environment before implementation. 
Holzmann et al. (2005:114) highlight that reform needs of multiplicity of systems and 
reform environment of administrative capacity are linked with the implementation 
effectiveness of five-pillar pension reform. Most specifically, the flow of money could be 
decentralised, and the flow of data could be partially or fully centralised. “Leaving both 
flows decentralised would seriously undermine the effort to improve compliance and the 
efficient collection of pension contributions” (Holzmann et al., 2005:115). However, in 
the OAA of the non-contributory scheme case, the flow of both money and data are 
decentralised. Holzmann et al. (2008:4) stress that the initial conditions establish the 
motivation for reform and constraints on feasible reform options. Perhaps, a limited 
administrative capacity of decentralisation process of the OAA might have both positive 
and negative impacts on the OAA’s performance outcome.  
Secondly, this thesis presumes that the government chose an unsuitable modality for 
achieving its core objectives. Holzmann et al. (2005:11) highlight that each country must 
carefully assess whether the government has the institutional infrastructure and capacity 
to implement and operate publicly managed elements of a reform. The full range of five-
pillar options is more suitable for developed, high-income countries. Thailand is a middle-
income country, not a developed, high-income country. This indicates that the Thai 
government has not strictly followed the feasible reform options. This thesis, therefore, 
aims to examine whether the government’s decision to offer the full options structure was 
simply beyond its capacity, consequently impacting the system’s performance outcomes. 
Finally, this thesis presumes that the government did not implement the Thai five-pillar 
pension reform against a set of primary and secondary evaluation criteria. Holzmann et 
al. (2005:6) emphasise that reforming the pension system for the five-pillar pension 
model comes with twin goals of evaluation criteria. The primary goal is providing 
‘adequate, affordable, sustainable, and robust retirement income’ for the elderly (p.6). To 
fulfil the system’s primary goal, the government must create positive secondary 
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development goals which support growth and development and minimise any possible 
negative impacts on macroeconomic stability and labour markets (Holzmann et al., 
2008:4). Reforming the Thai pension system in 2009 to align with the World Bank’s five-
pillar pension design included ensuring financial sustainability, reducing poverty among 
Thai seniors – including informal workers, and targeting more government social 
protection spending to benefit the elderly poor (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:5). However, in the 
development of this system, the Thai government did not consider lowering any potential 
labour market interference on the pension system or its interaction with other institutions 
functioning in the current Thai five-pillar pension system. The World Bank (2008:4) 
emphasises that the five-pillar pension reform should support labour and capital market 
efficiency, reinforce measures to improve savings, and facilitate financial market 
development. This implies that, to achieve the five-pillar pension reform, the government 
has to consider the interaction between pension systems and other institutions. 
Accordingly, this thesis explores whether these twin reform criteria, of which the Thai 
government appears unaware, may be behind the current Thai pension system’s results.  
To conclude, the transformation of the Thai pension system into the five-pillar pension 
model marks an obvious change in the system. However, it is yet unclear whether the 
nature of this transformation influences the performance outcomes of this reform. To 
discover this, it is important to understand the characteristics of pension programmes for 
Thai seniors, who are the main foci of this study. 
2.4.2 The characteristics of pension programmes in the Thai five-pillar pension 
system 
In this section, the characteristics of pension programmes in the current Thai five-pillar 
pension system are presented. In the World Bank’s report, Reducing Elderly Poverty in 
Thailand: The Role of Thailand’s Pension and Social Assistance Program, Jitsuchon, 
Skoufias and Wiener (2012:8) describe the current Thai pension system as a multi-layered 
design of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model. 
 
 
 62 
Table 2.4: Characteristics of the retirement programme 
 
*DB = Defined Benefit, DC = Defined Contribution 
Source: Jitsuchon, et al. 2012:37 
Table 2.4 shows four different pension and savings programmes that the informal 
working population can join. The Old Age Allowance (OAA) programme is a universal 
programme under the non-contributory scheme as the zero pillar. This programme is for 
the working population in both formal and informal sectors. The voluntary savings 
options for the informal sector in the third pillar include three savings programmes in 
total: the National Savings Fund (NSF), Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40) and Retired 
Mutual Fund (RMF). The National Savings Fund (NSF) and Social Security Act 40 (SSA 
40) are two savings programmes only for informal workers; these are based on the 
contributions of the government and informal workers, but supervised by different 
ministries. The Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF) is a voluntary savings programme for 
both formal and informal sectors. These four different programmes are interesting to 
study here as they help us analyse the development of the Thai government’s efforts 
towards offering pension and savings scheme coverage and incentivising savings 
8
Number of pension programs. Thailand appears to have too many pension 
programs and consideration should be given to consolidating and further rationalizing 
these programs. Several of the programs also lack an adequate legal framework. Unlike 
other countries in the region, Thailand lacks a pension and provident fund supervision 
agency or a consolidated financial institution regulator, and does not appear to have a 
well-articulated national pension policy. Thailand currently has eight separate pension 
programs covering different portions of the population as shown in the table below. 
Many of these programs appear to be duplicative, and of all these programs, only the 
social pension under Article 11(11) of the Old Age Act appears to have a significant 
impact on the prevention of old age poverty, particularly in the informal sector.
Table ES1: Characteristics of Retirement Programs
Note: GPF and Pension are two separate programs for civil servants. Hence, there are eight programs.
Social p nsion for the informal sector. The primary program benefiting the elderly 
poor, particularly those who work in the informal sector, is the social pension payable 
under Article 11(11) of the Old Age Act. This is a universal program paying monthly 
benefits to citizens age 60 or older who are not covered elsewhere by a formal 
statutory pension program. Recent changes to the social pension modified the program 
to increase benefits with age rather than paying a flat monthly benefit to all eligible 
beneficiaries as shown in the table below. 
	Program	 Eligibility	 Sponsor	 Type	 DB/DC	 Contribution	 Supervisor	
     source
 OAP, SSO Formal Employer Mandatory DB Employers, Ministry
 Articles sector    workers and of Labor
 33 & 39     government
 GPF and Government Employer Mandatory DB/DC Government Ministry of
 pension officials (Government)   and workers Finance
 PVD Formal  Employer Mandatory DC Employer Securities
  sector (Occupational if listed on  and workers Commission
    pension
   programs)  
 RMF All workers Individual Voluntary DC Workers Securities
      Commission
 OAA Informal Individual Universal DB Government Ministry of
  sector     Interior
 NSF Informal Individual Voluntary DC government  Ministry of
  sector    and Workers Finance
      match
 SSO  Informal Individual Voluntary DC government Ministry
 Article 40 sector    and Workers of Labor
      match
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behaviour to informal workers. Based on the target group of each pension programme, 
this section is thus broken into two, based on employment status: pension programmes 
for employees in the formal labour market and pension programmes for those in the 
informal labour market. 
2.4.2.1 Pension programmes for employees in the formal labour market 
This section is broken into two: pension programmes for state employees (Government 
Pension (GP) and Government Pension Fund (GPF)) and private employees in the formal 
labour market (Old Age Pension (OAP)). 
 1. Pension programmes for state employees  
The Government Pension (GP) was the first pension programme that ever existed in 
Thailand. It was initially only for government employees, including civil servants and 
state-enterprise employees (Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012:236). Later on, it came to 
cover both civil servants and military servants (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:272). The GP 
was fully financed from general tax revenue, and the lump sum payment of the GP was 
transferable to recipients’ children or relatives (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:273). Between 
1990 and 1996, the number of retirees doubled from 154,940 to 217,733; while 
government expenditure on old-age income security for government officials grew by 
about 20 per cent annually, from 6.6 billion Baht to 19.7 billion Baht (Phananiramai 2003 
cited in Paitoonppong et al., 2010:273). Due to constraints in the government’s budget, 
the GP was reformed and eventually replaced in 1997 with the Government Pension Fund 
(GPF). The benefits of the GPF relate to member contributions and returns on investment 
(Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012:236). Both the state and government officials 
contribute 3% of their monthly wages to the GPF (Brustard, 2011:181). The GPF was 
designed to cover anyone who was in service after March 27, 1997, as the GPF was 
initiated on that date; government officials who were in service before March 27, 1997 
had the option of either staying with the GP or joining the GPF. Again, these two 
programmes highlight the state’s tendency to prioritise the economic security of 
government officials. In the 1990s, the Thai pension system covered only 18 per cent of 
the labour force in the market (Suwanrada, 2012:6). The high number of retired 
government officials was one of the vital pressures that led towards the restructuring of 
the pension system from the GP to the GPF, as it raised concerns about financial 
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sustainability. In this sense, the issues of financial sustainability and pension provision 
for state employees were the top concerns of the former Thai pension system.  
 2. Pension for private employees in the formal labour market 
The Old Age Pension (OAP) was initiated in 1999 for all formal private workers including 
employees of businesses employing one or more employees (Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:10). 
Members are eligible for an annuitised pension benefit once they reach the age of 55 years. 
The OAP was designed to provide a financial replacement rate wage for a person who 
has contributed for at least 15 years (OECD, 2012:80). Those people who have 
contributed for the minimum period of 180 months will receive an income replacement 
rate of about 15 percent (Brustad, 2011:179). In other words, the contribution of the OAP 
requires 15 years of contributions for pension eligibility. However, if he or she contributes 
for less than 180 months, he or she will receive only a refund of their contributions with 
interest (Brustard, 2011:180; Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:17). The standard contribution rate 
for the OAP is 7%, consisting of 3% from employers, 3% from employees and 1% from 
general government revenues (Pfau and Atisphon, 2008:6; Boonpiam, 2014:13). A 
person’s monthly pension is calculated as a percentage of salary of their average monthly 
income during the last 60 months before retirement (Pfau and Atisphon, 2008:6). 
It is worth highlighting that there was a lot of criticism about the OAP might (or might 
not) turn into a financial collapse in a long-term outlook, with regard to low retirement 
age, rich benefit formula, and demographic transitions (Lloyd-Sherlock and SchrÖder-
Butterfill, 2008:3; Brustad, 2011:199; Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:10). The number of the 
current working population who make contributions to finance their benefits will decrease, 
and the overall cost of the pension system as a percentage of the payroll will dramatically 
increase, as the number of retirees increase rapidly (Asher, 2000:10). The current pension 
system will experience problematic issues in 2035 and be unable to pay out full benefits 
by 2046 (Brustad, 2011:188; The Nation, 2014). Accordingly, it implies that both pension 
and savings schemes for public and private employees face financial issues. It is plausible 
that financial sustainability is one of the core objectives of reforming the Thai pension 
system to the five-pillar pension model. However, it is doubtful whether reforming is the 
right solution, indeed, it is worth asking if Thailand is actually ready for the full breadth 
of five-pillar pension design. 
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2.4.2.2  Pension programmes for workers in the informal labour market 
In this section, pension programmes that informal workers are eligible to join are 
presented. This includes the Old-Age Allowance (OAA), Retirement Mutual Funds 
(RMF), National Savings Fund (NSF), and Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40).  
1. Old-Age Allowance (OAA) 
Under the non-contributory scheme, the Old Age Allowance (OAA) programme is a 
transformed programme from the former three-pillar pension system. In other words, the 
current non-contributory scheme in the zero pillar is an adaption of the former system’s 
targeted OAA programme, which was initiated in 1993 as a means-tested basic income, 
targeting underprivileged elderly citizens (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:278; Suwanrada and 
Wesumperuma, 2012:195; Suwanrada, 2012:2; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006:84). The OAA 
programme did not perform effectively, as the majority of the elderly did not receive the 
allowance, and the subsidies were far too low to ensure that the recipients had economic 
security (Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2012:165; Babajanian, 2013). In other words, 
the OAA programme was criticised of being led by favouritism, as many prior studies 
identified corruption issues in the targeting process (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2002:700; 
Paitoonpong et al., 2010:278; Brustard, 2011:184).  
Given the original OAA programme’s failings, the former Prime Minister, Abhisit 
Vejajiva, decided to restructure the OAA from a means-tested programme to a universal 
pension programme offering coverage benefits under the non-contributory scheme. In 
2009, after the transformation of the Thai pension system into a five-pillar pension model, 
the universal OAA programme increased its subsidies from 200 Baht (£4) to 500 Baht 
(£10) per month for Thai senior citizens aged 60 and above; this change was spearheaded 
by Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government (Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:8; Chalamwong and Meepien, 
2012:234). If Thai senior citizens wish to receive the allowance by the age of 60, they 
have to register the year before they turn 60. Registration for the OAA programme opens 
every year from 1st to 31st of November, and the only place where citizens are permitted 
to register for their senior allowance is at their relevant local authority’s office or their 
hometown mobile unit. However, if a citizen is unable to present himself or herself at the 
local office, he or she can sign an approval letter for someone to register at the local 
 66 
government office on his or her behalf; once they register for the system, the allowance 
will then automatically be transferred into their bank account, unless they wish to collect 
it personally from a local authority office (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:401; 
Brustard, 2011:201). Also, if a citizen is unable to register at the age of 59 to receive the 
allowance when they turn 60, they are still able to register after they turn 60, but they will 
receive the allowance in the following year. The state claimed that the aims of the 
transformation were to alleviate poverty and provide income replacement for all Thai 
elderly, especially those in the informal sector (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:283; SSO, 2012).  
After introducing the five-pillar pension system in Thailand, welfare provision not only 
covered all Thai senior citizens, but the allowance was raised as well. In 2012, the new 
government under Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra increased the amount of the 
subsidy to multiple-rate benefits in accordance with the age of the recipient: 600 (£12) 
Baht per month to citizens aged 60-69 years; 700 (£14) Baht per month to citizens aged 
70-79 years; 800 (£16) Baht per month to citizens aged 80-89 years; and 1000 (£20) Baht 
per month to citizens aged 90 years and above (Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2012:153; 
Brustad, 2011:198). It is worth highlighting in 2009, the absolute poverty line in Thailand 
was 2,676 Baht (£32) per month (FPO, 2009). The allowance offered by the OAA 
programme has increased since 2012. However, as of 2013, 34% of the Thai elderly had 
an income below the poverty line, and 14.8% relied on the OAA as their main income 
source (TGRI, 2014:35), it remains questionable whether the allowance is sufficient to 
offer income security for the elderly, especially those in the informal sector. This is 
because despite increases, the state’s current subsidies are still below the poverty line 
(ILO, 2016:1).  
The number receiving the OAA rose after it shifted to universal coverage. When the OAA 
was first started in 1993, there were only 20,000 recipients. However, when the OAA 
transformed to universal coverage in 2009, the number of recipients rose significantly to 
reach 5,448,843 (NESDB, 2009). In 2014, there were 9.9 million citizens aged 60 and 
above out of 68 million citizens in Thailand; approximately 7.6 million of those citizens 
who were over 60 years old were members of the OAA programme (NESDB, 2014; TGRI, 
2014:19-21). Nearly 80% of the Thai elderly have now joined the non-contributory 
scheme. After the targeted OAA programme adopted universal coverage, the number of 
Thai elderly joining the scheme grew vastly. Household registration for the OAA was 
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organised by the decentralisation process of the local governance. Some scholars stress 
that the decentralisation process of local governance together with the universal coverage 
formed the very successful performance outcome of the OAA (Sakunphanit and 
Suwanrada, 2011:408). However, some scholars emphasise that decentralisation process 
can be either positive or negative depending on the designs (Holzmann et al., 2005; Scott, 
2009). Accordingly, it is thus worth finding out whether the change of the OAA 
programme to universal coverage and adoption of the decentralisation structure, which is 
now incorporated in the Thai pension system, offers reason for this significant success. 
There are four different types of local government. It is important to investigate whether 
the administration of local government affected the capacity for inclusion and caused the 
system’s partly successful outcomes. The decentralisation process local governance will 
then be explained in more detail in Chapter 5.  
2. Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF) 
A Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF) has been offered in Thailand since the end of March 
2001, with the aim of providing a means for the public to put aside voluntary retirement 
savings (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:276). RMF is offered by mutual fund management 
companies to all Thai citizens in both the formal and informal sectors. These companies 
are required to provide investors with funds of varying risk profiles, either as equity, fixed 
income or mixed funds. Individuals have to continuously buy RMF units for at least five 
years until the age of 55, unless they do not have an income in a given year (Bangkok 
Bank, n.d; Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2015). The savings must amount to at least 3% 
of their income, or 5,000 Baht (£100), whichever is lower. The amount invested in RMF 
may not exceed 15% of their annual income up to a limit of 300,000 Baht when combined 
with any other pension savings (e.g. provident funds or GPF). The only obvious benefits 
from joining the RMF is that participants can enjoy tax deductions on contributions or 
they may hope to make additional savings (Brustad, 2011:184; Bangkok Bank, n.d; 
Creveling and Creveling, 2016). 
In 2012, the National Statistical Office (NSO) found that the average monthly income of 
informal workers was 5,045 Baht (£100.9) (NSO, 2012). It is obvious that the workers in 
the informal labour market cannot afford to put aside savings, as doing so requires at least 
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3% of their salary or 5,000 Baht (£100) per month, this is because informal workers’ 
average monthly is the same amount as the minimum RMF requirement. Moreover, a 
special benefit of the RMF is tax deduction, which seems to benefit private employees in 
the formal labour market the most. In other words, a RMF seems to be a mismatch 
programme for low-income workers, such as the informal working population. Perhaps, 
two new savings programmes might be better options. 
 3. National Saving Funds (NSF) 
In 2009, the Abhisit Vejjajiva government initiated the National Savings Fund (NSF), a 
new voluntary retirement savings programme in the third pillar. It was intended to cover 
Thai citizens in the informal labour market (Schmitt et al., 2013:2). Given the efficacy of 
the previous means-tested pension system in Thailand, the former Cabinet Prime Minister 
Abhisit Vejjajiva endorsed in principle that Thailand’s pension system should ensure 
sustainability and efficiency of funds so that all Thai senior citizens could enjoy 
sustainable income security after retirement; thus, the Ministry of Finance was assigned 
to establish mandatory saving funds (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:285-286). The new 
government policy aimed at ensuring Thai elderly citizens in the informal labour market 
would have sustainable income security in old age: this policy was first introduced as the 
National Pension Fund (NPF) and later renamed as the National Savings Fund (NSF) 
(p.283).  
The NSF was not a normal voluntary pension scheme because it returned the benefits to 
the recipients who made the contributions. In 2011, the NSF Act allowed individuals to 
save for their retirement via government contributions (Prapha, 2013). However, due to 
the delayed process of setting the rules and regulations, the registration did not start and 
so no participants joined the programme (Ministry of Finance, 2015). NSF registration 
was then ignored by the following government. The following government, under Prime 
Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, promoted the Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40), another 
savings programme for informal workers, arguing that the NSF overlapped with the SSA 
40 (Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:35; The Nation, 2014). The following Yingluck Shinawatra 
government was even about to abolish the NSF. Mrs Worawan Chandoewit, an academic 
and TDRI researcher, was interviewed by Thairath in 2013 and stressed that the major 
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reason why the Yingluck Shinawatra government was tempted to abolish the NSF and 
aim to transfer the savings idea for informal workers to the SSA 40 was mainly because 
the Yingluck Shinawatra government was in opposition to the Abhisit Vejjajiva 
government; however, this idea did not convince academics like Chandoewit (Thairath, 
2013). That said, the idea of abolishing the NSF did not occur; instead, the government 
only ignored the NSF and promoted the SSA 40. 
Nevertheless, in 2015, the following government under Prime Minister General Prayut 
Chan-Ocha decided to renew the NSF. The rules and regulations setting out its 
participation and benefits were clear. Participants are allowed to contribute a maximum 
of 13,200 Baht (£264) per year. The government will contribute to each participant’s 
account according to the holder’s age, with members aged 20 to 30 receiving 50% of their 
contribution or no more than 600 Baht (£12) annually; those aged 30 to 50 receiving 80% 
of their contributions, which is 960 Baht (£19.2) per year; those aged 50 to 60 receiving 
100% of their contributions or 1,200 Baht (£24) annually (NSF, 2017b). It is important 
to note that those aged 60 and above were encouraged to register within a year following 
the first date of registration, which was the 25th of September 2016 (Komchadluek, 2016). 
The NSF encourages individuals to acknowledge the importance of savings for retirement 
and to start saving at an early age so as to receive more contributions from the government 
and have more chance of ensuring income security for their retirement (NSF Act, 
2011:48). How much the savers will get from the government contribution depends on 
how much they contribute. This thesis found that the initiation of the NSF explains three 
vital development points. First, the government finally provided an opportunity for 
informal workers, who had previously been neglected in the formal system, by allowing 
them to start saving in a formal system while still working. Second, in contributing to the 
NSF, the government took a step away from letting citizens rely on just their family 
members or communities for financial resources. The state’s role thus significantly 
changed. It is hence interesting to find out whether this reform has affected the typology 
of the Thai welfare state regime. Third, the NSF’s core objectives appear to reflect the 
World Bank’s secondary evaluation criteria, including improving savings mobilisation 
and facilitating financial market development. The question then raises whether 
supporting labour market efficiency was taken into account as well. In 2015, apart from 
renewing the NSF, Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-Ocha’s government also 
reformed the SSA 40 (NSF, 2015). 
 70 
The following review covers the development of the Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40) and 
explains how it and the NSF no longer overlap. 
 4. Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40) 
In 2011, the Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40) was introduced as a voluntary savings 
programme by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra’s government, and available only for 
the working population in the informal sector (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:20). It is one of the 
savings programmes offered by the Ministry of Labour to those not included in pension 
and savings schemes for employees in the formal labour market, not a member of the 
Social Security Act 33 (SSA 33) and never registered the Social Security Act 39 (SSA 
39).  
It is worth noting that the SSA 33 was first initiated in 1990, and the SSA 39 was started 
in 1994 (Paitoonpong et al., 2010:268). The SSA 33 is a compulsory social protection 
programme for those employees in the private sector of the formal labour market. This 
includes the event of sickness or injury, maternity, invalidity, disability, old-age, 
unemployment and death unrelated to the workplace (SSO, 2012). The SSA 39 is a social 
protection programme offered to those who used to join the SSA 33. In other words, 
private employees who are no longer in the formal labour market or have resigned from 
their jobs and are no longer included in the SSA 33 can continue securing their social 
protection by joining the SSA 39 (SSO, 2012). From the SSA 33 and SSA 39, it implies 
that since the very early 1990s, the government has striven to ensure that the labour force 
in the formal sector is fully protected. The government has even offered social protection 
for those formal workers who leave the formal labour market. These are opportunities 
that the working population in the informal sector did not receive until 2009.  
In May 2011, two benefit options were offered under the SSA 40: one included insurance, 
and the other featured a pension savings benefit (SSO, 2012, 2014; Jitsuchon, et al., 
2012:13). Later on, in December 2013, the SSA 40 was expanded to offer a third, fourth 
and fifth option, also known as pension options. Table 2.5 reviews the descriptions, 
contributions and benefits of options 1–5 under the SSA 40 prior to 2015. 
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Table 2.5: Social Security Act 40 options 1–5 
Source: Adapted from the Social Security Office (2015d) (author’s translation) 
The differences among these options are the eligibility requirements, contribution rates 
and benefits. For instance, SSA 40 option 1 is the only option that includes insurance 
benefits but not pension benefits; option 3 just included pension benefits; whilst options 
2, 4, and 5 all offered insurance and old-age savings benefits, but are different regarding 
the eligibility requirements, contribution rates, and benefits. Later, in 2015, options 3, 4 
and 5 were cancelled. Any contributors to options 3, 4 and 5 who wished to continue 
contributing had to register for the NSF; contributors were allowed to register for the SSA 
40 options 3, 4, and 5 up until 20 April 2016 (SSO, 2016). Only SSA 40 options 1 and 2 
now remain. The reform of the SSA 40 in 2015 clearly distinguished the NSF and the 
SSA 40 programmes, eliminating any overlap. The NSF offers only pension benefits; and 
once the contributors reach the age of 60, they will receive a pension as a series of 
monthly payments. The SSA 40, on the other hand, offers two options. Only option 2 
offers old-age savings benefits. Once contributors to the SSA 40 reach the age of 60, they 
will receive a lump-sum payment. The reform of the SSA 40 reduced not only the 
complexity of the SSA 40, but also the confusing overlap of the two programmes under 
the scheme for informal workers. 
Social Security Act 
40 Description Contribution Benefits
Option 1
Includes only insurance 
benefits, but no pension nor 
lump-sum payment benefits
Workers contribute 70 Baht (£1.40) per 
month and the government contributes  
30 Baht (60p) per month.
1. Contributors receive disability, 
sickness and death benefits 
Option 2
Includes insurance benefits  
and lump-sum payment 
benefits
Workers contribute 100 Baht (£2) per 
month and the government contributes  
50 Baht (£1) per month.
1. Contributors receive disability, 
sickness and death benefits, and 
old-age savings benefits.  
2. Once the contributors turn 60, they 
will receive a lump-sum payment
Option 3 Includes only pension benefits
Workers contribute 100 Baht (£2) per 
month and the government contributes 
100 Baht (£2) per month.
1. Once the contributors turn 60, they 
will get their pension 
Option 4 
(Option 1+3)
Includes insurance benefits  
and pension benefits
Workers contribute 170 Baht (£3.40) per 
month and the government contributes 
130 Baht (£2.60) per month.
1. Contributors receive disability, 
sickness and death benefits 
2. Once the contributors turn 60, they 
will get their pension
Option 5 
(Option 2+3)
Includes insurance benefits  
and lump-sum payment and 
pension benefits
Workers contribute 200 Baht (£4) per 
month and the government contributes 
150 Baht (£3) per month.
1. Contributors receive disability, 
sickness and death benefits 
2. Once the contributors turn 60, they 
will receive a lump-sum payment 
and get their pension
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To conclude, there are three savings programmes in the savings scheme for informal 
workers. The Thai government has reformed and renewed pension programmes so many 
times over the past few years. It is interesting to find out whether the reforms were 
perfectly explained and conveyed to the target groups. Moreover, one significant thing 
that we can learn from the existence of the NSF and the SSA 40 is the role of the state 
and how its role has changed from the previous pension system. Indeed, the Thai 
government has put much effort into ensuring pension provision for the Thai elderly from 
the informal labour market who are facing economic vulnerability. This perhaps is a sign 
of a shift to a new scenario of Thai welfare regime. It will be examined in the empirical 
section. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The current chapter has reviewed the thesis’s theoretical framework and given a brief 
historical background of the Thai pension system before and after it was reformed to the 
five-pillar pension design. This chapter explains why welfare state analysis and 
comparative-historical analysis were employed to help the researcher analyse the nature 
of the transformation of the five-pillar pension system in Thailand and examine the 
answers to the main research questions.  
The welfare state regime approach was used in this study to explore whether the welfare 
state regime of the Thai pension system has changed since Thailand’s 2009 five-pillar 
pension reform. The typology of the three welfare state regimes was criticised for being 
outdated. Esping-Andersen (1997) himself even revisited his typology and proposed a 
fourth regime for one of the 18 cases. Some scholars later assert that multi-layered design 
in this modern world represents a more complex welfare mix of Esping-Andersen’s 
hybrid regimes (Arts and Gelissen, 2002:139; Rhodes and Natali, 2003:6). It might 
perhaps turn out to be the same scenario in the Thai case after the five-pillar pension 
reform. Nevertheless, it remains a mystery what type of welfare regime the Thai pension 
system actually is. Hence, this will be explored in the empirical section. 
This thesis further highlights that in order to explore the obstacles in achieving the 
effectiveness of informal workers inclusion and the outcomes of the Thai multi-pillar 
pension reform, the typology of social insurance institutions by Korpi and Palme (1998) 
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and the macro-configurational aspect are used. The typology of social insurance 
institutions is an analytical tool to explore whether the institutional structures of pension 
programmes affect the formation of citizens’ interests and decisions about joining pension 
and savings schemes. However, as this thesis also attempts to find out if the informal 
labour market and decentralisation process are causal factors, it adopts the macro-
configurational aspect to strengthen what the typology of welfare state institutional 
structures appears to be missing. The researcher believes that to analyse the causes in the 
large-scale outcome of the Thai pension system, a macro perspective is required. The 
combination of these two as an alternative approach will clarify not only the outcome at 
a macro level but also the micro processes, actions and motives of individuals. 
To explore the case study, the historical background of the Thai pension system has been 
presented. An overview of the Thai pension system before and after implementing the 
five-pillar pension model provides a basic idea of how the pension system was formed 
before and after five-pillar pension reform, and whether this reform has influenced 
citizens’ interests and decisions to join the schemes. Moreover, the characteristics of each 
pension programme for Thai employees in different groups of the labour market system 
are also presented so as to provide a brief idea of the roles of the state, market, and family 
as actors in the current Thai pension system before analysing its welfare regime. 
The next chapter presents the methodology of the thesis. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology for this thesis. The previous chapter explained the 
theoretical framework of this thesis and how it has been shaped to define the main focus, 
whilst also scrutinising the answers to the research questions. The previous chapter 
highlighted some criticisms and suggestions as to which methodological tools researchers 
might consider using when they combine welfare state analysis and comparative-
historical analysis. This research posits the view that both quantitative and qualitative 
methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. To employ the most suitable method 
for this research project, a mixed-methods research design was used. 
Previous studies in the welfare state literature, mostly cited papers, appear to employ 
quantitative more than qualitative methods. For instance, in the Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism by Esping-Andersen (1990), quantitative methods were used to analyse 
typologies of a selection of case studies. Some other studies building on Esping-
Andersen’s paper also chose the quantitative method to analyse welfare state regimes 
through different case studies (Ferrera, 1996; Talme, 2013). Korpi and Palme (1998), 
similarly, also employed the quantitative method to analyse their case study for the 
comparative study of social policies and their effects in reducing inequality and poverty. 
Some previous studies in comparative-historical analysis also suggest researchers use 
quantitative methods. Some scholars highlight that statistical analysis is a very powerful 
method when used in conjunction with the macro-configurational aspect of comparative-
historical analysis (Mahoney, 2004; Doyle, 2013:14; Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:10). 
Nevertheless, some scholars employ qualitative methods to analyse the case studies 
instead. Ebbinghaus (2012:2) suggests that researchers can use the qualitative rather than 
the quantitative method to analyse the typology of welfare state regimes. Mahoney 
(2003:97) also notes in his conclusion that though statistical analysis is powerful when 
combined with comparative-historical analysis, researchers might require qualitative 
methods to help them analyse case studies.  
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In recent studies, some scholars use not only quantitative analysis, but also the qualitative 
approach in order to analyse the case studies. For instance, Yang (2014) used both the 
questionnaire and qualitative research interviews in his research project on examining the 
changing nature of economic security in China. In the same vein, Lloyd-Sherlock and 
Redondo (2009:9) also applied both quantitative and qualitative social research methods 
to conduct a survey of a random sample and interviews of residents from the Metropolitan 
Area of the City of Buenos Aires (MABA) to analyse institutional care for older people 
in developing countries like Argentina. Lloyd-Sherlock and Redondo (2009:10) highlight 
that the interviews provided a more in-depth analysis of residents’ experience. They 
(2009) explain how quantitative and qualitative methods can help researchers analyse 
different aspects of a case study. This implies that some researchers see that using both 
methods will bring about better data analysis. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:14) point 
out that mixed method research design is a third research paradigm option for researchers, 
one that draws on the strengths and minimises the weaknesses of both methods in a single 
research project and across studies. Accordingly, to support the best possible data 
analyses of the case study, this thesis thus employs both the questionnaire and interview 
as methodological tools for producing primary data sources, with journal articles, books 
and data analysis in official statistics as secondary sources. 
The data from the questionnaires will explain the large-scale outcomes related to how 
different institutional factors functioning in the institutional framework of the Thai 
pension system might have influenced the Thai senior informal workers’ interests and 
decisions to join the pension and savings schemes. The interview data will then explain 
in-depth details from the perspectives of not only the Thai elderly, from both formal and 
informal labour markets, but also those local and national bureaucrats who were involved 
in the schemes. To enrich the explanation, the interview data from each group will be 
compared and analysed using the triangulation technique; they will be triangulated once 
using the questionnaire survey data and secondary sources.  
This chapter is broken into six sections. The next section reviews the mixed methods 
research design used in this thesis. It explains the definition of a mixed-method approach 
and why it is used to examine the Thai case. The third section reviews the fieldwork 
process and explains the researcher’s experience of the pilot study and how it benefited 
this research project before the data collection actually started. Later, in the fourth section, 
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the questionnaire survey is reviewed as an instrument, using the quantitative method to 
analyse the data. In the following section, unlike for the questionnaire survey data, the 
interviews data will be analysed using the qualitative method. Finally, the concluding 
remarks are reviewed. 
3.2 Mixed methods research design 
In the past, research in the social science field has mainly employed the qualitative 
method. However, the evaluation of social science research has gradually recognised the 
advantages of combining quantitative and qualitative methods in an approach known as 
‘mixed methods’ (Bryman, 2006, 2012). Some scholars highlight that the complex 
puzzles encountered in social scientific research are often best comprehended by 
scrutinising them through both quantitative and qualitative instruments (Brewer and 
Hunter, 1989; Waysman and Savaya, 1997; Burton, 2000). Several researchers, however, 
argue that either the quantitative or qualitative method is better than the other. Johnson 
and Onwuegbuzie (2004:18) summarise the main characteristics of the quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The quantitative method focuses on deduction, confirmation, theory 
or hypothesis testing, explanation, prediction, questionnaire data collection and statistical 
analysis; whilst the qualitative method focuses on induction, discovery, exploration, 
hypothesis generation, interview and observation of data collection and qualitative 
analysis. Clearly though, many researchers have concluded that both methods have their 
own strengths and weaknesses (Bryman, 2006, 2012; Cameron, 2009). Both quantitative 
and qualitative research designs can be informative and provide the possibility for 
analyses in which both types of data contribute to the analysis as a whole (Laurie and 
Sullivian, 1991:117). To sum up, many scholars assert that mixed methods research 
design can be productive because it offers a practical approach for selecting 
methodological mixes that can help researchers better answer many of their research 
questions (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004:17; Cameron, 2009:141). From this 
understanding, a mixed methods research design was chosen to analyse the case study 
and answer the research questions. 
Caracelli and Greene (1997:23) explain that the evaluation of mixed methods design 
includes three component designs (triangulation, complementary, and expansion) and 
four integrated designs (iterative, embedded or nested, holistic, and transformative). 
Creswell (2006:59) further extends this in his paper, positing that there are four major 
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types of mixed methods design (triangulation, embedded, explanatory, and exploratory 
designs). The differences between these designs are their uses, procedures, common 
variants and challenges. To fulfil this research project’s main purpose, we pay particular 
attention to triangulation design. Caracelli and Greene (1993:196) explain that 
triangulation seeks convergence, corroboration and correspondence of results across 
different types of methods. The analyses of different data types are conducted 
independently and then compared for convergence at the level of conclusion and 
interpretation (p.199). Maxwell and Loomis (2003) also developed the concept of using 
the triangulation approach in mixed methods research. They (2003:265) explain that the 
data from both quantitative and qualitative methods may supplement each other, 
producing a full empirical study. The triangulation technique thus was used in this thesis; 
the data from both primary sources and secondary sources will fill in the gap that each 
one alone might miss.  
Creswell et al. (2003:229) classified mixed methods procedures into two major types: 
sequential and concurrent. Sequential procedure is when either qualitative or quantitative 
data is collected during an initial stage, and followed by the collection of other data; whilst 
concurrent procedure is characterised by the collection of both quantitative and 
qualitative data at the same time (Castro et al., 2010:343). Tashakkori and Teddlie 
(2003:705) explain that concurrent mixed methods design is classified as a triangulation 
process for quantitative and qualitative methods in a research practice on the basis of 
complementary results. As the data for the questionnaire survey and the interviews were 
collected separately at the same time, it implies that the concurrent procedure was used 
in this thesis. 
Creswell et al. (2003:229) explain that the concurrent mixed method procedure allows 
researchers to triangulate data from separate components of their research and 
compensate for the weaknesses of the other; this allows them to “confirm cross-validate 
or corroborate findings within a single study”. In this research project, even though data 
collection for different instruments from different groups of participants occurred 
separately, they all were analysed at the same time. More specifically, both questionnaires 
and interviews were conducted independently and then compared with the secondary 
sources from previous studies and official statistics for convergence in the discussion and 
conclusion chapters. The current thesis uses questionnaire data, interview data and 
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official statistical analysis to define the same incident. Using both official data (e.g. 
Ministry of Finance, NESDB, NSF, NSO, SSO, TDRI, TGRI, and World Bank) together 
with data from the fieldwork is more reliable than judging from just one of them. 
Teddlie and Yu (2007:92) suggest that there are two types of concurrent mixed methods 
procedures. The first type involves the probability sampling techniques that are used to 
generate data for the quantitative questions and purposive sampling techniques that are 
used to generate data for the qualitative questions. The data collection for both procedures 
occurs independently. The second type of concurrent procedure, on the other hand, is 
implemented through the joint use of probability and purposive techniques to generate 
data for both the quantitative and qualitative questions of the research thesis. This 
procedure occurs when a sample of participants are selected through the joint application 
of probability and purposive techniques. For instance, the interviewees are selected after 
responding to a questionnaire survey that contains both closed-ended and open-ended 
questions. Based on the process of gathering and measuring information from 
questionnaires and interviews using the focus groups (Thai senior citizens, local and 
national bureaucrats or staff), it appears that this thesis uses both types of procedure. 
The first type of the concurrent procedure was used when an accidental sampling in 
selecting Thai senior citizens as questionnaire participants and a purposive sampling in 
selecting interviewees of the local and national bureaucrats’ groups were conducted 
independently. The questionnaire survey and interviews process for local and national 
bureaucrats occurred separately. However, in the Thai senior citizens’ interviews case, 
the Thai senior citizens’ interviewees were those who responded to the questionnaire 
survey before being asked to participate in the interview process of the thesis using the 
purposive sampling technique. This was due to their personal characteristics and some 
interesting information. Hence, this is why this thesis appears to use both types of 
procedures, with the aim of triangulating and combining the data from both instruments 
and thus analysing the research questions.  
3.2.1 Validity and reliability of the research: Triangulation 
Validity and reliability have been vital criteria in establishing and assessing the quality 
of research projects for many decades. In the quantitative method, ‘instruments’ is a 
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generic term that researchers often use when measuring the reliability and validity of a 
case study, including its tests and questionnaire surveys (Biddix, 2009). In the qualitative 
method, defining the concepts of reliability and validity is more problematic due to the 
variety of definitions for the terms (Simon, 2011). Zohrabi (2013:254) emphasises that 
using different procedures for collecting data and obtaining that information through 
different sources or groups of participants can augment the validity and reliability of both 
data and interpretation. Hence, the purpose of interpreting both statistical data analysis 
and qualitative analysis in this thesis is not only to explore in-depth detail at the macro 
and micro level, but also to create an intelligible and interpretable reference. 
Multiple scholars highlight that credibility in qualitative research depends heavily on a 
high quality of validity, reliability and triangulation techniques (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Lilleker, 2003:209; Patton, 1999:1190; Shenton, 2004:64). When triangulation is used to 
integrate different methods, different types of informants and different sites, it reduces 
any bias effect on the study and gives greater credibility in the eyes of the reader (Shenton, 
2004:66,73). Zohrabi (2013:258) reviews that triangulation is one of the very powerful 
methods that validate the internal validity of research instruments and data. More 
specifically, triangulation design is the use of multiple methods and sources of data in a 
study regarding the same phenomenon in order to generate a process of cross-checking 
findings; it derives from both the quantitative and the qualitative research methods 
(Bryman, 1992:131; Deacon et al., 1998:47; Gaber and Gaber, 2000:164; Bryman, 
2012:392). For instance, some researchers adopt triangulation in order to recheck their 
observations with interview questions and thus determine whether or not the researchers 
might have misunderstood what they saw, as well review the findings from another 
perspective (Bryman, 2006:182; 2012:392). In the same token, Gaber and Gaber 
(2006:165) state that triangulation is also known as convergence, which is the process 
employed in mixed-method research. The objective of the convergence model of 
triangulation design is to employ several methods to scrutinise a single phenomenon so 
as to increase the validity and credibility of researchers’ results (Bryman, 1992:131; 
Creswell, 2006:64). If researchers obtain the same results from various sources and 
various techniques, it can be confirmed that the findings and the data analysis are valid 
(Zohrabi, 2013:258). Hence, this is why this thesis conducts both questionnaire and 
interviews from different groups of participants and then will compare the data analysis 
with the official statistics and analysis from previous studies. 
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Apart from validity, the reliability of the data and findings is another main concern and 
requirement. Lincoln and Guba (1985:288) emphasise that instead of obtaining the same 
results, it is better to think about the dependability and consistency of the data. In other 
words, the purpose is not to attain the same results, but to agree whether the findings and 
results are consistent and dependable based on the data collection processes (Zohrabi, 
2013:259). Reliability of the results can be assured via three techniques: 1) investigator’s 
position: to elaborate every aspect of the study; 2) triangulation: to use different 
procedures through different sources; and 3) audit trial: to describe in detail how the data 
are collected. Accordingly, to increase the reliability of data in this thesis, the researcher 
used the triangulation technique, elaborating and describing every aspect of how the data 
were collected. The different procedures and different groups of participants that make 
up this thesis will be reviewed in the following sections.  
3.2.2 Case study 
This thesis employs a case study approach to investigate the implications of the multi-
pillar pension system and its capacity for inclusion of informal workers in Thailand, 
which is a middle-income country with a large informal labour market. A case study 
approach is “an effort to generalise from a small number of cases to a larger population 
of cases” (Yin, 2003:235). Wikfeldt (2016:8) and Shareia (2016:2) emphasise that the 
case study approach is the study of the particular, and particularisation is the one and only 
way of judging something’s true nature. In other words, the case study is the optimal way 
of studying the world. Hence, studying the Thai five-pillar pension system cannot only 
provide a detailed analysis of the Thai case, but it can also provide a guideline that may 
be useful to other governments. Wikfeldt (2016:1) summarises in her study that though 
the case study approach is heavily criticised by some scholars regarding generalisability, 
it is possible to ensure generalisability through this approach if the research is performed 
correctly and carefully, with great concern and accuracy. To ensure that this is achieved 
through optimal data validity, this study employs data collection through questionnaire 
surveys and interviews, document analysis and comparison of existing literature, and a 
survey and data triangulation technique. Accordingly, the current research carefully 
conducted the questionnaire and interview data collection before analysing and 
comparing the thesis’s original survey and interview data with the existing literature and 
surveys to increase the study’s validity. 
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This thesis points to Thailand as representing a case study for middle-income countries 
that have had a very short period of time to strengthen the pension system necessary to 
accommodate an ageing population in the informal labour market. More specifically, the 
involvement of the informal labour market can be identified as a new factor involved in 
the current Thai pension system. The change to this system, by including a labour force 
with irregular income to become included, was a challenging step. The former pension 
system in Thailand was criticised by many scholars for it had never shown any genuine 
attempt to extend pension provision to workers in the informal labour market previously, 
that is, prior to the five-pillar pension reform (Lloyd-Sherlock and Shroder-Butterfill, 
2008:14; Chondeowit, 2014; Sangwongwanich, 2014). Accordingly, this thesis attempts 
to find out how well the system has done to extend pension coverage for the informal 
population of Thai elderly. Moreover, Thailand is one of a very few middle-income 
countries that implemented the full breadth of five-pillar pension design, and appears to 
ignore some of the World Bank’s suggestions for reform options. After this reform, the 
Thai five-pillar pension reform was only partly successful. Hence, the Thai case study is 
a useful lesson for any middle-income countries with a large informal labour market, who 
insist on reforming their pension system to adhere to the five-pillar pension model. 
Apart from choosing the right country as a case study, choosing the right sample areas is 
also important. The current research project takes Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand, 
as the location of the fieldwork case. This is because Bangkok is the hub of the economic 
market in Thailand. There are more employment opportunities and choices for citizens in 
Bangkok than in rural areas. Amidst many social and economic changes, career structure 
for the Thai population has shifted away from traditional agriculture (Chalamwong and 
Meepien, 2012:234). Many citizens from rural areas prefer to migrate from their 
hometown to the capital city in order to find a (better) job (Medhi, 2007:20; Thanakwang 
and Soonthorndhada, 2007:38). Unfortunately, those people who cannot find a job in their 
hometown are also the ones who tend to have poor educational backgrounds 
(Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:47; Warunsiri, 2011:251). The jobs that these 
individuals tend to find are mostly low-paid jobs in the informal sector; as such, these 
people often become taxi drivers, street vendors, housekeepers and so on (NSO, 2015). 
Bangkok, in particular, has one of the biggest informal worker markets in Thailand 
(Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:37). The percentage of the informal working 
population in Thailand decreased from 24.8 million of 39.6 million (62.6%) in 2012 to 
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22.1 million of 38.4 million (57.6%) in 2014 (NSO, 2012b, 2014). On the contrary, the 
number of the informal working population in Bangkok gradually increased between 5.1% 
in 2012 and 7% in 2014 (NSO, 2012b, 2014). The Fiscal Policy Office (FPO) of the 
Ministry of Finance (FPO, 2014) reviews that Bangkok has the highest rate of poverty 
line. Thus, Bangkok offers a substantial opportunity as a case study area; it can be further 
explored to see if there are any differences between the interests and preferences of the 
local residents and low-income migrants in the informal sector as to their decisions on 
joining the government’s pension and savings schemes.  
A group of Thai senior citizens were included as this study’s sample. These participants 
were selected from the Lumpini Park. The Lumpini Park is located in a central area of 
Bangkok which blends all financial classes. Lumpini Park covers 142 acres, or 16%, of 
862 acres of the Lumpini sub-district. It is the largest free public space in the area 
surrounded by not only working buildings, government offices, schools, hospitals and 
embassies, but its surrounding also include residential areas for citizens in different labour 
markets and different income classes. For instance, in the Lumpini sub-district, there is 
one council housing community for low-income families and 14 slum areas, and one of 
the slum areas, 7 Soi Polo (a side-street branching number 7), is opposite to the east gate 
of the Lumpini Park from the Wireless Road, only a 7-minute walking distance. Members 
of the working population in the informal sector with low-incomes tend to live in this area 
(City Planning Department, 2005). Meanwhile, the Government Pension Fund office is 
only a 5-minute walk to the park, and it is located opposite to the south gate of the park 
on the Rama IV Road. This confirms that there are different class groups from different 
labour markets living or working around this area. 
Additionally, inside the park itself, there are both formal and informal sector jobs which 
reflect common dynamics in urban cities. Lumpini Park is a multi-purpose park that 
provides many activities, duties, and communities for visitors. Aside from its outdoor 
park area, there are many other important venues of the local area located on the property, 
and this has been organised by the Lumpini sub-district office under the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration (BMA). Such venues include the temple, Suan Lumpini 
School (a reception-primary school), BMA Lumpini Vocational Training Centre, 
Lumpini Library, food courts, sports complex, sport centres, Lumpini sub-district office, 
Lumpini Youth Centre Foundation, cosmetic shops, Sri Thai Derm Food Centre (Thai 
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food market), music hall, dance hall, Smiling Sun Ground (disabled communities centre), 
Home For Hope (refugee and homeless children centre), Bangkok Elder Citizens Clubs, 
and many more private activities, communities and clubs that are not organised by the 
local district.  
It is also worth noting that the Vocational Training Centre Lumpini Park is an apprentice 
school that offers free lessons for anyone interested in improving their working skills and 
experience. The centre provides paid on-the-job training (Archeep Centre, 2010). This 
displays that the governor of Bangkok is aware that there are members of the low-income 
working population living in this area who might be unemployed or seeking to improve 
their working skills to obtain a better job. Thus, in addition to the senior citizens who 
typically spend mornings and evenings undertaking leisure activities at the park, there are 
number of other residents who also frequent the park for activities such as working in the 
government sub-district office and private companies, performing flexible or informal 
sector jobs, visiting the library, attending free vocational classes, and buying goods and 
food. Hence, for the purposes of this study, the researcher was able to recruit government 
officers, private employees, pensioners, senior citizens, and low-income or unemployed 
respondents who were trained to find (better) jobs in this area. 
Official statistics from the National Statistical Office (2014) highlights that more than 
half of Thailand’s informal working population are in the trade and service sector of the 
informal labour market. Some scholars further emphasise that the most common informal 
sector jobs in urban cities, including Bangkok, tend to be petty activities or service jobs 
(ILO, 1996; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Warunsiri, 2011). As Lumpini Park is the largest 
public space in the area which interests many people for many different reasons, there are 
some most commonly found and new informal jobs represented in the location. These are 
mostly in the trade and service sector, such as housekeepers, security guards, sport 
coaches, taxi drivers, motorcyclists and tuk-tuk drivers (a three-wheeled motorised 
vehicle used as a taxi), mat renters, boat paddle renters, street vendors, street food stallers, 
waste pickers, and self-employed workers. Hence, studying the Lumpini sub-district can 
not only explain the phenomenon in this local area, but it can also shed light on a broader 
view of the informal sector workers in Thailand as a whole. 
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Finally, this area is a good location in which to make contact with the migrant informal 
worker group. ILO (1996) states that the persistence of widespread poverty, particularly 
in rural areas, cause some African, Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian countries in 
developing world to experience growth in rural-urban migration. Thailand is one of those 
countries, and it is now facing a growth of rural migration to Bangkok. Medhi (2007:20) 
highlights that many citizens from rural areas prefer to migrate from their hometown to 
Bangkok to find better jobs. However, they tend to become trapped in the informal labour 
market and earn very low income. Accordingly, it is of interest to this study to investigate 
whether income levels would affect migrant informal workers’ decisions on joining the 
pension and savings schemes. Also, in the World Bank’s pension systems and reform 
report, Holzmann et al. (2005:114) highlight that having both the flow of money and data 
decentralised would seriously undermine the effort to improve the system and the 
efficiency of pension contributions. It is worth mentioning that Yang (2014) finds that 
the decentralisation process of the pension household registration in China indulged local 
residents in urban areas to enjoy pension allowances, but that process constrained rural 
migrants in urban cities from enjoying the allowances as often as local urban residents. 
Therefore, the study of this Lumpini sub-district not only explores the impact of 
decentralisation on the rural-urban migration concern in the phenomenon of Thailand’s 
multi-pillar pension system, but it also sheds light on a useful guideline for other case 
studies that experience rural-urban migration in the informal sector.  
3.2.3 Data protection 
The questionnaire survey and interviews were protected in accordance with the data 
protection scheme in the UK. The researcher thoroughly reviewed the methodological 
disciplines and actual methods of data protection for the fieldwork and confirmed the 
current thesis’s ELMPS ethics form with the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics 
Committee of the University of York. On the Fieldwork Research Declaration form that 
the researcher submitted to the committee, the researcher highlighted that the fieldwork 
research was guided and restricted so as to meet the requirement that ‘all personal and 
sensitive data must be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998 of the United Kingdom’ (UK). This thesis thus strictly adheres to the guidelines for 
conducting the fieldwork and safeguarding the protection of the data subsequently 
collected. 
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3.2.4 Anonymity 
Ensuring data anonymity is a core component of any data protection scheme. The name 
of every questionnaire respondent and interviewee was kept anonymous. For the security 
of the participants in the questionnaire survey, each respondent was given an initial 
number from 1 to 204, whilst each interviewee was given an individual code number 
which was printed on a separate sheet; only the researcher was allowed access to this 
coding sheet. All the respondents from the questionnaire data and interviews received 
information about the study’s anonymity, stating “Your name will not be used in my 
research project or in any other papers. Your name, for instance, will be written as A, B, 
C or I1, I2, I3 (I = Interviewee)”. They were briefed as to how the data were collected 
and stored in accordance with Data Protection Legislation. This states that all published 
data must use these codes and the respondents’ identities cannot be revealed in any 
published paper. Hence, it can be confirmed that no personal information from the 
questionnaire respondents and no reference data pertaining to an interviewee’s actual 
identity is reviewed in any of the written material. 
During the fieldwork, the questionnaire forms were kept safely in the researcher’s drawer. 
Meanwhile, the digital recorder audio recordings were regularly transferred to either the 
researcher’s laptop or the researcher’s computer; all recordings were encrypted with a 
personal identification number immediately after each interview was completed. The 
questionnaire survey and interviews were conducted in Thai. As the questionnaire survey 
and the interviews were conducted in Thai, the questionnaire data were translated into 
English after being analysed, whilst the interview file was translated into English after 
being transcribed. During the transcribing and translating process, no printed copies of 
these audio recordings were made, and only electronic versions of the transcripts, 
translations and code sheets were stored on the researcher’s secured laptop or computer. 
Once the researcher came back to the UK, the questionnaire survey forms were kept in 
the researcher’s locker; the audio recordings, including the audio recordings and any 
copies on the researcher’s laptop or computer, were then deleted once they were 
transferred and stored on the researcher’s laptop or computer and the University of York’s 
Filestore (personalised data storing system with encryption). After all the audio 
recordings were deleted, the written forms of data, which were printed out, were used 
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only in the researcher’s office at the University of York and stored in a locked locker in 
that office. More importantly, the key to the locked locker was accessible only by the 
researcher. The building in which the documents were kept is located at the University of 
York. Thus, it can be assured that all information from questionnaire and interviewee has 
remained anonymous, with all document files kept in a safe place. 
3.3 Fieldwork research 
The main purpose of the fieldwork in this research was to seek out the truth which cannot 
be gleaned from a document. In order to understand the case of the Thai multi-pillar 
pension system, it is necessary to identify the beliefs, opinions, and experiences of the 
participants. The rationale for selecting individuals from the three groups (Thai senior 
citizens, local and national bureaucrats) as questionnaire survey respondents and 
interviewees is that they are the main players in the evolutionary process of both schemes 
in the Thai pension system. The fieldwork for this research took place in Thailand from 
June 2015 to September 2015. The pilot study took place before the main survey took 
place. After the fieldwork was done, the researcher returned to the UK to transcribe the 
collected data.  
3.3.1 The pilot study for this thesis 
The pilot study or the trying out version of this thesis’s data collection was conducted 
mainly to test the adequacy of the research instruments, both the questionnaire survey and 
interviews. Though the interview target groups are citizens and local and national 
bureaucrats, the questionnaire and interviews of the pilot study were collected from just 
the citizen group, due to limitations in contacting local and national bureaucrats or staff. 
Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001:1) point out that one of the advantages of conducting 
a pilot study is that it may give advance warning to researchers about what they might 
experience before investigating the real data collection, where the main research project 
could fail, where research protocols might not be followed, or whether proposed methods 
or instruments are inappropriate or too complicated.  
In this thesis’s pilot study, the convenience sampling technique was used to collect 
questionnaire survey data from Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above before asking if 
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they were willing to participate in the interview process. During the pilot study, the 
researcher indeed experienced some difficulties regarding the questions listed in both the 
questionnaire and interviews. This thesis piloted a questionnaire on a small group of Thai 
senior citizens from both formal and informal sectors. These were as similar as possible 
to the target population (sample size n = 10) and three of these questionnaire respondents 
were interviewed and asked for feedback on the questionnaire survey questions in order 
to identify ambiguities and difficult questions.  
The pilot study also allowed the researcher to try out some of the proposed questions. A 
few participants found that the questions were too difficult for them to understand and 
thus insisted on finishing the form early. However, after allowing the researcher to 
explain the questions more carefully using simpler words, the respondents felt more 
comfortable and were willing to finish the entire questionnaire. The interview process not 
only gave some idea of Thai senior citizens’ attitudes towards the pension system before 
the start of the actual interviews, but also how to form questions and ways of asking 
questions most suitable for the interviewees. Consequently, the pilot study shaped the 
idea of how the questionnaire survey form and interview questions should look, as well 
as how long the procedure for each instrument would take. In other words, a pilot study 
not only helps the researcher to become aware of any difficulties, and gives the researcher 
an opportunity to not only develop the instruments, such as re-wording and re-scaling any 
questions not answered as expected and discarding all unnecessarily difficult questions 
before the actual procedure takes place, but also estimates the time taken to complete the 
questionnaire and interview process. 
3.4 Quantitative method: Questionnaire survey 
A questionnaire was one of the instruments employed in the research, and analysed via 
descriptive statistics analysis and the inferential statistics analysis. The questionnaire 
survey was used in this thesis to gain information on Thai senior citizens’ personal 
characteristics (socio-demographic status, financial resources and labour market 
conditions), thus providing better and more accurate data on their decision to join the 
government pension and savings schemes, specifically the savings contribution scheme. 
To find out whether informal working population is affected by other factors in the 
context of the multi-pillar pension system, Thai senior citizens’ views and experiences 
will be reviewed from the satisfactions and open-ended question in the questionnaire 
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survey data. The satisfactions section offers greater information on the respondents’ 
attitudes to pension programmes under the non-contributory and voluntary savings 
scheme in the zero and third pillars. The satisfactions and open-ended question sections 
allow the researcher to find out whether, apart from informality, the decentralisation 
process of the local governance and the policy designs of the pension programmes 
influenced citizens’ decisions to join the schemes. Data analysis from this questionnaire 
will reveal the causal factors behind citizens’ decisions to join the schemes. This will then 
be triangulated with the interview data before analysing the answers to the main research 
questions and explaining the nature of the five-pillar pension reform in the Thai case.  
3.4.1 Unit of analysis: Population and sample of the study 
The data collection method of the questionnaire survey started with collecting survey data 
from a focused group, Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above in the informal and formal 
labour market. The intended population included participants from the local area of the 
Lumpini sub-district, Patumwan district, Bangkok. As of 2015, the working population 
in Thailand's informal sector was 21.4 million or 55.9% of the working population (38.3 
million), with 6.5% of these informal workers in Bangkok (NSO, 2015). The population 
of residents aged 50 and above in the Lumpini sub-district was made up of 6,613 residents 
(Official Statistics Registration System, 2015). As there are number of unknown 
residential informal workers, who are migrated from rural areas, the sample size of the 
thesis became 204 participants, regarding a reliable sample size with a 7% margin of error 
of the infinite population (Yamane, 1967).  
Regarding the limitations of the survey sampling, the researcher acknowledges that 
probability sampling is a methodological approach wherein all individuals have a chance 
of being selected, meaning that results are more likely to accurately reflect the entire 
population (NSO, 2012c). However, in order to employ probability sampling, the 
researcher must have official contact information for the entire population in the Lumpini 
sub-district and that unofficial rural migrants who live in the area. The researcher was 
unable to access official government information on the household registration system of 
the elderly in the area nor migrant data. Therefore, non-probability sampling was the most 
appropriate technique for this study.  
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The methods of non-probability, alternatively known as a non-random sampling, is a 
method of sampling where it is not known which individual from the population will be 
selected as a sample. In other words, this sampling technique does not give all the 
individuals in the population equal chances of being selected (Bryman, 2012). Methods 
of non-probability sampling include convenience sampling, quota sampling, purposive 
sampling, and snowball sampling. The sampling method used in this paper’s 
questionnaire survey data collection corresponds to ‘convenience sampling’. 
Bhattacherjee (2012:69) explains that convenience sampling, also called as accidental or 
opportunity sampling, is a technique drawn from a sector of the population readily 
available or convenient to the researcher. This technique excludes those not in the area of 
data collection. Therefore, the generalisability of the findings is limited.  
Nevertheless, this research experienced difficulties in accessing the official government 
information on local resident household registration and tracking migrant informal 
workers’ geographical locations. Most importantly, even if the researcher was able to 
access official government information, migrant data would not be included. Neither the 
researcher nor the government was able to track migrants’ geographical locations. 
Migrant informal workers, one of the main target groups in this research, are a hard-to-
reach population that have always been a major challenge for systematic sampling and 
data collection (Agadjanian and Zotova, 2012:132). Trochim (2006) states that though 
most researchers prefer the probability sampling method, in some social research projects, 
there may be circumstances in which it is not feasible, practical, or theoretically sensible 
to perform random sampling. This occurs in the study of migrants. To minimise potential 
error, existing studies in migrant workers have employed convenience sampling in the 
questionnaire survey to examine areas such as Russia (Agadjanian and Zotova, 2012), 
Northern California (Organista and Kubo, 2005), and Thailand (Wangroongsarb, et al., 
2016). Along the same lines, this thesis used convenience sampling in its questionnaire 
data collection.  
It is worth noting, some of this study’s sample over 65 years of age remain fit and active, 
whilst others experience acute physical illness. Woodhouse, et al. (1988:505) explain that 
this population can be categorised into two groups: the fit elderly and the frail elderly. 
The fit elderly are those living independently without receiving regular prescribed 
medication. Meanwhile, the frail elderly are dependent on others in daily living activities, 
 90 
are not independently mobile, are often in institutional care, and may require regular 
prescribed drug therapy. Because convenience sampling was used as a data collection 
technique, the researcher acknowledged that the majority of the frail population might 
not be included in the survey. However, in the Lumpini Park of the Lumpini sub-district, 
many elderly communities and societies host events and activities every morning and 
evening. Many members of the frail elderly in the area tend to join activities there 
accompanied by their families. Though the frail population in this research represents a 
group of relatively high mobility, the outcome of the survey could provide a relevant 
result. Most specifically, if those with high mobility still experience difficulties in savings, 
the difficulties would be even greater for those who are less mobile. Nevertheless, this 
thesis focuses on labour market behaviour regarding savings and receiving old age 
allowance. Therefore, fewer frail population members coming to the park would not be a 
fundamental limitation to the study.  
Moreover, the researcher acknowledges that some types of job with less leisure time, such 
as those who work both day and night shifts, might not be included in this data collection, 
as they may not have time to come to the Lumpini park. However, it is very important to 
highlight that apart from respondents who visit the park for leisure activities, the 
participants in the questionnaire survey and interview respondents also included both 
formal and informal labour sector workers who have less leisure time and actually work 
in and around the park area. There are both government and private offices located in the 
Lumpini Park, such as government officials who work at the BMA Lumpini sub-district 
office, teachers at public Suan Lumpini School, and employees at private companies 
inside the park including cosmetic shops, tutors and adult students at the BMA Lumpini 
Vocational Training Centre. Traffic through the area also includes staff from the Lumpini 
Library, the sports complex, sport centres, the Lumpini Youth Centre Foundation, the 
Smiling Sun Ground (a disabled communities centre), Home For Hope (a refugee and 
homeless children centre), and Bangkok Elder Citizens Clubs. These workers in the 
formal sector might not have enough time for leisure activities, but they spend most of 
their time working in the park area. Thus, the researcher collected data from these 
participants during their break times. As mentioned above, there are also many low-
income flexible informal workers with less leisure time in this area. These informal 
workers tend to have less spare time to visit the park for leisure. However, they came to 
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the location every day to make a living. The researcher collected data from these 
participants during their lunch or break times. 
Warunsiri (2011:451) highlights that job types in the informal sector are variable 
depending on individual local societies. Hence, it is difficult to cover every type of 
informal job. Since 2013, the NSO (2013:4, 2014:4, 2015:7, 2016:7, 2017:7) reviews that 
more than half of the informal working population in Thailand (55-58%) are in the trade 
and service sector. Since Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada’s study on the economic 
security among Thai elderly in 2007, the majority of informal workforce in Bangkok has 
always been in the service sector. The trade and service sector includes any type of goods 
and services (Kenton, 2018). Regarding the questionnaire respondents’ job types, more 
than half of the respondents in the informal workforce were in the trade and services 
sector (17.2% multiple jobs/street vendors, 17.6% in service sector, 15.7% self-
employed). Despite of not being able to include all types of informal jobs in this research 
project, most common informal jobs found in urban cities were represented. Some 
informants in the recipient group (such as Interviewees R1, R5, R6, R8, R10, R12, R14, 
R16 and R19) who either worked two shifts a day or reported that they have less leisure 
time were also included in this study. Therefore, although not all types of jobs with less 
leisure time were represented, respondents with less leisure had provided very in-depth 
information on how the informal economy has affected their savings behaviours and 
decisions on joining the pension and savings scheme. As this thesis’s main interest is 
citizen savings behaviours and pension and savings schemes decisions, fewer participants 
with less leisure time should not be a fundamental limitation.  
3.4.2 Participant recruitment 
Questionnaire participants were recruited through the convenience sampling technique. 
The researcher approached Thai senior citizens at the age of 50 and above from both 
formal informal labour markets who qualified as potential candidates in the Lumpini sub-
district, Patumwan district, Bangkok. The respondents were asked if they had the time 
and was willing to do the questionnaire survey; this would subsequently lead to the senior 
citizens’ interview group. The questionnaire survey was designed to take around ten 
minutes to complete, or the respondents could stop at any other time. The participants 
were informed that their participation was entirely voluntary. Hence, they were free to 
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withdraw from the research at any time or choose not to answer any question without 
giving a reason and without any determent to themselves or their organisations.  
3.4.3 Questionnaire participant selection 
The population in this survey was selected to represent every Thai citizen aged 50 years 
and above in both formal and informal sectors who resided in a sample household area. 
There are a few significant reasons why these citizens are the main target groups for this 
study. 
First, the participants aged 50 and above in this study are a reflection of the target groups 
of three savings pension programmes. The target groups of savings programmes under 
the voluntary savings scheme in the third pillar (NSF, RMF, and SSA 40) are those aged 
between 50 and 59 and between 50 and 54 in both formal and informal labour market 
sectors. The NSF Chairman Jaruluk Ruangsuwan highlighted that to receive pension, 
contributors have to contribute a savings of 13,200 Baht per year (£264) for ten years in 
total, which is the rate for receiving contribution by the age of 60 (The Money Case, 
2018). Mr. Korn Chatikavanij, the Finance Minister of the 2009 Abhisit government, 
emphasised that the 2009 government sought to specifically provide an incentive for Thai 
informal workers at the age of 50 to join the NSF so that they will receive pension by the 
age of 60 (Prachachat, 2009). The age eligibility of the SSA 40 is also between 15 and 59 
years of age. However, the SSA 40 options for pension benefits were cancelled in April 
2016. Any SSA 40 contributors who wished to continue contributing for pension had to 
register for the NSF. Meanwhile, to receive an annuitised pension benefit from the RMF, 
individuals (in both formal and informal labour markets) have to continuously buy RMF 
units for at least 5 years until the age of 55. This implies that the latest age for registration 
is thus 50 years of age. Accordingly, to examine the implications of the multi-pillar 
pension system and the effectiveness of the voluntary savings scheme, formal and 
informal workers aged between 50 and 59 are one of the target groups. 
Second, participants aged 60 and above in the informal sector are key actors to analyse 
the effectiveness of savings pension scheme policy design. Because contributors have to 
contribute for at least 10 years in order to receive pension, NSF registration was thus 
extended for those citizens in the informal labour market who were at the age of 60 and 
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above to register within the first year (by 25th September 2016) (NSF, 2016). Thai senior 
citizens in the informal labour market are one of the focus groups of the voluntary savings 
scheme. Including informal workers at the age of 60 and above is another way to test the 
effectiveness and influence of the savings programme policy design. Hence, informal 
workers at the age of 60 and above are also a target age of this thesis.  
Third, examining the experiences of senior citizens at the age of 50 and above from both 
formal and informal labour market is a way to determine the development of the non-
contributory pension scheme. Because Thai senior citizens at the age of 59 and above are 
eligible to register to receive the old age allowance, this thesis aims to examine how Thai 
citizens at the age of 59 and above have experienced the OAA registration process and 
how well those aged between 50 and 58 have been made aware of the programme. This 
is another way to examine the impact of the decentralisation process and the local 
bureaucrats’ actions.  
Finally, in order to find out whether the decentralisation process has any impact on 
migrants’ decisions to join either the non-contributory pension scheme or the voluntary 
savings pension scheme, as stated in previous studies (Chen et al., 2004), both local 
residents and migrants are included in this thesis. This is to compare whether there are 
any differences in their interests and preferences for joining one of the aforementioned 
pension and savings schemes.  
3.4.4 Construction of questionnaire 
The questionnaire has five sections: 1) general information about the participant; 2) 
financial status; 3) experience of the Thai pension system perspective; 4) satisfaction with 
different pension programmes under the non-contributory and the voluntary savings 
schemes; and 5) open-ended question.  
The first section of the questionnaire was designed to collect details of the personal 
background of participants, including: gender, age, marital status, educational 
background, residential area, occupation, income, household and living arrangement. The 
second section of the questionnaire collected the respondent’s financial status, including 
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their financial status from their own perspective, and whether they thought it was enough 
for the daily life. This section also included a question regarding their savings behaviour. 
All the information relevant to the respondent’s financial status was collected in this 
section. Next, the third section is the section collecting the respondent’s experience of 
different pension programmes. For instance, ‘Has the respondent ever heard of the 
programme or joined any programme? If so, where could the respondent get that 
information from?’ The fourth section was designed to collect respondents’ satisfaction 
for four different pension programmes, including the pension provision programme under 
the universal non-contributory pensions scheme (OAA) and three savings programmes 
under the voluntary savings scheme (RMF, NSF and SSA 40). The rated satisfaction of 
each programme was comprised of three components, including policy design, local 
bureaucrats’ actions, and overall satisfaction; each was rated on a 5-point Likert Scale 
(Vagias, 2006). This section helps us understand how much the citizens were satisfied 
with the programmes. The current thesis used a 5-point Likert scale to assess the 
participants’ satisfaction. The scale was an equal interval and gave a value of 0.80 to each 
interval. Hence, score interpretations for the attitudinal scale are as follows in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Rating scale of satisfaction  
 
There were 204 respondents in the questionnaire, including both formal and informal 
workers. However, not every respondent was allowed to answer every question. More 
specifically, for questions relevant to the NSF and SSA 40, only informal workers were 
included; on the other hand, both formal and informal workers were included in questions 
relevant to the OAA and RMF. Finally, in the fifth section, the question is open-ended. 
This section allows respondents to express any further comments freely. Here, the 
Range of Mean Scale Interpretation
1.00-1.80 Least satisfied
1.81-2.60 Less satisfied
2.61-3.40 Moderately satisfied
3.41-4.20 Satisfied
4.21-5.00 Very satisfied
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respondents were able to say more about their views on the system. However, the 
questionnaire system can only provide some basic views and experiences, not in-depth 
information. Hence, this is why in-depth interviews were included later.  
3.4.5 Questionnaire data analysis 
To obtain the objectives of the questionnaire survey, descriptive statistics analysis and 
inferential statistics analysis were adopted to describe the sample data as a quantitative 
method. Computer software package SPSS Version 21 was used. Gayle (2000:364) 
highlights that in social science data analysis there are two main statistical methods: 
descriptive statistics and inferential statistics. Descriptive statistics are used to summarise 
basic features of the data from a sample, including percentage, mean score, and standard 
deviation; whilst inferential statistics allow researchers to draw inferences about the 
population from the sample, such as testing hypotheses (University of the West of 
England, 2017). Most researchers in social world use a mixture of descriptive and 
inferential statistics (Gayle, 2000:364). In this research, likewise both descriptive and 
inferential statistics were used. 
In this research, a descriptive analysis was used to describe the characteristics of the 
sample. The types of descriptive analysis employed in this research project were 
frequency, percentage, mean scores, and standard deviation. Frequency and percentage 
were used to summarise the data from the questionnaire survey, mean scores were used 
to demonstrate the average measurement of the respondents’ satisfaction for each theme 
of each pension programme, and standard deviations were used to review how the 
measurements spread out from the average mean score. If the data has a low standard 
deviation, respondents’ satisfaction scores leaned to the average.  
An inferential statistics analysis was used to examine the relationships between the 
variables within the sample. This study used both cross-tabulation and chi-square. Cross-
tabulation was used to determine the interactions between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. The chi-square was used together with cross-tabulation to test 
hypotheses on the relationship between citizens’ savings behaviours (dependent variable) 
and their personal characteristics (independent variables), including socio-demographic 
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factors: financial status, and labour market conditions. In other words, these methods 
were employed to test the statistical significance of the cross-tabulation table.  
Cross-tabulation is a quantitative method used to analyse relationships between multiple 
variables. It is also known as contingency table analysis, which is commonly used for 
categorical data. A cross-tabulation is a two- or more-dimensional table that records the 
number (frequency) of respondents that have the specific characteristics described in the 
cells of the table (Qualtrics, 2016). It shows how correlations change from one variable 
grouping to another (Amuyunzu, 2016). The cells of the table report the frequency counts 
and percentages for the number of respondents in each cell. There are a few significant 
for of using cross-tabulation. Cross-tabulation aids researchers in making initial insights 
by investigating relationships between two or more variables or measuring how different 
variables are related to one another. Cross-tabulations are data tables that present the 
results of the entire group of respondents and the results of sub-groups of survey 
respondents (Grover, 2014). In other words, cross-tabulations allow researchers to 
examine relationships within the data that might not be readily apparent when analysing 
total survey responses. The method offers a simple method of grouping variables, which 
minimises the potential for confusion or error by providing clear results. Since cross-
tabulation clearly maps out relationships between categorical variables, researchers can 
gain better and deeper insights that might have been overlooked or would have taken a 
lot of time to decode from more complicated forms of statistical analysis. Many 
researchers use cross-tabulation together with chi-square analysis. The chi-square 
analysis is the primary statistic used for testing the statistical significance of cross-
tabulation tables (Qualtrics, 2016). Hence, the chi-square was employed in this thesis as 
well. 
The chi-square test, also known as the Pearson chi-square test, is a non-parametric 
statistic tool. This methodological tool has a number of strengths and offers valuable 
statistics in testing hypotheses when variables are nominal (McHugh, 2013:143). It is 
used to determine if there is a difference between two or more groups of participants 
(USDA, 2018). In other words, the chi-square is used when you have two nominal 
variables and you want to determine whether there is a significant relationship between 
two nominal (categorical) variables (McDonald, 2015). Moreover, chi-square’s 
advantages also include its robustness in terms of data distribution, its ease of 
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computation, and its use in studies for which parametric assumptions cannot be employed. 
Cross-tabulation and chi-square are powerful ways to analyse survey data (Qualtrics, 
2016). However, it should be noted that like other methods, both cross-tabulation and chi-
square analysis both have advantages and disadvantages.  
While cross-tabulation has a number of strengths, it also has its limitations. One of the 
method’s limitations is that it can lead to a large number of tables in the case of multiple 
responses, which can be cross-tabulated in many different ways. As such, it may not be 
clear which variables are meaningful until the researcher has performed the cross-
tabulation (Michael, 2001:1). Similar to any analysis, chi-square also has limitations. One 
of the limitations of this method is that it only determines the probability of a relationship 
between two variables. In other words, it only tests whether two variables are related 
(Ling, 2008). However, it does not indicate the strength of the relationship. Another 
limitation is that for the most appropriate use of chi-square the data must be frequency 
data greater than 5 for each class (USDA, 2018). This implies that even though the 
combination of cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis brings many benefits, it might 
not be able to significantly allow us to explore intercorrelations among variables. The 
researcher acknowledges the limitations of these two analysis tools. However, using these 
two methods were efficient enough to explain the impact of citizens’ personal 
characteristics on their savings behaviours. More specifically, this combination was 
sufficient to be able to underline the variable(s) playing important roles in shaping 
individuals’ positions within the labour market, and thereby structuring the nature of their 
engagement with the voluntary savings scheme of the Thai five-pillar pension system. 
Although the number of respondents in some classes might be small after spreading raw 
data into cross-tabulation table, it remains valuable to examine relationships within the 
data that might not be readily apparent when analysing total survey responses. 
Some previous studies use both descriptive analysis and cross-tabulation and chi-square 
to analyse case studies. For instance, Brindha and Priya’s study (2017) conducted 
questionnaire survey and interviews regarding households’ savings behaviour and factors 
influencing savings behaviour in Dingdigul district in TamilNadu. The percentage 
analysis, chi-square analysis, and cross-tabulation correlation were used to analyse the 
questionnaire data. Lloyd-Sherlock and Khumya’s study (2004) regarded the economic 
wellbeing of the older population in poor rural and urban Thailand communities. They 
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employed both questionnaires and interviews in Bangkok and Chiang Rai. The data in 
the study were presented through frequency and percentage in cross-tabulation tables. In 
Hirunsathaporn et al.’s study (2013) of the efficiency of elderly citizen savings 
behaviours in Bangkok, and in Preecha and Lakkanawanit’s (2018) research project on 
informal workers’ savings for retirement decisions in Muang district, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat province of Thailand, frequency, percentage, mean scores, standard deviation, 
and chi-square were used as data analytical tools. Along the same lines, this thesis also 
aims to explore the relationship between informality and savings behaviour so as to 
elucidate the implications of the multi-pillar pension system and its capacity for inclusion 
of informal workers. Therefore, this paper employed the frequency, percentage, mean 
scores, and standard deviation of the descriptive statistics analysis and inferential 
statistics analysis. 
Data analysis in each section of the questionnaire form 
The first three sections of the questionnaire form ask for the respondent’s general 
information, financial status information and experience with the pension system. The 
data from these three sections were analysed by using frequency, percentage, chi-square 
and cross-tabulation. The first three sections of the questionnaire attempt to explore how 
respondents’ personal characteristics might constrain the Thai senior citizens’ savings 
behaviour. The fourth section of the satisfaction section scores both the universal non-
contributory pension scheme and the voluntary savings scheme, defining the mean scores 
of the respondents’ satisfaction; hence, mean scores and standard deviations were used. 
The key questions in section four review citizens’ attitudes towards the pension 
programmes via their satisfaction rating. The Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated in order 
to check the reliability of each scale of the questionnaire survey data. The general 
agreement of Cronbach's Alpha reliability at 0.70 or above indicates appropriate 
instrument internal consistency (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011:54). The value of the 
Cronbach’s Alpha on the multiple Likert questions in this survey was found to be 0.881, 
which is clearly higher than the value recommended; hence, this implies a high degree of 
internal consistency in response to the questions in this questionnaire. Finally, the open-
ended question section was designed to be a section for respondents to write anything 
freely before the researcher grouped answers into the same themes via frequency and 
percentage. The data from the open-ended question review any further details respondents 
chose to raise, before they were analysed together with the in-depth interview data.  
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Variables for chi-square test 
A chi-square test was employed to test the association of two variables: personal 
characteristics and savings behaviour.  
Hypothesis 0 (H0) indicates that two variables are independent, whilst Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
indicates that savings is a variable dependent on one or more personal characteristics 
(independent) variables. If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected, and H1 is accepted, indicating that there is a significant association between the 
two variables. 
As the respondents’ personal characteristics were categorised into dependent and 
independent variables so the relationships between their personal characteristics and 
savings behaviour could be observed; this section clarifies each variable and how they 
were coded.  
(1) Dependent variable 
The aim of employing a chi-square test was to scrutinise the relationships between the 
citizens’ personal characteristics and their savings behaviour. To find out whether any 
factor of their personal characteristics affected their savings behaviour, the savings 
behaviour of the respondents is cited as the dependent variable, categorising ‘No’ of not 
savings = 0, and ‘Yes’ of savings = 1. 
(2) Independent variables 
This study assumes that the economic security of the elderly is influenced by three factors: 
socio-demographic status, financial support resources and labour market conditions. 
The key socio-demographic factors are gender, age, marital status, educational 
background, hometown and living arrangement. Gender was coded as the dichotomous 
variable of female = 0 and male = 1. Age was also coded as the dichotomous variable of 
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50-59 = 1 and 60 and above =2. Marital status was coded as the nominal variable as single 
=1, married = 2, and widowed/divorced/separated = 3. Educational background was 
coded as the nominal variable of no education = 0, primary school level =1, secondary 
school level = 2, university degree = 3. Hometown was also categorised as the 
dichotomous variable of rural area = 0, urban area = 1. Living arrangement was a nominal 
variable that categorised living alone =1, living with spouse only =2, living with family 
members = 3, living with unrelated persons = 4.  
The financial resource variables are financial support from family, looking after someone 
else, received pension provision (OAA), and income. Financial support from family was 
coded as the dichotomous variables of ‘No’ for not receiving financial support from 
family = 0, ‘Yes’ for receiving financial support from family =1. Looking after someone 
else was also coded as the dichotomous variable, ‘No’ for not looking after anyone else 
= 0, ‘Yes’ for looking after someone else =1. The received OAA variable was categorised 
as the dichotomous variable, coded into 2 groups: ‘No’ for not receiving the OAA = 0, 
‘Yes’ for receiving the OAA =1. Income was categorised as an ordinal variable and coded 
into three groups. Due to the outcome of the pilot study, nearly half the respondents felt 
uncomfortable admitting the exact amount of their income or that they were in a very 
low-income position, or even categorised as poor, therefore, the income level question 
was adapted by using tax revenue exemption as the line category. Anyone earning less 
than 12,500 Baht (£250) per person per month does not have to pay tax, as they are 
categorised as low-income (Revenue Department, 2013). Meanwhile, those who earn a 
salary higher than 62,500 Baht (£1,250) has to pay 20% of their income in tax revenue 
(ibid). Accordingly, in this thesis, those who earn more than 62,500 Baht (£1,250) per 
month are categorised as high income; and those who earn between 12,500 Baht (£250) 
and 62,500 (£1,250) Baht per month are categorised as the middle-income group. Hence, 
the low-income level =1, middle-income level =2, and high-income level =3. Labour 
market condition variables are types of labour market and types of job. Type of labour 
market is also a dichotomous variable, coded as informal = 0, formal =1. Lastly, the type 
of job is the nominal variable, coded with formal contract =1, multiple jobs/ street vendor 
=2, service sector =3, retired elderly/ family worker =4, and self-employed = 5.  
Based on the concept of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the ILO 
international symposium classified the working population in the informal sector as five 
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types: 1) own-account workers (or self-employed), 2) contributing family workers, 3) 
employees holding informal jobs, 4) members of informal producers’ cooperatives and 
5) agricultural workers (such as farmers) (ILO, 2004:7). The official data of the Labour 
Force Survey in Bangkok between 2007 and 2015 (NSO, 2015:28) categorised 
occupations into nine groups: 1) legislators, 2) senior officials and managers, 3) 
professionals, technicians and associate professionals, 4) clerks, service workers and shop 
and market sales workers, 5) skilled agricultural and fishery workers, 6) craft and related 
trades workers, 7) plant and machine operators and assemblers, 8) elementary 
occupations and 9) workers not classifiable by occupation. Meanwhile, the National 
Statistical Office (2015:7) categorised formal and informal working population into three 
groups: agriculture, manufacturing and trade and service. Warunsiri (2011:451) explains 
that the activities of the informal sector depend on the economic environment and society 
in each country; with workers in the informal sector normally uneducated, unskilled and 
of low productivity. This implies that types of jobs in the informal sector are variable 
depending on the location and society of each area, and that the workers in the informal 
sector have to create their own activities or jobs to fit the societies in which they live. 
Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada (2007:25) emphasise that most informal workers in 
Bangkok, especially migrant workers, are in the service sector. This is why new informal 
jobs in trade and service sector tends to arise in urban areas like Lumpini sub-district in 
Bangkok. According to respondents’ responses about their occupation from the 
questionnaire data, the current study thus classified types of jobs into the five types as 
stated above. 
After analysing a correlation between two variables through the use of chi-square test, 
the cross-tabulation was then used to gain deeper insights from raw data. Most 
specifically, the cross-tabulation was used to explore what is the underlying cause of not 
being able to make savings contributions for retirement. 
3.5 Qualitative method: Interviews 
The interviews were conducted in this thesis as another instrument. The interview is a 
very important data-gathering technique in this research because interviewing allows the 
researcher to move beyond written sources and ask probing, theoretically driven 
questions of key participants about the events and processes of interest. DiCicco-Bloom 
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and Crabtree (2006:315) state that interviews help researchers appreciate the 
interviewee’s knowledge and understanding in the research context. Guion et al. (2011:1) 
also point out that the interview method is most appropriate for gathering in-depth 
information from complex situations. This is because researchers are allowed to ask for 
in-depth details about complex issues and obtain more in-depth information (Yang, 
2014:85). Flick (2014:219) highlights that a key role of using the interview as a research 
tool is “making the interviewee’s implicit knowledge more explicit”. Hence, interviews 
were used in this thesis. The interview data will explain in-depth details from the 
experiences and personal knowledge of not only the Thai citizens, from both formal and 
informal sectors, but also those local and national bureaucrats. The data from different 
groups will provide a clear picture as to why the pension and savings schemes coverage 
did not turn out as the government expected, particularly the voluntary savings scheme. 
Also, the interview data will lead to the discussion of whether or not the Thai welfare 
state regime has shifted away from the previous welfare state regime after the 2009 
pension reform. 
3.5.1 Unit of analysis: Interviewees 
We used three groups of interviewees: Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above, local 
bureaucrats, and national bureaucrats. Warren (2002:99) suggests that the minimum 
number of interviewees that should participate in interviews in a qualitative study is 
approximately 20 to 30. Nevertheless, Bryman (2012:425) highlights that there is no 
exact sample size to support a convincing conclusion to a study. Rather, the effective 
number varies according to the variables in each situation, or perhaps at the point when 
interviewees begin repeating significant information. This study, hence, stopped 
interviewing upon reaching 19 participants in the senior citizen group, 5 participants in 
the local bureaucrat group, and 3 participants in the national bureaucrat group. This 
totalled to 27 key informants, which was deemed sufficient because the interviewees 
began to repeat significant information. 
The purposive and snowball sampling methods were used in this study’s interview data 
collection. As highlighted above, the researcher acknowledges that non-probability 
methods such as purposive and snowball sampling methods, may or may not adequately 
represent the whole population (Bhat, 2018). However, there may be circumstances in 
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social science research in which it is not feasible, practical, or theoretically sensible to 
perform probability sampling methods (Trochim, 2006). This includes in-depth 
interviewee data collection. In this research project, the interviewees of local and national 
bureaucrat groups were first approached by the purposive sampling technique, followed 
by the use of the snowball method.  
Purposive sampling, also known as a judgemental, selective, or subjective sampling 
method, is a sampling technique that relies on the judgement of the researcher in selecting 
the units (Sharma, 2017:751). As purposive sampling is based on the researcher’s 
judgement, it can be highly prone to researcher bias (p.752). Meanwhile, the snowball 
sampling technique was employed to identify cases of interest from sampling respondents 
who know people with similar characteristics and have experience and background 
knowledge in the field (Palinkas et al., 2016:534). However, this could again introduce a 
sampling bias (Bhat, 2018). Hence, in order to limit any disadvantages regarding the use 
of these two sampling methods, the researcher collected interviewee data from three 
different groups of interviewees. The senior citizen group includes interviewees from 
different backgrounds, whilst the local and national bureaucrat groups include 
interviewees from different departments and different levels before comparing the 
thesis’s original interview data to the thesis’s original survey data and other secondary 
sources. The researcher used the triangulation technique to increase the reliability of the 
data in this thesis. 
3.5.2 Interviewee recruitment 
The purposive and snowball sampling methods were the interview data collection method 
used three groups of interviewees: Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above, local 
bureaucrats, and national bureaucrats. The Thai senior citizens’ group was recruited with 
a purposive sampling technique following participation in the questionnaire survey, when 
they were asked if they were willing to participate in the interview process as well. 
Meanwhile, the local and national bureaucrats were initially gathered through purposive 
sampling and then through snowball sampling. Only the potential candidates from 
different groups were asked.  
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The researcher informally approached the first interviewees of local and national 
bureaucrat groups in December 2014 by email, telephone, and in-person to impart what 
the researcher has to do before carrying out interviews during summer 2015. In June 2015, 
the first interviewees from the local and national bureaucrat groups were formally 
approached again, as were all new potential interviewees. This was done via email and 
in-person using a participant information sheet with an invitation message, consent form 
and reply slip, or via telephone with a verbal invitation and information about the research 
project. The researcher asked the potential interviewees to confirm their interest by 
signing the consent form. Meanwhile, the Thai senior citizens were approached again 
following the questionnaire survey. These respondents were asked if they had the time 
and willingness to participate in interviews, each taking between 30 and 50 minutes. 
Before any interview took place, the participants from three groups were informed that 
they were free to withdraw from the interview process at any time or could refuse any 
questions without giving a reason and without any effect to them or their organisations. 
Bolderston (2012:69) emphasises that if possible, interviews should be conducted in a 
location convenient (and comfortable) for participants. Accordingly, in this research 
project, all the interviews were held at the workplaces of respondents. 
The interviews were audio-recorded using a digital recorder and then transcribed and 
translated. As this thesis adopts the semi-structured interview, a topic guide to the core 
questions were prepared beforehand. Each interview used an interview topic guide to 
guide the interviewer throughout the interview. The researcher followed the themes given 
on the questions list; nevertheless, the interviewees were also encouraged to express their 
opinions freely and flexibly so as to gain deeper insights into their personal knowledge 
and experiences. 
3.5.3 Interviewee selection 
There are three groups of interviewees: Thai senior citizens aged 50 and above, local 
bureaucrats, and national bureaucrats. The interviewee selection of each group of key 
informants is various. 
The first and most important group can be identified as the Thai senior citizens. These 
participants were interviewed to identify their savings behaviour, interests and attitudes 
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to different pension programmes under both the non-contributory and voluntary savings 
schemes in the zero and third pillars, and regarding policy design and local bureaucrats’ 
actions. The Thai senior citizens’ group was recruited with a purposive sampling 
technique following participation in the questionnaire survey. Discussions with all 
participants were compared so as to identify any unique responses. The discussions with 
the interviewees in this group had significant explanatory power regarding the causal 
factors behind citizens’ interests and decisions to join the schemes as well as the role of 
the state, market, and family in the modern Thai case. This implies that data explaining 
the causal factors behind the citizens’ decisions could then be analysed to explain the 
research’s main focus and research questions. 
Second, interviews were carried out with local bureaucrats (or staff) who were in charge 
of the OAA under the non-contributory pension scheme and the savings programmes of 
the voluntary savings scheme (RMF, NSF, and SSA 40). The local bureaucrats were 
initially gathered through purposive sampling and then through snowball sampling. They 
were the only group of key informants working with both high-ranking government 
officials and citizens. Therefore, the answers from their perspectives are key to explaining 
how the evolutionary process of the Thai pension system developed. Specifically, the 
information from this group is key, not only for analysing the impact of the 
decentralisation process, but also for comparing with citizens’ and national bureaucrats’ 
data. Hence, local bureaucrats’ knowledge and experiences are key factors for revealing 
information that cannot be found in any published paper. 
Lastly, the national bureaucrats’ group was the last key informant group of this thesis. 
The purpose of interviewing this group was to pull out any in-depth details that the other 
two groups of interviewees might not be able to review. The purpose of interviewing this 
group was also to capture personal experiences and background knowledge regarding the 
development of the Thai pension system, thus providing a bigger picture of the whole 
pension system. This research assumes that diverse interests, preferences, motivations 
and responsibilities reveal not only different perspectives from different key informants 
but also reflect different aspects of different positions by different institutions as well. 
Hence, national bureaucrats from different departments and at different levels were 
interviewed in order to compare the similarities and differences of their perspectives 
before comparing this to the data from other groups of interviewees and other sources. 
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This thesis believes that apart from providing in-depth details on the causal factors behind 
citizens’ interests and decisions regarding joining the pension and savings schemes, the 
interview data will also review the formation of the institutional framework of the Thai 
pension system and the effectiveness of extending pension and savings schemes coverage 
to informal workers. Moreover, the interview data will also review the role of the state, 
market, and family, finding out whether they have changed, and whether this change has 
reshaped the welfare regime type in Thailand.
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Table 3.2: Informants in recipients’ group  
 
Table 3.3: Informants in local and national governments’ group  
  
Number Name 
Code
Gender Age Hometown Joining pension and savings 
programmes 
Types of job
1 R1 Female 60 and above Urban OAA Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Multiple jobs worker)
2 R2 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, SSA 40 Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
3 R3 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, NSF Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
4 R4 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, NSF Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
5 R5 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Maid)
6 R6 Female 60 and above Urban OAA, SSA 40 Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Mat hiring)
7 R7 Male 50-59 Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker 
8 R8 Male 60 and above Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Van driver)
9 R9 Male 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
10 R10 Male 60 and above Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker (Private wushu coach)
11 R11 Female 50-59 Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker (Spectacle seller)
12 R12 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Maid)
13 R13 Male 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
14 R14 Male 60 and above Rural OAA Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Handmade shoes 
maker)
15 R15 Female 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired banker) 
16 R16 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/Street vendor (Food seller)
17 R17 Female 60 and above Urban GP Group 1: Formal worker (Retired state employee)
18 R18 Female 60 and above Rural OAA, SSA 40 Group 5: Self-employed worker (English tutor assistant)
19 R19 Male 50-59 Urban OAA, SSA 39 Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Clothing street seller)
*
Number Name Code Position In Charge of
1 L1 Local bureaucrat, Deputy District, TAO (Amphur Meung Chiang Man District) OAA
2 L2 Local bureaucrat, BMA staff (Lumpini sub-district) OAA
3 L3 Local bureaucrat, NSF staff (Government Savings Bank) NSF
4 L4 Local bureaucrat, SSA staff (Social Security Office) SSA 40
5 L5 Local bureaucrat, RMF staff (Krungthai Asset Management) RMF
6 N1 RMF staff, Securities Commission RMF
7 N2 National bureaucrat, Ministry of Finance NSF
8 N3 National bureaucrat, Ministry of Labour SSA 40
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3.5.4 Conducting semi-structured interviews 
This study employed semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews by using face-to-
face interview techniques. 
Most researchers make use of interviews when they wish to obtain more detailed 
information on a topic than they could glean from just context (Adams and Cox, 2008:21). 
The more structured an interview is the less likely that a participant will feel at ease and 
reveal important and relevant issues; by the same token, the less structured an interview 
is the harder to shape its scope and analyse the outcome (Adams and Cox, 2008:21). In a 
semi-structured interview, the structure is flexible, but the key points that need to be 
discussed are still in place. The interviewer does follow a script that contains certain key 
points that need to be discussed, but there is still a flexibility that allows details to emerge 
during the discussion (Bryman, 2008:471; Adams and Cox, 2008:22).  
Meanwhile, in-depth interviews are also a useful data collection technique when 
researchers want to find detailed information about a person’s thoughts and behaviours 
or to explore new issues in depth (Boyce and Neale, 2006:3; Guion, Diehl and McDonald, 
2011:1). This is because when researchers want to ask open-ended questions in order to 
elicit detailed information from relatively few people, in-depth interviews provide enough 
freedom for the interviewees to speak openly about the topics related to their interests 
(Hakim, 2000:35; Guion et al., 2011:1). Ritchie and Lewis (2003:138) further claim that 
the face-to-face interview is appropriate when depth of meaning is necessary and when 
the research is mainly focused on gaining insights and understanding. Burton (2000:323) 
also suggests that the most effective way of enlisting respondents is to conduct a face-to-
face interview. Hence, this thesis thus employs the semi-structured, face-to-face interview. 
This thesis further emphasises that to offer a critical advantage, the one-to-one interview 
is the most suitable interview type for preventing any uncomfortable situations, as the 
participants may feel uncomfortable talking openly in a group or divulging individual 
opinions or personal information in public. For instance, key informants from the Thai 
senior citizens’ group might feel uneasy discussing their financial status in the presence 
of strangers. Consequently, the current thesis decided to employ the semi-structured in-
depth interview with a one-to-one meeting.  
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3.5.5 Interview data analysis 
In this research, the interview data were analysed via the qualitative method. Burnard, et 
al. (2008:429) explain that there are two fundamental approaches for analysing qualitative 
data: deductive and inductive. The deductive approach uses a predetermined framework 
to analyse data that researchers are already aware of and probable participant responses; 
whilst the inductive approach, on the other hand, involves analysing data with very little 
structure and uses actual data to derive the structure of the analysis; this is a common 
approach for analysing qualitative data (p. 429). The current thesis, thus, employed the 
inductive approach with thematic content analysis. The process of thematic content 
analysis involves analysing transcripts, identifying themes within the data, and gathering 
together examples of those themes from the transcript (ibid). There are several computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software programmes, including ATLAS.ti and NVivo. 
This thesis, on the other hand, managed the data ‘by hand’. This is because those 
computer software programmes only manage the data and make the handling of them 
easier (Burnard, 1991:463; Burnard and et al., 2008:430). The aim of conducting in-depth 
interviews is to explore uncovered in-depth views and experiences from the key 
informants, therefore a using hand technique is sufficient for answering the key test. In 
order to carry out thematic content analysis, three types of coding framework were 
employed: open coding, initial coding and final coding (Burnard and et al., 2008).  
In the first stage, once the interview data were transcribed, the researcher read each 
transcript and made notes in the margins, these were on words and short phrases 
summarising the main statement of each interviewee; this is known as open coding. In 
the second stage, the researcher collected the summary statements from all key informants 
onto a clean set of pages, using the initial coding framework to represent numbers of 
categories. Later, the final stage took the shape of form of a final coding framework. The 
researcher searched for overlapping or similar categories, informing the analytical and 
theoretical ideas developed during the data analysis process, so as to reduce the categories 
in the initial coding framework. To do so, the researcher allocated each of the categories 
with the same theme in its own colour. What the researcher achieved in employing these 
three coding frameworks was an organised dataset that helped identify the emerging 
themes in a constant search for understanding a meaning of the data.  
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Burnard and et al. (2008:432) highlight that there are two approaches to writing up the 
findings of qualitative research: simply reporting the key findings under the same theme, 
or doing the same but also incorporating the discussion into the findings. In Lloyd-
Sherlock and Redondo’s paper (2009:14), Institutional Care for Older People in 
Developing Countries: Repressing Rights or Promoting Autonomy? The Case of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, they used the combined findings and discussion section approach which 
is easy for readers to follow. Accordingly, in this thesis, the reporting key findings and 
discussion section approach was employed.  
The field notes taken during the fieldwork were also used in this thesis to give a 
descriptive account of the study. The field notes left the researcher with a vivid memory 
of the interviewees’ reactions when the interviews were conducted, which helped the 
researcher to produce and analyse an in-depth understanding of the respondents’ 
experiences and views. After collecting primary data from both questionnaire survey and 
interview, secondary sources were also used so as to triangulate the outcomes from three 
different sources and establish the reliability and validity of the research project. It is 
worth noting that even though open-ended question in the questionnaire survey was not 
part of the interview process, open-ended question data were also analysed using the same 
process as the interview data. 
3.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter summarises the research methodology design and data collection used to 
answer the main research questions.  
This chapter explains that a mixed-method design is a suitable method for this thesis, 
whose questions aim for an understanding of the Thai multi-pillar pension system’s 
barriers and the performance outcomes of the pension reform since 2009. A mixed-
method research design was able to help the researcher to better examine the main focus 
and answer the main research questions. The questionnaire survey and in-depth 
interviews were used as instruments in investigating the case. The questionnaire data were 
analysed via the quantitative method, whilst the interview data were analysed via the 
qualitative method. The data from both methods will minimise the weakness of one 
another. The data from both methods will be compared and triangulated with the 
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secondary sources. This triangulation design is a methodological tool used in this thesis 
to provide an un-biased outcome to the research project. It increases a high level of 
validity and reliability for the thesis.  
This chapter reviews that the pilot study conducted before the fieldwork had helped the 
researcher minimise some difficulties and develop the research instruments 
(questionnaire survey form and proposed interviews questions). The questionnaire survey 
data were broken into five sections. The first three sections were conducted mainly to 
investigate the relationships between the personal characteristics of the Thai senior 
citizens in the informal sector and their savings behaviour. The data from these three 
sections will reveal the causal factors behind the results of the effectiveness of extending 
pension and savings schemes coverage to informal workers, thus providing a broader 
picture of how the institutional framework of the Thai pension system was formed after 
five-pillar pension reform. The fourth and fifth sections mainly focus on the perspectives 
of the Thai elderly on policy design and local bureaucrats’ actions for each pension 
programme under the non-contributory pension scheme in the zero pillar and the 
voluntary savings scheme in the third pillar. These two sections will reveal whether the 
institutional structure of each pension programme, informality and decentralisation 
process of local governance affect Thai informal workers’ interests and decision to join 
the schemes.  
Meanwhile, the interviews were used in this thesis as another tool to glean in-depth details 
from the interviewees, information that a questionnaire survey might miss. The data 
collection of the interviews included citizens from both formal and informal labour 
markets, as well as local and national bureaucrats. The data from both instruments will 
subsequently be analysed in order to examine the vulnerable group in the current pension 
system; as well as analysed to investigate the role of the state, market and family in the 
current Thai five-pillar pension design. Through this, it is believed that we will better 
understand the direction taken by Thai welfare state regimes post the 2009 reform. The 
data from the questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews, official statistics and prior 
studies will be compared and analysed. The data analysis from both primary and 
secondary sources will produce a full picture of the empirical study, which will then 
explain the nature of the five-pillar pension reform in the Thai case. 
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Next, in the following chapters, the findings so far are presented. Both Chapter 4 
(questionnaire survey data analysis) and Chapter 5 (interview data analysis) explain and 
evaluate the outcomes of the fieldwork study before the data is once more analysed in the 
discussion chapter (Chapter 6). 
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QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS: THE 
EFFECT OF INFORMALITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presents the data analysis of the questionnaire survey. It includes with twin 
goals. First, this chapter investigates significant barriers to the expanding social 
protection to informal workers since the 2009 new multi-pillar pension reform. Second, 
to better understand the practical obstacles toward informal worker coverage and the 
success of pension system development, this chapter pays particular attention to the 
relationship between labour-market condition and informal workers’ savings behaviours. 
The data from the questionnaire survey were analysed to evaluate citizens’ personal 
characteristics and their satisfaction of and decision to join both pension and savings 
schemes. Apart from exploring the relationship between informality and savings 
behaviour, the data analysis in this chapter also elucidates how decentralisation and policy 
designs of different pension programmes are relevant to citizens’ interests and decisions 
regarding joining such schemes. There are five sections in the questionnaire. The data 
analysis of the first three sections of the questionnaire mainly presents the relationship 
between the respondents’ personal characteristics and their savings behaviours. The last 
two sections explore their attitudes regarding the non-contributory and voluntary savings 
schemes. The data from these five sections evaluate the causal factors prompting citizens’ 
interests in and decisions to join the pension and savings schemes. However, it focuses 
more on the impact of informality to explain savings behaviour. This is based on the belief 
that respondent characteristics can better describe the outcome of savings decisions than 
can attitudes toward pension programmes.  
This thesis presumes that since Thailand’s five-pillar pension reform in 2009, informality 
– a major constraint the labour market system’s development – has become involved in 
the Thai pension system’s institutional framework of both the non-contributory and 
voluntary savings schemes and has constrained the effectiveness of pension and savings 
scheme coverage. However, the accuracy of this assumption is unclear. Previous studies, 
especially those examining Latin American countries, highlight that an informal economy 
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constrains pension contributions (Tuesta, 2014:25; Schclarek and Caggia, 2015:40). 
Some prior studies on the Thai case also highlight the impact of informality on citizens’ 
savings behaviour decisions (Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006:81; Paitoonpong, 2008, Paitoonpong 
et al., 2010:266; Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:46; Warunsiri, 2011:452). 
Despite abundant research analysing the development of the Thai pension system, there 
are virtually no explorations of the correlation between informality and the Thai pension 
system, specifically its current multi-pillar pension system. This could be explained by 
the relative newness of the multi-pillar pension model, making research studies in this 
area scarce. This chapter fills this gap by shedding light on the relationship between the 
labour market and the Thai five-pillar pension system. In order to understand whether 
informality is a causal factor behind the performance outcome of pension and savings 
schemes for informal workers, particularly the voluntary savings scheme in the third pillar, 
this chapter to analyses the experiences of these Thai citizens.  
To further support and answer this thesis’s main research questions, this chapter addresses 
the following guiding questions: 1) Why did many members of the Thai senior informal 
working population opt out of joining a scheme(s), specifically the voluntary savings 
scheme?; 2) How did informality affect informal workers’ decisions on savings 
behaviour?; 3) To what extent and how was a vulnerable group in the labour market 
affected by informality in the context of the Thai five-pillar pension system?; and 4) What 
were citizens’ attitudes towards the pension programmes offered by both schemes? This 
chapter’s data analysis reveals the causal factors affecting citizens’ interests and decisions 
regarding joining the pension programme and help the researcher picture why the non-
contributory pension scheme’s results were far more successful than those of the 
voluntary savings scheme.  
The current chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is the introductory 
section, which outlines the overall chapter. Second, the following section reviews the 
frequency and percentage of respondent characteristics in each category (socio-
demographic, financial resources and labour market conditions). Third, the main purpose 
of this section is to examine the respondents’ personal characteristics (the independent 
variables) and their savings behaviour (the dependent variable) so as to evaluate the effect 
of the informal economy of the informal labour market on their savings behaviours; this 
should lead to an evaluation of this thesis’s main research questions. This section presents 
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an analysis of each variable through use of a chi-square test and cross tabulation data 
analysis to define whether any variables are interrelated. This section also examines the 
vulnerable group in the current Thai pension system. Apart from reviewing the data 
analysis from the fieldwork, this section also compares and analyses data analysis with 
prior studies regarding the Thai and other cases. More specifically, it analyses the 
relevance of a citizen working in the informal labour market with the probability of that 
citizen making contributions for retirement by comparing the Thai case to others in the 
Latin America region. Next, the fourth section evaluates the respondents’ satisfaction 
with the pension programmes offered and analyses the answers using open-ended 
question. This section gives a general idea of Thai citizens’ views on the pension and 
savings schemes. It sheds light on how the process of decentralisation structure and local 
governance, as well as the policy design of each pension programme are relevant to the 
pension interests and decisions made by the Thai elderly. The data in this section are 
discussed and compared to the data in the previous sections before further analysing the 
in-depth interview data in more detail in the next chapter. Lastly, concluding remarks for 
the chapter are provided.  
4.2 Respondents’ personal characteristics obtained from the 
questionnaire  
Individual experience is the richest source of information for finding answers to the 
socioeconomic conditions that affect the final decisions of individuals to save in a 
voluntary savings scheme. Accordingly, before finding out which variables affected the 
respondents’ savings decisions, in this section, the characteristics of respondents from the 
questionnaire survey are presented. In Table 4.1, the characteristics of respondents 
obtained from the questionnaire survey are reviewed as a descriptive data analysis, using 
percentage and frequency.  
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of respondents 
 
Variable Percentage (100) Frequency (204)
Gender
     Male 
     Female
42.2 
57.8
86 
118
Age
     50-59 
     60 and above
54.4 
45.6
111 
93
Marital Status
     Single 
     Married 
     Divorced or widowed
16.7 
54.4 
28.9
34 
111 
59
Education
     No education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     University degree
10.8 
27.5 
33.3 
28.4
22 
56 
68 
58
Hometown
     Rural 
     Urban
33.8 
66.2
69 
135
Financial support from family members
     No 
     Yes
45.6 
54.4
93 
111
Looking after someone else
     No 
     Yes
54.4 
45.6
111 
93
Living arrangement
     Living alone 
     Living with spouse only 
     Living with family members 
     Living with unrelated persons
19.6 
12.7 
56.4 
11.3
40 
26 
115 
23
Received pension provision, OAA
     No 
     Yes
55.9 
44.1
114 
90
Labour market
     Informal 
     Formal
85.3 
14.7
174 
30
Income
     Low-income level 
     Middle-income level 
     High-income level
34.3 
44.6 
21.1
70 
91 
43
Types of Job
     With formal contract 
     Multiple jobs/street vendor 
     Service sector 
     Family worker 
     Self-employed
14.7 
17.2 
17.6 
34.8 
15.7
30 
35 
36 
71 
32
Savings
     No 
     Yes
47.1 
52.9
96 
108
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Table 4.1 displays the 204 respondents. Overall, more women completed the 
questionnaire than men. There were 118 female respondents (57.8%) and 86 male 
respondents (42.2%). Of these, 111 respondents (54.4%) were Thai senior citizens aged 
between 50 and 59 years, whilst 93 of them (45.6%) were aged 60 and above. Among the 
respondents, more than half were married senior citizens (54.4%). Nearly 30% were 
divorced or widowed (28.9%), and the smallest number among marital status statistics 
including those identifying as single (16.7%). Regarding educational background, more 
than 30 per cent of the questionnaire participants had graduated from secondary school 
(33.3%). This was followed by those holding university degrees (28.4%) and those with 
a primary school level education (27.5%). Consequently, participants with less than a 
primary school degree were the lowest respondent population at 10.8%. Of the 204 
respondents, 135 were originally from the urban area of Bangkok, amounting to about 
66.2% of respondents. Meanwhile, 69 respondents (33.8%) had migrated from rural areas. 
The data in Table 4.1 shows that not every participant received financial support from 
family members. Approximately half of the respondents received financial help from their 
family (54.4%), while (45.6%) did not. This number roughly corresponds with those in 
charge of looking after other family members. Table 4.1 displays that 93, or 45.6%, of 
the respondents were in charge of looking after other family members, whilst the other 
111 participants, or 54.4%, were mainly looking after just themselves. This implies that 
respondents who were looking after someone else tended not to receive any financial 
support from their family members, whilst those who received financial support did not 
have to look after someone else. The data show that Thai senior citizens are likely to live 
with their family members. Out of 204 questionnaire respondents, there were 115 
participants (56.4%) living with their families. The remaining percentages were 
distributed among those who lived by themselves (19.6%), who lived with a spouse 
(12.7%) and who lived with unrelated persons (11.3%).  
It appears that more than half of respondents did not receive an OAA subsidy from the 
government (55.9%), whilst 44.1% did receive a subsidy. This could be explained by the 
fact that more than half the respondents were not yet in the group able to receive a subsidy, 
as had yet to reach the age of 60 and above. It is interesting to note that of the 93 
respondents aged 60 and above, 90 were receiving subsidies. This means that only three 
qualifying respondents aged 60 and above were not receiving government subsidies. This 
outcome indicates that the non-contributory scheme has achieved much of its goal of 
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covering all Thai senior citizens. Nevertheless, it is worth finding out why the other three 
respondents who were eligible to join the OAA had not yet joined. The explanation given 
by these three respondents as to why they did not join the scheme, together with those 
between aged between 50 and 59 might help the researcher clarify the reason why some 
Thai elderly did not join the universal non-contributory pension scheme to receive a 
pension allowance (NESDB, 2014). 
As the current thesis mainly focuses on Thai senior citizens in the informal working 
population, the majority of respondents were in the informal sector. Indeed, 174 
respondents were informal workers (85.3%), whilst 30 were employees with a formal 
contract (14.7%). Out of the 204 questionnaire participants, the majority of the 
respondents were in the middle-income group (44.6%), followed by the low-income 
group (34.3%), then the high-income group (21.1%). The respondents in the high-income 
group consisted of the lowest number among the groups working for wages. This could 
be explained by the fact that the majority of respondents were in the informal sector. 
Though the main focus of the thesis is the informal working population, formal employees 
were also included in the questionnaire data. This was done in order to determine whether 
a gap exists between formal and informal labour market conditions. According to the 
respondents’ responses about their occupation from the questionnaire data and the main 
focus of the thesis, this thesis classified types of jobs into five types: 1) employees in the 
formal sector, 2) multiple jobs or street job workers, 3) workers in the service sector, 4) 
retired or family workers and 5) self-employed workers. Taking a closer look at the types 
of informal jobs in the empirical study, 34.8% of respondents were family workers, whilst 
the other three types of informal worker were more or less evenly distributed among 
service sector workers (17.6%), multiple-job workers (17.2%) and self-employed workers 
(15.7%). 
Table 4.1 illustrates that though more than half of participants (52.9%) had begun saving 
for their retirement, there were still a number of respondents who had not contributed any 
savings or joined the voluntary savings scheme (47.1%). There were 108 respondents 
who admitted making a savings contribution; 30 of them were employees in the formal 
labour market. This confirms the fact that all the formal workers officially contributed 
savings for their retirement due to the requirements imposed on formal employees in both 
public and private sectors by the government (Boonpiam, 2014). On the other hand, in 
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the informal workers’ sector, only 78 respondents out of 174, or 44.8% of the respondents 
in the informal sector, admitted saving for their retirement (Table 4.2). This indicates that 
citizens in the informal sector are less likely to save or contribute to their retirement than 
those in the formal labour market.  
To find out whether being part of the informal working population constrained the 
informal workers’ pension contributions, the next section presents data illustrating the 
association between citizens’ personal characteristics and their savings behaviour.  
4.3 The relationships between respondents’ personal characteristics 
and their savings behaviour 
Based on information from the questionnaire survey data presented in section 4.2, the 
present section presents a wealth of information about the relationship between the 
personal characteristics of the respondents (independent variables) and their savings 
behaviour (dependent variable). The characteristics of respondents were reviewed and 
analysed using a chi-square test and cross tabulation data analysis. This section helps 
evaluate the thesis’s argument on whether the informality constraint of the informal 
labour market might impact on citizens’ interests and decisions regarding savings 
behaviour. The independent variables are: socio-demographic factors, financial sources 
and labour market conditions. The dependent variable was coded into two groups using 
the following savings behaviour: 1) those who contributed to saving for retirement; and 
2) those who did not contribute to saving for retirement. The data are presented in Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Percentage distribution of Thai senior citizens in savings percentage (number) 
  
Variable Not savings Savings Percentage (Frequency) 100(204) Chi-square test
Gender
     Male 
     Female
19.8 (17) 
66.9 (79)
80.2 (69) 
33.1 (39)
42.2 (86) 
57.8 (118)
p-value < 0.05
Age
     50-59 
     60 and above
62.2 (69) 
29.0 (27)
37.8 (42) 
71.0 (66)
54.4 (111) 
45.6 (93)
p-value < 0.05
Marital Status
     Single 
     Married 
     Divorced
94.1 (32) 
14.4 (16) 
81.4 (48)
5.9 (2) 
85.6 (95) 
18.6 (11)
16.7 (34) 
54.4 (111) 
28.9 (59)
p-value < 0.05
Education
     No education 
     Primary school 
     Secondary school 
     University degree
95.5 (21) 
91.1 (51) 
30.9 (21) 
5.2 (3)
4.5 (1) 
8.9 (5) 
69.1 (47) 
94.8 (55)
10.8 (22) 
27.5 (56) 
33.3 (68) 
28.4 (58)
p-value < 0.05
Hometown
     Rural 
     Urban
68.1 (47) 
36.3 (49)
31.9 (22) 
63.7 (86)
33.8 (69) 
66.2 (135)
p-value < 0.05
Financial support from family
     No 
     Yes
65.6 (61) 
31.5 (35)
34.4 (32) 
68.5 (76)
45.6 (93) 
54.4 (111)
p-value < 0.05
Looking after someone else
     No 
     Yes
40.5 (45) 
54.8 (51)
59.5 (66) 
45.2 (42)
54.4 (111) 
45.6 (93)
p-value < 0.05
Living arrangement
     Living alone 
     Living with spouse only 
     Living with family members 
     Living with unrelated persons
95.0 (38) 
46.2 (12) 
20.9 (24) 
95.7 (22)
5.0 (2) 
53.8 (14) 
79.1 (91) 
4.3 (1)
19.6 (40) 
12.7 (26) 
56.4 (115) 
11.3 (23)
p-value < 0.05
Received pension provision, OAA
     No 
     Yes
61.4 (70) 
28.9 (26)
38.6 (44) 
71.1 (64)
55.9 (114) 
44.1 (90)
p-value < 0.05
Labour market
     Informal 
     Formal
55.2 (96) 
0
44.8 (78) 
100 (30)
85.3 (174) 
14.7 (30)
p-value < 0.05
Income
     Low-income level 
     Middle-income level 
     High-income level
78.6 (55) 
42.9 (39) 
4.7 (2)
21.4 (15) 
57.1 (52) 
95.3 (41)
34.3 (70) 
44.6 (91) 
21.1 (43)
p-value < 0.05
Types of Job
     With formal contract 
     Multiple jobs/street vendor 
     Service sector 
     Family worker 
     Self-employed
0 
77.1 (27) 
63.9 (23) 
32.4 (23) 
71.9 (23)
100 (30) 
22.9 (8) 
36.1 (13) 
67.6 (48) 
28.1 (9)
14.7 (30) 
17.2 (35) 
17.6 (36) 
34.8 (71) 
15.7 (32)
p-value < 0.05
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Table 4.2 summarises the results of the chi-square test and the percentage and number of 
the association between dependent variable (savings behaviour) and independent 
variables (different personal characteristics). The chi-square test was employed to test the 
association of two variables: personal characteristics and savings behaviour. Hypothesis 
0 (H0) indicates that two variables are independent; whilst Hypothesis 1 (H1) indicates 
that savings behaviour is a variable dependent on one or more personal characteristics 
(independent) variables. If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected, and thus H1 is accepted, indicating that there is a significant association between 
the two variables.  
In Table 4.2, the chi-square test reviewed that all personal characteristics (independent) 
variables, including socio-demographic factors, financial resources and labour market 
conditions, and saving (dependent) variable are associated. The p-value of each category 
analysis is less than 0.05. This result indicates that regards statistical data analysis, all the 
variables of respondents’ personal characteristics are significantly associated with 
respondents’ decisions to contribute or not to saving for retirement. Looking at each 
characteristic variable of the respondents individually in relation to their decision to save 
for retirement shows that more male respondents (69) claimed to be saving for retirement 
than female respondents (39). Moreover, the data indicate that respondents aged 60 and 
above (71.0%) were more likely to save for retirement than the elderly aged 50–59 
(37.8%). The number of OAA pension receivers appears to follow the same direction as 
their age: 71.1% of those who received the OAA have already started saving for 
retirement; whilst 61.4% of those who have not yet received the OAA have also not yet 
started saving for retirement. 
More than 50% of the respondents were married (54.4%, 111 respondents), and 85.6% of 
them had saved for their retirement, leaving only 14.4% of married elderly who were not 
saving. The number of divorced or widowed respondents who had contributed savings 
was higher (18.6%) than the number of those who were single and saving (5.9%). 
Likewise, the number of respondents who lived with family members was the group in 
which most members were saving for retirement (79.1%). More of the elderly who 
received financial support from family members were saving for their retirement (68.5%) 
than those who did not receive support from family members (34.4%). This parallels those 
who are looking after someone else. The respondents who claimed to look after someone 
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else tended to save for their retirement (45.2%) less than those who did not (59.5%). In 
terms of educational background, the majority of respondents with higher degrees were 
saving for retirement; the same was not true for those with less education. There was a 
huge gap in savings behaviour between those with no schooling and primary school level 
education and those with university degrees and secondary level education. The 
contribution rates were higher in groups with university degrees (94.8%), followed by 
secondary school level (69.1%), primary school level (8.9%) and lower than primary level 
education (4.5%). It is also interesting to note that the number of migrant respondents 
who had moved to the city and who claimed to be saving for retirement (31.9%) was 
significantly lower than those who originated from Bangkok (63.7%). 
Type of labour market is one of the most vital factors in citizens’ decision to save. Every 
respondent in the formal sector claimed to be saving for his or her elderly livelihood, as 
all the formal workers were automatically included in the savings scheme of the current 
system. Based on the survey data, there is a massive gap between the savings behaviour 
of formal and informal workers. Only 44.8% of respondents in the informal sector had 
contributed to saving for retirement. This could be explained by the Law of SSA 33 
(Social Security Act, 1990) that states all formal employees have to contribute to the 
pension system formally via a mandatory savings scheme, whilst saving for retirement in 
the informal sector is a voluntary option. More specifically, the number of informal 
workers saving for retirement in each type of occupation in the informal sector (family 
worker 67.6%, service sector 36.1%, self-employed 28.1% and multiple jobs or street 
vendor jobs 22.9%) tends to be lower than the number in the formal sector. When broken 
into different types of occupations inside the informal sector, family workers ranked the 
highest among participants who were saving for retirement. Participants undertaking the 
other three types of informal jobs displayed less saving behaviour than did family workers. 
Regarding the income level in Table 4.2, the majority of respondents with high-income 
levels had saved for retirement (95.3%), but fewer of those with a lower income had 
begun saving (middle-income 57.1% and low-income level 21.4%). Notably, contribution 
rates, from the questionnaire these accord with income levels, indicate a vast gap between 
the numbers of contributors to each level of income. Two participants who earned a high-
income level claimed they were not saving for retirement. Accordingly, a question 
seeking the reason behind the decision to not join the scheme from high-income 
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respondents is raised. This will thus be examined and analysed in interview data analysis 
in the following chapter. 
To conclude, the chi-square data analysis reviewed that the p-value of each category 
analysis registered at less than 0.05. The statistical data analysis in Table 4.2 emphasises 
that all personal characteristics of respondents significantly interrelate with saving 
behaviour. This implies that being a worker in the informal labour market exerts a 
significantly impact on saving behaviour. 
4.3.1 Labour market conditions and their savings behaviour 
The Chi-square test reviewed that personal characteristics of informal workers 
significantly impacted the informal working population’s decision to save for retirement. 
The section uses cross tabulation analysis, based on data from the questionnaire survey, 
to further review that type of job, income level, living arrangement and financial support 
from family members are relevant to citizens’ decision-making. 
4.3.1.1 Types of job and income levels 
The data analysis in the previous section shows a huge gap between the savings 
behaviours of respondents from different types of occupations, income levels, and those 
receiving financial support from family members. This section thus first reveals the 
relationship between the respondents’ occupations and their income levels. 
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Table 4.3: Types of job and income levels 
 
The data in Table 4.3 summarises that most informal workers appear to be low- and 
middle-income respondents. Only some of the respondents in the family worker or self-
employed groups in the informal sector that included in the high-income group. It seems 
that most of the respondents in the multiple-job or street-job group tended to earn a low 
income (65.7%), while respondents with any of the other three types of informal 
occupation were mostly at the middle-income level (service sector 58.3%, retired or 
family workers 45.1%, self-employed 56.3%), and most of the formal workers were at 
the high-income level (70%). This indicates that the working population in the informal 
sector tends to have fewer opportunities to contribute savings for their retirement due to 
income constraints. The different types of jobs available in the labour market, levels of 
income and savings behaviour are clearly interrelated. Some studies have demonstrated 
that the informal working population is a vulnerable group in the labour market 
(Warunsiri, 2011:451). In the same vein, based on the data analysis in this chapter, this 
thesis suggests that informal employment is ‘vulnerable employment’ directly impacting 
on informal workers’ savings contributions.  
As the data in Table 4.3 shows, apart from employees in the formal labour market, those 
in the retired or family worker and self-employed groups were also categorised at a high-
Total Low income Middle income High income
Total 100 (204) 34.3 (70) 44.6 (91) 21.1 (43)
Formal sector 14.7 (30) 3.3 (1) 26.8 (8) 70.7 (21)
Multiple/Street 
jobs 17.2 (35) 65.7 (23) 34.3 (12) 0
Service sector 17.6 (36) 41.7 (15) 58.3 (21) 0
Retired/Family 
workers 34.8 (71) 28.2 (20) 45.1 (32) 26.8 (19)
Self-employed 15.7 (32) 34.4 (11) 56.3 (18) 9.4 (3)
Types of Job and Income Levels 
Percentage (Number)
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income level; the data in Table 4.2 indicate that informal workers in the family worker 
group have the highest percentage of savings behaviours, higher than for other types of 
jobs in the informal labour market. Based on this, this thesis further examines respondents 
receiving financial support from their family members and their savings behaviours. 
4.3.1.2 Informal transfers, living arrangements and savings behaviours 
Previous studies on the Thai case (Gough, 2001:170; Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 
2007:37; Cook and Kwon, 2007a:226, 2007b:12; Knodel et al., 2013:51) and official data 
(TGRI, 2014) highlight that the elderly in Asia, including Thailand, tend to be financially 
sponsored or looked after by their children, grandchildren or other family members; even 
when the elderly are divorced or widowed, they tend to have children or grandchildren or 
other relatives in their family who look after them. From this assertion, the data analysis 
in this thesis also reaches the same conclusion. Although being a family worker is an 
unpaid job in the informal sector, the elderly who were receiving financial support from 
their family members, also tended to have economic security in their retirement. In 
contrast, other types of informal workers have the same or less financial support; hence 
less economic security than unpaid family workers.  
Table 4.4: Financial support from family, savings and types of job 
 
Financial 
support from 
family 
Savings Formal Multiple/ Street jobs
Service 
sector
Retired/
Family 
workers
Self-
employed
100 (204) 100 (204) 14.7 (30) 17.2 (35) 17.6 (36) 34.8 (71) 15.7 (32)
Not received No   65.6 (61) 0 34.4 (21) 29.5 (18) 13.1 (8) 23.0 (14)
45.6 (93) Yes  34.3 (32) 59.4 (19) 6.3 (2) 6.3 (2) 25.0 (8) 3.1 (1)
Total 45.6 (93) 20.4 (19) 24.7 (23) 21.5 (20) 17.2 (16) 16.1 (15)
Received No  31.5 (35) 0 17.1 (6) 14.3 (5) 42.9 (15) 25.7 (9)
54.4 (111) Yes 68.5 (76) 14.5 (11) 7.9 (6) 14.5 (11) 52.6 (40) 10.5 (8)
Total 54.4 (111) 9.9 (11) 10.8 (12) 14.4 (16) 49.5 (55) 15.3 (17)
Financial Support from Family, Savings and Types of Job 
Percentage (Number)
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Table 4.4 shows that 40 retired or family worker respondents (52.6%) who received 
financial support from family members claimed to have contributed savings for their 
retirement, followed by those in the formal sector (14.5%), service sector (14.5%), self-
employed (10.5%), and multiple jobs or street vendor jobs (7.9%). This indicates that the 
Thai elderly in the retired or family worker group received financial support more than 
any other type of job, in either the formal or informal sector. It also indicates that apart 
from the formal working population, the percentage of retired or family worker 
respondents who saved for retirement is significantly higher than for the other types of 
informal worker jobs. Despite the data in this table showing that the elderly who received 
financial support from family members tended to save for their retirement more than those 
who did not receive family support or received less, it is important to note that they are 
still counted as a vulnerable group. This is because, if the family members could not look 
after or support them anymore, they would not be able to contribute to their savings or 
even earn a living. 
The next section thus investigates further in-depth details regarding the vulnerable group 
in the current Thai pension system. 
4.3.2 Vulnerable group in the Thai five-pillar pension system 
Many prior studies have highlighted that the Thai elderly are now facing situations of 
vulnerability (Paitoonpong, 2008; TGRI, 2011, 2014), especially the female elderly 
(Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:47). The data in some prior studies further 
indicates that female citizens in the informal sector comprise a vulnerable group in the 
labour market (Chen, Vorek and Carr, 2004:40; Warunsiri, 2011:451). Meanwhile, some 
prior studies highlight that migrants from rural to urban areas tend to be less-educated, 
and thus get stuck in the informal labour market without other options (Thanakawang and 
Soonthorndhada, 2007:36). The data analysis of the questionnaire survey (Table 4.2) 
indicates that more male respondents than female respondents were saving for their 
retirement. However, it does not explain whether the Thai female elderly in the informal 
labour market are the vulnerable group of the current Thai pension system or not, nor 
does it review any relationship between savings behaviour and the identified concern 
around migration. From this assertion, this section aims to find out if the data analysis 
from the fieldwork also points out that the Thai female elderly and rural to urban area 
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migrants, both of whom work in the informal labour market, are the most vulnerable 
groups in the Thai five-pillar pension system.  
4.3.2.1 Are female informal workers categorised as a vulnerable group? 
Some previous studies have explained that the informal working population not only 
earns less income than the formal sector population, but also suffers from a huge gender 
gap (Chen, 2001; Chen, et al., 2004). The average income of male informal workers tends 
to be higher than that of female workers due to the types of jobs in the informal sector 
that each gender holds (ILO, 2014). Chen et al. (2004:40) explain that in informal sectors 
around the world, men tend to be over-represented in the top segment, whilst women tend 
to be over-represented in the bottom segment, especially in unpaid jobs such as family 
worker; there are also significant gaps in wages between female and male informal 
workers. This implies that men tend to get better jobs than women in both the formal and 
informal sectors.  
 
Figure 4.1: Average earnings and gender segmentation   
Source: Adapted from Chen et al., 2004:40 
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 128 
Warunsiri (2011:452) highlights that traditional Thai beliefs sustain inequality in the 
social, work and family status of men and women. This inequality increases the number 
of Thai female labourers holding family worker positions in the informal sector. In 
official data gathered between 2002 and 2007, The National Statistical Office (NSO) 
(2008:61) revealed that women (460,000-330,000) tended to do work at home more than 
men (120,000-100,000). It appears that previous studies have also raised concerns over 
the gender gap in the labour market and wages globally, including in Thailand. This study 
builds on previous studies to further explain how the gender gap in the labour market can 
indirectly impact the effectiveness of extending pension and savings schemes coverage 
to the informal sector.  
Table 4.5: Gender, savings and types of job 
 
Table 4.5 reviews the link between gender, savings and job type. When broken into 
different types of job, the results show that female respondents were categorised as 
informal workers more than men in every category, with 38 respondents, or 32.2% of 
female respondents, working as family workers, followed by 26 multiple-job workers 
(22.0%), 24 service sector workers (20.3%) and 18 self-employed workers (15.3%). In 
the case of savings, the data significantly show that the numbers of the female elderly in 
Gender Savings Formal Multiple/ Street jobs
Service 
sector
Retired/ 
Family 
workers
Self-employed
100 (204) 100 (204) 14.7 (30) 17.2 (35) 17.6 (36) 34.8 (71) 15.7 (32)
Male No   19.8 (17) 0 29.4 (5) 17.6 (3) 11.8 (2) 41.2 (7)
42.2 (86) Yes  80.2 (69) 26.1 (18) 5.8 (4) 13.0 (9) 44.9 (31) 10.1 (7)
Total 42.2 (86) 20.9 (18) 10.5 (9) 14.0 (12) 38.4 (33) 16.3 (14)
Female No  66.9 (79) 0 27.8 (22) 25.3 (20) 26.6 (21) 20.3 (16)
57.8 (118) Yes 33.1 (39) 30.8 (12) 10.3 (4) 10.3 (4) 43.6 (17) 5.1 (2)
Total 57.8 (118) 10.2 (12) 22.0 (26) 20.3 (24) 32.2 (38) 15.3 (18)
Gender, Savings and Income Levels 
Percentage (Number)
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the informal sector who saved for retirement were lower than men. From Table 4.5, it can 
be concluded that the Thai female elderly exist mostly in the informal sector, especially 
in the family worker group. They heavily rely on their family members’ support for 
expenses, and more than the Thai female elderly in other job types within the informal 
sector. This can be explained by the greater financial support that family workers receive 
from their family members (Table 4.6).  
Table 4.6: Gender, savings and financial support from family 
 
In Table 4.6, the data indicate that more female than male respondents received financial 
support from family members. However, the number of males who received financial 
support from family members contributed to their savings more than did women. Lloyd-
Sherlock and Khumya (2004:6) stress that older men in Thailand are less likely to receive 
financial support than women. The current study builds on this argument and further 
highlights that however receiving financial support from family members does not 
guarantee that the elderly will automatically be able to save for their retirements. That 
said, the number of male elderly who are managing to save for their retirement is 
significantly higher. No matter if the Thai male citizens received or did not receive 
Financial support 
from family Savings Male Female
100 (204) 100 (204) 42.4 (86) 57.8 (118)
Not received No   65.6 (61) 18.0 (11) 82.0 (50)
45.6 (93) Yes  34.3 (32) 65.6 (21) 34.4 (11)
Total 45.6 (93) 34.4 (32) 65.6 (61)
Received No  31.5 (35) 17.1 (6) 82.9 (29)
54.4 (111) Yes  68.5 (76) 63.2 (48) 36.8 (28)
Total 54.4 (111) 48.6 (54) 51.4 (57)
Financial Support from Family, Savings and Gender 
Percentage (Number)
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financial support from their family members, they are still more likely to make savings 
more than women.  
Some prior studies indicate that in most countries in East Asia, the family is the core 
source of ‘social welfare and service delivery’ (Gough, 2001:163 Cook and Kwon, 
2007a:226, 2007b:2; Choi, 2012:3; Kuypers, 2014:12). Thai seniors are typically married 
and reside with at least one child (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:47). This 
implies that social security and income security for the Thai elderly unofficially tends to 
be a responsibility shouldered by family members (Knodel et al., 2015:5). Senior 
employees in the formal sector are able to look after themselves, as they have already 
contributed to retirement plans while working. For most Thai seniors in the informal 
sector, however, economic constraints may be reduced if they live with family members 
or are regularly supported by them (Knodel and Teerawichitchainan, 2017:6; 
Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:47). The senior women in the family worker 
group, for example, would not be able to live with income security or contribute savings 
for their retirement unless they were receiving (enough) financial support. Thanakwang 
and Soonthorndhada (2007:46) conclude that Thai women tend to face economic 
vulnerability when they are older and more likely to be dependent on family members for 
financial support. This appears to be true in the data analysis undertaken in this research. 
In short, from this perspective, without informal support and services from family 
members or a governmental old age allowance, informal workers, specifically Thai 
female, face substantial economic vulnerability. 
Taking a closer look at respondents’ gender and income levels, the data seem to be 
relevant to their savings behaviour.  
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Table 4.7: Gender, savings and income levels 
 
Table 4.7 displays income level in terms of participants’ savings behaviour and gender. 
Although all the female respondents at a high-income level (15 respondents) contributed 
to saving for their pension, more than half the female respondents were categorised at a 
low-income level (55 respondents) and middle-income level (48 respondents). Only 17 
of the middle-income female respondents and only 7 of the low-income female 
respondents reported that they were saving for their retirement, whilst the majority of 
low-income (48 respondents) and middle-income (31 respondents) female respondents 
had not started saving yet. In the case of the male respondents, majority of male 
participants in all three income levels claimed to be saving for their retirement. Only 2 
high-income male respondents were not saving for their retirement; the other 26 high-
income male workers were saving for their retirement. This suggests that a high income 
may not be the only reason for Thai senior citizens deciding whether or not to save for 
retirement; many other factors may be behind their decisions. It is worth noting that the 
questionnaire data indicated that some participants have to look after someone else, for 
instance, this is one of the reasons why they could not afford to save for their retirement. 
In the family workers at high-income level case, if their family members earned a higher 
income, the female elderly in family worker group would be able to save for their 
Gender Savings Low-income Middle-income High-income
100 (204) 100 (204) 34.3 (70) 44.6 (91) 21.1 (43)
Male No   19.8 (17) 41.2 (7) 47.1 (8) 11.8 (2)
42.2 (86) Yes  80.2 (69) 11.6 (8) 50.7 (35) 37.7 (26)
Total 42.2 (86) 17.4 (15) 50.0 (43) 32.6 (28)
Female No  66.9 (79) 60.8 (48) 39.2 (31) 0
57.8 (118) Yes 33.1 (39) 17.9 (7) 43.6 (17) 38.5 (15)
Total 57.8 (118) 46.6 (55) 40.7 (48) 12.7 (15)
Gender, Savings and Income Levels 
Percentage (Number)
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retirement. However, if their family members could only provide financial support for 
their daily lives, it would be impossible for the dependent elderly in the family worker 
group to contribute savings. By the same token, even though some informal workers are 
able to earn a high-income, they might not be able to save for their retirement due to 
personal issues, such as looking after someone else. This will be further discussed and 
analysed after the interview data analysis in the following chapter. 
Regarding the data in Table 4.2 showing a significant gap in respondents’ saving 
behaviours at different levels of educational background, when taking a closer look at the 
respondents’ genders, types of job, and education, there are some interesting data worth 
highlighting. 
Table 4.8: Gender, types of job and educational levels  
 
 
Gender Types of job Lower than primary school
Primary 
school
Seconday 
school University
100 (204) 100 (204) 10.8 (22) 27.5 (56) 33.3 (68) 28.4 (58)
Male Formal 20.9 (18) 0 0 5.6 (1) 94.4 (17)
Multiple/Street 
jobs 
10.5 (9)
22.2 (2) 11.1 (1) 66.7 (6) 0
42.2 (86) Service sector 14.0 (12) 0 41.7 (5) 58.3 (7) 0
Retired/Family 
worker 
38.4 (33)
6.1 (2) 6.1 (2) 27.3 (9) 60.6 (20)
Self-employed 
16.3 (14) 0 14.3 (2) 64.3 (9) 21.4 (3)
Total 42.2 (86) 4.7 (4) 11.6 (10) 37.2 (32) 46.5 (40)
Female Formal 10.2 (12) 0 0 16.7 (2) 83.3 (10)
Multiple/Street 
jobs 
22.0 (26)
15.4 (4) 61.5 (16) 23.1 (6) 0
57.8 (118) Service sector 20.3 (24) 4.2 (1) 45.8 (11) 50.0 (12) 0
Retired/Family 
worker 
32.2 (38)
21.1 (8) 26.3 (10) 34.2 (13) 18.4 (7)
Self-employed 
15.3 (18) 27.8 (5) 50.0 (9) 16.7 (3) 5.6 (1)
Total 57.8 (118) 15.3 (18) 39.0 (46) 30.5 (36) 15.3 (18)
Gender, Types of Job and Educational Levels 
Percentage (Number)
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The data in Table 4.8 show that the informal working population in the Thai case tend to 
be women more than men. The data in Table 4.8 also show that the Thai female elderly 
in the informal sector tend to have a lower educational background than men. Male 
respondents were outnumbered by women at most educational levels, except the 
university degree. Based on the data in this table, it is further indicated that workers in 
the formal labour market tend to hold higher educational qualifications than those in the 
informal labour market; and women in all the informal job groups appear to hold a lower 
educational status than men. It can be concluded that the Thai female elderly tend to have 
a lower educational background and be categorised in the informal labour market.  
Because of their personal characteristics and their types of job, these female senior 
citizens have fewer opportunities to save for retirement. In other words, the Thai female 
elderly appear to have fewer opportunities to contribute to their retirement savings and 
thus enjoy less economic security in their later life than men, as most of the formal 
workers tend to be well-educated. It is interesting to note that Cook and Pincus (2014:11), 
analysing data on the educational level of the female labour force in South-East Asia 
region, concluded that Thai women (10%) in the labour force who have completed 
secondary education ranked at the bottom, significantly lower than women in Singapore 
(50%), Malaysia (50%), Indonesia (20%), and the Philippines (38%). Based on their 
analysis, this implies that Thai female labourers are now in an urgent situation 
internationally. If they remain less-educated citizens, this will limit their job options in 
the labour market and thus affect their opportunities to earn a higher income, reflecting 
on their savings behaviour. 
In summary, based on the data analyses in this section, it can be concluded that the Thai 
female elderly with low-educational background in the informal labour market constitute 
a vulnerable group in the current Thai five-pillar pension system, with fewer opportunities 
to save for retirement. The causal factor underlying an important role in shaping an 
individual’s position within the labour market and thereby structuring the nature of their 
engagement with the pension system is not gender, but education. 
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4.3.2.2 Are migrant informal workers categorised as a vulnerable group? 
Lloyd-Sherlock and Khumya’s (2004) research paper focuses on the economic well-being 
of the Thai elderly in poor rural and urban communities. They stress that living in a rural 
location and extreme old age are strongly associated with economic vulnerability. There 
is a large gap in economic well-being between rural and urban areas. The current chapter 
builds on the summary and further highlights the similarities and differences that exists 
between migrants in the informal sector who come from rural areas and informal workers 
who are local residents of urban area like Bangkok. Many previous studies on the Thai 
case have given their attention to informal workers in rural areas, where the majority of 
the informal workforce resides (Thavorn et al., 2013). This focus, however, has led to 
ignorance regarding those low-income migrant informal workers who have moved to 
urban areas and those low-income local residents who could also be categorised as facing 
with economic vulnerability, just like those workers in rural areas.  
Due to the country’s development process, Thailand’s economy has shifted from a 
reliance on agriculture to a reliance on the industrial sector. Accordingly, the Thai 
people’s career structure and ways of working have also shifted, especially with regard 
to a moving away from traditional Thai agriculture. Warunsiri’s (2011:451) study on ‘The 
Role of Informal Sector in Thailand ’ highlights that when the demand for an agriculture 
workforce becomes lower than the supply of labour, the jobs of the informal sector in 
urban areas play a distinct role in absorbing the surplus labour workforce from rural areas, 
as workers strive to survive and escape the poverty and underemployment rampant in the 
rural areas. Indeed, many informal labour workers have migrated to urban centres for 
work opportunities, particularly Bangkok, as it is the capital city and Thailand’s most 
well-developed city (ibid.). Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada’s (2007) study on the 
‘Determinants of Economic Security among Thai Elderly’ come to the same conclusion 
as Warunsiri’s study. They (2007:35) stress that rural migration to Bangkok has expanded 
the informal workforce in Bangkok’s service sector. This could be because most labourers 
from rural areas are employed in the agriculture sector, and normally the workforce in the 
agricultural sector is considered to be unskilled and less educated (Warunsiri, 2011:451). 
In other words, the skills of most migrants from rural areas do not match labour market 
demands in urban areas, especially in the formal sector. Hence, those who have migrated 
from rural areas are unlikely to obtain jobs in the formal sector, which requires a higher 
level of education and more relevant skills.  
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As mentioned above, the data analysis in the previous studies were made almost a decade 
ago. If their conclusions are relevant to contemporary times, rural migrants with lower 
educational background in urban cities are the vulnerable group in the current pension 
system. This is because they earn less income and thus have less opportunity to contribute 
savings for retirement. An explanation of the relationship between hometown, types of 
labour market, educational levels, and income levels is required to confirm this. 
Table 4.9: Hometown, types of labour market, educational levels and income levels 
 
Hometown Labour Market Income level Education
100 (204) 100 (204) 100 (204)
Lower than primary
10.8 (22)
Primary
27.5 (56)
Secondary
33.3 (68)
University
28.4 (58)
Rural migrants Low 48.4 (31) 19.4 (6) 41.9 (13) 38.7 (12) 0
33.8 (69) Informal Middle 50 (32) 15.6 (5) 43.8 (14) 40.6 (13) 0
92.7 (64) High 1.5 (1) 0 0 0 1.6 (1)
Total 17.2 (11) 42.2 (27) 39.1 (25) 1.6 (1)
Low 
0 0 0 0 0
Formal Middle 20 (1) 0 0 0 20 (1)
7.2 (5) High 80 (4) 0 0 0 80 (4)
Total 0 0 0 100 (5)
Local residents Low 34.5 (38) 21.1 (8) 50.0 (19) 21.1 (8) 7.9 (3)
66.2 (135) Informal Middle 46.4 (51) 5.9 (3) 19.6 (10) 58.8 (30) 15.7 (8)
81.5 (110) High 19.1 (21) 0 0 9.5 (2) 90.5 (19)
Total 10.0 (11) 26.4 (29) 36.4 (40) 27.3 (30)
Low 
4 (1) 0 0 4 (1) 0
Formal Middle 20 (5) 0 0 8 (2) 20 (5)
18.5 (25) High 68 (17) 0 0 0 68 (17)
Total 0 0 12.0 (3) 88.0 (22)
Hometown, Types of labour market, Educational Levels and Income Levels 
Percentage (Number)
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Taking a closer look at the correlations between hometown, labour market, income level, 
and educational level, the data in Table 4.9 show that most of the respondents who held 
university degrees from both rural and urban areas overwhelmingly earned high income. 
Meanwhile, those with lower educational backgrounds tended to get stuck in the informal 
sector with lower income levels. This includes both rural migrants and local residents 
from rural areas in the informal sector. 
The data in Table 4.9 show that respondents in the formal sector held the highest number 
of educational degrees compared with respondents in the informal sector. Only 
respondents with a secondary level and university degree education were employed as 
formal workers, whilst participants in the informal sector tended to finish their education 
at the primary and secondary school level. Taking a close look at the relationships 
between participants’ hometown and the type of labour market that they participated in, 
it appears that hometown does not have any significant impact on respondents’ 
opportunities to find a job in a formal labour market. The data analysis in Table 4.9 shows 
no significant gap between the percentage of local resident respondents and rural migrant 
respondents in joining either the formal or informal labour market. Instead, the level of 
education has a significant impact on the type of labour market in which respondents were 
included.  
Some previous studies highlight that most of labourers from rural areas who earn a low 
income are part of the informal labour market and mostly have attained only lower levels 
of education (Paitoonpong, 2008; Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007; Warunsiri, 
2011). The current study supports this argument. It is true that most migrant informal 
workers who moved to urban areas are likely to end up in the informal sector and earn 
low and irregular incomes. However, taking a closer look at the data in Table 4.9, it 
appears that both local residents in urban areas and rural migrants to urban areas with 
lower educational backgrounds ended up working in irregular jobs and earned unfixed 
income in the informal sector. None of the lower than primary and primary education 
respondents from neither the urban area nor the rural areas were categorised as formal 
workers. The respondents with low educational backgrounds were only able to find jobs 
in the informal labour market. This outcome, however, does not apply to those who hold 
high educational degrees. Local respondents from the urban area in the formal labour 
market are overwhelmingly at the university level. Rural migrants with university degree, 
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in the same vein, were either formal workers with fixed incomes or informal workers with 
high incomes. This could explain the fact that higher education is an advantage for anyone 
who wishes to get a job in the formal sector in an urban area, while a low education tends 
to trap workers in the informal sector. This indicates that the respondents’ hometown is 
not a constraint that obstructed them from finding higher-paying and more secure jobs or 
from thereafter saving for retirement. Again, the educational level is a significant personal 
characteristic constraint that affects opportunities to find regularly well-paying jobs. 
Based on the data analysis, it could be concluded that the chance for those respondents 
with lower educational background to be categorised as part of the formal working 
population is slimmer than it is for those with higher educational backgrounds. Official 
statistics and prior studies show that rural migrants in the informal sector face economic 
vulnerability. Indeed, they represent the most vulnerable group in the labour market 
(Thavorn et al., 2013). Nevertheless, this thesis further highlights that the relationships 
between education and income level significantly impact citizens’ economic security. 
Low educational backgrounds for both local residents in urban areas and rural migrant 
informal workers indirectly led them to earn lower income levels. This low educational 
background group was therefore not able to afford to contribute to the savings programme. 
The chance for citizens categorised as informal workers to face economic vulnerability is 
higher than it is for those who work in the formal sector. As a consequence, the chance 
for them to contribute to savings for retirement is slimmer as well. Hence, it is plausible 
that most of the respondents with lower educational backgrounds tend to get stuck in the 
informal sector, earn lower income, and have a lesser chance to save for retirement. This 
group typically has not yet joined Thailand’s voluntary savings scheme.  
4.3.3 Discussion: The influence of low-income on savings behaviours can be 
explained by educational background 
A number of previous studies on the Thai context have found that informality has a 
significant negative impact on informal workers in terms of savings contributions. This 
is especially true for female seniors and migrants, who are the vulnerable group in the 
market (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007; Warunsiri, 2007; Thavorn et al., 2013). 
This thesis also supports the view that informality has a significant impact on informal 
workers’ savings behaviours. However, based on this study’s questionnaire data, this 
study found that neither the gender nor the hometown of informal workers is a main 
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personal characteristic constraint on their savings behaviour. Instead, not holding a 
university degree has a significant impact on their savings decisions.  
This study concludes that among the personal characteristics of informal workers, income 
and education levels are the major constraints on their decisions whether or not to join 
savings schemes. The data analysis shows that most informal workers with lower 
educational backgrounds than university degrees tend to receive low or irregular income, 
unlike those in the formal labour market. Thus, most informal workers are not able to 
contribute savings for retirement. Education is significant in relation to formality when 
discussing respondents with higher education, but it is not significant or even insignificant 
in respondents that do not have university education. Informality is widespread across all 
educational levels, except university levels, for both migrants and non-migrants. This 
finding implies that the role of low education is widespread in terms of informality, which 
affects citizens’ decision to join savings schemes. Due to low educational backgrounds, 
a chance for informal workers to find a job with fixed and regular income in the formal 
labour market is difficult. Therefore, the likelihood for them to make savings 
contributions is even slimmer. This study thus concludes that the influence of low income 
on informal workers’ decisions to make savings for retirement can be explained by 
informal workers’ lower educational levels. 
This chapter further concludes that the true vulnerable group in the Thai pension system 
are those who have lower educational backgrounds. Many prior studies emphasise that 
Thai female seniors and migrants in the informal labour market are those who have the 
least capability to make savings contributions (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007). 
Some scholars highlight that Thai female seniors and migrants who have moved to bigger 
cities to find better jobs tend to be categorised as informal workers and earn low and 
irregular incomes with fewer opportunities to make savings contributions (Warunsiri, 
2011). The data analysis in this study also suggests that female seniors and migrants in 
urban areas are those who face difficulties in savings for retirement. However, the 
findings from the questionnaire further reveal that low educational background is actually 
the underlying cause of not being able to make savings contributions. Those female and 
migrant informal workers who were not able to contribute savings for their retirement are 
those informal workers who held low educational backgrounds. The data analysis in this 
chapter (Table 4.9) further demonstrates that both migrants and local residents in urban 
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areas are equally likely to experience economic vulnerability if they have lower 
educational background. Both rural migrants and local residents in urban areas with 
university degrees, on the other hand, were either part of the formal working population 
with regular incomes or informal workers with high incomes. Opportunity is scarce for 
those citizens with lower educational backgrounds to be categorised as formal workers, 
earn higher incomes, or achieve enough financial support to contribute the savings for 
their retirement. Educational level plays a vital role in shaping an individual’s position 
within the Thai labour market, thereby structuring the nature of their engagement with 
the contributory savings scheme. If an individual has a lower education level, the 
individual tends to be in the informal market with little opportunity to save funds.  
It is interesting to note that the World Bank (2008:7) suggests that clients, especially 
middle-income countries, first pay attention to the reform needs of labour market issues 
and secondary evaluation criteria regarding lowering labour market distortion before 
implementing the five-pillar pension model. However, if any country’s government does 
not pay attention to these suggestions before reform, the initial conditions – including 
inherited systems, reform needs, and the enabling environment – might constrain the 
system to achieve reform designs’ core objectives (p.2). According to the World Bank’s 
reform conceptual framework, it implies that the World Bank is aware of the interaction 
between the pension system and the impact of the labour market system. This chapter’s 
data analysis confirms that the Thai government reformed the pension system but not the 
labour market system. The nature of the informality significantly impacted the 
effectiveness of expanding pension coverage to the informal sector, and unintentionally 
formed vulnerable groups in the current pension system. This implies that, in an attempt 
to reach the core objectives of pension reform, an assessment of the initial conditions and 
secondary evaluation criteria is required. In other words, to achieve the capacity for 
inclusion of informal workers, the government should consider the interaction between 
the pension system and other institutions functioning in the design.  
In summary, this section shows that informal economy of labour market and educational 
level significantly negatively impacts the informal workers’ pension savings decision-
making. Such workers have vulnerable employment, which indirectly makes them a 
vulnerable group in the Thai pension system. Informal workers at the low educational 
background and low-income are by far the most vulnerable groups in the Thai five-pillar 
pension system. Because the majority of the working population in the informal sector 
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earns a lower income than those in the formal sector, it is virtually impossible for senior 
citizens in the informal sector to contribute to the voluntary savings scheme. Based on 
this chapter’s data analysis, this thesis presumes that other middle-income countries may 
also face the same situation. 
4.3.4 Informality and savings contribution: The Thai and Latin American cases 
In The World Bank’s Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century, Holzmann et al. 
(2005:17) stress that Latin America has influenced some European and Central Asian 
countries’ efforts to reform and develop innovative approaches to design and implement 
multi-pillar pension reform. However, one of the most crucial problems that Latin 
America and the Caribbean region is now facing in term of pensions is the relatively low 
level of savings, specifically the informal working population (Tuesta, 2014; Schclarek 
and Caggia, 2015). This section thus aims to assess whether or not there are any 
similarities or differences between the Thai case and other case studies that are relevant 
to informality and informal workers’ savings contributions. 
Schclarek and Caggia (2015:2) point out that countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean have relatively low levels of savings compared to other parts of the world due 
to informality. In their paper, the authors compare the savings behaviour of the formal 
and informal working population in Chile by using a financial household survey. They 
scrutinise (2015:40) the socio-economic and financial characteristics of these workers. 
The data analysis in their paper indicates that citizens in informal households save less 
than those in formal ones. Income level is found to be the most relevant variable in 
relation to savings behaviour. One interesting point to note in their paper is that the 
informal working population in Chile mostly prefers to have lower savings rates than the 
population in formal households, this is due to the often low and unstable income they 
receive from temporary employment. The challenges of the informal sector’s inclusion in 
the Chilean case appear to align with the challenges in the Thai case discussed in the 
current thesis. The Thai senior respondents in the informal sector tended not to contribute 
any savings for retirement due to the irregular income from their flexible jobs. Based on 
these findings, this thesis concludes that no matter which part of the world is involved, 
employment informality tends to generate economic vulnerability and make it difficult to 
make any savings contributions. 
 141 
Apart from Schclarek and Caggia’s (2015) paper, a few other prior studies have also 
focused on the relationship between informality and savings for retirement. Tuesta (2014) 
discusses the informal economy and its constraints on pension contributions in Latin 
America, focusing on Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Tuesta (2014:20) 
reports that more than 68.8% of the labour workforce in Peru works in the informal sector, 
which is one of the highest percentages in Latin America and the Caribbean; and the most 
negative constraint on pension contributions in Peru (Tuesta, 2014:21). Comparing 
citizens in the formal and informal sectors, Tuesta (2014:25) further highlights that 
informal workers save less money than formal workers because they are less financially 
included in the formal system. Comparing the Thai case to those cases in Tuesta’s study, 
there are many points that shed further light on the same conclusions. In the Thai case, 
the 2015 official statistics from the Fiscal Policy Office deduced that there were 39 
million Thai citizens in the labour market, with 22 million in the informal sector; 19 
million of these informal workers, or 86%, did not save for their retirement 
(Wiriyanupong, 2015:8). This implies that only 3 million informal workers, or 14%, have 
prepared for their retirement by saving. On the other hand, 17 million of the formal 
workers in the labour market joined the mandatory savings programmes of either the first 
or the second pillar of the pension system. It is obvious that employees with a formal 
contract have a much higher probability of contributing to the pension savings system 
than informal workers do.  
Tuesta (2014:25) further emphasises that being a woman and from a rural area and having 
a low educational background have a significant negative statistical impact on the 
probability of pension contributions. The data analysis in this thesis also shows that both 
the Thai female elderly and senior migrants in the informal sector with a low income and 
low educational level face economic vulnerability. However, this thesis has further 
demonstrated that a low educational background actually is the underlying cause of 
trapping citizens in the informal labour market with low and irregular income; this threat 
leads to less opportunity to enjoy economic security for retirement. In other words, they 
tend to have fewer opportunities to contribute savings for their retirement. Comparing the 
Thai and Peruvian cases, it is once again confirmed that most informal workers struggle 
to save for their retirement globally. 
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Above all, the data analyses in the Thai case and other case studies in Latin America 
confirm that informality and savings behaviour for retirement are significantly related. 
No matter which part of the world, the informal working population are a significant 
vulnerable group in the labour market that has now become a vulnerable group in the 
pension systems. Informality tends to generate economic vulnerability and make it 
difficult to make any savings contributions. Based on this assertion, even if the Thai 
pension system has been reformed, that is, by introducing a universal old age pension 
programme and contributory savings programmes to informal workers, the effectiveness 
of extending savings scheme coverage to the informal sector is still minimised due to the 
potential negative impact of informality on saving behaviour. If the state wants to secure 
full pension coverage and substantial and long-term income security for the Thai elderly 
in the informal sector via the current five-pillar pension system, it first needs to take action 
regarding the relationship between informality in the labour market and the five-pillar 
pension system.  
Apart from reviewing how informality has indirectly impacted the effectiveness of 
voluntary savings scheme coverage, this thesis further explores whether the 
decentralisation structure of the public bureaucracy system has had any significant impact 
on the performance outcome of the non-contributory pension scheme and the voluntary 
savings scheme. To find out, this thesis analysed both respondents’ satisfaction with each 
pension programme of both pension and savings schemes and the answers from the open-
ended question. These will be considered in the following section.  
4.4 Respondents’ satisfaction with, and attitudes to, the Thai pension 
system 
The aim of this section comes with twin goals. This section first aims to determine and 
compare participants’ level of satisfaction with different programmes under the non-
contributory scheme and voluntary savings scheme of the current pension system; 
measuring satisfaction is one way to determine citizens’ interests and preferences on 
whether to join schemes; this then leads to an evaluation of the effectiveness of extending 
pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers. The data in this section will 
later be compared and triangulated with other parts of the thesis. 
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4.4.1 Respondents’ satisfaction levels 
An exploration of participants’ satisfaction towards different pension programmes of the 
non-contributory pension scheme and the voluntary savings scheme subsequently 
highlighted the strong and the weak points of the system, defining areas that may need 
improvement. There are two pension and savings schemes in the current Thai five-pillar 
pension system that include the informal working population: the Old Age Allowance 
(OAA) that exists under the non-contributory scheme and the Retirement Mutual Fund 
(RMF), National Savings Fund (NSF) and Social Security Act 40 (SSA 40), which run 
under the voluntary savings scheme. The OAA is a pension provision programme for both 
formal and informal workers. Even though the RMF is not a savings programme just for 
informal workers like the NSF and the SSA 40, it is still worth assessing in order to 
compare people’s satisfaction with it to the satisfaction they experience with the two other 
savings programmes. The comparison between the RMF and the other two savings 
programmes (NSF and SSA 40) helps evaluate the development of the voluntary savings 
scheme for informal workers. 
The current thesis uses a 5-point Likert scale to assess participants’ satisfaction with the 
pension programmes. Satisfaction with the four pension programmes in these two pension 
and savings schemes was measured on a scale of 1 to 5. 
Table 4.10: Satisfaction rating scale 
 
Range of Mean Scale Interpretation
1.00-1.80 Least satisfied
1.81-2.60 Less satisfied
2.61-3.40 Moderately satisfied
3.41-4.20 Satisfied
4.21-5.00 Very satisfied
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The questionnaire had 204 respondents from both the formal and informal working 
population. Evaluating the satisfaction of the respondents from both sectors of the labour 
market might reveal interesting information about the satisfaction of each sector with the 
system. The OAA and RMF are offered to workers in both sectors, whilst the voluntary 
savings scheme outlined in the NSF and SSA 40 programmes was designed only for the 
informal sector. Accordingly, answers related to the OAA and the RMF emerged from all 
204 respondents. On the other hand, answers regarding the NSF and the SSA 40 voluntary 
savings programmes came from only 174 respondents from the informal labour market. 
Data from the questionnaire satisfaction section are presented via three different themes 
regarding Thai seniors’ satisfaction levels: satisfaction with policy design, local 
bureaucrats’ actions, and overall satisfaction. Satisfaction with the policy design aims to 
understand whether the policy of each pension programme exerted any significant impact 
on citizens’ decision to join the programmes. Satisfaction with the pension provision 
provided by universal OAA coverage, with the RMF tax deduction, and with the 
government contributing to the NSF and SSA 40 savings programmes were ranked as 
being satisfied with the policy design section. As this thesis contends that low and 
irregular income is a causal factor for most of the informal working population have not 
yet joined the voluntary savings scheme, it is interesting to explore the citizens’ 
perspective on contributory policy design; that is, whether they were pleased with the 
government’s savings contributions as much as they were pleased with the pension 
provision. Regarding how the local bureaucrats or staff delivered and advertised the 
pension system and pension programme information relevant to Thai citizens, the data 
were scored a satisfaction in the local bureaucrats’ actions section. The overall score of 
satisfaction with each programme was analysed to understand the respondents’ 
perspectives towards the programmes as a whole. 
The overall satisfaction score is first presented and followed by the satisfaction score of 
the policy design and local bureaucrats’ actions. 
4.4.1.1 Overall satisfaction 
Table 4.11 shows the overall level of satisfaction with each programme (OAA, RMF, 
NSF and SSA 40). 
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Table 4.11: Overall satisfaction 
 
The highest overall score for satisfaction belongs to the OAA of the non-contributory 
scheme. It is worth noting that only the OAA produced satisfaction at the satisfied level 
(3.93); the other three savings programmes inspired only moderate satisfaction and less 
satisfaction. The SSA 40 scored 2.85 and the NSF scored 2.80 at the moderately satisfied 
level, whilst the RMF scored 2.56 at the less satisfied level. The standard deviation of 
each satisfaction score appears about the same, between 0.62 and 0.80. It seems that Thai 
senior citizens tend to be more satisfied with the OAA than with the voluntary savings 
programmes. This could be because the OAA is a programme of the non-contributory 
scheme that provides an allowance for them, whilst the voluntary savings scheme is a 
scheme that requires the citizens themselves to contribute savings.  
4.4.1.2 Satisfaction with policy design 
Table 4.12: Satisfaction with policy design 
Overall Satisfaction  Mean Standard Deviation
OAA  (204) 3.93 0.74
RMF  (204) 2.56 0.66
NSF  (174) 2.80 0.62
SSA 40  (174) 2.85 0.80
Satisfaction with 
Policy Design
 Mean Standard Deviation
OAA  (204) 4.09 0.74
RMF  (204) 2.67 0.84
NSF  (174) 2.99 0.74
SSA 40  (174) 2.91 0.83
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Table 4.12 reviews satisfaction with the policy of each programme. The mean satisfaction 
score with the policy of the OAA again provided the highest score. The satisfaction score 
of the OAA policy was ranked at the satisfied level (4.09), followed by the NSF (2.99), 
SSA 40 (2.91), and RMF (2.67), which were all rated at the moderately satisfied level. 
The standard deviation of each satisfaction score once again was about the same, between 
0.74 and 0.83. This indicates that the respondents tended to rate their satisfaction with the 
policy of each programme at the same level. One thing that is certain is that most of the 
respondents were satisfied with the idea of the government providing an OAA pension 
provision as a social safety net for the elderly. The ranks of satisfaction with the policies 
offered by the voluntary savings programmes were significantly lower than the rank of 
satisfaction with the non-contributory scheme. It is interesting to explore what influenced 
the respondents to express these levels of (dis)satisfaction. Also, it is also helpful to find 
out why satisfaction with NSF and SSA 40 policy designs were ranked higher than for 
the RMF. These curiosities will be explored after the open-ended question is clarified, 
and will be analysed again after analysing data from the in-depth interviews. 
4.4.1.3 Satisfaction with local bureaucrats’ actions 
Table 4.13: Satisfaction with local bureaucrats’ actions 
 
Table 4.13 shows that satisfaction levels relating to local bureaucrats’ actions regarding 
the OAA were ranked higher than satisfaction levels with the other three programmes. 
The mean satisfaction with the OAA was rated at the satisfied level (3.78), while the SSA 
40 (2.79) and the NSF (2.61) were ranked at the moderately satisfied level. The mean 
score for satisfaction with the RMF emerged at the less satisfied level (2.45). The local 
Satisfaction with 
Local Bureaucrats’ 
Actions
Mean Standard Deviation
OAA  (204) 3.78 0.91
RMF  (204) 2.45 0.67
NSF  (174) 2.61 0.71
SSA 40  (174) 2.79 0.90
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bureaucrats for each programme are those who closely communicate with Thai citizens. 
If satisfaction with local bureaucrats was rated at the moderately satisfied or less satisfied 
level, the local bureaucrats of that programme might have impacted on citizens’ decisions 
not to join the programmes. The standard deviation of the mean satisfaction score of each 
programme appears at more or less the same level, between 0.67 and 0.91, which again 
means that the satisfaction scores for local bureaucrats’ actions in each programme ranked 
by the respondents were fairly similar.  
The mean scores of three different themes clearly state that citizens in both formal and 
informal sectors are more satisfied with the OAA than with the voluntary savings 
programmes. Even though the satisfaction rating of the three different savings 
programmes produced fairly similar scores, it is worth highlighting that the RMF received 
the lowest mean score among the three, despite it being introduced first to society. 
Paitoonpong (2008) stresses that the RMF tended to promote low awareness, given other 
savings options. It is thus plausible why it ranked lower than the other two savings 
programmes. Another interesting point to note here is that the SSA 40 local bureaucrats’ 
action score and the overall satisfaction score with SSA 40 were higher than the NSF’s. 
Perhaps, this was because the data collection occurred during the renewal process of the 
NSF; hence, NSF staff were not well-prepared for the advertisement; at the same time, 
the SSA 40 had already been in existence for four years. These are the puzzles that the 
researcher will explore in the following chapter after the interview data are reviewed and 
the official data analysed together. 
4.4.2 Open-ended question data  
The open-ended question section in the questionnaire survey was provided to give an 
opportunity for the respondents to express further comments.
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Table 4.14: Participants who answered and did not answer the open-ended question 
 
Table 4.14 presents the number of the participants in two groups: those who answered the 
open-ended question and those who did not answer it. A total of 204 participants 
completed the questionnaire, there were 93 participants (45.59%) who answered the 
open-ended question, while 111 (54.41%) left it blank. From the top five comments given 
to the open-ended question, several interesting issues arose that are worth noting.  
Table 4.15: Open-ended question comments  
The Open-Ended 
Question Number Percentage
1. Answered open-
ended question 93 45.59
2. Did not answer 
open-ended question 111 54.41
Total 204 100
Further Comments on 
the Open-Ended 
Question
Number Percentage
1. Very interested in the 
savings pension scheme, 
but I do not have enough 
money to afford it. 
35 37.63
2. Very good policy, but it 
needs to be better clarified. 
(savings pension scheme)
23 24.73
3. Not interested. Family 
support is better and can 
find something superior.
13 13.97
4. Local bureaucrats were 
very helpful. The citizens 
themselves need to be more 
active.
12 12.90
5. Happy with the subsidies 
of the OAA 10 10.75
Total 93 100
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Table 4.15 divides the open-ended question data into five themes. First, analysis of the 
responses shows that 35 out of 93 participants (37.63%) explained that although the 
state’s voluntary savings scheme is interesting, they cannot afford to join it due to 
personal financial issues. The second most mentioned theme from respondents’ 
concerned clarification. There were 23 respondents (24.73%) who agreed that the pension 
and savings schemes, which the state adopted for the informal working population under 
the current five-pillar pension system, are very good policies; however, these participants 
also argued that the pension programmes of these schemes still need to be better clarified 
to Thai citizens, specifically the voluntary savings scheme. A number of senior 
respondents felt that the voluntary savings scheme was too complex for them to 
understand due to the very limited amount of information they had received about it. From 
this assertion, it would be interesting to scrutinise further in the interview data analysis 
why some respondents had not received enough useful information. Thirdly, 13 
participants (13.97%) clarified the reason for their disinterest in the pension scheme(s) is 
their belief that they could find something superior, such as better interest rates from their 
personal savings bank account, their family support or their own savings before 
retirement. This answer highlights that the financial background of each informant is 
another factor to be considered. Fourthly, 12 respondents (12.90%) claimed that 
recipients need to be more active in obtaining information about the system, as accessing 
the system is their right. These respondents stressed that local bureaucrats were very 
helpful and good at explaining about the programmes. If the recipients were not aware of 
what the pension programmes contained, they needed to take more action and find out. 
Lastly, 10 respondents (10.75%) claimed that they were happy with the subsidies 
provided by the government. The least number of informants claimed that they were very 
pleased with the allowance that the government provided for them via the non-
contributory scheme.  
4.4.3 Discussion: Citizens’ attitudes towards the pension and savings programmes 
Regarding the satisfaction of the respondents and theirs answers to the open-ended 
questions, there are some similarities that both sections share. These similarities are 
relevant to the impact of the informal economy, the effect of local bureaucrats’ actions, 
and the complexity of policy designs.  
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First, the answers from both satisfaction and open-ended question sections revealed that 
the informal economy significantly impacted informal workers’ decisions around joining 
the non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary savings pension scheme. The 
empirical data indicated that some informal workers were very interested in the savings 
pension scheme. However, due to their financial issues, these informal workers were not 
able to contribute to the contributory savings scheme. Moreover, the satisfaction of some 
respondents with the subsidies of OAA supports the assumption that citizens, especially 
in the informal labour market, tend to be more satisfied with receiving the allowance 
rather than contributing savings. Though some respondents claimed that they were not 
interested in joining the savings scheme as they have found superior options, others were 
very happy with the allowance the government provided. It is worth noting that only the 
OAA satisfaction scores were all at the satisfied level. The other three programmes were 
ranked between moderately satisfied and less satisfied. This indicates that the respondents 
were more satisfied with the non-contributory scheme than with the voluntary savings 
scheme. Based on the respondents’ personal characteristics, this could be because the 
majority of respondents were categorised as senior informal workers with irregular 
incomes. Although they were interested in joining the savings programme, the financial 
constraints around being informal workers inhibited them from making savings.  
Second, local bureaucrats’ actions seemed to be another concern, causing respondents to 
split into two groups. Based on the open-ended answers, some respondents were very 
pleased by the local bureaucrats’ actions regarding providing information about the 
pension and savings schemes relevant to their lives. Meanwhile, some participants were 
disappointed with their actions and wanted local bureaucrats to improve in their jobs, or 
take more action in terms of providing detailed information about the pension 
programmes. Regarding the satisfaction with local bureaucrats’ actions, OAA was rated 
at the satisfied level whilst the savings programmes were rated at the moderately satisfied 
and less satisfied levels. Perhaps satisfaction with local bureaucrats’ actions around 
different programmes may be the reason why respondents’ satisfaction answers were split 
into two groups. 
Lastly, because some respondents explained that they were very pleased with the policy 
design of both the non-contributory pension scheme (OAA) and the voluntary savings 
scheme for informal workers (NSF and SSA 40), perhaps the policy design of each 
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pension programme might have captured the citizens’ interest in terms of joining the 
programmes. Many respondents were significantly satisfied with the OAA policy design. 
Meanwhile, some respondents stated that they were interested, but they required more 
information and better clarification before they would allow themselves to commit to any 
savings programme. This implies that the policy design of each pension programme 
caught the citizens’ interest in terms of joining the programmes, but other factors might 
have made them hesitant to join the programmes. It is possible that informality and the 
decentralisation process may have worked together as a causal package that affects the 
citizens’ decisions around joining the programmes. 
To conclude, the data in this section show that most Thai senior citizens in the informal 
sector are very pleased with the OAA pension provision – more than they are with the 
savings provision – due to their own financial constraints. The data further suggest that 
local bureaucrats’ actions and policy designs are also taken into consideration. This thesis 
thus presumes that the interactions among these three factors might be the causal cocktail 
behind the performance outcome of the system. The data in this chapter merely provide 
a brief window into the effect of the decentralisation process of local governance and the 
policy design for each programme. Hence, these issues are further analysed and discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter explores the causal factors behind informal workers’ interests and decisions 
on whether to join the pension and savings schemes. It pays particular attention to the 
relationships between respondents’ personal characteristics and their savings behaviours, 
so as to analyse the effect of informality on extending pension and savings scheme 
coverage and explore the causal factors behind the multi-pillar pension system’s partly 
successful outcomes. 
To begin with, this chapter’s data analysis revealed that the informality has a significant, 
negative impact on informal workers’ savings behaviours, and automatically impacting 
the effectiveness of pension coverage. The findings indicate that the nature of informality 
has deterred them from making pension contributions, in turn weakening the economic 
security of informal labourers. The research in the current thesis confirms past findings 
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whereby the informal working population faces vulnerable employment. It further 
explains that, within this vulnerable population, those at the low level of education and 
income level in the informal labour market have indirectly been transferred to the 
vulnerable group in the current Thai pension system, and clearly have had less 
opportunity to contribute to retirement savings. Based on the data analysis, educational 
level and income level have a strong correlation with savings behaviour. This is 
particularly true regarding higher educational attainment such as a university degree and 
working in the formal labour market. Education provides people with more opportunities 
to choose among various work options and provides them with the capacity to access a 
higher income. This gives them a chance to contribute to saving for retirement. The 
informal working population, on the other hand, constitutes those with low educational 
backgrounds and irregular and low income, which means that they tend to be least able 
to save for retirement. It is worth noting that whilst formal employees contribute to the 
pension system in a formal way, for the informal labour market, saving for retirement is 
only an option via the voluntary savings scheme. Accordingly, the working population in 
the formal sector is less likely to experience economic insecurity, since the stability they 
achieve in their working years continues into their elderly lives. However, due to unfixed 
salaries and a low income, most informal workers tend not to contribute to retirement 
savings. This tendency is a crisis scenario occurring in many middle-income countries 
with large informal labour markets, such as Thailand and Latin American countries. 
In terms of satisfaction with pension and savings schemes and the open-ended question 
section, the data shed some light on Thai senior citizens’ perspectives regarding the 
programmes of both the non-contributory and voluntary savings scheme. The Thai senior 
elderly were mostly satisfied with the OAA, whilst they ranked the programmes of the 
voluntary savings scheme (RMF, NSF and SSA 40) at either the moderately satisfied or 
less satisfied level. The three savings programmes of the voluntary savings scheme either 
mismatched citizens’ interests, did not come with enough clarification, or were unlikely 
to catch their attention, due to citizens’ financial issues. It is worth noting that the 
satisfaction scores of the NSF and SSA 40 savings programmes were higher than the 
satisfaction scores of the RMF; though the number of the respondents has to date 
remained fairly low. This implies that the development of the pension system in Thailand, 
regarding pension coverage and economic security for informal workers, is gradually 
getting better. However, due to the nature of informal economy, the decision-making 
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capabilities of informal workers, in terms of whether or not they should make regular 
savings contributions has been affected.  
Apart from problems of informality, the questionnaire data also show that local 
bureaucrats’ actions and policy design are another two factor affecting citizens’ interests 
and decisions. However, data from the questionnaire was unclear and difficult to clarify 
whether the nature of decentralisation and policy designs are the other two factors 
affecting informal workers’ interests and decisions. The data barely explains how the 
decentralisation structure might be mostly coherent with the effectiveness of the universal 
non-contributory pension scheme, or whether the institutional structures of the pension 
programmes affected citizens’ interests and decisions in terms of joining the programmes. 
Hence, the next chapter will evaluate in-depth information that provides detailed 
information from the interviews in order to clarify citizens’ and local and national 
bureaucrats’ perspectives towards the pension and savings schemes and answer the main 
research questions. 
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INTERVIEW DATA ANALYSIS: THE EFFECT OF 
DECENTRALISATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As examined in Chapter 4, the informality constraint on labour market systems has 
impacted Thai informal workers’ decisions to save for retirement. The informal workers 
at the low level of education and low-income are the vulnerable groups in the current Thai 
five-pillar pension system due to their personal characteristics and financial constraints; 
the effect of decentralisation and policy design of pension programmes in the current 
multi-pillar pension system has barely been examined in previous chapter. This chapter 
therefore scrutinises in-depth details of not only the impact of labour market conditions, 
but also decentralisation structure on expansion of pension and savings schemes coverage 
to informal workers. More specifically, this explores whether the nature of 
decentralisation has fundamentally affected citizens’ interests and decisions regarding 
joining the non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary savings scheme. The 
experience of Thai senior citizens and local and national bureaucrats’ groups reveal in-
depth information that the questionnaire data from the previous chapter might have 
missed.  
In 1997, Thailand reformed its public administration from centralisation to 
decentralisation and introduced four new administrative types of local government. 
Thailand is currently categorised as a decentralised state, with much of the control over 
policy implementation having transferred from national to local governments. There are 
four different administrative types in local government, so it is necessary to examine 
whether local government administration affected Thai informal workers’ decisions to 
join pension and savings schemes and form any kind of a vulnerable group in the current 
pension system. Due to decentralisation elements inherent in the government, each city 
and area’s local government individually responded to the policy designed by the central 
government. This implies that the local government’s ability to take responsibility and 
efficiently implement social policies is vital for social security and long-term 
development, including the non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes of the 
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current Thai five-pillar pension system. Some scholars have praised the decentralisation 
process for successfully expanding pension coverage for OAA (Sakunphanit and 
Suwanrada, 2011:408). Despite this success after switching universal coverage, there is 
still room for improvement. Most but not all Thai senior citizens have registered for OAA. 
Some scholars state that decentralisation has both positive and negative impacts, 
especially when it is combined with other institutions (Scott, 2009; Dufhues et al., 2011). 
In the same token, Holzmann et al. (2005:114) highlights that reform needs of multiplicity 
of systems and reform environment of administrative and implementation issues are 
linked with five-pillar pension reform. Most specifically, the flow of money could be 
decentralised and the flow of data partially or fully centralised; otherwise it might be a 
constraint on feasible reform options. Based on these scholars’ concerns and the World 
Bank’s five-pillar pension reform framework, it is important to find out whether the 
nature of decentralisation, which appears to codetermine the pension system after the five-
pillar model reform, is another causal factor affecting citizens’ decisions to join pension 
programmes and subsequently the effectiveness of pension scheme coverage.  
This chapter scrutinises in-depth information and perspectives related not only to Thai 
senior citizens in formal and informal sectors, but also to local and national bureaucrats 
in charge of pension programmes of non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes. To 
support the main focus of this thesis and answer the main research questions, this 
chapter’s guiding questions are as follows: 1) Why was the number of citizens joining the 
non-contributory pension scheme significantly higher than that of the voluntary savings 
scheme?; 2) How did the decentralisation process affect informal workers’ decisions to 
join these two schemes’ pension programmes?; 3) To what extent and how was a 
vulnerable group in the labour market affected by the administrative and implementation 
issues in the context of the Thai five-pillar pension system?; and 4) What were citizens’ 
attitudes towards the pension programmes of both schemes?  
This chapter is broken into five sections. The chapter starts by briefly introducing the 
main foci of this chapter and outlines the overall argument. Secondly, the processes of 
decentralisation and local governance are explained, so as to shed light on how these 
might affect citizens’ decisions to join the schemes. Thirdly, the following section 
provides the Thai senior citizens’ perspectives on the pension programmes of the two 
pension and savings schemes. Apart from reviewing the interview data analysis from Thai 
 156 
citizens, this section builds on the previous chapter to further look at the most vulnerable 
group in the current Thai pension system; it also compares and analyses the effect of 
decentralisation in the Thai and Chinese cases. Next, in section four, data on local and 
national bureaucrats’ views of the pension system are reviewed, and are later compared 
to data from citizens, as well as from the previous chapter and previous studies. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by summarising the causal factors presented in this chapter and 
explaining how data culled from the interviews and questionnaire can track back to the 
main research questions, which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
5.2 The decentralisation process and the local system of autonomy  
One important resolution in the areas of decentralisation and local governance was that 
Thailand reformed its public administration from centralised to decentralised and 
introduced four new administration types of local government. The overview of the Thai 
local government’s historical development in this section explains how the distinctive 
characteristics of local government systems in both urban and rural areas are vastly 
different in many ways. This section thus clarifies those differences and highlights the 
nature of decentralisation so as to build on the results from the survey data and interviews. 
5.2.1 Four new administration types in local government 
The history of local autonomy in Thailand dates back to 1932, when the Constitutional 
Revolution abolished the absolute monarchy and instead introduced democracy. The 
establishment of basic local authorities in rural areas did not materialise until the 1990s. 
The Administrative Law of 1933 primarily established three layers in the Thai 
administrative structure: central or national administration, provincial administration and 
local administration (Chardchawarn, 2010a). 
In October 1997, the Constitution was promulgated, and decentralisation was therein 
defined as a basic national policy. The local system of autonomy then largely transformed 
from one of centralisation to decentralisation through the involvement of provincial, 
district and sub-district offices. To facilitate the decentralisation process, the central 
government announced four different types of local government to be supervised by the 
Ministry of Interior: Provincial Administrative Organisations (PAOs); Thesaban; 
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Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs); and a special form of local government, 
including the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and the Pattaya City 
Administration, due to their fast socio-economic development (Nagai, Funatsu, and 
Kagoya, 2008). Officials in local Thai administrations are either directly elected by the 
people or directly appointed by the government, depending on the type of local 
administration and the positions (Sopchokchai, 2001:2). 
PAOs were established to take responsibility of local administration in rural provinces. 
Thesaban, or district administration organisations, are the municipalities of Thailand’s 
local autonomy system. There are three levels for municipalities: Thesaban-nakorn (city-
municipality), Thesaban-muang (district-municipality) and Thesaban-tambon (sub-
district municipality). TAOs, or sub-district administrative organisations, are the local 
administration organisations at the sub-district (Tambon) level, they plan and manage 
community development affairs in sub-district areas and are the main organisers of local 
management (Rajchagool, 1999:29). Only Bangkok and Pattaya are not included in the 
PAOs, Thesaban and TAOs. Instead, due to their fast socio-economic development, both 
Bangkok and Pattaya are treated as special municipal entities, being designated as special 
self-governing cities. This thesis thus categorises Bangkok and Pattaya as urban cities in 
Thailand, and others as rural cities. Some scholars have explained that the decentralisation 
process is aimed at encouraging autonomy and blocking direct interventions in local 
authority management from the Ministry of the Interior (Sopchokchai, 2001:3; Nelson, 
2002:219; Nagai, et al., 2008:3; Chardchawan, 2010b:6). Some also explain that 
decentralisation of the local government in Thailand has not only returned the decision-
making power of the central administration to local people, namely people at the sub-
districts and village levels, rather than to bureaucrats, but also contributed to the building 
of closer relationships between local governments and local residents, providing more 
effective and efficient public services (Nagai and Kagoya, 2015:214). As there are four 
types of local government, only Bangkok and Pattaya are directly controlled and 
supervised by the Interior Minister, whilst other provinces are supervised by their local 
governments; the latter are controlled and supervised by the Interior Minister at the 
national level. Given these different types of local government, it is worth examining the 
extent to which different types of decentralisation create coherence or conflict in relation 
to social policy design. It is also necessary to note its relation to the effectiveness of the 
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non-contributory and the voluntary savings schemes, in terms of extending pension and 
savings schemes coverage to the informal sector. 
5.2.2 Differences between local governments in rural and urban areas 
There are vast characteristic differences between urban and rural areas at the local 
administrative level, however, the main difference between Bangkok and other provinces 
at the local government level is the selection of local representatives. 
Bangkok is one of two Thai cities with directly elected executive governors, the other 
being Pattaya. Local residents elect the governor of Bangkok, also known as the chief 
executive of the BMA, to a four-year term. The chief executive or city mayor in other 
provinces is appointed by the central government. Although citizens in other provinces 
do not elect the city mayor in local areas, they do elect village and district-chief officers. 
Every Tambon (sub-district) is subdivided into villages and supervised by a Kamnan, a 
sub-district-chief officer, and every village is supervised by a village leader. The Kamnan 
and village leaders, known as agents of the central government, are representatives of the 
local residents’ respective constituencies (Rajchagool, 1999:33). A Kamnan is elected 
from among village leaders in that sub-district area and serves a five-year term. Local 
residents elect a village leader by popular vote once every five years. Kamnan and village 
leaders are influential persons in local areas (Nagai, et al., 2008:5), because their duties 
range from communicating the orders from central government to the residents to 
managing resident registration and maintaining public order. Both Kamnan and village 
leaders communicate to the citizens all political information, including information about 
the pension system. As the TAO does not exist in urban areas (Nagai, et al., 2015:215), 
Kamnan and village leaders, whom are selected by local residents and who communicate 
and have a close relationship with citizens, are not present in Bangkok.  
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Source: Sopchokchai, 2001:6
Chart 5.1 shows that local residents in rural areas vote for village representatives who 
communicate key information to them. Local bureaucrats who work with citizens in 
Bangkok, on the other hand, are instead appointed by the BMA. It is interesting to find 
out whether, when communicating with citizens, local bureaucrats’ actions have any 
significant impact on the elderly’s interests and decisions to join pension and savings 
schemes. If the local bureaucrats’ actions did exert any significant impact (positive or 
negative) on Thai senior citizens’ interests and decisions to join the schemes, this implies 
that decentralisation of public administration is another causal factor affecting the results 
Figure 5.1 : Structure of government division in Thailand 
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of extending pension and savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. It is important 
to note here that only the OAA is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, whilst the 
RMF is supervised by the Securities Commission, the NSF is supervised by the Ministry 
of Finance, and the SSA 40 is supervised by the Ministry of Labour. The local staff of 
these three aforementioned savings programmes might take different sorts of action from 
the OAA. To support this examination, interview data from residents’ perspectives on 
pension and savings programmes of the non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes 
were collected individually. This data are presented in the following section. 
5.3 Data on residents 
In this section, Thai senior citizens’ perspectives on the non-contributory and the 
voluntary savings scheme are presented. This section examines the causal factors 
affecting informal workers’ interests and decisions in joining the schemes, especially the 
effect of decentralisation, before comparing and analysing the effect of decentralisation 
in the Thai and Chinese cases. 
5.3.1 Interview data on senior respondents’ perspectives 
The interview data on senior respondents included 19 interviewees. Though the main 
focus of this thesis is the informal working population, employees in both formal and 
informal sectors were included in the interview data. This is because receiving different 
comments from different groups can shed some light on new aspects that might be 
invisible to just one group of respondents. Also, the comments from both labour markets 
provide a clearer understanding on the role of the state, market, and family in the current 
Thai pension system, which is very helpful for analysing the main research questions.  
Table 5.1 provides summary data on recipients’ responses. This data from different 
groups of recipient sheds light on some intriguing information that it might not yet have 
been disclosed.
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Table 5.1 : Informants in recipient group (19 recipients) 
 
Four themes arose from the interview data: impact of decentralisation, informality, 
complexity of pension scheme design and superior options constraints.  
5.3.1.1 Impact of decentralisation  
This section explains the importance of local bureaucrats’ actions on senior citizens’ 
decisions to join the schemes. The data reviewed both the positive and negative impact 
of the decentralisation process on citizens’ interests and decisions regarding joining the 
schemes. The positive feedback is first reviewed, then analysed; this is followed by the 
negative feedback.  
 
Number Name 
Code
Gender Age Hometown Joining pension and savings 
programmes 
Types of job
1 R1 Female 60 and above Urban OAA Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Multiple jobs worker)
2 R2 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, SSA 40 Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
3 R3 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, NSF Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
4 R4 Male 60 and above Urban OAA, NSF Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
5 R5 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Maid)
6 R6 Female 60 and above Urban OAA, SSA 40 Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Mat hiring)
7 R7 Male 50-59 Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker 
8 R8 Male 60 and above Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Van driver)
9 R9 Male 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
10 R10 Male 60 and above Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker (Private wushu coach)
11 R11 Female 50-59 Urban none Group 5: Self-employed worker (Spectacle seller)
12 R12 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 3: Service sector worker (Maid)
13 R13 Male 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired)
14 R14 Male 60 and above Rural OAA Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Handmade shoes 
maker)
15 R15 Female 60 and above Urban OAA Group 4: Family worker (Retired banker) 
16 R16 Female 50-59 Rural none Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/Street vendor (Food seller)
17 R17 Female 60 and above Urban GP Group 1: Formal worker (Retired state employee)
18 R18 Female 60 and above Rural OAA, SSA 40 Group 5: Self-employed worker (English tutor assistant)
19 R19 Male 50-59 Urban OAA, SSA 39 Group 2: Multiple jobs worker/ Street vendor (Clothing street seller)
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1) Positive feedback on the decentralisation  
Some key informants from both urban and rural areas expressed a positive point of view 
towards bureaucrats at the local level. Their answers are categorised using their 
hometown. 
 a) Local resident from urban area 
There were seven informants (R1, R2, R4, R6, R7, R13 and R15) who were originally 
urban citizens and knew about the pension and savings schemes; however, they had 
received information from different sources. 
Interviewer: How did you know about the pension system, both the OAA and the 
SSA 40? 
Interviewee R2: The local government came to our house and knocked on our 
door with a leaflet to tell us about it. And if you were not there, they left the leaflet 
on the gate so it would be received. Apart from that, I personally love listening to 
the news on the radio while driving and cycling, and I always watch TV and read 
newspapers, so I get lots of information from many sources, including my family 
and friends. Tomorrow, I’m going to a local community meeting hosted by the 
local government, explaining the change of the savings scheme from the SSA 40 
to the NSF. I currently am part of the SSA 40, and if it’s going to be cancelled and 
moved to the NSF, then I have to be there at the meetings. 
Apart from R2, the other six informants (R1, R4, R6, R7, R13 and R15) also expressed 
the same conclusion. They all received information from local bureaucrats and knew 
which programme(s) they had joined at that time. R1, R13, and R15 mainly received 
information about the OAA. Despite both R2 and R6 claiming they had joined the SSA 
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40, they could not confirm which savings option, from 1 to 5 of the SSA 40, they meant. 
Both interviewees admitted that the options they chose were for insurance and pension 
benefits. However, the information was unclear enough to confuse the outcome, that is, 
whether it was option 3, 4, or 5. Unlike R2, R6 did not know that SSA 40 contributors 
needed to resign and re-register with the NSF. R6 explained that she did not know this as 
her local bureaucrats had not mentioned it when they visited her home. The interview 
data from these interviewees explain how important the local bureaucrats’ role is for the 
Thai people. In particular, R1 and R6 both claimed that they could not read and did not 
own a television. The ways they could receive information were from the radio and 
through friends, neighbours and local bureaucrats. R7 saw the benefits of both pension 
and savings schemes. He had not yet signed up for old age pension provision, as he was 
not permitted to join the OAA due to his age. However, he insisted that once he turned 
59, he would register for the scheme. Meanwhile, the savings programme proved an 
obstacle for him due to receiving unclear information and experiencing financial 
constraints.  
b) Rural migrants to urban areas 
Some informants (R5, R8, R14 and R18) had migrated from rural areas to work in the 
city. These people were very satisfied with their local government’s actions. They 
claimed that they had received all the information they needed about the pension system, 
and that the information had mainly come from local government, family members and 
friends or neighbours. One difference between migrants who never contact anyone in 
their hometown (R12 and R16), and those who still have family in rural areas, is that the 
second group still travels to visit their family in their hometown from time to time (R5, 
R8, R14 and R18); any information that they missed during this time would normally be 
provided by their family and neighbours when they return home. Only one interviewee, 
R8, claimed that he knew about both the non-contributory and the voluntary savings 
schemes, but had joined neither. His answer is worth noting. 
Interviewer: Have you joined any pension and savings schemes, specifically the 
OAA?  
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Interviewee R8: I have not joined any pension scheme yet. But I have heard about 
it. The local government in my hometown visited our village and told everyone. 
Everyone in my family also knows that. My cousins have already joined the OAA. 
However, my wife has not joined as she is only in her mid-50s. I know that I have 
to go back home, so I will wait till next time when I have a chance to go back 
home. Now I live in Bangkok by myself to earn a living and send money back to 
my family. My wife works at home. You can say that I am the breadwinner of the 
family. I have to look after my own family, my parents and my niece as well. My 
work is a day-by-day job: if I stop one day, it means I will lose money on that day.  
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of the NSF or SSA 40? Or are you currently in 
either of these two savings programmes?  
Interviewee R8: I might have heard, but not sure. In my hometown, I think 
everyone might know about it. I think this is what my wife has mentioned earlier 
last time, but I’m not sure. I finished only year 4, so my reading is not good. I 
don't read newspapers. I wake up very early and get back home very late. So the 
only source of information that I have is my family when I have a chance to go 
back home. 
Interviewer: Will you join the OAA next year? And will you join the savings 
programme? 
Interviewee R8: This year I’m 61. I know that I missed the registration of last year. 
I might go back home and register this year. I will see. I don’t think I can save any 
money for myself (my savings). My income is for my family and my health issues. 
I spend most of my money on my health issues. I just live day by day. 
Information from some key informants provided positive feedback on the decentralisation 
of the pension system. They highlighted how important their local bureaucrat’s role in 
their lives is and how close these bureaucrats’ are to other local residents. All the updated 
information that they received came mainly from these local bureaucrats. Even though 
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some migrants did not live in their hometown anymore, they still had an opportunity to 
receive updated information from their family when they visited home. Nevertheless, 
some negative feedback was also given. A couple of interviewees, who lost contact with 
family or friends in their hometown, explained that they had never heard about the 
programmes of these two pension and savings schemes before.  
2) Negative feedback of the decentralisation  
The negative feedback appears to be revealed by migrants from rural areas. 
a) Rural migrants to urban areas  
Interviewer: Have you heard of the OAA, NSF or SSA 40? If so, where did you 
get the information from? 
Interviewee R12: No, I am not sure what you are talking about… that sounds 
really interesting, where can I register? How can I do it? I am very keen to join 
the OAA, but the savings one, I don’t think I can. My income is not enough for 
my daily life. I have to look after my son as well. He’s now in year 3. There are 
lots of things I have to care about. I have no time to think about myself… I work 
two full-time jobs for whole days, two jobs. I don’t have time to listen to the news. 
I don’t have T.V. at home. I finished only year 3, so my reading skills are not good 
as well. If I am going to get any information, I will get it from my friends.  
Interviewer: Are you originally from Bangkok? 
Interviewee R12: No, I’m from Kalasin (northeast of Thailand). I moved to 
Bangkok many years ago now. I work here as a maid; it’s a day-by-day job to get 
paid.  
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Interviewer: Have you ever heard or received any information from the local 
government in your hometown/local area before? 
Interviewee R12: For me, it is a ‘no’. The local government might have been to 
my village in my hometown, but I have not gone back for ages, so I don’t know. 
If any are here in Bangkok, I also don’t know. They might have been to my place 
while I was working, or perhaps they might have not. I don’t know. 
Respondent R16 shared an answer almost identical to that of R12. She had also migrated 
from a rural area to a city to find a job. Both interviewees work daylong shifts and had 
not heard or received any information about the pension system before the interview. 
They were both undereducated with low incomes. R12 and R16 were interested in joining 
both the OAA and the savings programme but claimed that their chance of joining the 
savings programme was fairly slim, due to their personal financial constraints.  
Interviewer: Have you ever heard of or joined the pension programmes?  
Interviewee R16: I have never heard anything about these programmes before. 
You were the first person who told me about it. I am very much interested in the 
OAA, and the savings as well. But I have to see if I could or could not afford it 
(the savings programmes).  
Interviewee R16 was only in her 50s, which means that she still has time to learn more 
about the OAA and can register when she is aged 59. However, the situations of R12 and 
R16 reflect the issues caused by the decentralisation structure and the influence of 
financial constraints of labour market conditions impacting the performance outcome of 
the pension system. Some of the Thai elderly have not yet joined both pension and savings 
schemes because of the irregular types of job they do, earning a day by day income, whilst 
some of them have not yet joined the OAA. This is mostly the migrants and due to the 
decentralisation process of OAA household registration.  
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5.3.1.2 Impact of labour market conditions 
Apart from the questionnaire survey data, the interview data also revealed how 
informality can be a negative constraint on both the non-contributory pension scheme and 
the voluntary savings scheme. 
1) Informal workers with less security 
What is interesting from interviewees R5, R8, R12 and R16 is that together with the 
informality constraint, rural migrants in the informal labour market, who receive an 
irregular income and have little to no contact with anyone in their hometown for several 
years, may have had receiving less information from the local government. This finding 
suggests that both informality and decentralisation could be pension system constraints. 
Interviewer: You are still in your 50s, not yet eligible for the OAA, but you are 
now eligible for the savings scheme. Will you consider joining the OAA or the 
savings programmes that the government offers in the near future? 
Interviewee R5: Now, I’m on the disability living allowance, so I will definitely 
join the OAA, but not the savings. I think the savings scheme is quite interesting, 
but because my income is not high nor stable. The money that I earn it is not even 
enough for me and my brother to live happily. My brother is in his 70s, and we 
both mainly rely on our disability living allowance, my income, and my brother’s 
OAA as our main income source. 
R8, R12 and R16 came to the same conclusion. Despite finding the savings scheme 
interesting, the reality of their financial situation forced them to reconsider. More 
interestingly, R7 is one of two self-employed workers in the informal labour market 
claiming to earn a salary in the high-income level range. However, he admitted that he 
had not yet started saving for his retirement. This is because he is a leader of a family, 
looking after his wife and three children. The data from R7 once again reflects the concept 
of a breadwinner in Thai culture and how informality heavily constrains informal workers’ 
decisions on whether or not to contribute to the savings programmes. Indeed, as long as 
 168 
they are in the informal labour market, there is no guarantee of economic security for 
them, even if they earn a high income.  
2) Formal workers with more security 
The interview data from interviewees indicated that once Thai citizens have a chance of 
getting a job in the formal labour market, they are more likely to be able to enjoy more 
economic security than those comprising the informal working population. 
The answer from R19, a former employee in a private company, who is now a self-
employed worker in the informal sector, highlights that once you are in the formal sector, 
you are often guaranteed income security even if you later leave.  
Interviewer: Are you currently in any savings programmes under the voluntary 
savings scheme? NSF or SSA 40? 
Interviewee R19: I am currently in a savings programme, but not these two (NSF 
and SSA 40). I’m in the SSA 39. This is because before I retired, I used to work 
in a private company, and I joined the SSA 33 before. Even though I am not 
working as a worker for the company anymore, I got a chance to choose whether 
I wished to continue savings, so I switched to the SSA 39. And I am very happy 
because it covers insurance for health issues as well. 
R19 also claimed that he read a lot of newspapers and listened to the radio and also kept 
himself up to date with any updated information related to the pension system. He thus 
joined the SSA 39 instead of the SSA 40 or NSF, which is for informal workers who have 
never entered the formal labour market. Interview data from R19 indicates that even 
though employees in the private sector of the formal labour market may not receive as 
privileged welfare provision or welfare coverage as government officials, they still have 
a better option than the informal workers. Nevertheless, interview data from R3, also a 
former employee in a private company, highlighted how formal employees in the private 
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sector might have the possibility of enjoying less economic security in their retirement, 
just like the informal working population. The interview data from R3 is thus worth noting. 
Interviewer: Are you currently in any pension programmes? The NSF or SSA 40? 
Or the SSA 39, as you used to work in the formal sector? 
Interviewee R3: I am now in the NSF. I used to be in the SSA 33, because I used 
to work for a small company, but I didn’t know at first that after we quit the job 
we were still allowed to continue the savings (by registering for the SSA 39). Once 
I realised that I could continue the savings but it had to be through the SSA 39 
instead, it was too late, because there is a time limit as well. But I can’t remember 
how long it was, maybe a year or… I don’t know. So that’s why I am now in the 
NSF, because I saw it advertised on the TV and newspapers, saying that this is for 
anyone who has not yet joined the SSA 40. Because one cannot join both the NSF 
and SSA 40 anyway. So I joined the NSF, and I think it’ll be good for me. And I 
know that I have to be quick, because anyone who is older than 60, like me, is 
allowed to join only in the first year. 
This key information from R3 shows that it is possible for formal workers in the private 
sector to be in the same position as informal workers, once they are no longer actively 
included in the formal labour market. R17, on the other hand, highlighted the privilege 
enjoyed by state employees in Thailand, as she explained that the only pension 
programme of these two pension and savings schemes that she was aware of was the OAA. 
She explained that the other three savings programmes had nothing to do with her life. 
She had nothing to be worried about, as she would receive state pension provision (GP) 
for the rest of her life. The answers from R3, R17 and R19 support the idea that employees 
in the formal labour market typically have more opportunities to achieve income security 
than informal workers, even if formal workers in the private sector might not be as secure 
as those in the public sector. The interview data support the idea that informal workers 
are a vulnerable group in the labour market, and that informal workers tend to enjoy less 
economic security in their retirement than formal labourers, specifically state employees. 
It is worth noting here that the data from these three interviewees regarding state 
employees as privileged class in the labour market lighten up the role of the actors (state, 
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labour market and family) operating in the welfare state regime. More specifically, it 
emphasises how the government officials have, from the first pension system until now, 
always received privileged welfare state provision, no matter how many times the pension 
system has been reformed.  
5.3.1.3 Complexity of pension and savings schemes design 
Apart from informality and decentralisation concerns, the complexity of policy design 
seems to be another important issue. Both pension and savings schemes have their own 
unique policy design drawbacks. 
1) Complexity of the OAA household registration system 
Most Thai citizens have joined the OAA, with only a few of the interviewees not being 
registered. Some key informants’ answers (R8 and R10) highlight that registration time 
and location can be identified as potential issues preventing citizens from joining. This is 
a drawback of the policy design. 
Interviewer: You have not joined the OAA yet, but have you considered joining? 
Interviewee R10: Yes, I have thought about it. And maybe I will join this year.  
Interviewer: Why have you not joined the OAA yet, may I kindly ask? 
Interviewee R10: I knew about the OAA last year, but I was too late to join the 
scheme, as I had to register the year before if I wanted to receive the allowance 
when I turn 60. The time of registering is very limited. I was really busy at that 
time. Once I was free, the registration time had closed. This year I will try to 
remind myself not to forget it again. 
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The registration time of the OAA is between 1st and 30th November in any given year. 
It is understandable why some respondents lamented this short registration period. Two 
interesting issues on this point were raised by R9. 
 Interviewer: Are there any other comments you would like to add? 
Interviewee R9: One thing that I really don’t like about the OAA is the registration 
system. For the last two years, I went to the local office to register but they said 
that it was too late, the registration had already closed for the last year; which 
means that I had to wait until the following year. I think it is a bit too complicated 
and complex for citizens like me. I have now moved to the Lumpini sub-district 
to live with my wife rather than in the area where I’m officially a resident. It would 
be better if we, me and my wife, could register at a local area. Also, I think the 
OAA was delayed. What I mean is I checked my bank account, the money was 
transferred after the date it should be transferred. So, please jot down these three 
issues: time limitation of the registration, location of the registration, delayed 
allowance transfer. Also, if the allowance could be higher that would be great. 
Due to its time and location limitations, R8, R9 and R10 felt that the OAA registration 
system was not really a beneficial opportunity for the elderly looking to receive income 
security from the government. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that R18, who now 
worked in Bangkok, claimed that she was originally form Narathiwat province (a 
province in the Southern part of Thailand). She did not find the OAA registration system 
was too complex for her at all. On the contrary, she pointed out how convenient the 
process was as she only had to take the train back to her hometown once, and that the 
allowance would be transferred to her bank account every month. She also stressed that 
local staff in her hometown were very helpful and provided clear information about the 
pension system to everyone in the area.  
Apart from R9, R1 also stressed that the OAA transfer was delayed.  
 Interviewer: Are there any other comments that you would like to raise? 
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Interviewee R1: I really love the OAA. It is very helpful to someone like me, no 
proper job in my 70s. I would like to say thank you to the government for 
providing this kind of welfare provision, but can you help me explore or inform 
anyone who is in charge of the OAA, and ask them for me why my allowance of 
the last three months has not yet been transferred to my bank account? The 
allowance normally transfers to my bank account every month, but I don’t 
understand why the three months were not transferred into my account yet. Do 
you think that someone might steal my money? Do you think the government 
might corrupt the elderly OAA? I went to the bank this morning again to check 
my account, but the money was not there yet.  
Even though many citizen interviewees had already joined the OAA, there were still a 
number of who found the allowance too low (R6, R8, R9 and R11). Moreover, according 
to R1 and R9, apart from the OAA being too low for senior citizens to survive on, OAA 
transfers are also often delayed. Regarding the delayed money transfer issue, the Ministry 
of Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) explain that the OAA might be 
delayed for some months due to insufficient and delayed annual government budget 
(Thairath, 2015). It is worth highlighting that a concern over an historically poor record 
of disbursing funds has been previously raised by some scholars (Wheway and Punmanee, 
2017:146). This highlights that not only the Thai pension system but also other systems 
in the country are undergoing periods of slow development and reaching more or less the 
same outcomes. This may be the reason why Thailand has continued to be categorised as 
a developing country. That is, even though the system has already been developed, there 
is still room for further expansion. 
2) Complexity of the voluntary savings scheme  
A few key informants claimed that the programmes of the voluntary savings scheme were 
too complicated for them to understand (R2, R4, R7 and R11). R4 talked specifically 
about the change from the SSA 40 to the NSF. The development of the voluntary savings 
scheme has clearly led to some complexity and confusion and thus impacted the 
effectiveness of extending scheme coverage.  
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Interviewer: You mentioned earlier that you are joining the voluntary savings 
scheme. Is it the SSA 40 or the NSF? 
Interviewee R4: I’m not quite sure what it is called, but I know that I joined the 
scheme after I watched the news on the TV. It was two or three years ago. It was 
introduced by Khun Korn (Minister of Finance) or Yingluck became Prime 
Minister, I’m not sure. And it has changed again. That’s a bit confusing. 
The interviews highlighted that the complexity of the voluntary savings scheme, due to 
too many reforms, was causing confusion among citizens. Some interviewees (R2, R4, 
R6, and R18) claimed that they had already joined the savings programmes, but could not 
name which programme nor which option they registered for. They were only able to 
describe the benefits they received.  
R2 acknowledged the change of savings programmes under the voluntary savings scheme, 
from the SSA 40 to the NSF. However, even R2 himself claimed that the voluntary 
savings scheme offered by the government is a bit complicated and confusing, making it 
difficult for citizens to follow. He had to go back to the local bureaucrats’ office to ask 
them to clarify a few times. Based on this, for those citizens less proactive than R2, who 
searched for all the information he wanted, it is understandable why they might not want 
to join the savings scheme, indeed for them, it appears too complex and perhaps unreliable.  
Interviewees R11 and R7 are examples of citizens who have not yet joined the savings 
programme of the voluntary savings scheme due to the information they received being 
insufficient or unclear.  
Interviewer: As you are not yet 60, will you consider joining the OAA? 
Interviewee R11: Definitely, yes, it is my right. I definitely am going to join the 
OAA.  
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Interviewer: How about the voluntary savings schemes: SSA 40 or NSF? Have 
you ever heard about them or are you joining any of them? 
Interviewee R11: I think I know one savings programme. It was the one that 
opened for the registration last year or last few years, and there were tons of 
elderly queuing up to register. The NSF is a new thing that the government is now 
introducing, but I haven’t got that much information yet, so I can’t tell you 
whether I want to join the savings scheme or not. I am also saving some money 
for my retirement. If the savings scheme is not that interesting, I would rather not. 
It might be interesting, but I need time to do some research on it first.  
R7 also claimed that he needed more information if he really was going start saving. Most 
of the interviewees (R1, R2, R3, R4, R6, R7, R9, R11, R13, R15, R18 and R19) claimed 
that joining the OAA is their right. However, whether or not to join the savings 
programme is also an option. If this option has not yet been clearly clarified, they would 
rather not allow themselves to commit to a financial programme that seems unclear.  
5.3.1.4 Superior options  
Along with the informality, decentralisation and complexity of the policy designs 
constraints, some appear to have found better options, and thus chose not to join the 
voluntary savings scheme.  
Interviewer: You are now joining the OAA. What about the savings programmes, 
the SSA 40, the NSF, or maybe the RMF? 
Interviewee R13: The OAA is my right. I definitely joined it. If I didn’t join the 
OAA then I must be stupid. The government gives me the money, and it’s for 
everyone. It’s not that much, but it’s my right. I have to get it. However, the 
savings programme is a different story. For the RMF, I know that I have to 
contribute the same amount of money for five years. I don’t like that kind of 
commitment. And the other two programmes did not catch my attention at all. 
Although the interest of the SSA 40 and the NSF was higher than the interest of 
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saving with a bank, it is still too low for me. My children can give me more than 
that. And if I want to contribute to something for many years, like those 
programmes [of the voluntary savings scheme] that the state provided, I would 
just invest in the stock market. But yeah, I have my children to look after me, so 
there is no need to be worried about my future. 
In the same vein, R15 admitted that she also had only joined the OAA. The reason she 
gave for not joining the voluntary savings scheme is noteworthy. 
Interviewer: You are now joining the OAA. What about savings schemes like SSA 
40, the NSF, or maybe the RMF? 
Interviewee R15: Before I retired, my husband and I worked as bank managers. 
We know a lot about the RMF. I advertised it to lots of customers. For me, I don’t 
think it is a good programme. Why do you have to commit to something for five 
years? I mean, if you wish to you can, but if you have enough financial potential 
to contribute to the RMF, I believe you can find better options than the RMF. 
About the NSF, I believe that it is a very good programme, but it’s quite new; it 
needs to be advertised more and citizens need more information about it. I think 
the NSF is a very good way to help the poor learn how to save their money. It is 
good for someone who works day-by-day. Frankly speaking, it is suitable for 
those very low-income workers, like street vendors or farmers, but not for me. I 
have my children to look after me, and I also saved some money for myself since 
I started working… The OAA is a very good programme, and the government 
should continue doing it. 
Informants R13 and R15 supported the questionnaire survey data and some previous 
studies suggesting that those receiving enough financial support to contribute to the 
voluntary savings scheme tend not to join it, insisting that they can find better options. It 
is interesting to note that though some interviewees (R11 and R14) claimed that they had 
not found any savings options superior to the savings scheme, they had already started 
saving before the savings scheme for informal workers was introduced. Hence, they were 
not bothered about switching their personal savings to the savings scheme. This suggests 
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that apart from the government’s savings scheme, Thai citizens also have many private 
saving options to choose from. 
5.3.2 Discussion: The interaction between the pension system and other 
institutions 
Based on the interview data analysis from the citizen’s perspectives, there are four main 
points that require further attention. These four main points appear to be relevant to the 
questionnaire survey data in Chapter 4, and evaluate the guiding questions of this chapter, 
all of which are relevant to the main research questions. 
First, the decentralisation process appears to facilitate the majority of Thai senior citizens 
joining the OAA of the non-contributory pension scheme, except for migrants. That said, 
the OAA registration time limit and location deterred some citizens from registering and 
receiving OAA pension provision. The majority of the Thai elderly, including the 
questionnaire’s respondents and interviewees, had joined the OAA, at the same time, 
most Thai senior citizens were pleased with local bureaucrats’ actions on advertising and 
their ability to provide information about the pension system for them. However, the 
drawback of the decentralisation structure has constrained a small number of Thai citizens 
from joining the OAA. Some key informants revealed how complex the process of 
registration is. The registration time is very limited, open only from the 1st to the 31st of 
November each year, while the only place where citizens are permitted to register for 
their senior allowance is their relevant local authority office or hometown mobile unit. 
Even though senior citizens can sign an approval letter for someone to register for them 
at a local government office, some claimed they did not know about this; overall, the 
process was too complicated for them to understand. The data analysis in this chapter 
indicates that the decentralisation process of local governance not only facilitated but also 
constrained the effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme coverage to 
informal workers. This implies that the nature of decentralisation is two-sided, something 
the government does not seem aware of. Decentralisation appears to be one of the causal 
factors behind the results of coverage for pension scheme. Also, the decentralisation 
process behind the OAA’s household registration system constrained some low-income 
rural migrants in the informal sector from registering for the programme and receiving 
any pension provision. This implies that it unintentionally formed a vulnerable group in 
the pension system.  
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This finding supports Scott’s argument (2009:19) that decentralisation can be positive or 
negative when it bonds to other institutions as social networks. Moreover, regarding the 
World Bank’s conceptual framework for reform options, the World Bank emphasises that 
to match reform needs with constraints and opportunities for middle-income countries 
with emerging reform, the reform needs of the multiplicity of systems and the reform 
environment of the administrative capacity are required (Holzmann et al., 2008:18). This 
implies that the World Bank suggests the client countries to be aware of the interaction 
between the pension system and other institutions, including the public administration. 
Holzmann et al. (2005:115) emphasise that the “from the point of view of social security 
institutions, the flow of money could remain decentralised, while the flow of data could 
be partially or fully centralised. Leaving both flows decentralised would seriously 
undermine the effort to improve compliance and the efficient collection of pension 
contributions.” This implies that the decentralisation process is a potentially powerful 
approach for the cash transfer process, but not for the data. However, in the Thai case, 
both the data of the OAA registration and the allowance transfer are decentralised. Based 
on the data analysis, it implies that the Thai government were not aware of the interaction 
between the pension system and the nature of the decentralisation that functioned in the 
institutional framework of the Thai pension system after implementing the five-pillar 
pension reform, which is one of the World Bank’s concerns regarding reform criteria. In 
other words, the Thai government did not actually pay attention to the World Bank’s 
conceptual framework before implementing the five-pillar pension design. 
Second, this chapter demonstrates that informality and decentralisation work together as 
a ‘causal package’ that negatively impacted on informal workers’ inclusion. Apart from 
being a constraint on their savings behaviour, informality is another reason why some 
received less information. These citizens worked all day and had no chance of obtaining 
any information on pension possibilities, even if local bureaucrats visited their locales. 
More specifically, those migrant informal workers who do not return to their hometown 
or regularly contact anyone in their local area, and who also have flexible working times, 
seem to experience an issue with receiving information about the pension and savings 
schemes available for them. This chapter sheds further light on concerns regarding the 
vulnerable group, indicating that senior informal migrants are now also facing economic 
vulnerability. This is because apart from not being able to afford to contribute to the 
savings programme, some migrant interviewees claimed that they had not yet joined the 
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OAA because they could not skip a day’s work to visit the local office in the official 
residential area and register.  
Lloyd-Sherlock and Khumya’s study (2004:4), exploration of the economic vulnerability 
of the Thai elderly in rural and urban areas, found that the elderly in rural areas are at a 
disadvantage in terms of cash transfers, this is because the children and other relatives of 
most elderly in rural areas have migrated to urban areas, which is far away from the 
elderly. This study, on the other hand, has shifted its focus and highlighted that those 
migrants have also lost the opportunity to receive any updated information on pension 
and savings schemes. If any of the migrants in the informal sector did not contact anyone 
in their hometown, the opportunities for them to receive any updated information will be 
less than supposed. This implies that being migrants in the informal labour market can be 
seen as a great disadvantage in terms of joining pension and savings schemes in the five-
pillar pension system.  
Third, the complexity of policy design seems to be another drawback. The interview data 
show that the complexity of the OAA non-contributory pension scheme lay in limitations 
of time and location, as mentioned earlier. If only citizens were allowed to register in any 
convenient local area, the number of OAA recipients would be higher; and thus the 
effectiveness of the pension coverage would make it more successful. Moreover, the data 
further highlight that the policy design for the voluntary savings scheme is far more 
complex for the average citizen to understand. In particular, although the voluntary 
savings scheme has been reformed several times with several different options and 
programmes, there has been no clear clarification of each programme. A few interviewees 
stressed that the complexity of the voluntary savings scheme was too complicated for 
them to understand. Some interviewees in the informal labour market even claimed that 
due to their lower educational background, it was very difficult for them to get any 
updated information by themselves. The interview data show that those acknowledging 
the NSF clearly tended to be those with higher education or those simply keen to seek for 
information themselves, using the TV, radio, newspaper, or visiting the local office 
(interviewees R2, R3, R7, 18 and R19). Meanwhile, those who acknowledged their 
understanding of the SSA 40 tended to get the information mainly from local bureaucrats, 
but could not tell which options they had chosen or understood (interviewee R6). Some 
prior studies stress that older people with little education and limited family support were 
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less likely to acknowledge or understand pensions, especially ones offered in highly 
complex programmes like the voluntary savings scheme (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:35). This 
is also visible in the Argentinian case. Lloyd-Sherlock (2002:707) highlights that the 
survey of Buenos Aires’ shanty towns found that those elderly “with poor mobility, little 
education and little family support were less likely to have knowledge about pensions, 
and were less able to fulfil the complex and onerous bureaucratic application process”. 
This implies that informal workers across the world tend to have lower educational 
backgrounds, while facing the same scenario of economic vulnerability. 
Fourthly, the prospect of superior options lured some citizens’ attention away from the 
voluntary savings scheme. Some interviewees exemplify how some middle- and high-
income informal workers decided not to join the voluntary savings scheme because they 
found better options, including financial support from family members and better interest 
rates from private institutions. The two new voluntary saving scheme programmes, NSF 
and SSA 40, did not attract middle- and high-income informal workers due to their very 
low contribution-based benefits. The superior options factor reflects how personal 
characteristics and labour market conditions are relevant to decision-making. This again 
implies that informal workers with low and irregular income did not have superior options 
and ended up with fewer opportunities to contribute to pension savings. 
To conclude, this section’s data shed light on how the informal labour market, 
decentralisation structure, and complexity of policy design can impact Thai informal 
workers’ decisions and by extension the effectiveness of the current Thai pension system. 
The data analysis emphasises how the nature of each institution can obstruct pension 
reform and inclusion of informal workers. It also confirms the importance of considering 
both initial conditions and evaluation criteria to reach pension reform’s objectives. 
Moreover, this section’s data stressed that migrants in the informal sector comprise a 
vulnerable group in the current pension system due to the nature of informality and 
decentralisation. Accordingly, the next section further analyses and compares the effects 
of decentralisation of the household registration system in the Thai and Chinese cases.  
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5.3.3 The negative effect of decentralisation in the Thai and Chinese pension 
systems 
The previous section explained how the decentralisation process of the OAA household 
registration system has exerted a negative impact on the interests and decisions of some 
migrants in the informal sector to join the pension programme. This section aims to clarify 
that even though the government has reformed the pension system, by co-opting the 
decentralisation process into the pension system to increase citizens’ potential coverage, 
there is still a tiny spot of negative impact from decentralisation that the Thai government 
has not previously been aware of. China and Thailand share a similar issue: the policy of 
the household registration system seems to be one of the constraints inhibiting rural 
migrants’ registration, mostly in the informal sector; this has unintentionally created new 
vulnerable group.  
Yang’s research project (2014) highlights that the existing social security policies in 
China have largely failed to protect senior migrants regarding the household registration 
system related to pension insurance in Tangshan (p.154). This is because the citizens are 
allowed to register to make contributions and receive a state allowance depends on where 
the citizens officially reside. Yang (2014:154) reveals that the two-tier social security 
system of household registration in China is disadvantageous to rural residents. More 
specifically, Chinese rural migrants, working in urban cities, would have to return to their 
hometown or official local residence, not just to register for pension insurance, but also 
to collect their social security benefits (p.217). He points out that the household 
registration system in China not only treats rural migrants unequally compared to local 
residents in urban areas, but also shapes them into becoming a new vulnerable group 
within the system. 
Based on Yang’s data analysis on the China case and this current thesis on the Thai case, 
it appears that rural migrants in both cases now face the same obstacle. The household 
registration system of the pension system is deterring those citizens who are interested in 
joining the pension programmes from doing so. Even though the majority of Thai senior 
citizens have already joined the OAA, there are still some Thai elderly who have not yet 
registered. The data analyses in this thesis indicate that the OAA household registration 
system remains one of the obstructions that are blocking migrants from easily registering 
at any local area. Those senior citizens who want to join the OAA have to register at the 
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official local area that is defined by their official household registration system. Senior 
migrants in the informal sector thus had to decide whether or not to join the pension 
scheme; this indirectly diminished their chance to gain some income security and thus be 
more economic secure, as defined by the government. The picture of the current Thai 
multi-pillar pension system captures the main drawback to senior migrants living in an 
urban area; this is, that the OAA household registration system is impacted by the nature 
of decentralisation. It is interesting to note that both the Thai and the Chinese cases offer 
support to Holzmann et al. (2008), Scott’s argument (2009), and the World Bank’s five-
pillar pension reform framework (2008) regarding the positive and negative side effects 
of decentralisation. Holzmann et al. (2008) and Scott (2009:15) emphasises that 
decentralisation may not just reduce conflict and strengthen social networks, but also 
increase conflict and damage social cohesion, depending on different factors relating to 
implementation and context.  
This thesis concludes that decentralisation has positive and negative elements. It can 
either support or damage the whole system’s results after functioning in a new context. 
More specifically, decentralisation could affect migrant informal workers’ decision to 
join the pension programme; thus, it automatically reflects the effectiveness of extending 
pension scheme coverage to informal workers. The concern decentralisation’s impact is 
evident not only in Thailand but in other countries as well, such as China. This suggests 
that governments should be aware of the nature of other institutions that function 
alongside the pension system. Most specifically, this thesis concludes that it is very 
important to carefully consider the World Bank’s reform conceptual framework. 
Data from local and national bureaucrat interviewees were collected alongside the data 
analysis of senior citizen interviews. The data is analysed in the next section. 
5.4 Data on local and national bureaucrats 
The previous section reviewed senior citizens’ perspectives towards the pension system 
via in-depth interviews. This section further reviews local and national bureaucrats’ 
perspectives. There were 8 key informants in total: 5 informants were from the local 
bureaucrats’ group, and 3 informants were from the national bureaucrats’ group. Both 
local and national government bureaucrats from different pension programmes were 
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interviewed to find similarities and differences among their answers, and their answers in 
turn were compared with the answers from the resident group, the questionnaire survey 
data and data from previous studies. This section first analyses the data analysis regarding 
the OAA, followed by three different savings programmes.  
Table 5.2: Key informants of local and national government group 
 
5.4.1 Local and national bureaucrats’ perspectives on the non-contributory 
pension scheme 
There is only one pension programme in the non-contributory pension scheme that 
informal workers are eligible to join. Thus, only data analysis for the OAA is presented 
here. 
5.4.1.1 OAA staff 
The data from both the questionnaire survey and Thai senior citizens’ interviews highlight 
that local bureaucrats’ actions significantly impact citizens’ decisions to join the pension 
and savings schemes. L1 and L2 explained that they work very closely with citizens. L1 
claimed that the OAA staff visit residents’ houses in their local areas to explain any update 
information that may be useful for them. L1 further highlighted that village leaders and 
*
Number Name Code Position In Charge of
1 L1 Local bureaucrat, Deputy District, TAO (Amphur Meung Chiang Man District) OAA
2 L2 Local bureaucrat, BMA staff (Lumpini sub-district) OAA
3 L3 Local bureaucrat, NSF staff (Government Savings Bank) NSF
4 L4 Local bureaucrat, SSA staff (Social Security Office) SSA 40
5 L5 Local bureaucrat, RMF staff (Krungthai Asset Management) RMF
6 N1 RMF staff, Securities Commission RMF
7 N2 National bureaucrat, Ministry of Finance NSF
8 N3 National bureaucrat, Ministry of Labour SSA 40
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sub-district representatives are selected by residents, so these leaders know everyone in 
the community. L1 also confirmed that he certainly knows the local residents in his area 
very well. It is thus very easy for him to communicate with citizens. Though L2 was not 
a village leader or local representative selected by local residents, she claimed that she 
and her colleagues went to local residents’ houses and knocked on their doors to provide 
them with information leaflets. Both L1 and L2 claimed that if anyone had any further 
questions, they could visit the local office at any time during office hours. Further, both 
L1 and L2 claimed their prior responsibility as ensuring that local residents have access 
to the latest most relevant information. The interview data from L1 and L2 confirmed that 
after the OAA was reformed to universal coverage, the inclusion of OAA coverage 
achieved a fairly successful take-up phenomenon.  
Based on interview data from L1 and L2, some previous studies also express the same 
conclusion. Indeed some scholars point out that because of the universal approach, the 
number of recipients for the OAA has significantly increased (Sakunphanit and 
Suwanrada, 2011:407; Suwanrada, 2012; Suwanrda and Wesumperuma, 2012:158). 
Nevertheless, though the official statistics reveal that nearly 80% of the Thai senior 
elderly have already joined the OAA, there are still approximately 20% of this 
demographic who have not yet registered (NESDB, 2014). Thai senior respondents’ 
interview data reveals that due to decentralisation, it is mostly Thai senior migrants 
working in the informal sector, who have yet to register for the OAA. Again, this implies 
that decentralisation not only facilitates but also constrains pension coverage, shaping a 
new form of vulnerable group in the current Thai pension system.  
5.4.2 Local and national bureaucrats’ perspectives on the voluntary savings 
scheme 
In this section, local and national bureaucrats and staff related to the RMF, NSF and SSA 
40 and those familiar with the voluntary savings scheme were interviewed.  
5.4.2.1 RMF staff 
The RMF was introduced in Thailand prior to the implementation of the five-pillar 
pension model. RMF staff appear to have much experience in the evolution of the Thai 
pension system, and their comments are worth highlighting. 
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Interviewer: Could you explain any differences between the RMF and the other 
two programmes (NSF and SSA 40)? 
Interviewee L5: As far as I am aware, only informal workers are eligible for 
registering the NSF and SSA 40. The RMF, on the other hand, are available to all 
workers from both formal and informal sectors. Another issue, from my 
perspective, is that the target group for the NSF and SSA 40 are low-income 
informal workers. However, the RMF is more suitable for middle-income and 
high-income level workers. This is because you have to commit yourself to 
contributing the same amount of money every month per year for five years. 
Contributors will not be able to withdraw the funds until they attain retirement 
age at 55 years old. RMFs catch the eyes of many people who are working in 
private companies in the formal sector, as contributors can claim tax deduction of 
their income up to a maximum of 500,000 Baht (£10,000). Another group of 
people is those who are not working, or you can say housewives, as they can invest 
some money without taking a high risk like investing in the stock market.  
Informant L5’s response explains that the existence of the voluntary savings scheme does 
provide an opportunity for informal workers to contribute their money to a retirement 
fund. However, whether or not they are able to contribute to the savings scheme is another 
issue. N1 confirmed that although the RMF is open to everyone, the target group is 
middle-income and high-income private employees; mostly those who have already 
invested in the stock market or are interested in investment but do not want to take too 
high a risk. Clearly, the comments of L5 and N1 confirm that the RMF is not the right 
programme for informal workers with a low-income level. It becomes plausible why, in 
the questionnaire data, participants admitted they were least satisfied with this savings 
programme. 
5.4.2.2 NSF staff 
After interviewing some members of the NSF staff, a number of interesting issues arose 
that should be highlighted. 
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Interviewer: The NSF has just been introduced again. What is the reaction to the 
programme among citizens? 
Interviewee L3: It has been only a month since the NSF registration date started 
(20th August 2015), however, many people have already signed up for the 
programme. It has been a very positive sign.  
Interviewer: As the NSF was just introduced, has there been lots of work to do? 
Interviewee L3: It was very busy over the last few months. We all have to learn 
everything new.  
Interviewer: Were there any difficulties regarding the shift of the SSA 40 to the 
NSF? 
Interviewee L3: All contributors to the SSA 40 wishing to continue contributing 
to the voluntary savings scheme will have to register before 23 March 2016. Some 
of the SSA 40 contributors have already registered with the NSF. A few of the 
SSA 40 contributors came to us and asked about the similarities and differences 
between the NSF and the SSA 40. I can tell them what I can tell. But if I can’t tell 
them something, I tell them to ask the officials who work for the SSA 40, who can 
provide better information than I can. But I think it will be cancelled soon, and it 
shouldn’t be any problem. 
Interviewer: As the news reported, citizens aged 15–59 in the informal sector are 
eligible to register for the programme, and those who are older than 60 are eligible 
to register only the first year after the programme was introduced. Is that correct? 
Interviewee L3: Yes, it was supposed to be like that. However, at the moment, 
those who are older than 60 are not yet permitted to register for the NSF, as there 
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is a technical problem. Once citizens aged 60 and above are allowed to register, 
the announcement will be made. But we’re not quite sure yet when will that be. 
Interviewee L3’s comment indicates that even though the voluntary savings scheme 
claims to have switched from one programme to another, the system is not as ready as its 
campaign suggested. The NSF advertised that any Thai senior citizen in the informal 
sector aged 60 and above was allowed to join the programme only in the first year after 
the programme was introduced. However, what actually happened was that even though 
registration for the NSF has now started, there is only registration for contributors aged 
from 15 to 59. Any interested senior citizens aged 60 and above have to wait for the 
announcement that registration for this age band is open. This reflects an ill-prepared of 
registration system. Citizens aged 60 plus were allowed to join the NSF within the first 
year that the programme was introduced, but the registration system for the elderly was 
not ready at the same time as for those aged between 15 and 60. This suggests that NSF 
registration is another example of a period of slow development in Thailand.  
Further, another interesting point to note is that NSF staff could not clearly explain the 
differences between the NSF and the SSA 40. The staff misunderstood the cancellation 
of the SSA 40; as it was claimed that the SSA 40 would soon be cancelled. However, it 
was only SSA 40 options 3, 4, and 5 that were cancelled, with SSA 40 options 1 and 2 
still in existence. Though NSF staff (L3) were not charge of the SSA 40, it would be better 
to acknowledge this basic information; as they were in the process of transferring from 
one savings programme to another savings under the same savings scheme. Nevertheless, 
it is understandable why L3 had misunderstandings over the cancellation of the SSA 40. 
Indeed, many newspapers used the news that the SSA 40 would be cancelled as a headline 
(ASTV, 2015; Bangkok Biz News, 2014). They did not clearly clarify that this only 
related to options 3, 4, and 5. This misunderstanding perhaps the main reason why there 
was a lot of criticism from SSA 40 contributors who did not want to transfer to the NSF 
(Bangkok Biz News, 2014). Reforming several times and giving out unclear information 
are both likely barriers deterring citizens’ interest. The data from N2 also confirms that 
the NSF was still very new to everyone. There were a lot of things to learn, not only for 
the citizens but also the staff members themselves, as well as a lot of things to explain 
and advertise about the programme. Nevertheless, N2 claimed that the NSF is a very good 
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savings programme, creating both financial sustainability and a savings option for 
informal workers.  
5.4.2.3 SSA 40 staff 
The data from SSA 40 staff also reveal some interesting information that is relevant to 
the focus of this thesis.  
Interviewer: The SSA 40 will be cancelled soon. Was it hard for you to 
communicate or explain this to citizens? 
Interviewee L4: The SSA 40 will be cancelled, only options 3, 4 and 5. However, 
SSA 40 option 1 for insurance benefits and option 2 as s savings option for lump-
sum payment benefits are still available. The contributors to the SSA 40 option 2 
will get a lump-sum payment after they reach 60 years of age. The main 
differences between options 2, and 3, 4, and 5 were the amount of money that they 
would have to contribute in each year and the benefits. However, as options 3, 4 
and 5 will be cancelled soon, the only savings option with old-age benefits is 
option 2. For anyone who is interested in joining the programme from now on, I, 
as a staff, will recommend option 2; because the contributors will get both 
insurance and lump-sum payment benefits. All the SSA 40 contributors to options 
3, 4, and 5 who wish to continue contributing must register for the NSF instead; 
because we only accept contributors between the ages of 15-60. There were some 
confusions at first, but I just explain it to them (citizens).  
L4 stressed that she and her colleagues also went to the local area from time to time to 
provide residents with the latest information about the programme. L4 even stressed that 
SSA 40 staff bring leaflets and registration form with them in case anyone is interested 
and would like to register right away. This implies that SSA 40 staff pay much attention 
to providing updated information and giving the population the most convenient way to 
register. This does not happen with regards the NSF. 
Interviewer: Were there any confusing issues that citizens noted? 
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Interviewee L4: There were a lot, actually. There were lots of elderly people 
coming to us and asking why they had to move from the SSA 40 to the NSF. 
Protests even occurred earlier. However, everything is settled now.  
Interviewer: Does it mean that you have to work with those in charge of the NSF 
at all? Do you have to provide information about the NSF to the citizens who 
inquire information? 
Interviewee L4: I don’t have to work with them. We are in different departments, 
supervised by different ministries. There is no point for us working together. I just 
do what my boss tells me to do. Some asked about the differences between SSA 
40 and the NSF. However, I could not answer them. I could only tell them 
information about the SSA 40.  
One interesting point to highlight from L4 and N3 is that SSO staff and NSF staff work 
independently. This supports the data from L3 and N2 (NSF staff). Regarding the 
interview data from NSF and SSA 40 staff members and senior citizens expressing their 
opinions on the SSA 40, there were some significant misunderstandings. Many citizens, 
and even NSF staff, thought that the SSA 40 would be cancelled; however, what actually 
happened was that this only happened to options 3, 4 and 5. The saving with lump-sum 
payment benefits of the SSA 40 is still available using option 2. That said, without the 
interview data from L4 and N3, it would be hard to clarify the confusion of the SSA 40 
during the beginning of transferring and cancelling the process. Additionally, both L4 and 
N3 confirmed that the decentralisation process also occurs in the Social Security Office 
(SSO), with the Ministry of Labour supervising the SSA 40; there are some SSO staff 
who are in charge of the SSA 40 in different local areas. This can be confirmed by 80 
SSO local units in different provinces across Thailand and 12 different areas across 
Bangkok (SSO, 2009). On the other hand, those NSF staff, who communicate with Thai 
citizens, work in local offices and do not visit local areas as do SSO staff.  
The current picture of the voluntary pension scheme is the result of the 2015 
government’s effort to reduce the complexity of having two savings programmes in the 
voluntary savings scheme for informal workers. If informal workers wish to receive a 
 189 
lump-sum payment and insurance benefits, they have to join the SSA 40; if they wish to 
receive a pension, they have to join the NSF. After reforming both programmes several 
times, the development of the voluntary savings scheme in 2015 marked the first time the 
government had taken an actual step towards establishing an effective voluntary savings 
scheme for these informal workers. The interview data from NSF and SSA staff clarify 
why the questionnaire respondents were more satisfied with the SSA 40 local bureaucrats’ 
actions.  
5.4.3 Discussion: The effect of decentralisation and policy design 
From local and national bureaucrats’ perspectives, there are two main points worth noting: 
the decentralisation effect and the complexity of policy design. These two main points 
appear to be relevant to the data from the questionnaire survey presented in the previous 
chapter as well as senior citizens’ interview data.  
First, the interview data from local and national bureaucrats confirm that the 
decentralisation process significantly advantages the effectiveness of extending pension 
and savings schemes coverage (OAA and SSA 40). Local and national bureaucrat 
interviewees expressed that updated information was delivered to local residents. This 
also expressed by most senior interviewees. However, migrants in the informal sector, 
specifically those with a lower educational background, tended to get less information 
and were also constrained by the OAA household registration system. Based on this, the 
nature of decentralisation is shown to have significant impact on extending pension and 
savings scheme coverage to informal workers, both positively and negatively.  
Second, providing two different programmes supervised by different supervisors in the 
same voluntary savings scheme is one of the constraints on the effectiveness of extending 
coverage to the informal sector. Although the latest reform of the SSA 40 programme in 
2016 reduced confusion among citizens, the origin of the savings scheme itself was still 
too complex. Many people were unsure of what actually had happened, including both 
recipients and local bureaucrats supervising other programmes or other pension and 
savings schemes. There has been very limited communication and ongoing lack of clarity 
about the respective roles played by the NSF and SSA 40, why two programmes are 
needed and what criteria informal sector workers should use to choose between them. It 
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appears that the two different savings programmes of the voluntary savings scheme are 
competing with each other. While the Ministry of Finance is busy introducing and 
promoting the NSF to informal workers, the Ministry of Labour is busy promoting the 
SSA 40. This problem is something that has been raised before in prior studies (Brustard, 
2011; Jitsuchon et al., 2012). In 2012, Jitsuchon et al. (2012:26) recommended the 
government phase out some savings options for informal workers, including RMFs and 
SSA 40 option 2, as the NSF could support consolidation; the authors also recommended 
reducing the number of ministries regulating pension programmes to just one or two. So 
far, only a year after Jitsuchon et al. (2012) commented on this, another three savings 
options under the SSA 40 have been introduced in December 2013, while registration for 
the NSF stopped. Then, in 2016, SSA 40 options 3, 4 and 5 were cancelled, and the NSF 
was renewed. The development of the savings scheme has mostly returned to its position 
at the time of Jitsuchon et al.’s criticism. It appears that the voluntary savings scheme for 
informal workers has gradually come full circle, moving from confusing to more complex 
to less complicated. It is not a bad thing to provide options for citizens, but this system 
might prove simply too complex for anyone with little education, little family support and 
limited information from local bureaucrats about pension and savings schemes.  
In summary, Chapter 4’s questionnaire survey and comparison of the interview data from 
the citizen groups to the local and national bureaucrats shows that decentralisation and 
the complexity of the policy design of the non-contributory and voluntary savings 
schemes both affect informal workers’ decisions to join the programmes. The nature of 
informality, decentralisation and the complexity of the policy design is a barrier to the 
system’s capacity for inclusion. It significantly impacts informal workers’ decisions 
around joining pension programmes; it therefore automatically affects the expansion of 
pension and savings scheme coverage. The data confirm that, following the 
transformation of the five-pillar pension model, the informal labour market, 
decentralisation system and pension system are now functioned in the Thai five-pillar 
pension system’s institutional framework. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
The data analysis in the previous chapter shows that informality significantly affected 
informal workers’ decisions on whether to join the Thai pension programmes. The 
interview data in this chapter further demonstrates how the nature of informality has 
 191 
significantly impacted informal workers’ decisions on joining the pension and savings 
schemes, and thus the effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme coverage 
to the informal sector. This chapter also shows that the effect of decentralisation is another 
significant causal factor affecting informal workers’ interests and decisions, and thus 
affecting the general effectiveness of the pension and savings schemes’ coverage. 
The data analysis in this chapter shows that the nature of decentralisation has, in many 
respects, caused both advantages and disadvantages to occur in the pension system. On 
the one hand, the decentralisation process has helped citizens to receive updated 
information about the way the pension system works, with both rural and urban citizens 
receiving the most updated information about the OAA and savings programmes quite 
consistently from local staff. The process advertising the pension and savings schemes 
appeared better than before the decentralisation process was underway in the institutional 
framework of the Thai five-pillar pension system. This supports some previous studies’ 
arguments on how decentralisation has contributed to the successful performance 
outcome of OAA coverage (Suwanrada, 2009; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). On 
the other hand, the decentralisation process appears to be pulling some citizens back from 
joining the OAA. More specifically, rural migrants, who have moved into the informal 
labour market after locating to cities, have tended not to join the OAA. The 
decentralisation process of the OAA household registration system has created an 
obstruction for rural migrants, allowing them to register only at their official local area 
office, and within a short time frame. This causes difficulties for many migrants in the 
informal sector. If senior citizens were simply allowed to register at their closest 
registration station, a major obstruction to those migrant informal workers’ accessing the 
allowance would disappear; and thus the number of citizens joining the programme would 
possibly be higher.  
The in-depth interview data confirm that the decentralisation structure is another causal 
factor unintentionally shaping a vulnerable group in the Thai pension system- migrant 
informal workers with low educational background and low-income level. Together with 
informality, decentralisation appears to be creating a powerful constraint on citizens’ 
decisions to join the pension programmes, and also forming the vulnerable group in the 
pension system. The negative impact of decentralisation has occurred in many cases not 
just Thailand, for example, in China. The data analysis in this chapter confirms that the 
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Thai government not only ignored the interaction between the Thai pension system, 
labour market system, and public administration, but carelessly follow the World Bank’s 
conceptual framework for the pension reform options as well. This could be the reason 
why the pension and savings schemes coverage for informal workers was only partly 
successful. 
Apart from informality and decentralisation constraints, policy design and superior 
options are a further two causes in terms of citizens’ interest in joining the pension 
programmes. First, providing two different savings programmes caused a lot of 
complexity and confusion for Thai senior informal workers. Even though both 
programmes were finally reformed to a less complicated version in 2016, the confusion 
remains, as clarification of the development has been poor. Second, some middle- and 
high-income classes in the informal labour market were not interested in joining the 
savings programmes. Those informal workers with enough financial resources to make a 
savings contribution tend to be able to find superior options from their family supporters; 
while those low-income informal workers who remain interested in the savings 
contribution programmes, are unable to afford the payments. The superior options reflect 
how the respondents’ personal characteristics and labour market conditions have a 
significant impact on their experience and decision making.  
In the following chapter, the data from Chapters 4 and 5 will be analysed and discussed 
in order to evaluate the main research questions. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5) evaluated the effects of informality and 
decentralisation on informal workers’ decisions to join the pension programmes of 
Thailand’s non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary savings scheme. The data in 
Chapter 4 show that informality significantly constrained informal workers’ savings 
behaviour, clearly impacting the effectiveness of extending voluntary savings scheme 
coverage to informal workers. The informal working population, a vulnerable group of 
the labour market system, has now become a vulnerable group in the pension system, 
particularly those with low educational background and low-income level. Chapter 5 not 
only confirmed that the impact of informal workers’ low income on their savings 
behaviour has been influenced by the low level of educational background, but also 
concluded that the nature of decentralisation is double-sided. The decentralisation 
structure significantly encouraged most citizens to join OAA; however, the OAA 
household registration system’s decentralisation process constrained some rural migrants 
in urban areas, specifically those in the informal sector, from registering for the 
programme and receiving any pension provision. Both Chapters 4 and 5 emphasised how 
informality and decentralisation are causal factors affecting informal workers’ interests 
and decisions regarding joining pension and savings schemes, and automatically affecting 
the effectiveness of pension and savings scheme coverage of the informal sector. 
However, these two chapters did not reveal whether the institutional structure of each 
pension programme also affects informal workers’ interests and decision-making, or 
whether the new multi-pillar pension model’s design has formed a broader and more 
complex institutional framework. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the implication of 
the five-pillar pension reform has formed a new Thai welfare state regime. Given the Thai 
situation, Chapter 6 examines the effect of institutional pension programmes on citizens’ 
decisions, the Thai pension system’s institutional framework, and the Thai welfare state 
regime following this reform. 
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This chapter evaluates three main research questions: 1) What are the constraints on the 
effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers?; 2) 
To what extent has the nature of five-pillar pension reform influenced the institutional 
framework of the Thai pension system?; and 3) To what extent has the implication of the 
five-pillar pension reform formed a new Thai welfare state regime? To answer these 
questions, this chapter integrates data analysis from previous chapters using different 
approaches regarding welfare state and comparative-historical analysis.  
To answer the first two questions and evaluate the case, this chapter employs five different 
ideal types of institutional structures of welfare state institutions (Korpi and Palme, 1998), 
along with the macro-configurational aspect of comparative-historical analysis, as 
analytical tools. These two approaches examine the causal factors affecting informal 
workers’ interests and decisions around joining the schemes and clarify the influences of 
five-pillar pension reform on the Thai pension system’s institutional framework. The 
answer to the third question, on the other hand, evaluates the typology of the welfare state 
in Thailand since the five-pillar pension reform. This helps the researcher clarify whether 
the evolutionary process of the Thai welfare state regime has been influenced by the 
nature of the five-pillar pension reform and perhaps its unique historical background. The 
answers of these questions will lead to this thesis’s main focus: to examine the implication 
of the multi-pillar pension system in Thailand and its capacity for informal workers’ 
inclusion. 
This chapter is broken into five sections. An outline of the overall chapter and its main 
foci are reviewed in the first section. Next, the institutional structures of the pension 
programmes in the Thai five-pillar pension system are analysed and discussed so as to 
examine whether the institutional structure of the pension programme is another causal 
factor affecting informal workers’ interests and decisions around joining the schemes, 
and thus influence the effectiveness of pension and savings schemes coverage. Even 
though the case studies in this thesis are the pension and savings programmes that exist 
in the non-contributory zero pillar, along with the voluntary savings scheme in the third 
pillar, this section also evaluates different pillars of other pension programmes so as to 
make a comparison and clarify the case study more clearly. Next, the third section 
examines how five-pillar pension reform has influenced the institutional framework of 
the pension system and the effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme 
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coverage to informal workers; by integrating and analysing the data analysis in Chapters 
4, 5 and the previous section, the answer to the first two main research question should 
be reached. This section explains how the informal labour market, decentralisation, and 
institutional structures of pension programmes are relevant to the evolutionary process of 
the Thai pension system, and can possibly influence the effectiveness of pension and 
savings schemes coverage on the informal sector, following five-pillar pension reform. 
In the fourth section, the typology of the Thai five-pillar pension system is analysed and 
presented. This section briefly tracks back to the historical background of the Thai welfare 
state regime, before paying attention to the evolutionary process of the welfare state in 
Thailand since the five-pillar pension reform. Finally, the conclusion section is presented 
before leading to the final chapter of the thesis. 
6.2 Korpi and Palme’s different types of welfare state institutional 
structures in the Thai case 
The data analysis from previous chapters (4 and 5) reveal the causal factors affecting 
informal workers’ decisions to join the Thai pension and savings schemes. They highlight 
how the informal labour market and decentralisation are the institutional factors 
functioning in the institutional framework of the Thai pension system, impacting the 
effectiveness of pension and savings schemes coverage for the informal sector. This 
section, on the other hand, attempts to find out whether the institutional structure of each 
pension programme can be explained as another causal factor affecting the effectiveness 
of extending pension and savings schemes coverage.  
Korpi and Palme (1998:666) propose five different types of institutional structures for 
old-age pensions and sickness cash benefits programmes (targeted, voluntary state-
subsidised, corporatist, basic security and encompassing models). This is done to describe 
the role of conflict for interest groups, in terms of the relative roles of markets and politics 
in the distributive process; as well as to examine the formation of interests, preferences, 
and identities, resulting in the degree of poverty and inequality in a society. They 
(1998:664) explain that different types of institutional structures can be shaped by the 
actions of different interest groups in a society, and in return, different types of 
institutional structures can also shape the formation of interests and preferences among 
citizens. Accordingly, this thesis employs the concept of the institutional structures of 
welfare states to identify citizens’ interests and decisions that they are likely to make in 
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the context of the Thai five-pillar pension system. Korpi and Palme (1998:669) stress that 
each type of institutional structure refers to just a single model in a particular insurance 
area; more than one programme may exist, and more than one institutional type. 
Accordingly, as in Thailand’s current five-pillar pension system, there are a few 
programmes offering four different pillars, this thesis analyses each programme of each 
pillar individually so as to also more clearly evaluate their impact on citizens’ interests 
and decisions around joining the pension programmes.  
6.2.1 The institutional structures of different programmes in each pillar 
Even though this thesis’s main focus is on four different pension and savings programmes 
of the non-contributory pension scheme in the zero pillar and the voluntary savings 
scheme in the third pillar, different pillars of other pension and savings programmes are 
also discussed so as to better clarify the differences in their results. In other words, 
analysing the institutional structure of each pension and savings programme in different 
pillars helps explain why the outcome of the voluntary savings scheme was not as 
successful as other schemes. As reviewed in Chapter 2, there are five different pillars in 
the current Thai five-pillar pension system. The zero, first, second and third pillars are 
organised by the state, with only the fourth pillar representing private individuals’ 
financial and non-financial supports and informal-assets (Holzmann et al., 2005; 
Holzmann et al., 2008). Accordingly, only pension and savings programmes in the zero, 
first, second and third pillars are analysed and discussed. After evaluating the data 
analysis from the last two chapters carefully using the lens of Korpi and Palme’s five 
different types of the institutional structures, it appears that different programmes in the 
same and different pillars represent different types of institutional structure, with different 
target groups from Korpi and Palme’s ideal types. Moreover, the institutional structures 
of four different pillars appear to reveal that the institutional structure of the Thai five-
pillar pension system is a crossbreed type. 
To begin with, in the current Thai five-pillar pension system, pension programmes in the 
zero pillar represent both basic security and targeted models. Regarding the ideal concept 
of the World Bank’s five-pillar design (Holzmann et al., 2008:5; World Bank, 2008:7), 
the zero pillar is a non-contributory social assistance programme, financed by the state to 
deal with poverty alleviation and to provide minimal old age pension provision to all 
 197 
senior citizens. However, feasible options for reform depend on country-specific 
considerations to be codetermined by the development status and income level of country 
(World Bank, 2008:5). The universal OAA was introduced after five-pillar pension 
reform. It matches the World Bank’s ideal zero pillar type and can be categorised as a 
basic security model. Korpi and Palme (1998:668) explain that the basic security model 
aims to offer achieve basic security for all citizens universally. They highlight that the 
fundamental principle of the basic security model is to have either flat-rate benefits or a 
low ceiling on earning replacements in order to leave some space for better-off and high-
income citizens to protect their standard of living through private insurance programmes. 
The interview data in Chapter 5 reveal that some elderly in the informal labour market 
argued that the amount of old age provision was fairly small, and they preferred being 
sponsored by their family; however, they registered for the OAA anyway as they believed 
it to be their right (interviewees R3, R13, and R15). These people are those with the option 
to choose, whilst those with a lower income and no financial support believed that the 
OAA was good enough for them, or at least better than nothing (interviewees R1 and R6). 
The OAA first started with (very) low flat-rate benefits, but after the system was reformed, 
it changed to multiple-rate benefits, depending on recipients’ age (as reviewed in Chapter 
2). Based on its institutional characteristics, it can be confirmed that the OAA is a basic 
security model. However, due to the inherited Thai pension system, the Government 
Pension (GP), which is another pension programme in the zero pillar, is instead a targeted 
model. The GP is the oldest pension programme in Thailand, one targeting only 
government officials. This programme is not for those who fall below the poverty line or 
are defined as needy, as explained in Korpi and Plame’s paper (1998:667). Rather, it is a 
basic pension provision to ensure economic security in government officials’ later life. 
This implies that before 1997, the state only offered privileged welfare to state employees.  
The first pillar of the pension programme is a mandatory pension programme with 
contributions linked to earnings-related contributions; its purpose is to replace some 
portion of pre-retirement income (World Bank, 2008:7; Jitsuchon, et al., 2012:34). It 
presents a concept of the corporatist model. The Old Age Pension (OAP) is a pension 
programme for private employees in the formal labour market. The standard contribution 
rate for the OAP is 7% (3% from employers, 3% from employees, and 1% from general 
government revenues) (Brustard, 2011:181; Boonpiam, 2014:13). Korpi and Palme 
(1998:668) highlight that in the corporatist model, programmes are financed primarily via 
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contributions from employers and employees, whilst the state is a minor third party. The 
OAP’s institutional characteristics clearly reflect the corporatist model. Next, the 
Government Pension Fund (GPF) in the second pillar appears to match the concept of 
both the corporatist model and the voluntary state-subsidised model. The second-pillar is 
a mandatory individual savings account with a defined contribution plan (Holzmann et 
al., 2008:8). The GPF is a pension programme for government officials who served the 
state after 1997. Both the government and government officials contribute 3% of monthly 
wages to the GPF (Brustard, 2011:181). Even though the main actors of the institutional 
structure of the corporatist model are employers and employees, the GPF process is the 
same, existing by changing the main actor from employer to the state. Meanwhile, the 
GPF also shares similarities with the voluntary state-subsidised model, as this programme 
uses tax money to provide insurance for protecting state employees. The target group of 
the voluntary state-subsidised model is the skilled workers and middle-income class; data 
in previous chapters (Table 4.3) show that formal workers tend to be in regular middle-
income and high-income classes, unlike those of the informal working population. This 
confirms that the pension programmes in both the first and second pillars perfectly match 
the target group of Korpi and Palme’s corporatist and voluntary state-subsidised models: 
middle-income and skilled workers.  
Next, even though savings programmes under the voluntary savings scheme in the third 
pillar also represent the voluntary state-subsidised model, different programmes focus on 
different target groups. The RMF is a savings programme that both formal and informal 
workers are eligible to join. However, it seems to primarily impress private employees in 
the formal labour market, as RMF participants enjoy tax deductions on contributions or 
may hope to make additional savings (Bangkok Bank, n.d.; Brustad, 2011:184; Creveling 
and Creveling, 2016). Korpi and Palme (1998:668) highlight that the middle-income class 
and better-off citizens are the main target group of the voluntary state-subsidised model, 
rather than poor, unskilled informal workers. This is because the eligibility criteria for 
benefits using this model is based on voluntary contributions. This implies that even 
Korpi and Palme do not believe that this will work if low paid and irregular income 
workers form the target group. The RMF target group appears to match the ideal target 
group of the voluntary state-subsidised model. However, on the other hand, the target 
group of the NSF and the SSA 40, is the informal labour market, which is clearly opposite 
to Korpi and Palme’s suggestion. The contribution rate of these two savings programmes 
 199 
include the government matching contributions as an incentive to participants (Prapha, 
2013; NSF, 2017b). Even though these two savings programmes are categorised as 
operating as part of the voluntary state-subsidised model, the target group is instead 
informal workers, who tend to earn a very low and irregular income. The priority aim of 
these two programmes is to extend social security coverage to informal workers and to 
enhance their quality of life (SSO, 2012). This clearly implies that the Thai government 
have tried to take difficult things and make them possible. Indeed, it can be argued that 
the World Bank has suggested a fairly difficult challenge for clients to follow. The 
question then raised is whether this mismatched target group could be a reason behind the 
effectiveness of savings scheme coverage in the informal sector? 
Korpi and Palme (1998:669) suggest researchers bear in mind that these types are just 
ideal concepts, which can never exactly fit the real world; instead, researchers must expect 
“to find crossbreeds, not purebreds; alloys, not elements.” The data analysis of this 
chapter also came to the same conclusion. It appears that different programmes in 
different pillars represent different types of institutional structure. Also, the concept of 
informal workers joining both the non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary 
savings scheme appears to match the encompassing model. Korpi and Palme (1998:669) 
assert that the concept of an encompassing model is a combination of the basic security 
model and the corporatist model that comes with universal programmes offering basic 
security for all citizens and earnings-related benefits. Korpi and Palme contend that this 
encompassing model is a way to not only reduce the demand for private insurance, but 
also offer a potential social insurance for all citizens within the same programme (ibid.). 
Accordingly, it appears that the purpose of offering non-contributory pension scheme and 
voluntary savings scheme to the informal sector shares an idea with the encompassing 
model. However, the major point of difference is that the encompassing model offers a 
universal programme of both basic income and earnings-related benefits to everyone; 
whilst the universal OAA of the non-contributory pension scheme includes both formal 
and informal sectors, but the savings programmes of the voluntary savings scheme in the 
third pillar includes only the informal workers. 
One of the reasons why these five different types of institutional structures were proposed 
(Korpi and Palme, 1998:665) lies in the need to examine the effects of institutions on 
citizens’ interests and preferences and the degree of poverty and inequality in society. 
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After the introduction of the non-contributory pension scheme and the voluntary savings 
scheme, the number of Thai elderly in poverty was reduced. Jitsuchon et al.’s speculation 
(2012:28) on the poverty gap and the severity of poverty for the Thai elderly between 
2006-2008 and 2009-2010, indicates that since the OAA switched to universal coverage 
in 2009, the reduction in poverty for the Thai elderly population was significant; from 
23.25% to 14.72%. Some scholars also stress that reforming the universal OAA not only 
alleviated poverty for the elderly, but also improved pension distribution by fully 
covering all Thai senior citizens in both formal and informal sectors (Suwanrada, 2012; 
Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). It appears that the government has gradually 
achieved its aim regarding poverty reduction. Indeed, poverty for the Thai elderly has 
fallen parallel to increased pension coverage for Thai senior citizens (ILO, 2016:1). 
However, extending savings coverage to informal workers seems to still have a lot of 
room for improvement. The voluntary savings scheme for informal workers remains the 
only scheme that was unsuccessful in achieving its coverage goal, unlike the non-
contributory pension scheme. Questions thus arise: what are the causal factors behind this 
outcome? Does the institutional structure of the pension programme also influence 
citizens’ interests and decision making, thus affecting the effectiveness of extending 
savings scheme coverage? These concerns will be explored in the next section. 
6.2.2 The effect of institutional structures on informal workers’ interests and 
decision making 
In the current Thai five-pillar pension system, the pension and savings schemes of the 
zero and the third pillars are the only two that informal workers are eligible to join. 
However, the performance outcome of these two schemes appear to be vastly different. 
Korpi and Palme (1998:663) point out that institutional structures affect citizens’ interests 
and preferences; in return, institutional structures are shaped by citizens’ interests and 
preferences. After analysing the data analysis via different types of institutional structures, 
this thesis agrees with Korpi and Palme’s argument on how the institutional structures of 
pension programmes are the causal factors affecting citizens’ interests and decisions 
around joining pension programmes. 
On the one hand, the institutional characteristics of the universal OAA positively affected 
citizens across both formal and informal sectors to join the programme. For example, the 
number of OAA recipients skyrocketed from 1.7 million in 2008 to around 5.5 million in 
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2009 (NSO, 2009); and the number of recipients has grown annually since then. Many 
scholars claim that the government has to give major credit to the decentralisation process 
of local governance, as this helped universal coverage to run smoothly (Sakunphanit and 
Suwanrada, 2011:408; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). However, if the 
characteristics of the OAA itself, providing a basic income to everyone, did not affect 
citizens’ interests, they would not have registered for the OAA in the first place. 
Accordingly, this implies that both the decentralisation process and the characteristics of 
the OAA are the causal factors affecting citizens’ interests and decisions around joining 
the scheme.  
On the other hand, the institutional structures of savings programmes (RMF, NSF, and 
SSA 40) in the third pillar reflect a different picture from the OAA. The characteristics 
of the institutional structures of three pension programmes can be categorised as within 
the voluntary state-subsidised model. However, the major difference between the RMF 
and the NSF and the SSA 40 is the target group. The NSF and the SSA 40 are known to 
target low and unskilled informal workers to become members of the voluntary savings 
programmes, instead of middle-income and skilled workers, who are the target group of 
the voluntary state-subsidised model. This thesis suggests that mismatched target group 
of the pension programmes from Korpi and Palme’s suggestion has a significant negative 
impact on the effectiveness of the savings scheme. The data analysis in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 indicates that informal workers with enough financial capacity to contribute 
were not interested in joining the voluntary savings scheme, due to various reasons such 
as complexity of policy design and having superior options. Meanwhile, those poorer 
informal workers, who likely live with financial constraints but expressed an interest in 
joining the savings scheme, were clearly the least able to afford to make a contribution. 
Rather, this group tends to focus on living in the present, a day-to-day existence, that is 
less concerned with the future (interviewees R5, R8, R12, R16 and R7; Jitsuchon, et al., 
2012:40). It thus appears that the chance of informal workers contributing to the savings 
plan is fairly slim. Because it is difficult to expect workers who earn quite a low and 
irregular income to constantly contribute for their future, even Korpi and Palme 
(1998:668) have suggested not to choose them as a target group. Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that the institutional characteristics of the savings programmes of the voluntary 
savings scheme did affect some informal workers’ interests. However, due to their 
financial status, it pulled them back from making contributions. This implies that the 
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voluntary savings scheme for informal workers does not have a negative effect on the 
effectiveness of extending savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. Instead, the 
real causes are a mismatched target group and the nature of informality.  
It appears that the Thai government tried to make the impossible possible, with their goal 
of seeing low- and irregular-income workers constantly make savings contributions for 
their later life. Unfortunately and unsurprisingly, the result turned out the same way as 
many scholars had predicted, with a low number of informal workers joining the 
voluntary savings scheme (Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011; Jitsuchon et al., 2012; 
Chandoewit, 2014). Nevertheless, to place the majority of the blame on the actions of the 
Thai government’s action may not be right either. The reason why the informal working 
population is the target group of the voluntary pension scheme is the Thai government 
implemented the voluntary savings scheme in the third pillar from the World Bank’s five-
pillar pension design. Still, the World Bank has already emphasised that how each country 
implements the model is reliant on its own decisions. This implies that if anything goes 
wrong, the government is fully responsible for that outcome. 
Holzmann et al. (2008:4) point out that some pension systems function effectively with 
only a universal social pension programme in the zero pillar and a voluntary savings 
programme in the third pillar. This implies that the combination of basic security model 
and voluntary state-subsidised model, or the concept of the encompassing model, might 
work very well for some countries. Korpi and Palme (1998:670) review that Nordic 
countries, including Finland, Norway and Sweden, are sample countries forming the 
encompassing model for the nations’ citizens. It is worth noting that the Nordic countries 
are developed countries with only around 11% of the working population in Nordic 
countries are employed in the informal sector (Hazans, 2011:1). However, more than half 
of the working population in Thailand are employed in the informal labour market (NSO, 
2016). Most specifically, the focus group of the voluntary savings scheme in the third 
pillar includes only the informal workers, who likely live with financial constraints and 
were clearly the least able to afford to make a contribution. This dissimilar factor may 
lead to different outcomes. The opportunity for informal workers in middle-income 
countries like Thailand to make savings contributions is far slimmer than for those in 
high-income countries.  
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To conclude, the data analysis in this section reviews how the institutional structures of 
pension programmes from both the non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary 
savings scheme affected informal workers’ interests and decisions to join the pension and 
savings schemes. The data emphasised that decentralisation and informality are either 
compatible or incompatible with the institutional structures of the pension programmes, 
depending on its nature in affecting informal workers’ interests and decisions. The 
institutional structures of the pension programmes in the Thai pension system have 
significantly influenced informal workers’ interests and decisions. However, the nature 
of other factors functioning in the institutional framework of the Thai five-pillar pension 
system, including the informal labour market and decentralisation, have also indirectly 
impacted on their decisions, and thus also on the effectiveness of extending pension and 
savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. 
The data analysis in this study reveal that the interaction between the labour market, 
public administration and pension systems is an outcome of the nature of five-pillar 
pension reform. The question then raised is ‘To what extent has the interaction among 
these three institutions combined to form a causal package that affect the Thai multi-pillar 
pension system’s outcomes?’ 
6.3 The nature of individual causal factors works together as a ‘causal 
package’ 
The data analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 show that informality, decentralisation, and 
institutional structures of pension programmes are the causal factors affecting informal 
workers’ interests and decisions around joining the pension and savings schemes. The 
empirical chapters reveal that, since the 2009 pension reform, the informal labour market 
and public administration decentralisation now function in the Thai pension system’s 
institutional framework. This section evaluates the data analysis again to determine 
whether the nature of the informal labour market, the decentralisation and the policy 
designs of different pension programmes work together as an effective ‘causal package’ 
that can affect outcomes of the pension reform.  
Using the macro-configurational approach, Mahoney and Thelen (2015:7) give an 
example of a relationship between X and Y. They explain that the effect of X on Y 
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normally involves other variables that interact with X, which possibly shape the nature of 
its effect on Y. They further explain that the nature of individual causal factors work 
together as ‘causal packages’ shaping the interest and actions of key actors (individual 
citizens) (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:7). If this assumption is correct, the outcomes at the 
macro-level might be traceable to the actions and motives of individual agents or citizens 
(p.10). Accordingly, for the case study, the macro-configurational approach tests the Thai 
pension reform’s capacity of comprehensive coverage for informal workers; it also 
examines how the informal labour market, decentralisation, and welfare state institutions 
interact in the current Thai pension system’s institutional framework and impact citizens’ 
interests and decisions around joining the schemes following five-pillar pension reform. 
Based on data analysis utilising the macro-configurational approach, this thesis’s 
assumptions regarding the effect of the five-pillar pension reform on the institutional 
framework of the Thai pension system are correct (Chapter 2 section 2.3.3). 
First, this thesis’s data analysis shows that, due to the correlation between informal labour 
market and the Thai pension system, informal economy and informal workers’ personal 
characteristics are the significant labour market conditions impacting the workers’ 
pension savings decisions at the local level; they subsequently affect the inclusiveness of 
pension reform. Many previous studies have examined low and irregular income of 
informal workers, focusing on how savings contributions might have been impacted even 
before the such workers were allowed to join the formal pension system (Warunsiri, 
2011:451; Chudasri, 2014; Chandoewit, 2014). Based on this study’s data analysis and 
that of prior studies, this thesis thus concludes that since the 2009 multi-pillar pension 
reform, the informal labour market functions within the Thai pension system’s 
institutional framework, which is an outcome at the macro level. Meanwhile, the 
effectiveness of pension scheme coverage is a result of informal workers’ low 
participation in pension savings at the micro level. The negative impact of the informal 
labour market on the reform’s outcomes is a result of how the influence of low educational 
background on finding jobs and earning income level interacting with the informal labour 
market can shape its effect on the effectiveness of the savings scheme. Some scholars 
point out that this pension scheme was introduced to ensure economic security for Thai 
senior citizens in the informal sector, teaching them to save and maintain their financial 
self-reliance later in life (Sakhunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:404; Chudasri, 2014; 
Chandoewit, 2014). Based on the data analysis, this thesis adds to these scholars’ 
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argument that the government can only convince informal workers on the importance of 
retirement savings and entice them join the government savings scheme. However, the 
negative elements of informality are greater than the benefits of saving for the future. 
Second, the data show that decentralisation is another causal factor affecting informal 
workers’ decisions at the local level, which is an outcome of the correlation between the 
public administration and pension system. The data analysis shows that the 
decentralisation process of the OAA household registration system has enhanced OAA 
coverage for the majority of the elderly, as claimed by previous studies (Sukunphanit and 
Suwanrada, 2011; Suwanrada, 2012; Suwanrada and Wesumperuma, 2013). However, 
the data analysis (Chapter 5) shows that the decentralisation process has both positive and 
negative effects on citizens’ interests and actions. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the 
two-sided nature of decentralisation is an unexpected administrative issue, which is an 
outcome of the interaction between the decentralisation of public administration and the 
Thai pension system following the reform at the macro level, and impacting some migrant 
citizens’ interests and decision-making at the micro level, subsequently constraining the 
effectiveness of extending pension coverage following the reform. 
Third, the data analysis shows that the institutional structure of the pension programme 
is another institution that functions in the institutional framework of the Thai pension 
system and is a causal factor affecting citizens’ interests and decisions to join pension and 
savings schemes. The policy designs for both the universal OAA pension provision and 
the savings programmes for informal workers have significantly caught the informal 
worker’s attention. However, the effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme 
coverage to informal workers has not been as successful as the government expected due 
to other factors involved in the system’s institutional framework. More specifically, this 
thesis found that informality and decentralisation comprise a causal package that 
significantly and negatively impacts the effectiveness of pension scheme design for 
informal workers. The informal labour market condition’s informal economy pulled some 
informal workers back from pension savings, while the OAA household registration’s 
decentralisation process unintentionally gave migrant informal workers fewer 
opportunities to register for the programme than local urban residents. Despite some 
urban, migrant informal workers’ interest in joining the OAA, underlines they claim that 
the registration process was ineffective to their irregular employment status (interviewees 
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R9, R10, R12, and R16). This implies that even if the pension scheme policy designs are 
interesting to migrant informal workers, there is no guarantee that these workers will join 
the programmes due to constraint of other factors with in the institutional framework. 
Through the lens of welfare state institutions (Korpi and Palme, 1998), this thesis’s data 
analysis shows that the nature of the voluntary state-subsidized institutional structure 
focuses on skilled workers and the middle-income class, not poor and unskilled workers 
or those unable to financially source voluntary contributions. The Thai government 
appears to have set a goal proving too difficult to achieve. The government chose to offer 
the voluntary savings scheme to low- and irregular-income workers. It is clear why the 
government’s aim to include informal workers in the voluntary savings scheme was not 
as successful as the non-contributory pension scheme. If the negative impact of 
informality and decentralisation potentially constraining the pension programmes 
remains unsolved, it is virtually impossible for informal workers, who are perhaps the 
most vulnerable group in the system, to join the pension and savings schemes, and more 
specifically, the savings programmes.  
Finally, because of the outcomes of the non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary 
savings scheme, this thesis concludes that an interaction between the informal labour 
market, public administration system, and pension system is the result of a broad and 
complex institutional framework of the Thai pension system at macro level after 
implementing the World Bank’s new multi-pillar pension model; the effectiveness of 
extending pension and savings scheme coverage to the informal sector is the result of 
other variables interacting in the informal labour market and public administration system 
that have impacted informal workers’ decisions at the local level. However, because this 
multi-pillar pension model requires a positive interaction among institutional factors 
functioning in its institutional framework, the capacity for inclusion of the informal 
working population in the Thai case was only partly successful. 
To conclude, the transformation of Thailand’s five-pillar pension system has formed a 
broader and more complex institutional framework for the Thai pension system. The 
informal labour market, decentralisation process of public administration system, and 
pension design of the five-pillar pension model are new factors involved in the Thai 
pension system’s institutional framework. However, because of the informal economy’s 
impact and decentralisation’s positive and negative effects, the pension and savings 
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scheme coverage expansion to the informal sector was only partially successful. The 
World Bank (2008:1) suggests that to assess pension system designs and reform options 
and achieve the core objectives of the five-pillar pension reform, it is necessary to 
evaluate the initial conditions and capacities of country-specific circumstances and 
evaluation criteria. More specifically, middle-income countries with emerging reform 
should consider the reform needs of the multiplicity of systems and labour market issues 
and the administrative capacity’s reform environment to achieve the pension model’s core 
objectives (Holzmann et al., 2008:18). The World Bank appears aware of the interaction 
between pension systems and other institutions and suggests that client countries’ 
governments pay attention to these concerns. However, the Thai government developed 
the Thai pension system but not develop the labour market system or decentralisation so 
as to be compatible with the pension system’s development. This implies that the Thai 
government was not aware of the broad and complex institutional framework of the 
pension system and how the interaction of different institutional factors can negatively 
impact inclusiveness. This thesis thus concludes that the pension system’s focus should 
not only be on reforming the design, but also diminishing labour market distortion and 
any negative effects from other factors that enhance the function of its institutional 
framework. 
6.4 Reflecting the typology of the Thai welfare state regime 
The development of social protection in Thailand has been classified into five periods 
(Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012). The first stage of social protection in Thailand 
included only pensions for civil servants. Later, social protection for private company 
employees in the formal labour market related to the workplace were included. The third 
period of Thai social protection in the 1980s was acknowledged as the turning point of 
social protection development in Thailand. The 1990s social protection was the first time 
that social protection programmes were expanded to other groups, including private 
employees in the formal labour market and underprivileged elderly individuals in rural 
areas. This period was when the Thai government implemented after the World Bank 
introduced an initial multi-pillar pension design, or three-pillar pension model; mainly to 
strengthen the system’s sustainability (GPF, 2012). This period was categorised into 
different types of welfare state capitalism, such as paternalistic welfare state, a 
developmental welfare state, or a liberal welfare state. However, after the development 
of social protection in the early 2000s, such as universal access to healthcare, education, 
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and old age basic income, as many scholars have argued, the Thai welfare state has 
switched to a universal social protection period (Paitoonpong et al., 2010). This thesis 
builds on this line by discussing the impact of the implementation of the five-pillar 
pension reform on the welfare state in Thailand. 
In 2009, the evolutionary process of the Thai pension system continued after the World 
Bank once again introduced a new multi-pillar pension design, also known as the five-
pillar pension model. The Thai pension system was completely restructured again to fit 
with the five-pillar pension model, offering different pension and savings schemes 
through different pillars of the system to different groups of people, based on their 
employment status. After this reform, this thesis argues that the typology of the Thai 
welfare state regime has changed. Nevertheless, what typology of the welfare state regime 
of the Thai pension system actually is, following this transformation, remains 
questionable. Esping-Andersen (1997:187) argues that other East Asian and South-East 
Asian countries are possible representatives of a fourth welfare regime, known as the 
hybrid model. Meanwhile, some scholars emphasise that multi-layered design represents 
a more complex welfare mix of Esping-Andersen’s hybrid regime (Arts and Gelissen, 
2002:139; Rhodes and Natali, 2003:6). Accordingly, this section will explore the welfare 
state regime of the Thai pension system since the transformation of five-pillar pension 
reform, which is one of the main research questions in this thesis. To evaluate the welfare 
regime of the Thai pension system, this thesis follows the same path as used by Esping-
Andersen (1997) to analyse the Japanese welfare regime.  
6.4.1 Moving beyond the three worlds of welfare regimes: The Japanese and Thai 
regimes 
Esping-Andersen (1997) himself revisited one of the case studies in his The Three Worlds 
of Welfare Capitalism paper (1990), arguing that the Japanese welfare state regime could 
not be perfectly described using the classic three types of welfare regimes, instead, a 
fourth regime, known as a hybrid model, a fusion of catholic-conservative and liberal 
welfare states, was offered. Esping-Andersen (1997:187) concludes that other East Asian 
and South-East Asian nations might also be represented by the fourth welfare regime. As 
Thailand is one of the countries in the South-East region, this section, aims to find out if 
Thailand can also be categorised as a fourth welfare regime. 
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Esping-Andersen (1997:181) points out that there are three components which created 
this Japanese welfare mix: Confucianism, cooperate occupational welfare and an invisible 
sense regarding Japan’s phenomenal achievements of full employment, promoting 
education and minimising poverty, marginalisation and crime. In the Thai case, based on 
the data analysis, this thesis also points out three components that form the Thai welfare 
mix. However, instead of the concept of an invisible sense, this thesis highlights the Thai 
government’s expenditure on pension provision for Thai senior citizens. Instead of a 
combination of conservative and liberal regimes like in Japan, this thesis builds on 
Esping-Andersen’s hybrid model as proposing that after the transformation of the five-
pillar pension model, Thailand is now a welfare mix of three components: conservative, 
liberal and social-democratic.  
First, even though Thailand does not have a Confucian cultural heritage, the concept of a 
conservative regime, represented by Confucian familialism in Japan, also shows up in the 
Thai case. Esping-Andersen (1997:181) highlights that the common law and cultural 
practices of Japan place families and local communities as the main welfare providers; 
this represents a conservative regime and seems to be relevant to the nation’s adherence 
to Confucian familial and communal solidarities and obligations. Also, the Japanese tend 
to live in a three-generation household, where the younger generation will look after the 
elderly. It is important to note that traditional familial function in Thailand is also a major 
factor shaping the concept of a conservative regime in the Thai case. Even if Thailand’s 
historical background lacks a Confucian inheritance, unlike Singapore and Vietnam in 
South-East Asian region (Gough, 2001:189; Low, 2006:235; Cook and Kwon, 
2007a:223), this thesis stresses that the main welfare providers in Thailand are family 
members and communities and that this is due to the influence of Thailand's cultural 
heritage. Based on its historical background, Thailand is one of many Asian countries 
where families composed of three generations can be found living in one house 
(Waterman et al., 2017:1372). The interview data from Thai senior citizens (interviewee 
R8) also reveal that some Thai elderly still live in a three-generation household. The data 
analysis from both questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews reviews that the Thai 
elderly tend to live with family members and rely on their private financial support, rather 
than any provision provided by the state (Chapter 4 Table 4.1 and Table 4.4, Chapter 5 
interviewees R13 and R15). The findings in some previous studies also indicate that the 
majority of Thai elderly received financial support from their families and live with their 
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children and grandchildren (Gough, 2001:181; Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 
2007:40; Kuypers, 2014:12).  
It is worth noting that Ferrera (1996:18) explains that the Southern model of welfare states, 
existent in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, form a separate cluster where the traditional 
family still plays a key role as welfare provider. Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen 
(1997:186) argues that neither the Southern model nor the Confucius welfare state should 
be held up as a unique model, because they all displace the traditional familial welfare 
function, which is the same as Catholicism in Europe. From this assertion, this thesis 
builds on this line by emphasising that although Thailand was not categorised as 
providing any type of familial welfare function as mentioned earlier, and while it does 
not believe in either Confucianism or Catholicism, the historical background of the Thai 
case does show that the family has continued to play a vital role in welfare provision for 
Thai senior citizens. Hence, this is why the thesis stresses that the conservative regime is 
the regime presented in the Thai case. 
Esping-Andersen (1997:186) further points out that the Japanese family model tends to 
be a male breadwinner and a female housewife. In the Thai case, in the same vein, the 
data analysis from the questionnaire survey in Chapter 4 reviews that Thai female elderly 
are mostly categorised as family workers in the informal labour market (Table 4.5 and 
Table 4.6). The data analysis from the interviews in Chapter 5 and some previous studies 
further reveal that Thai female elderly are mostly dependent on their family members, 
which may be their children or grandchildren or husband (interviewees R7, R8, and R19). 
Some previous studies also note how the Thai culture has shaped the types of jobs 
available for Thai female and male citizens, with men designated the breadwinners and 
women staying at home to focus on domestic tasks (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 
2007:47; Warunsiri, 2011:451). Being categorised as informal workers mean they will 
have an irregular income at a lower amount than those in the formal labour market. It 
appears that female senior citizens have more opportunities than men to face economic 
vulnerability, and that this occurs in both the Thai and Japanese cases. The familial 
welfare function (male breadwinner and female housewife) are unique characteristics 
confirming that a conservative welfare regime has also formed in the Thai pension system, 
one predicated on the historical influence of Thai traditional familialism. It is important 
to highlight that the conservative model also represents a combination of very generous 
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transfer and very few services, along with very privileged welfare state provision for state 
employees (Esping-Andersen, 1997:182). Even though the Thai pension system has been 
reformed several times, state employees remain in the top position in the labour market 
and receive the state’s best welfare provision. Because of the Thai familial welfare 
function and privileged welfare provision for government officials, this thesis contends 
that the Thai five-pillar pension system can now be categorised as a conservative regime. 
Secondly, in the Thai Case, the role of the market regarding liberal welfare state is fairly 
similar to the Japanese case. Another component that shaped the Japanese welfare mix is 
corporate occupational welfare, where the concept of liberal regime comes from. Esping-
Andersen (1997:184) stresses that the Japanese social security system is quite dependent 
on either the market or the family. He points out that large and medium firms in Japan are 
the main social-welfare providers for employees in the private sector, and that this 
includes pension provision (p.181); additionally, the government has yet offered only a 
very low level of de-commodification (p.182). In the Thai case, state employees are the 
privileged group in receiving a public pension. Welfare provision for private employees 
in the formal labour market is mainly supervised by the firms and employees themselves, 
with the state playing a very small role. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Old Age Pension 
(OAP) is a mandatory defined-benefit plan for private employees in the formal labour 
market. The OAP is operated on a defined-benefit plan, whereby both company 
employees and employers contribute 3% each, while the government contributes 1% 
(Sathavarodom, 2003; Pfau and Atisophon, 2008:7; Boonpiam, 2014:13). Data analysis 
from the questionnaire survey (in Chapter 4) clearly indicates that workers in the formal 
labour market enjoy far better economic security in retirement than those in the informal 
labour market. Nevertheless, the interview data (in Chapter 5) reports that even though 
formal employees in the private sector have better economic security and pension 
provision than the informal working population, public employees are still the superior 
group (interviewees R3, R17, and R19). More specifically, there is an opportunity for 
Thai employees in the private sector to face financial vulnerability or economic insecurity 
in later life (interviewee R3). For instance, interview data in Chapter 5 reveals that it is 
possible for a formal employee in the private sector to be in the same position as informal 
workers, facing economic insecurity, once they are no longer actively included in the 
formal labour market. Based on previous studies and data analysis in this thesis, private 
companies are seen to play a strong role in pension provision for private employees. In 
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other words, welfare pension provision for Thai citizens that is administered by private 
companies is heavily dependent on the labour market.  
Based on the earlier discussion, this thesis supports Esping-Andersen’s view on seeing 
East Asian and South-East Asian countries as constituting a hybrid welfare regime. This 
is because offering privileged welfare provision for state employees, providing pension 
provision based on employment status and contributions with very low levels of de-
commodification, as well as relying mostly on family support is clearly indicative of 
conservative and liberal welfare regimes. However, based on the development of the 
social protection in the 2000s, particularly the implementation of a five-pillar pension 
design, and the data analysis from Chapters 4 and 5, this thesis contends that the 
components of the Thai welfare mix are more than just conservative and liberal welfare 
regimes. In other words, this thesis emphasises that the welfare regime of the Thai five-
pillar pension system is moving beyond just the three worlds or the fourth welfare regime, 
but instead is a combination of all three classic welfare regimes. The role of the state in 
the current pension system is the last component, one that explains the combination of 
this mix.  
6.4.2 A combination of all three types of welfare regime 
Based on the data analysis in the previous chapters and in this discussion chapter, this 
thesis contends that the Thai five-pillar pension system combines three types of welfare 
regime. Apart from the characteristics of conservative and liberal welfare regimes as 
mentioned earlier, the Thai five-pillar pension system also covers the social democratic 
model. 
This thesis emphasises the changing role of the state following the transformation of the 
five-pillar pension model in the Thai case. More specifically, that the state started to take 
action on providing welfare state provision to those who had not been covered by state 
provision previously, the informal workers. The OAA in the zero pillar is now a universal 
scheme covering all Thai senior citizens, which equalises basic pension provision to Thai 
elderly across both formal and informal labour markets. Esping-Andersen (1997:182) 
explains that the social democratic model is a welfare state regime which builds on 
universalistic principles and is committed strong and comprehensive social rights. The 
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current five-pillar pension system appears to review the concept of social rights. Some 
scholars explain that there are numerous reasons why the Thai government decided to 
fully restructure the Thai pension system towards the World Bank’s five-pillar pension 
model. Sakunphanit and Suwanrada (2011:405) and Suwanrada and Wesumperuma 
(2012:158) reveal that one of the reasons why the government reformed the OAA from 
its targeting approach to universal coverage, is because it is a prerequisite of political 
ideology with an appropriate emphasis on social justice. It is worth noting that 
Sakunphanit and Suwanrada (2011:403) also point out that the “Rights to Public Health 
Services and Welfare from the State” were clearly written in Part 9 of the Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007).  
Constitution of 2007, Part 9, Section 53. A Person who is over 
sixty years of age and has insufficient income shall have the right to 
receive dignifiedly public welfare, public facilities and proper aids from 
the State. 
Directive Principles, Section 84(4). The State shall pursue directive 
principles of State policies in relation to economy to provide savings for the 
people and State officials for their living in old age. 
Source: The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2550 (2007) cited in Sakhumphanit and Suwanrada, 
2011:403 
Both the policy design of universal OAA coverage and the regulations written in the 
Constitution, support the view that the Thai government has now paid attention to citizens’ 
social rights. Despite this, the allowance might not be sufficient to ensure the elderly’s 
economic security above the poverty line, although the amount of the allowance has 
gradually increased since it was first introduced. It is interesting to note that the 
government has put a lot of effort into ensuring economic security for all Thai citizens. 
For instance, the government prepared more than 66 billion Baht for the OAA budget 
(Thansettakij, 2017); 2.6 billion Baht for the NSF budget in 2017 (NSF, 2017d); and 2 
billion Baht for the SSA 40 budget (MOF, 2015). A government budget exclusively for 
Thai informal workers, had never previously existed. However, after the five-pillar 
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pension reform, the government prepared a budget for informal workers and for all Thai 
senior citizens.  
Apart from the changing role of the state, the family role in the current Thai five-pillar 
pension system has also gradually changed. Some scholars have raised concerns over the 
changing form of the Thai family unit from its shape in the past (Thanakwang and 
Soonthorndhada, 2007:37). The Thai elderly are now experiencing a sharp decrease in 
family care provision and intergenerational support, due to socio-demographic change 
and job types available (Knodel and Teerawichitchainan, 2017:2). More and more young 
adults are moving to urban centres, particularly Bangkok, for work opportunities, and 
indirectly decreasing family size to a nuclear unit (Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 
2007:37). Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada (ibid.) emphasise that though most Thai 
elderly still live with their families (composed of more than two members), the number 
of elders living alone or only with their spouses have increased. In the same token, the 
data analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 highlights this gradually changing process. The living 
arrangement data analysis in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1) reveals that most Thai elderly still live 
with their family (56%), the data showing that some senior citizens claimed to live alone 
(19.2%), followed by living with spouse (12.7%) and living with unrelated persons 
(11.3%). Some interview respondents (interviewees R1, R5, R6, R9, and R11) 
emphasised how they look after themselves, either through their own income and the 
government’s pension provision or with their spouses or one child who look after them. 
It implies that some Thai elderly are now less likely to rely on family support. This is 
another sign confirming that the role of the family in Thailand's pension provision has 
gradually changed. Esping-Andersen argues that the social democratic model offers 
strong and comprehensive social rights, with the state playing a main role in welfare 
provision, whilst citizens are generally less dependent on their family and the market. 
Based on universal pension coverage, even though the government has not yet become a 
main welfare provider, there is a sign of an emerging social democratic regime. 
Arts and Gelissen (2002:139) assert that welfare states in the real world are more likely 
to exhibit hybrid types, instead of pure regimes. Rhodes and Natali (2003:6) claim that 
multi-pillar pension design is a more complex version of a hybrid system. Regarding the 
nature of the multi-pillar pension design and the role of government provision, market 
activity and citizen’s self-help and voluntarism after the reform in Thailand, this thesis 
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also supports the view that multi-pillar pension designs, specifically the five-pillar 
pension model, represent the hybrid regime. This thesis asserts that the combination of 
three classic welfare state regimes (liberal, conservative and social-democratic models) 
actually fits the scenario of the current Thai five-pillar pension system. The researcher 
further postulates that other countries employing the five-pillar pension model might be 
categorised as hybrid regimes as well. However, what components in a combination of 
welfare regimes of each multi-pillar pension system depends on the historical background 
of each case and the variables used and the limitations.  
It is worth noting that Esping-Andersen (1997:188) concludes that a final confirmation 
of how to best define the Japanese welfare state regime must await consideration, as it 
would best be carried out after the development process has matured. In the same vein, 
despite this thesis pointing out that the welfare regime of the current Thai five-pillar 
pension system is a combination of three types, the Thai welfare regime is still young and 
thus still in the process of development. Therefore, the Thai welfare state regime might 
be different if the evolutionary process of the Thai pension system is continually 
occurring.  
To conclude, the discussion in this section has revealed the answer to the third main 
research question: ‘To what extent has the implication of the five-pillar pension reform 
formed a new Thai welfare state regime?’ Based on the data analysis and discussion, it 
appears that Thailand is indeed now a welfare mix. However, the combination of this 
model appears to be different from the fourth hybrid welfare regime of Esping-Andersen 
(1997). That is, the hybrid regime of the Thai five-pillar pension system covers not only 
liberal and conservative-corporatist regimes, but also those that are social democratic.  
6.5 Concluding remarks 
The main focus of this chapter has been to answer the main research questions. In order 
to answer these questions, this chapter mainly carried out data analysis based on the 
results of Chapters 4 and 5 to further analyse in-depth detailed analysis in this chapter.  
The key findings from the data analysis chapters show that informality significantly 
constrained informal workers from joining the pension and savings schemes, specifically 
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the voluntary savings scheme, whilst the decentralisation structure unexpectedly 
constrained a minority of Thai senior citizens, migrant informal workers who had moved 
to urban areas, from registering for the OAA programme. The combination of informality 
and decentralisation clearly diminished the likelihood that the informal working 
population would decide to join the pension and savings schemes. On the other hand, the 
institutional structures of the pension programmes of both schemes, positively affected 
the interest of citizens in joining the pension programmes. However, the data analysis 
reveals that the only positive sign from the policy designs of both pension and savings 
schemes was not enough to make most of the informal workers join the schemes, 
particularly the voluntary savings scheme, due to the nature of both informality and 
decentralisation. This clearly confirms that the five-pillar pension reform has formed a 
broader and more complex institutional framework for the Thai pension system beyond 
the system itself, including such institutions as the informal labour market and public 
administration. If the government fails to acknowledge and address the negative impact 
of the informal economy and decentralisation at the local level, the possibility of 
achieving inclusiveness for informal workers is slim. 
This chapter also points out that the nature of the five-pillar pension model has shaped a 
new type of Thai welfare state regime. Esping-Andersen (1997) revisited the Japanese 
welfare state case, he claimed that perhaps the welfare state regimes of other East Asian 
and South-East Asian countries are the same version as the Japanese welfare mix. The 
discussion in this chapter built on Esping-Andersen in using the concept of the hybrid 
welfare regime. However, the data analysis in previous chapters and discussion in this 
chapter speculated that instead of the combination of conservative and liberal regimes 
used in the Japanese mix model, the Thai welfare regime is a combination of three types: 
conservative, liberal and social-democratic. Regarding the nature of the multi-pillar 
pension design and the role of government provision, market activity and family support 
following five-pillar pension reform, the Thai five-pillar pension system can now be 
understood as a welfare mix of all three regimes. 
Ultimately, the analysis in this chapter reaches the answers of the main research questions, 
comprehending the implication of the five-pillar pension reform in Thailand, revealing 
the barriers to the effectiveness of pension and savings scheme coverage to informal 
workers and clarifying the pension system’s outcome after the reform. This leads us to 
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the final question of this thesis: ‘What would be required for the World Bank’s five-pillar 
pension model to work in middle-income countries like Thailand?’. This question will be 
clarified in the final chapter of the thesis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the implications of the World Bank’s new multi-pillar 
pension system and its capacity for the inclusiveness of informal workers in Thailand. 
This study has investigated the performance outcomes of the universal non-contributory 
pension and voluntary savings scheme to illustrate the causal factors affecting informal 
workers’ interests in and decisions around joining the pension and savings schemes. This 
paper has examined why informal workers more frequently register for the OAA than for 
the savings programmes for retirement. Understanding the implications of the five-pillar 
pension reform in Thailand not only clarifies significant constraints on the inclusiveness 
of informal workers in the multi-pillar pension system. Such study also supports an 
understanding of a complex institutional framework of the Thai five-pillar pension system, 
which requires a broader perspective for development. Moreover, this thesis concludes 
that the current Thai welfare state regime has formed a hybrid regime due to the nature 
of the five-pillar pension model and the unique historical background of Thailand. This 
chapter seeks to clarify how to solve the constraints in terms of the inclusiveness of 
informal workers in middle-income countries such as Thailand, presenting an answer to 
the final main research question. 
The main objectives of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension approach are protection 
against the risk of poverty in old age and consumption smoothing from work to retirement 
(Holzmann et al, 2005:8). Based on these objectives, the Thai government’s aims focus 
on the capacity for inclusion, the alleviation of poverty, the expansion of social protection, 
the strength of the system’s sustainability, the reduction of its financial burden issue, the 
increase of national savings, and financial market development (Fiscal Policy Office, 
2015:15). This paper, therefore, asks ‘To what extent were these aims met?’, ‘To what 
extent were the core objectives of the World Bank’s pension reform met in the Thai case?’, 
and ‘Are there other national systems that have used three-/four-/five- pillar approaches 
and successfully included informal workers in contributory schemes?’. These questions 
aid in discussing the outcome of the Thai five-pillar pension system as well as answering 
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the last main research question, ‘What would be required for the World Bank’s five-pillar 
pension model to work in middle-income countries like Thailand?’   
This chapter is broken into six sections. The second section summarises the main focus, 
highlighting once again the key pivots on which this thesis emerged, before reviewing the 
theories and methodologies subsequently used. In the third section, the data analysis, and 
discussions from Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are summarised. The fourth section answers the 
thesis’s final main research question. This section reviews the main challenges and gives 
recommendations for Thailand and other middle-income countries planning to implement 
the five-pillar pension model and offer the voluntary third pillar savings scheme to 
informal workers. Then, this thesis’s significant contributions and limitations are 
presented. Finally, suggestions for future study are presented.  
7.2 The concerns of the Thai case and the thesis’s main focus 
Before the five-pillar pension model was implemented, the Thai pension system had been 
reformed and transformed several times. The World Bank’s five-pillar pension model is 
the latest pension model adopted in Thailand. There are three pillars which include 
informal workers as the target group, these include the zero, third and fourth pillars, but 
only the zero and the third pillars are formal pension programmes offered by the 
government. As the current thesis’s main focus is welfare state provision for informal 
workers, only the performance outcomes and implementation of the formal pension 
programmes were analysed and discussed. 
The original Thai pension system was implemented in the early 1990s, however, at that 
time, only government officials were included. Later, private employees in the formal 
labour market and those who were categorised as the underprivileged elderly were 
included in a three-pillar pension system. In 2009, the Thai pension system was fully 
reformed to correspond with the World Bank’s new five-pillar pension model. The most 
significant achievement of this five-pillar pension system is its coverage of every 
employment status, including that of informal workers. The informal working population 
is now covered in the universal OAA under the non-contributory scheme and savings 
programmes in the voluntary savings scheme. After the government switched the OAA 
from a targeting approach to universal coverage, more senior citizens joined the scheme. 
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More specifically, in 1993, as a targeting means-tested programme, only selected 
recipients were able to receive the allowance, which amounted to only 20,000 recipients 
(Suwanrada, 2012). In 2009, after the OAA was reformed and reintroduced as a universal 
allowance of the non-contributory scheme, there were more than 5.5 million recipients 
(NSO, 2009). The success of the OAA programme’s development has thus been dramatic. 
Most specifically, by 2014, there were 9.9 million senior Thai citizens aged 60 and above, 
with 7.7 million of them joining up for the OAA in that year (NSO, 2014). According to 
statistical records in 2014, nearly 80% of Thai senior citizens had already joined the 
programme in that year. The success of the development of the non-contributory scheme 
was therefore significant. Nevertheless, though the number of Thai elderly joining the 
OAA significantly increased, there remain a number of Thai informal workers who have 
yet to join a voluntary savings scheme. Meanwhile, even though the government finally 
took the big step of offering state contributions to voluntary savings programmes for 
informal workers, the number of those workers joining the savings scheme has yet 
remained low. In 2011, 24.6 million of 39.3 million workers were in the informal labour 
market (NSO, 2011); only about 590,000 informal workers who had joined the savings 
scheme (Prapha, 2013). This implies that the number of informal workers joining the 
savings scheme has remained fairly low. Some scholars highlight that informality is a 
major constraint citizens’ financial capability to make savings contribution (Jitsuchon et 
al., 2012; Chandoewit, 2013, 2014), whilst some have praised the positive effect of local 
governance’s decentralisation process on the achievement of OAA coverage 
(Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:409; Suwanrada, 2012; Suwanrada and 
Wesumperuma, 2013). Hence, this thesis’s attempt to explore the causal factors behind 
informal workers’ interests and decisions around joining the schemes.  
The researcher’s belief was that an explanation of the causal factors affecting citizens’ 
interests and decisions around joining the pension and savings schemes would lead to the 
answers to this thesis’s main research questions. Moreover, apart from the impact of 
informality, decentralisation and policy designs, it appears that there are four key 
principles of the World Bank’s conceptual framework worth exploring. First, the initial 
conditions and capacity to improve enabling environment should be considering and 
evaluating even before aiming to achieve the core objectives of five-pillar pension reform 
(World Bank, 2008:2). Second, each country has to carefully assess its choice and 
capacity to undertake reform (Holzmann et al., 2005:11). Third, how the multi-pillar 
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pension system reform depends on country-specific factors regarding the development 
status and income level (World Bank, 2008:2). Lastly, reform of the five-pillar pension 
model should come with twin goals of evaluation criteria (Holzmann et al., 2005:8). 
According to these four points, this thesis has attempted to find out whether the Thai 
government has taken these four concerns into account, and whether these concerns have 
impacted the results of the two pension and savings schemes. 
To conclude, the puzzles in the performance outcome of the non-contributory and 
voluntary savings schemes and the World Bank’s suggestions for pension reform are the 
main foci of this thesis. In this thesis, there was a certain belief that an explanation of the 
five-pillar pension system reform in Thailand would explain the influences of the 
reform’s nature and the cultural heritage of the Thai pension system on the system’s 
performance outcomes, and also provide some suggestions for other middle-income 
countries in making this model work. To analyse the Thai case, the main focus and the 
main research questions of this thesis lie in the interaction between the labour market 
system, public administration and the pension system, and a consideration of how this 
interaction influences the most vulnerable group. To investigate the thesis’s main focus 
and answer to the main research questions, a theoretical framework and methodological 
tools have been required. 
Main research questions  
The main research questions of this thesis are as follows:  
What are the constraints on the effectiveness of extending pension and savings 
scheme coverage to informal workers? 
To what extent has the nature of the five-pillar pension reform influenced the 
institutional framework of the Thai pension system? 
To what extent has the implication of the five-pillar pension reform formed a new 
Thai welfare state regime? 
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What would be required for the World Bank’s five-pillar pension model to work 
in middle-income countries such as Thailand? 
To analyse the case study, this thesis employed both welfare state analysis and 
comparative-historical analysis, which, when used alone, cannot adequately examine the 
Thai case. The theoretical framework of this thesis was formed based on the main focus 
and the research questions. 
Theoretical framework  
The welfare state regime approach offered by welfare state analysis was utilised to 
explore the typology of the welfare state regime in the Thai pension system since five-
pillar pension model was introduced in 2009. Over the past few decades, before the 
transformation of the five-pillar pension reform, Thailand was characterised into different 
types of welfare state due to the development of social protection. This thesis has 
presumed that the nature of the 2009 five-pillar pension reform has formed a new type of 
welfare state regime in Thailand. Esping-Andersen (1997) himself even revisited his 
concept of three classic welfare regimes to propose a new regime, a hybrid model. Some 
scholars also follow along the same path as Esping-Andersen highlighting that welfare 
state regimes in this modern world, specifically multi-pillar designs, are the samples of 
complex hybrid regimes (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Rhodes and Natali, 2003). This thesis 
thus, along the same lines, has revisited the evolutionary process of the Thai welfare state 
regime following five-pillar pension reform.  
To explore the barriers to the expanding social protection to informal workers and the 
institutional framework of the Thai pension system since the 2009 new multi-pillar 
pension reform, the typology of welfare state institutions by Korpi and Palme (1998) was 
used alongside the macro-configurational aspect of comparative-historical analysis 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2015). Korpi and Palme’s typology of welfare state institutional 
structures (1998) was used to explore whether the institutional structures of the Thai 
pension programmes affected citizens’ interests and decisions around joining the schemes. 
It clarified whether pension programmes in the five-pillar pension design can really catch 
informal workers’ interests and decisions regarding the programmes. Meanwhile, the 
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macro-configurational aspect was used to analyse the nature of the informal labour market 
and the decentralisation process, considering them together with the institutional 
structures of pension programmes as a causal package in the large-scale outcome of the 
non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes, beyond just the institutional structures 
of these programmes. The concept of macro-configuration not only explained the broad 
structural-institutional causes of the pension scheme results, but also analysed individuals’ 
actions and behaviours likely to occur as a reflection of the macro level (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2015:6). Each of these two approaches compensated for the weakness of one 
another. They were used to analyse whether the nature of informality, decentralisation 
and the institutional structures of the pension programmes are causal factors that affect 
informal workers’ interests and decisions. The data analysis from these two analytical 
tools then automatically explained how the five-pillar pension reform has formed the 
broad institutional framework of the current Thai pension system, as well as led to the 
effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme coverage.  
Methodological tools 
Mixed-method research design was used in this thesis so as to minimise the weakness of 
both methods and provide un-biased results with more validity and reliability. The 
questionnaire data were analysed via the quantitative method and the interview data were 
analysed via the qualitative method. The questionnaire survey data were conducted with 
twin goals. On the one hand, the goal was to investigate the connections between the 
personal characteristics of Thai senior citizens in the informal sector and their savings 
behaviour. On the other hand, a further goal explored whether the policy designs of the 
pension and savings programmes, the informal labour market or the decentralisation 
process affected Thai informal workers’ interests and decisions around joining the 
schemes. The interviews were conducted as another tool to gain in-depth details or any 
interesting information that the questionnaire survey data might not be able to provide, 
before comparing and analysing the empirical study with previous studies and official 
documents so as to find answers to the main research questions.  
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7.3 Results summary 
This section provides a summary of the data from the empirical study. The researcher 
conducted the fieldwork in order to better understand the capacity for inclusion of 
informal workers and the pension schemes’ outcomes following the five-pillar pension 
reform. This includes the Thai pension system’s institutional framework, the barriers to 
the effectiveness of extending pension and savings schemes coverage to the informal 
sector, and the welfare state type of the Thai pension system. The questionnaire survey 
data were analysed and presented in Chapter 4, whilst the interview data were analysed 
and presented in Chapter 5. The data analysed in both Chapter 4 and 5 were once again 
analysed and discussed in Chapter 6 to answer the main research questions.  
In Chapter 4, the data showed that informality significantly impacted informal workers’ 
decisions around savings contributions. The empirical data reviewed that most of the 
informal working population had not joined the voluntary savings scheme due to their 
own problematic financial issues. Being a part of the informal labour market generally 
means that you are a citizen who does not receive a regular income. Most informal 
workers tend to have low educational background and thus earn a low and irregular 
income, unlike those in the formal sector. Even though the informal working population 
would like to make pension contributions, their financial resources are insufficient. Many 
prior studies on the Thai labour market have stressed that the informal working population 
is a vulnerable group in the labour market, due to low and irregular nature of their income 
(Warunsiri, 2011:450; Sakunphanit and Suwanrada, 2011:409). The current thesis further 
highlights that as financial issues continue to constrain the informal labour market, they 
also indirectly impact on the performance outcome of the voluntary savings scheme.  
The data analysis in this chapter suggests that informal workers with lower educational 
levels and income are the most vulnerable group in the current Thai pension system. 
Existing studies have highlighted that elderly women in the informal sector tend to enjoy 
the least income security in their retirement. The majority of Thai women are categorised 
as family workers with limited educational backgrounds and receive little to no income 
(Cook and Pincus, 2014:11; Thanakwang and Soonthorndhada, 2007:37). Meanwhile, 
other scholars have highlighted how rural migrants with limited educational backgrounds 
are likely to work in the informal sector (Suwanrada, 2009:51; Warunsiri, 2011:451). This 
thesis also concludes that neither gender nor hometown are significant negative variables 
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in informal workers’ saving behaviours. More specifically, this thesis reviews that Thai 
elderly women and migrants in the informal sector faced with economic vulnerability 
tended to have lower education levels and low and irregular income. This paper also finds 
that both rural migrants and local residents in urban areas are not able to find jobs with a 
regular income or in the formal labour market due to their limited educational background 
and inadequate skills. Therefore, this study concludes that workers from urban areas such 
as Bangkok also face economic vulnerability or are in low income jobs with higher living 
expenses. The informality constraint on savings contributions was found not only in 
Thailand, but also in other developing countries with large informal labour markets, such 
as Latin American countries. This chapter concludes that, regardless of which part of the 
world is involved, as long as citizens exist within the informal labour market, they are 
likely to experience economic insecurity and difficulties in saving for their retirement. 
This finding implies that informality is a causal factor affecting informal workers’ 
interests and decisions in joining savings schemes.  
The data analysis in this chapter also revealed that the Thai elderly were fairly satisfied 
with the OAA policy design aimed to provide a basic income for all Thai senior citizens. 
Some participants were very satisfied with local bureaucrats’ actions in providing and 
clarifying information about these pension programmes. Above all, the data analysis in 
Chapter 4 mainly revealed how informality significantly impacted Thai informal workers’ 
decisions to join the voluntary savings scheme, forming a vulnerable group within the 
current pension system. The data only briefly described how much Thai citizens were 
satisfied with the decentralisation process of local government in clarifying the 
information about the pension programmes and the policy design of each pension 
programme in these two pension and savings schemes. Hence, the effect of 
decentralisation was the main focus of Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 5, apart from revealing that informality is a causal factor affecting citizens’ 
decisions to joining the pension and savings schemes, the interview analysis in this 
chapter significantly revealed decentralisation as another causal factor behind the 
performance of the non-contributory and voluntary savings schemes for informal workers. 
As some previous studies stress, the decentralisation process plays a major role in 
increasing the effectiveness of the universal OAA (Suwanrada, 2009; Suwanrada and 
Wesumperuma, 2013); the data analysis in this chapter has come to the same conclusion. 
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The interview data from the citizens confirmed that most of the Thai elderly were very 
pleased with local bureaucrats’ actions in providing updated information about the policy 
design of both pension and savings schemes. The interview data from local and national 
bureaucrats also confirmed that they had worked very hard to ensure that all Thai citizens 
would receive updated information about the pension system. Some interviewees even 
claimed that they had joined the OAA and the savings programme after becoming better 
informed by local bureaucrats. However, the data analysis in this chapter also revealed 
that the decentralisation process not only facilitated the coverage of the OAA, but also 
affected some citizens’ interests and decisions around joining the savings programme.  
The decentralisation of household registration for the OAA unexpectedly had an indirect 
negative impact on some senior migrants’ decisions to join. More specifically, 
decentralisation indirectly discouraged migrants from rural to urban areas from 
registering for the allowance due to the time limitation and location; that is, all Thai senior 
citizens interested in registering for the OAA must register between the 1st and 30th of 
November each year, and they must either register at their official household registration 
location or sign a power of attorney letter allowing another citizen to register for them in 
their official local area. Though there are two options for citizens, senior informal workers 
from rural areas still find it difficult and complicated. The interview data thus pointed out 
that migrants from rural to urban areas who are working in the informal labour market, 
constitute one of the vulnerable groups in the current pension system. The data analyses 
indicated that those who had migrated to Bangkok several years ago, and not contacted 
anyone in their hometown, tended not to receive any information about the updated 
pension scheme. Living far away from their hometown led to fewer opportunities to gain 
access to information concerning any benefits that they could receive. The local 
bureaucrats in rural areas hold a village leader position and normally have very close 
relationships with people in the community; it is their responsibility to update citizens 
with any important information from the government. This position, however, does not 
exist in Bangkok. It is thus difficult for migrants to know if there have been any changes 
to the pension and savings schemes that would affect them. Decentralisation appears to 
thus be a ‘double sided coin’ in the current Thai pension system.  
It is also important to note that this issue occurs not only in Thailand, but also in China. 
Both cases show the impact of decentralisation on opportunities for rural migrant informal 
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workers, effectively discouraging them from joining the pension programmes and thus 
providing them with fewer chances of enjoying the pension provision experienced by 
local residents in urban areas. More specifically in the Thai and Chinese cases, rural 
migrants to urban areas, who work in the informal labour market, were found to be the 
vulnerable group in the pension system, due to a combination of informality and 
decentralisation constraints. Accordingly, this chapter concluded that apart from 
informality, decentralisation is another causal factor influencing informal workers’ 
decision to join the pension and savings schemes, and form a new vulnerable group in the 
system. If the registration system of the OAA programme were less complex, the 
government might be able to provide full coverage to all Thai seniors, and senior migrants 
from rural areas could more easily gain access to the programme.  
In Chapter 6, answers to the main research questions were discussed and presented. This 
chapter’s main purposes lay in discussing the barriers to the informal workers’ inclusion, 
the influence of the five-pillar pension reform on the pension system’s institutional 
framework, and the typology of its welfare state regime. This chapter revealed that the 
institutional structure of each pension programme under both non-contributory and 
voluntary savings schemes exerted a positive effect on informal workers’ interests and 
decisions around joining the pension programmes. The universal OAA, or basic income 
provision, significantly influenced citizens’ interests and decisions around registering for 
the programme. It was far more successful than once it was a targeting programme. On 
the other hand, while state contributions to savings programmes may have caught the 
attention of informal workers, this did not influence them enough to join, due to their own 
personal financial constraints. In other words, the financial status of the informal workers 
obstructed their savings behaviour. The institutional structure of the savings programmes 
(NSF and SSA 40) revealed that the target group of the voluntary savings scheme, which 
is a low- and irregular-income workers’ group, is a mismatched target from the ideal 
institutional structure of Korpi and Palme’s state-subsidised model (1998), that is, a 
middle-income and skilled workers’ group. This implies that the opportunity for the 
programmes to catch citizens’ interests and decisions around joining was thus diminished.  
The data analysis in Chapter 6 confirmed that the nature of the informal economy 
significantly constrained Thai informal workers’ decisions on retirement savings; the 
decentralisation process partially obstructed some migrant informal workers to register 
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for the pension allowance programme (OAA). The nature of these two factors comprises 
a causal package that significantly impacts the inclusiveness of the current pension system. 
Moreover, this chapter confirmed that, after the five-pillar pension reform, the Thai 
pension system appeared to have a broad and complex institutional framework, including 
the informal labour market, public administration system, and Thai five-pillar pension 
design. This was confirmed by analysing the Thai five-pillar pension reform through the 
macro-configurational approach. The nature of each factor functioning within the Thai 
five-pillar pension system significantly affected informal workers’ interests in and 
decisions around joining the scheme at the micro level; it therefore reflected the 
effectiveness of informal workers’ inclusion. This chapter emphasised that the World 
Bank is aware of the interaction between the pension system and other institutions, which 
are considered crucial features of the initial conditions and evaluation criteria. However, 
the Thai government did not carefully pay attention to this suggestion. This chapter 
therefore concluded that as long as the government remains unaware of the connection 
between pension and other systems, such as the labour market system and public 
administration, the pension scheme might be unable to cover all Thai citizens. To extend 
pension and savings scheme coverage, this thesis suggests that Thailand and other 
countries consider not only the five-pillar pension reform’s core objectives, but also the 
initial conditions and capacities to improve the enabling environment and evaluation 
criteria, specifically the development of labour market and public administration.  
Moreover, Chapter 6 found that the welfare state regime of the Thai pension system has 
changed since the five-pillar pension model was implemented. In the 1990s, the Thai 
welfare state was categorised into different types of welfare state, such as paternalistic, 
developmental, and liberal welfare capitalism. However, in the early 2000s, following the 
introduction of the universal 30 Baht Health Care Scheme, the free twelve-year 
compulsory education, and the universal OAA, scholars have argued that the Thai welfare 
state has shifted away from the 1990s model to a universal social protection period 
(Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012). This thesis concludes that the welfare state regime in 
Thailand since the five-pillar pension reform is now a combination of the liberal, 
conservative and social-democratic models. None of the welfare state regimes in the 
classic welfare state system describe a new case study in this modern world, an alternative 
method to describe the case is required. Chapter 6 offered a new explanation of the Thai 
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welfare regime after acknowledging how the actions and roles of the state, the market, 
and the family have changed since the implementation of the five-pillar pension system. 
To conclude, the data analyses and discussion from Chapters 4, 5, and 6 review the 
barriers toward effectively extending pension and savings scheme coverage to informal 
workers. Moreover, because of the nature of the five-pillar design and the historical 
background of the Thai case, this thesis concludes that the transformation of the five-
pillar pension model has shaped the broader and more complex institutional framework 
of the Thai pension system and formed a Thai welfare mix. However, there remains the 
need to explain how to improve the effectiveness of extending coverage and a future 
direction of the multi-pillar approach in Thailand, which comprises this thesis’s final 
main research question. 
7.4  The performance outcomes and future direction of multi-pillar 
pension system in Thailand 
The pension system was first introduced in Thailand in the late 1990s as a mono-pillar 
pension model. This model was first implemented for the well-being of all government 
officials after retirement. Later, the government adopted the World Bank’s three-pillar 
pension design. The target groups and the benefits of the system were expanded to not 
only government officials, but also formal employees in private companies and the 
underprivileged poor elderly. In the 2000s, the system was again reformed by 
implementing the World Bank’s five-pillar pension system. The current five-pillar 
pension system now includes the life-time poor, formal sector workers, and informal 
sector workers as new target groups. Since the implementation of the five-pillar pension 
reform, all Thai senior citizens are covered under the pension system.  
The core objectives of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension approach are protection 
against the risk of poverty in old age and consumption smoothing from work to retirement 
(World Bank, 2008:7). Following the World Bank’s guidance, the Thai government 
introduced the five-pillar pension system reform with the core objectives that not only 
focus on income security for Thai elderly in their retirement, but also the development of 
the pension system and sustainability of the financial market. These objectives include 
ensuring the pension coverage and savings contributory scheme inclusion for all Thai 
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citizens, guaranteeing universal basic income for Thai elderly citizens to be able to live 
above the poverty line, promoting savings for retirement to informal sector workers, 
aiding Thai citizens in becoming self-reliant before retirement, reducing the financial 
burden of the future budget, and strengthening the pension system’s financial 
sustainability (Fiscal Policy Office, 2015:15). This paper therefore asks to what extent 
the core objectives of the Thai five-pillar pension reform and the World Bank multi-pillar 
pension reform were met. 
7.4.1 The Thai five-pillar pension system’s partly successful outcomes 
Since the five-pillar pension reform, the government aims to ensure that informal workers 
register not only in the zero-pillar non-contributory pension scheme to receive basic 
income, but also in the savings programme (NSF or SSA 40) to ensure income security 
and help them be more self-reliant and live above the poverty line. The government states 
that, if informal workers contribute to savings programmes (NSF or SSA 40) and register 
in the OAA, they will be able to live above the poverty line (Fiscal Policy Office, 
2015:10). Once the informal workers contribute to the savings scheme, the Thai 
government will be able to achieve the reform’s aims regarding strengthening the 
system’s sustainability, increasing the national savings, and developing the financial 
market (Fiscal Policy Office, 2015:5). This implies that increasing the capacity for 
inclusion, alleviating poverty, and expanding social protection are the primary goals that 
need to be achieved so as to be able to fulfil the secondary goals, which support the 
pension systems’ financial sustainability and financial market development.  
After the five-pillar pension reform, the Thai government only partly achieved its 
objectives. These objectives include ensuring pension coverage and savings for 
retirement opportunity, providing universal basic income (OAA), and promoting the 
importance of savings for retirement. On the other hand, some core objectives were not 
met. The government were not successful in ensuring that elderly citizens live above 
poverty line, helping citizens to be more self-reliant before retirement, reducing the 
financial burden of the government’s future budget, nor strengthening the pension 
system’s financial sustainability.  
The Thai government successfully achieved its aim of expanding pension coverage to all 
Thai senior citizens. Approximately 7.6 million out of 9.9 million senior citizens, or 
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almost 80%, from both the formal and informal working population have already joined 
the universal OAA of the non-contributory pension scheme (NSO, 2014; Suwanrada, 
2012). The data analysis in this thesis suggests that the decentralisation motivates most 
Thai senior citizens to join the universal OAA of the non-contributory scheme; only 
migrant informal sector workers have been constrained by the decentralisation process of 
the OAA registration. The universal OAA is one of the greatest achievements of the Thai 
five-pillar pension system. On the contrary, despite the savings scheme having been 
promoted and offered for years, the number of informal workers contributing to the saving 
scheme (NSF and SSA 40) has remained low.  
Despite the NSF’s aim of seeing 1.5 million contributors by 2016 (Thansettakij, 2016), 
in 2017 only around 529,006 informal workers have so far registered (NSF, 2017a). On 
the other hand, around 2.3 million informal workers appear to prefer the savings insurance 
benefits offered by the SSA 40 (SSO, 2017). This implies that Thai informal workers 
prefer savings options with insurance more than pension benefits. The interview data for 
Thai senior citizens (R3, R5, R6, R8, R9, R18, and R19) raised concerns over health 
issues, rather than saving for their future. Though the SSA 40 does not come with any 
pension benefit, informal workers prefer to get the chance to be insured in case they get 
sick or encounter an accident. This, of course, is something that the NSF cannot give them. 
Hence, it is plausible why informal workers registered for the SSA 40, instead of the NSF. 
Nevertheless, in 2017, there were only a total of 2.9 million (NSF, 2017; SSO, 2017) out 
of 20.8 informal workers (NSO, 2017:48) who had registered for these two programmes 
in total. This implies that the majority of the informal worker group have yet to join the 
programmes offered by the voluntary savings scheme. 
The Thai government offers protection against poverty for all Thai senior citizens and 
contributes to the contributory savings scheme for informal workers. However, most 
informal sector workers are not able to join the scheme due to their low and irregular 
incomes. It is fairly impossible for these workers to regularly contribute saving for their 
future. Whilst these workers’ income is not high enough to contribute to savings from 
working life to retirement, the OAA is insufficient in protecting low- and irregular-
income workers from poverty. This finding implies that the government has not been able 
to ensure whether the Thai citizens are able to live above poverty or be more self-reliant. 
The Thai government has provided more effective elderly poverty protection to all Thai 
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senior citizens. However, the aim of consumption smoothing from work to retirement and 
elderly poverty protection through minimum pension and savings have not been met. As 
long as these workers are part of the informal sector, and still concentrate on coping with 
present (financial) stressful circumstances, it is difficult for them to ensure economic 
security for themselves from work to retirement. Furthermore, in order to reduce the 
system’s financial burden and sustainability, the informal working population must first 
contribute the third-pillar contributory saving scheme. However, if the number of 
contributors remains low, it is impossible for the government to achieve the pension 
system’s financial sustainability and market development goals. This finding further 
suggests that the government has not been able to reduce the Thai pension system’s 
financial burden nor strengthen its financial sustainability.  
Regarding the outcome of the Thai five-pillar pension reform, the core objectives of the 
World Bank’s five-pillar pension reform conceptual framework and the Thai five-pillar 
pension reform were not adequately met in Thailand. The World Bank (2008) emphasises 
that, to reach an outcome of country-specific conditions, needs, and core objectives, 
pension designs should be evaluated using a conceptual framework. To determine what 
would be required to make the multi-pillar pension approach work in Thailand, and 
perhaps other middle-income countries with large informal labour markets, it is worth 
revising the World Bank’s multi-pillar pension conceptual framework so as to best decide 
an appropriate pension system design. 
7.4.2  The future direction of multi-pillar pension system in Thailand 
This thesis asserts that Thailand should have carefully considered the World Bank’s 
reform conceptual framework and the stylised reform choices before the implementation 
of its pension system. This paper recommends that the government of Thailand take into 
consideration the following three points. 
The first recommendation is that the government should assess initial conditions before 
implementation. The World Bank emphasises that initial conditions can both motivate 
and constrain feasible reform options (World Bank, 2008:2). Accordingly, the existing 
system, reform needs, and reform environment of the initial conditions should be 
considered. The World Bank highlights that efforts at reform need to include an 
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evaluation of the multiplicity of systems and implementation environment of the 
administrative capacity, as well as a process of deciding how to integrate the flow of 
money and data; the five-pillar pension reform is no exception (Holzmann et al., 
2005:114). More specifically, the World Bank suggests that the flow of money could be 
decentralised, and the flow of data could be partially or fully centralised. “Leaving both 
flows decentralised would seriously undermine the effort to improve compliance and the 
efficient collection of pension contributions” (Holzmann et al., 2005:115). However, in 
the Thai context, both the money and data are decentralised. Based on the data analysis 
in this study, the nature of decentralisation is shown to have significant impact on the 
non-contributory pension scheme, both positively and negatively. The decentralisation 
structure significantly encouraged most Thai citizens to join OAA. However, the OAA 
household registration system’s decentralisation process constrained some rural migrants 
in urban areas, specifically those in the informal sector, from registering for the 
programme and receiving any pension provision. This thesis argues that the government 
did not have enough administrative capacity to implement and operate publicly managed 
elements of the Thai pension reform. This is because obstruction from the decentralisation 
of the OAA household registration system pulled some citizens, specifically migrant 
informal workers, away from joining the schemes. Hence, it is very important to evaluate 
initial conditions before focusing on how best to work within a system’s core objectives. 
The second recommendation is that governments should be aware of their own 
capabilities and limitations. Holzmann et al. (2005:9) suggest that country governments 
choose their reform carefully depending on country-specific circumstances linked with 
development status and income level. Most specifically, they point out that the full 
breadth of the five-pillar pension model is suitable for high-income countries because it 
requires a system’s full financial capability. Nevertheless, based on this thesis’s data 
analysis, the Thai case shows that implementing the voluntary savings scheme for 
informal workers in middle-income countries with large informal labour markets is a 
concern that needs attention, alongside providing a full breadth of the five-pillar pension 
model. This is because if middle-income countries under stress such as Thailand 
implement fewer pillars but still offer the voluntary savings scheme to informal workers, 
only a very small number of informal workers might contribute to a savings programme. 
It is virtually impossible to expect informal workers to join the voluntary savings scheme, 
although it is offered to informal workers, unless the financial constraints of the informal 
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labour market are solved. The Thai government must consider whether citizens in the 
informal labour market have enough financial potential to make savings contributions. 
Based on the data analysis, the government can only convince informal workers of the 
importance of retirement savings and entice them to join the government savings scheme. 
However, the negative elements of informality are greater than the benefits of saving for 
the future. 
The final recommendation is that the government should compare the secondary 
evaluation criteria with the reform options. The Thai government reviewed its five-pillar 
pension reform goals to ensure economic security and poverty reduction for Thai senior 
citizens as well as long-term fiscal sustainability of various pension provisions and 
programmes (Jitsuchon et al., 2012:5). The Thai government paid attention to the 
development of the pension system and financial sustainability, but it did not consider 
labour market efficiency. Currently, informal workers are still facing economic 
vulnerability due to their low and irregular incomes. This vulnerability poses major 
constraints on informal workers’ retirement savings decisions. Based on Thailand’s 
example, it is vital to set secondary goals with the system’s core objectives. In particular, 
the informal labour market’s informality constraint must be diminished to ensure 
effective pension coverage for informal workers. Once the secondary goals are set and 
the informality issue is solved, the government will be able to effectively expand the 
contributory savings scheme to the informal sector workers. However, if the number of 
contributors remains low, it will be impossible for the government to achieve the pension 
system’s financial sustainability and market development goals. The informal working 
population must first contribute the third-pillar contributory saving scheme. Hence, this 
multi-pillar pension reform should be evaluated against a set of primary and secondary 
evaluation criteria so as to fully achieve the reform’s core objectives.    
To conclude, the discussion in this section has revealed the answer to the final main 
research question: What would be required for the World Bank’s five-pillar pension 
model to work in middle-income countries like Thailand? This thesis emphasises that the 
Thai government should go a step beyond developing the pension system and develop the 
other institutions that function in conjunction with it, such as the labour market and public 
administration systems. If this development is executed effectively, the constraints 
apparent in the current Thai pension system would gradually diminish. The World Bank’s 
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five-pillar pension model was introduced in Thailand mainly to develop the pension 
system. However, the government was not aware of the relationships between the pension 
system and the other institutions within it. If a government can contextualise the 
transformation of the five-pillar pension model as a part of a larger phenomenon, the 
government can minimise the negative effects of informality and decentralisation on 
extending pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers. This thesis suggests 
the Thai and other governments carefully follow the World Bank’s conceptual framework, 
considering the interaction between pension systems and other systems. This should be 
done via assessments of the initial conditions and capacities to improve the enabling 
environment against the criteria evaluation. Such cases should be contextualised through 
a broader lens prior to reform.  
The significant weakness of the Thai five-pillar pension system is the voluntary saving 
scheme for informal workers. It would be interesting to discover whether other systems 
in other countries also experienced similar difficulties and whether this multi-pillar 
approach can be practically applied in the real world.  
7.4.3 Contributory savings scheme for informal workers in multi-pillar approach: 
realistic or idealistic?  
The multi-pillar pension system was first introduced in Thailand as a three-pillar pension 
system. Some significant issues in this system, such as those surrounding financial 
burdens and pension coverage, brought the Thai pension system to the five-pillar pension 
approach. However, after the reform, not only difficulties in the previous multi-pillar 
pension system have remained, but also new difficulties have emerged. The limitations 
of administrative capacity, the multiplicity of the public administration system, financial 
labour market, and informal labour market issues are major constraints in the current 
multi-pillar pension system. Informal income is a main concern that obstructs informal 
workers from contributing to savings for retirement. Therefore, this paper asks whether 
there exist other national systems that have used a multi-pillar (three-/four-/five-) 
approach to successfully include informal workers in contributory savings schemes.  
Thailand is a middle-income country that has implemented the World Bank’s multi-pillar 
pension approach and only partially achieve its core objectives. Interestingly, not only 
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Thailand was unable to successfully include informal workers in contributory savings 
scheme, but also other middle-income countries. The Chinese multi-pillar pension is an 
example of a middle-income country with a large informal labour market that shares some 
similarities to the outcome of Thailand’s implementation. The pension systems in 
Switzerland and Singapore, on the other hand, are examples of how three- and five-pillar 
pension designs perform differently in high-income countries. 
Similar to Thailand, before the multi-pillar pension reform, the labour force in the 
informal labour market in China was not covered in the social protection system (Yang, 
2014:236). However, in its current state, the Chinese government implemented the three-
pillar pension reform, and informal workers are now covered in the formal pension system 
through rural pensions (Help Age International, 2013:10). As the majority of Chinese 
informal workers are rural citizens, an effort to provide social security for informal sector 
workers in China involved establishing a pension plan called the ‘New Rural Social 
Pension System’ (NRSPS) (Zuo, 2015). This plan combines the zero-pillar non-
contributory basic pension for the rural population and a highly subsidised personal 
savings programme in the third pillar (Liu and Sun, 2016:20). The nature of pension 
policy in China has shifted from a historical focus only on urban residents of the formal 
sector workers to universal coverage of the formal and informal working population from 
both urban and rural areas (Help Age International, 2013:6). Unfortunately, this plan was 
not able to fully achieve its main objectives. Two significant constraints of the plan arose 
in the development of the non-contributory pension scheme and contributory saving 
scheme. As the NRSPS is parallel to the Thai government’s aim on seeing informal 
workers join both non-contributory pension scheme and voluntary saving scheme, it is 
valuable to analyse these two schemes simultaneously. 
Firstly, rural and migrant residents are still faced with the decentralisation barriers of the 
household registration system of the NRSPS (Liu and Sun, 2014:21). The rural residents 
were asked to register and collect social insurance benefits in the area of permanent 
residence (Yang, 2014:158). Secondly, the high degree of informality caused a low 
number of saving contributors in the savings scheme (Yang, 2014:247). Poor rural and 
low wage informal workers in China have the most limited capacity to save for retirement, 
thereby discouraging them from pension saving contributions (Dorfman, et al., 2013:31). 
Interestingly, low income significantly affects informal workers’ pension contribution in 
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both Thailand and China. Zuo (2014) emphasises that the impact of all the problems with 
the Chinese multi-pillar pension system go beyond the pension system itself. If the 
government aims to develop the pension and social security systems, implementing only 
a new pension approach is not enough. The development of other systems functioning in 
the multi-pillar pension design is required, such as the decentralisation process of the 
public administration system and the economic insecurity of the informal labour market 
system.   
The Chinese and Thai pension systems are now facing the same difficulties. These two 
case studies demonstrate how difficult it is for the governments of middle-income 
countries to incentivise informal workers to contribute saving for retirement. As long as 
the working population in the informal labour market still experience the volatility of 
wages and employment, these workers tend to feel less secure and have less opportunities 
to make retirement contribution. The outcomes of both cases confirm that it is difficult 
for the government in middle-income countries with large informal labour markets to 
ensure that informal sector workers contribute to savings schemes for later life. Holzmann 
(2012:13) argues that the multi-pillar pension approach has received increasing levels of 
interest from policy makers across the world. However, effectively regulating and 
supervising this approach remains a challenge. This thesis found that low- and middle-
income countries tend to experience difficulties not only in administrative capacity, 
multiplicity of systems and extending labour market coverage to pension reform, but also 
in informal sector worker inclusion in contributory savings schemes. Regardless a brief 
comparison of the Chinese and Thai cases, it appears that number of pillars in a pension 
system is not a factor for individuals to join or not to join pension scheme and contribute 
to retirement savings. The insecurity of informal workers in the labour market instead is 
the actual case. As long as the informality issue has yet remained, the advantages of multi-
pillar pension system, such as the inclusiveness of informal workers coverage and 
individuals to compensate for reduced public spending, are just a delusion that we hope 
for. 
Switzerland is a high-income country that has implemented the World Bank’s first multi-
pillar pension approach (three-pillar design). Switzerland is the first country to have 
publicly articulated the benefits of the three-pillar pension approach in 1963 and the first 
OECD country to have mandated that employers provide occupational pension plans for 
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their employees. Queisser and Vittas (2000:1) argue that the non-contributory pension 
scheme in Switzerland is highly redistributive: it has a near universal coverage, a low 
dispersion of benefits, and no limit on contributions. The third pillar covers not only self-
employed workers and those not covered by the second pillar, but also those covered in 
the second pillar but wish to contribute additional retirement savings. However, the role 
of the third pillar is relatively insignificant, implying that difficulties of informality do 
not occur in Switzerland. 
Singapore is another high-income country that first implemented a three-pillar pension 
approach that was later developed into a five-pillar pension design. The Supplementary 
Retirement Scheme (SRS) is a voluntary savings arrangement in the third pillar that 
allows both those included and not included in the secondary pillar compulsory savings 
arrangement to contribute to the SRS. Ramesh (2006) highlights that the SRS has 
performed relatively well. The number of SRS contributors is high enough to maintain 
the system’s sustainability. It should be noted that SRS contributors are eligible for tax 
relief. Investment returns are tax free before withdrawal, and 50 per cent of the 
withdrawals from SRS are taxable at retirement (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, 
2017). The descriptions and benefits of SRS are parallel to those of the Retirement Mutual 
Funds (RMFs) in Thailand. These two contributory saving programmes are suitable for 
employees in private companies in the formal labour market interested in tax relief or to 
save for later life. This finding implies that the informal labour market has no significant 
impact on the development of the multi-pillar pension system in Singapore.   
Switzerland and Singapore are both high-income countries that have implemented multi-
pillar pension models. Though each model is unique, both countries have introduced the 
voluntary savings scheme to the whole working population in the labour market. 
Regarding the outcome of the savings scheme for informal workers, neither country 
experienced the difficulties that occurred in the Thai and Chinese cases. The major reason 
is because high-income countries tend to have a much smaller informal labour market 
compared to low- and middle-income countries. These two high-income countries offer 
the third-pillar savings scheme only to individuals as an opportunity to save more and 
compensate for reduced public generosity. The performance of multi-pillar pension 
model in other middle- and high-income countries supports this thesis’s conclusion that 
informality is a major constraint on informal workers’ decision to save for retirement. No 
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matter how many times pension systems have been developed or how well-designed 
contributory saving schemes are, informal workers will still struggle to make 
contributions due to their financial difficulties, making a large informal labour market a 
continued challenge.  
In summary, the performance outcomes of the pension system in the Thai, Chinese, Swiss, 
and Singaporean cases reveal that different multi-pillar pension systems tend to perform 
the same when the systems are in countries with similar income groups. After 
implementing the five-pillar pension approach, middle-income countries with a large 
informal labour market tend to experience many difficulties, both in the development of 
the pension system itself and in the functioning of other systems involved in the design. 
Specifically, informality is a main factor that impacts on the saving decisions of informal 
workers across the world. In comparison, the pension systems in high-income countries 
have not faced the same informality challenges as the systems in low- and middle-income 
countries. Hence, it can be concluded that the multi-pillar pension approach is more 
practical and realistic in high-income countries with a small informal labour market. 
Specifically, this multi-layered pension design appears to be only an idealistic model. It 
is hardly possible to achieve the core objectives of this approach successfully in low- and 
middle-income countries with large informal labour markets.  
7.5 Significant contributions and limitations of this thesis 
Previous studies in welfare state analysis have mainly focused on either Western countries, 
Latin American countries or East Asian countries with a history of Confucianism. 
Thailand appears to be repeatedly omitted from the discussion (Low, 2006:235). Even 
though some previous studies concentrated on the Thai pension system, those analyses 
took place more than a decade ago. The current thesis provides up-to-date data so that 
this study can reflect and benefit from more contemporaneous insights on the 
evolutionary process of the five-pillar pension model in the Thai case and the direction 
for its future.  
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7.5.1 Contributions of the thesis 
Regarding the data analysis and discussion chapters, my study has made some significant 
contributions to the literature on welfare state analysis and comparative-historical 
analysis. 
First, this thesis has contributed to previous studies on the development of social 
protection in Thailand. It has shown that the current Thai welfare state regime has shifted 
away from the regime of the 1990s. The thesis has contributed to welfare state analysis 
by explaining that the welfare state regimes outlined in previous studies may be unable 
to perfectly describe the typology of welfare state regimes in the modern world. In the 
1990s, civil servants held a privileged position, and public expenditure was low. Some 
researchers have identified this Thai welfare state regime of the 1990s as a paternalistic 
welfare state (Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012; Schramm, 2015); others have identified 
it as a developmental welfare state (Kohler, 2014) or a liberal welfare state regime per 
Esping-Andersen’s three classic types (Ramesh and Asher, 2001). Despite the different 
lenses of welfare state capitalisms applied, however, all researchers have emphasised that 
since the early 2000s, the Thai welfare state has developed towards universal welfare state 
protection. After the development of social protection in the 2000s, specifically after the 
universal coverage of healthcare, education, and old age allowance schemes, some 
scholars highlighted that the Thai welfare state had moved to the universal period (Lloyd-
Sherlock and Schröder-Butterfill, 2008; Chalamwong and Meepien, 2012). The present 
study builds on those previous studies not only by confirming that the 2000s social 
protection in Thailand has grown into a universal social protection period, but also by 
further concluding that the Thai welfare state regime since the World Bank’s new multi-
pillar pension system in 2009 is now a mixed regime that incorporates elements of three 
classic welfare state regimes. 
Esping-Andersen (1997) went on to introduce a fourth hybrid welfare regime, a 
combination of liberal and conservative regimes, highlighting that it might describe not 
only the Japanese welfare state regime, but also welfare regimes for other East Asian and 
South-East Asian countries. The current thesis builds on Esping-Andersen’s concept of a 
hybrid welfare regime to describe the current Thai five-pillar pension system. Arts and 
Gelissen (2002:149) state that welfare states nowadays tend to be hybrid regimes; whilst 
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Rhodes and Natali (2003:6) emphasise that multi-layered design represents a more 
complex welfare mix of Esping-Andersen’s classic regimes. This study builds on those 
previous studies confirming that the multi-layered design of pension system in this 
modern world, such as Thailand, is a complex design of mix welfare regimes. The nature 
of the World Bank’s five-pillar pension reform and the influence of both cultural heritage 
and historical background in the Thai pension system confirm that the current Thai 
pension system is a combination of all three classic welfare state regimes: liberal, 
conservative and social-democratic. This thesis contributes to previous studies from 
welfare state literature by suggesting that to understand the welfare state regime in the 
current world, researchers might have to move beyond just the classic types; also, since 
times have changed and other factors in the environment have changed also, a new type 
of welfare regime might be called for. Perhaps, other countries employing the World 
Bank’s five-pillar pension model might be categorised as hybrid regimes with all three 
types of welfare regime as well.  
Moreover, Esping-Andersen (1997:186) asserts that both Southern European countries, 
which represent pro-family cultures, and Japan, with a culture which can be traced to 
Confucianism, are not unique, but instead are similar to the Catholic-conservative welfare 
state, which represents a traditional familial welfare function. Based on the data analysis 
and discussion in Chapter 6, we can add that even though Thailand is not a Southern 
European nation nor a Confucian one, the historical influence of familialism represents a 
conservative regime in the Thai case. This thesis suggests that as long as the traditional 
familial welfare function stays strong, the conservative model will be presented. 
Finally, this thesis has contributed to the literature on welfare state analysis and 
comparative-historical analysis by combining the typology of social insurance institutions 
of welfare state analysis (Korpi and Palme, 1998) and the macro-configurational element 
of comparative-historical analysis (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015) as an alternative 
approach for analysing pension system. This thesis employed Korpi and Palme’s concept 
of five different ideal-typical models of social insurance institutions to examine whether 
institutional structures of pension programmes are causal factors affecting citizens’ 
interests in and decisions around joining the schemes. In other words, it is a way to test 
whether the multi-pillar pension model can successfully expand pension coverage to 
informal workers. Specifically, the expectation of Korpi and Palme’s different types of 
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social insurance institutions has been confirmed that a mismatched target group of the 
voluntary savings scheme and the nature of informality are the real causes on the 
effectiveness of extending savings scheme coverage to the informal sector. However, this 
concept only explored the effect of pension programmes’ institutional structures. This 
thesis’s main focus was on exploring, not only the effect of these institutional structures 
of pension programmes for informal workers’ inclusion, but also the effect of the nature 
of both the informal labour market and the decentralisation process. Korpi and Palme 
(1998:673) suggest that researchers have to acknowledge that institutional structures of 
welfare states change over time, and institutional structures are only one of many factors 
affecting the effectiveness of pension programmes. Gingrich (2015:90) stresses that 
neither welfare state analysis nor comparative-historical analysis alone can exclusively 
uncover the historical development of welfare regimes or their structural role. Meanwhile, 
Mahoney and Thelen (2015:5) explain that comparative-historical analysis’s macro-
configurational aspect focuses on explaining large-scale political and political-economic 
outcomes. They consider combinations between the comparative-historical and other 
aspects to find out if comparative-historical analysis can be incorporated and help 
compensate for the weaknesses of other approaches, thus forming one useful and 
powerful alternative approach. Accordingly, this thesis has contributed the macro-
configurational aspect in order to fill a gap that the welfare state institutional structures 
could not. More specifically, the macro-configurational aspect was used to clarify the 
effect of the nature of the informal labour market and decentralisation on informal 
workers’ interests and decisions around joining the schemes; thus explaining the 
effectiveness of extending pension coverage to informal workers.  
Based on data analysed in this thesis, the researcher thus summarises that the concept of 
welfare-state institutional structures by Korpi and Palme (1998) together with the macro-
configurational aspect (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015) offers a very powerful alternative 
approach for analysing the broad and complex structural-institutional arrangement of the 
welfare state institution at the macro level, and different types of social insurance 
institutions as they identify matched and mismatched target group of the programmes and 
reflect citizens’ interests and decisions at the micro level, which indirectly influenced the 
effectiveness of extending pension and savings scheme coverage to informal workers. 
Therefore, this is a valuable research contribution because it provides a reference resource 
for anyone who wishes to study how multiple factors combine to form complex causal 
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packages at the macro level that link to the attitudes and preferences of key actors at the 
micro level, such as the capacity for inclusion of informal workers following the World 
Bank’s multi-pillar pension reform in different case studies.  
7.5.2 Limitations of the thesis 
Although the research was carefully prepared and has reached its aims, limitations and 
shortcomings are naturally still present.  
First, due to the time limitations inherent in pursuing a PhD degree, the data collection 
took place from June to September 2015. The NSF was renewed in August 2015, the SSA 
40 options 3, 4, and 5 were cancelled in March 2016, and NSF registration for senior 
citizens aged 60 and above was closed in September 2016. The process of data collecting 
started during the evolutionary process of the savings scheme. However, due to the time 
limitation, the thesis could not perform a second round of data collection for comparison 
with the data collected in 2015. Second, the study focused on the institutions that 
interacted with the design of the pension and savings schemes for informal workers. 
Therefore, the findings of the thesis are limited predominantly to the interaction of the 
informal labour market, the decentralisation process, and the design of the Thai pension 
system for that period of time, via the lens of welfare state analysis and comparative-
historical analysis only. The results of the same case study could thus be revealed 
differently, depending on the variables used and the historical background and limitations 
of each case. Finally, the last limitation is the survey sampling method. The survey 
sampling method used in this thesis corresponded to ‘convenience sampling’ 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). The researcher was aware that convenience sampling would 
introduce sampling bias concern in the thesis, unlike probability sampling. However, the 
main focus group of this thesis involved both formal and informal sectors from both local 
residents in Bangkok and migrants from rural areas. To be able to employ the probability 
sampling, the researcher has to be able to access official government information on the 
household registration system of the elderly in the area. The researcher, however, was 
unable to access official government information nor locate migrant respondents. Even if 
the researcher were able to access the government’s official information on the local 
resident household system, migrants’ residential areas remain unknown. The 
characteristics of unknown residential area respondents make these respondents 
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inherently difficult to study. The focus groups of the thesis thereby compounded the 
difficulties of avoiding selection error. Questionnaire respondents thus were selected via 
the convenience sampling method despite its methodological limitations, as it was the 
most appropriate technique for this study. 
7.6 Suggestions for future research 
The aim of the final section of this chapter is to provide suggestions for future research. 
The data analysis and discussion of this thesis highlighted some important aspects that 
merit further investigation. This section suggests future possibilities for examining this 
thesis’s theoretical framework in a new context. It also outlines some key research gaps 
that still need to be explored.  
Firstly, this study suggests future research to revisit the development of welfare state 
regime of any countries in this modern world through the lens of hybrid regimes. This 
thesis posits the view that since Thailand’s five-pillar pension reform, the welfare state 
regime of the Thai pension system has moved beyond the three classic welfare regime 
remits, emerging instead as a new welfare mix; this may also be the case for other middle-
income countries that implemented the five-pillar pension model. Due to the pension 
design of the five-pillar pension model and the influence of the Thai historical background, 
the role of the state, the market, and the family in the current Thai pension system has 
shifted away from its previous welfare regime. The government now offers basic pension 
provision for the Thai elderly and pension contributions to the voluntary savings scheme 
for informal workers. Meanwhile, the role of private firms in the formal labour market 
continue to play a significant role, working as social-welfare providers for private 
employees in their companies, and most elderly tend to rely on their family support. Even 
though the Thai pension system has been reformed several times, three things have 
remained the same: one, privileged welfare provision for state employees; two, the need 
for companies in the labour market and private employees in the formal labour market to 
be the main pension providers for themselves; three, the strength of traditional familial 
function in Thailand. Nevertheless, due to social-demographic change and the varied 
types of occupations in the current situation, some previous studies, along with the data 
analysis in this thesis, highlight that some of the Thai elderly have started to rely on the 
government’s pension provision and are less likely to rely on family support. Because of 
the nature of the transformation of the five-pillar pension reform and the traditional 
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familial function in Thai culture, this thesis contends that the Thai welfare regime is now 
a mix regime. Hence, it is interesting for other nations, especially middle-income 
countries, to find out whether after implementing the World Bank’s five-pillar pension 
model, their welfare state regimes have remained the same as before or have moved on, 
creating a new regime.  
Secondly, this thesis suggests future research to combine the macro-configurational 
aspect with the typology of social insurance institutions to form an alternative approach 
for analysing the case study as a broad and complex structural-institutional arrangement. 
Korpi and Palme’s institutional structures of welfare state institutions (1998) were used 
to examine whether the effect of different types of social insurance institutions affecting 
the formation of citizens’ interests and decisions around joining the pension and savings 
programmes. Meanwhile, the macro-configurational research of comparative-historical 
analysis was employed for an awareness of how multiple factors combine to form larger 
combinations, complexes and causal packages (Mahoney and Thelen, 2015:7). These two 
approaches were employed to analyse how the nature of various factors affected the 
macro-structural environment of the whole system, shaping the interests of individual 
agents at the local level. The data analysis in this thesis shows how the macro-
configurational approach can be incorporated into the typology of welfare state 
institutions (Korpi and Palme, 1998) and each can compensate for the weaknesses of one 
another. This thesis thus recommends future studies consider cooperation between the 
macro-configurational aspect and the typology of social insurance institutions or either 
one of these two approaches and other approaches as alternative ways to analyse case 
studies. 
Finally, this thesis suggests that future researchers carefully consider the target group and 
data collection method for the questionnaire survey based on the case’s conditions. This 
thesis focused on Thai citizens at the age of 50 and above from both rural and urban areas. 
There were two main reasons for choosing this target group. First, Mr. Korn Chatikavanij, 
the Finance Minister of the 2009 Abhisit government, stated that the target group of the 
NSF is from the age of 15 to 59. However, the government would like to incentive 
specifically Thai citizens at the age of 50 to join the NSF and thereby to start accumulating 
savings for retirement, so that they will receive pension by the age of 60 (Prachachat, 
2009). This is because, to receive pension for the rest of their life, Thai citizens have to 
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contribute at the requirement level for at least ten years. The NSF advertised that any Thai 
senior citizen in the informal sector aged 60 and above was allowed to join only in the 
first year after the programme was reintroduced in 2015 (NSF, 2016). Anyone from the 
age of 60 and above will not receive pension allowance if they failed to join the NSF by 
September 2016 (NSF, 2017a). Accordingly, studying citizens at the age of 50 and above 
helped the researcher analyse the effectiveness of Thailand’s pension and savings 
schemes policy design. However, different case studies could select different target group 
based on the case’s conditions.  
Furthermore, avoiding selection error becomes difficult when taking on migrant workers 
as one of the target groups. Migrants comprise a hidden group that is not formally tracked 
by the government. Thus, researchers seeking to study migrant workers have only a few 
method options for data collection. ‘Convenience’ and ‘snowball’ sampling are common 
solutions when migrants and other hard-to-reach populations are target groups 
(Agadjanian and Zotoya, 2012:134). The convenience sampling method is commonly 
used for questionnaire data collection, whilst the snowball sampling method is mainly 
used in interview data collection (ibid). In the present study, the target groups of the 
questionnaire included both local residents in Lumpini sub-district Bangkok and migrants 
from rural areas in both formal and informal sectors, and the convenience sampling 
method was employed as a data collection method. Though the researcher acknowledged 
that a convenience sample may lead to the under-representation or over-representation of 
particular groups within the sample (Lund Research, 2012), it was the most suitable 
option in this context. Accordingly, this thesis suggests that future researchers who intend 
to have migrants as a target group should be aware of the difficulties in avoiding selection 
error in data collection and carefully consider the most suitable method for the study.  
In summary, it remains inconclusive whether other middle-income countries using the 
World Banks’ new multi-pillar pension system will have the same institutional 
framework of their pension system, the same result for pension scheme effectiveness, or 
even the same typology of the welfare state regime as the Thai case. Hence, this thesis 
suggests future researchers examine these puzzles in a new context and be aware of 
difficulties of avoiding selection errors that researchers might experience.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 Consent form for participant (English version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM   
Reference number: <Ref_Number>  School of Philosophy, Economics and Politics (PEP) 
      Department of Politics 
      University of York 
      Heslington, York 
      YO10 5DD, The UK 
      Tel: +44 (0) 1904 323542 
      Fax: +44 (0) 1904 323563 
Researcher: Phohnthip Smithsarakarn 
 
Thesis Title:  
The Thai Multi-Pillar Pension System: Extending Pension and Savings Scheme 
Coverage to Informal Workers 
 
 
Please tick each box 
 
1 I agree to participate in this study             
2 I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and I am free to  
Withdraw from the research at any time without giving any reason and without 
any detriment to myself and my organisation 
      
3 I confirm that I have read and understand clearly the information sheet for this 
Research and have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study. 
These questions have been answered satisfactory by the researcher. 
 
4 I understand that the interview will be audio-taped.  
5 I understand that only the members of the research team have access to the  
Information collected during the study. 
 
6 I am aware that the information collected during the interview will be used to  
Write up a PhD thesis, and may be used in future research. 
 
7 I understand that information collected during the course of the research project will 
be treated as confidential. This means that my name, or any other information that 
could identify me, will not be included in anything written as a result of the research. 
 
8 I understand that when this research is completed the information obtained will be 
Retained in locked filing cabinets in a storeroom at the University of York’s Digital 
Data 
Archive; and it will be destroyed after collected for 5 years. 
 
9 I would like to be informed of the outcome of the research via a report summary, 
and/ or be informed of any future publications. 
 
 
 
Name of Participant: Date: Signature: 
Name of Researcher: Date: Signature: 
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APPENDIX 2 Consent form for participant (Thai version)  
 
 
 
ใบแสดงความยินยอมเข้าร่วมโครงการวิจัย   
เลขที& อ้างอิง          โรงเรียนปรัชญา เศรษฐศาสตร์ และการเมือง 
มหาวิทยาลัยยอร์ก 
    เฮสลิงตัน ประเทศอังกฤษ                            
รหัสไปรษณีย์ YO10 5DD 
                     โทร 44 (0) 1904 323843 
        +44 (0) 1904 323542, +44 (0) 1904 323556 
                    โทรสาร+44 (0)1904 424563 
 
ชื#อนกัวจิยั นางสาวพรทิพย ์สมิทธ์ศราการย ์
 
หัวข้องานวิจัย 
วิเคราะห์การเปลี> ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางสถาบันของ ระบบบํานาญแบบหลายชัEนในประเทศไทย: การครอบคลุมแรงงานนอก
ระบบ 
กรุณาทําเครื> องหมายกากบาท 
1 ข"าพเจ"ายินยอมเข"าร-วใโครงการวิจัย             
2 ข"าพเจ"ามีความเข"าใจว-าการเข"าร-วมโครงการวิจัยของข"าพเจ"าเป7นไปด"วยความสมัครใจและข"าพเจ"ามีสิทธ์ิที่จะถอนตัว
จากงานวิจัยนี้ได"ตลอดเวลาโดยไม-จําเป7นต"องแสดงเหตุผลและไม-มีผลกระทบอันเสียหายแก-ตัวข"าพเจ"าและบริษัท
ของข"าพเจ"า 
      
3 ข"าพเจ"ายืนยันว-าข"าพเจ"าได"อ-านและเข"าใจถึงข"อมูลเก่ียวกับงานวิจัย และมีสิทธ์ิที่จะถามคําถามเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัย 
และได"รับคําตอบที่เป7นที่พอใจจากผู"วิจัย 
 
4 ข"าพเจ"าเข"าใจว-าระหว-างการสัมภาษณPจะมีการบันทึกเสียงในการสัมภาษณPร-วมด"วย  
5 ข"าพเจ"าเข"าใจว-าเฉพาะคณะผู"วิจัยเท-าน้ันที่สามารถเข"าถึงข"อมูลที่เก็บระหว-างการศึกษา  
6 ข"าพเจ"าทราบว-าข"อมูลที่เก็บระหว-างการสัมภาษณPจะถูกนําไปใช"ในการเขียนดุษฎีนิพนธPระดับปริญญาเอก 
และอาจมีการนําไปใช"ในการวิจัยในอนาคต 
 
7 ข"าพเจ"ามีความเข"าใจว-าข"อมูลที่เก็บระหว-างงานวิจัยจะมีการเก็บรักษาอย-างไม-เปWดเผย ซ่ึงหมายความว-าชื่อของข"าพเจ"า 
หรือข"อมูลใดๆที่สามารถระบุถึงตัวข"าพเจ"าได"นั้น จะไม-ถูกนํามาใช"ในงานวิจัย 
 
8 ข"าพเจ"ามีความเข"าใจว-าเม่ืองานวิจัยนี้เสร็จส้ินลง ข"อมูลที่ได"รับจะถูกเก็บไว"ในห"องเก็บข"อมูลของมหาวิทยาลัยยอรPก 
คณะปรัชญา เศรษฐศาสตรPและการเมือง ภาควิชารัฐศาสตรP เป7นระยะเวลา 5ป[ และจะถูกทําลายลงหลังจากนั้น 
 
9 ข"าพเจ"ามีความประสงคPขอรับรู"ผลสรุปของงานวิจัยโดยการเขียนสรุปรายงานและหรือรายงานถึงการตีพิมพPที่อาจจะ
มีข้ึนในอนาคต 
 
 
 
 
ชื่อผู"ร-วมงานวิจัย วันที ่ ลายเซ็น 
ชื่อนักวิจัย วันที ่ ลายเซ็น 
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APPENDIX 3 Participants information sheet (English version) 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Reference Number:     School of Philosophy, Economics and Politics (PEP) 
      Department of Politics 
      University of York 
      Heslington 
      YO10 5DD, UK 
      Tel: +44 (0) 1904 323542 
      Fax: +44 (0) 1904 323563 
Researcher: Phohnthip Smithsarakarn  
Thesis Title: 
The Thai Multi-Pillar Pension System: Extending Pension and Savings Scheme 
Coverage to Informal Workers 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study which is being conducted as a part of a Doctoral 
Research degree at the University of York by Miss Phohnthip Smithsarakarn under the supervision 
of Dr. Louise Haagh. The researcher appreciates your participation, which will greatly enhance the 
findings of this research. 
 
Before you decide whether or not to take part in this project, it is necessary for you to understand 
why the research is being undertaken and what it shall involve. Please kindly take your time to read 
the following information carefully, and should you have any enquiries for further information, 
please do not hesitate to contact the researcher. 
 
The purpose of this research 
The pension system in Thailand has been reformed several times. In 2009, a five-pillar pension 
model implemented in Thailand; it was marked the first time that informal workers were included 
in the formal system. The objectives of transformation were mainly to improve the coverage 
(mainly to include informal workers into the system) and benefits adequacy (to reduce poverty and 
provide income security). Currently, non-contributory pension scheme participation is at a record 
high; however, many informal workers have not yet joined the voluntary savings pension scheme. 
This thesis thus investigates the causal factors affecting the informal workers’ decisions on joining 
the schemes after this pension reform. From this perspective, the present thesis attempts to 
understand the nature of the transformation of the current five-pillar pension in Thailand. In order 
to explore the causes in this outcome, the questionnaire survey and interview are the main 
empirical instruments of this research to get in-depth information. 
 
Whilst the pension system has become a hot topic in the world welfare state debate, there are fairly 
few studies in the welfare state literature that focus on the informal working population, especially 
in the Thai case. Even though some studies have explored the performance of the pension system in 
Thailand, there is still lack of in-depth understanding regarding the effectiveness of extending 
pension coverage for informal workers. Moreover, the current literature also reveals a limited 
understanding of how different the local political context affects the system’s institutional 
development and its effectiveness. This study highlights that since the pension system first adopted 
in Thailand, there are three different actors have played important roles in the pension system’s 
development, including Thai senior citizens, local and national bureaucrats/staff. Each actor has 
been influential in the development of the pension. Hence, the questionnaire survey is used in this 
thesis to gain information at the Thai senior citizens’ personal characteristics to provide better and 
more accurate data on their joining pension schemes decision, specifically the savings contribution. 
Meanwhile, the interview is used in this thesis to allow the researcher to move beyond written 
sources and ask probing, theoretically driven questions of key participants about the events and 
processes of interests. There are three groups of informants: 1) Thai senior citizens, 2) local 
bureaucrats/staff, and 3) national bureaucrats/staff.  
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Your involvement 
As you are involved in the process of the development of the Thai pension system, you have been 
identified as a potential participant. Your knowledge and experience towards the Thai pension 
system is vulnerable to this research project. 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. Should you choose to participate, you would be free to 
withdraw from the research at any time without giving a reason and without any detriment to 
yourself or your organisation. 
 
If you decide to take part in the research, you will be asked to fill in the questionnaire form and/or 
interviewed regarding your perspective towards the current pension system in Thailand. The 
interview will take approximately 30-50 minutes or anytime that you wish to stop; and with your 
permission, the interview will be audio-recorded. Before the interview starts, you will be given an 
opportunity to ask questions, and the researcher will ask you to sign a written consent form 
confirming that you are willing to take part in this research project.  
 
Possible Benefits 
This is a great opportunity for you to share your professional knowledge and experience, which are 
likely to prove very useful and helpful not only to the research paper but also to the public. The 
findings of this study might lead to a better understanding of the origin of the dilemmas in the 
current pension system in Thailand, as well as a suggestion for other developing that facing the 
same situation.  
 
The Information You Provide 
Your information in the questionnaire survey data and/or audio-recording and interview script will 
be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to the researcher. Interview tapes will be 
transcribed. All the questionnaire survey forms, audio-recordings and transcriptions will be locked 
in a safe place. All the information collected during the fieldwork of this research project will only 
be viewed by the researcher, and remain strictly confidential. The confidential handling, 
processing, storage and disposal of data will be in accordance with the Data Protection Guidelines. 
 
At the end of the study, this information may be used to write up a PhD thesis, and may be used in 
published articles in professional and academic journals as well as conference presentations. The 
names of the participants, who have taken part in the research or any other information that could 
identify them, will not appear in the thesis or in other written forms when the study is completed. 
 
All the participants who take part in this research project will receive a summary of the final report 
afterwards, if they indicate a desire for one. When the study is completed, all the information will 
be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a storeroom of the department at the University of York for 5 
years; that information will be deleted and destroyed afterwards. 
 
What is the next step? 
If you are willing to participate in this research project, please complete the reply slip and return in 
either the provided envelope or via email. The researcher will contact you after receiving your 
reply slip to arrange the data and time for the interview. A consent form can be signed on the day 
of the interview. The consent form will not be used to identify you. It will be filed separately from 
all the other information. However, you may keep this sheet for reference. 
 
Further information 
Should you have any further enquiries or concerns about the research project, please do not hesitate 
to contact the researcher Miss Phohnthip Smithsarakarn. 
 
Call: +44 (0) 7 548 434343 
E-mail: ps811@york.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 4 Participants information sheet (Thai version) 
 
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
ข้อมูลสําหรับผู้เข้าร่วมงานวิจัย  
เลขที& อ้างอิง                     โรงเรียนปรัชญา เศรษฐศาสตร์ และการเมือง 
มหาวิทยาลัยยอร์ก 
    เฮสลิงตัน ประเทศอังกฤษ                            
รหัสไปรษณีย์ YO10 5DD 
                     โทร 44 (0) 1904 323843 
        +44 (0) 1904 323542, +44 (0) 1904 323556 
                    โทรสาร+44 (0)1904 424563 
 
ชื#อนกัวจิยั นางสาวพรทิพย ์สมิทธ์ศราการย ์
 
หัวข้องานวิจัย 
วิเคราะห์การเปลี& ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางสถาบันของ ระบบบํานาญแบบหลายชัLนในประเทศไทย: การครอบคลุมแรงงานนอกระบบ 
 
ท"านได'รับการเชิญเพื่อเข'าร"วมงานวิจัยเพื่อการศึกษาในระดับดุษฎีบัณฑิตของมหาวิทยาลัยยอรGก (The University of York) ณ เมืองยอรGก 
ประเทศอังกฤษ สหราชอาณาจักรบริเตนใหญ"และไอรGแลนดG จัดทําโดย นางสาวพรทิพยG สมิทธGศราการยG ภายใต'การควบคุมของ ดร. หลุยสG 
ฮากคG (Dr. Louise Haagh) เราขอขอบคุณในความสนใจของท"าน และเช่ือว"าความร"วมมือของท"านจะเปRนประโยชนGแก"งานวิจัยดังกล"าว ก"อนที่
ท"านจะตัดสินใจว"าจะเข'าร"วมการวิจัยนี้หรือไม"นั้น ใคร"ขอความกรุณาท"านโปรดอ"านข'อมูลดังกล"าวตามเอกสารที่แนบมานี้ เพื่อทําความเข'าใจ
ถึงข'อมูลของงานวิจัยและที่มาของงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้ด'วยและหากท"านมีข'อสงสัยประการใดเกี่ยวกับงานวิจัยดังกล"าวกรุณาสอบถามข'าพเจ'าเพื่อ
ขอข'อมูลเพิ่มเติม 
 
วัตถุประสงค,ของงานวิจัย 
ระบบบํานาญในประเทศไทยถูกปฎิรูปมาแล'วหลายครั้งปVจจุบันประเทศไทยได'ใช'รูปแบบระบบบํานาญหลายชั้นหรือที่รู'จักกันดีว"า เปRน
แนวคิดแรกเริ่มจากธนาคารโลก แม'ระบบบํานาญในประเทศไทยจะมีการปฎิรูปมาหลายยครั้ง แต"ครั้งนี้ถือเปRนครั้งแรกของประเทศไทยที่
ระบบํานาญครอบคลุมประชาชนทุกคนในสังคม โดยมีเปWาหมายหลักคือแรงงานนอกระบบ จุดประสงคGหลักของการปฎิรูประบบํานาญจาก
ระบอบเก"ามาเปRนแบบระบบบํานาญหลายช้ันนั้น เปWาหมายหลักเพื่อครอบคลุมลูกจ'างแรงงานนอกระบบ เพื่อเปRนหลักประกันรายได'ที่ดี
ให'แก"ประชาชนผู'สูงอายุหลังวัยเกษียณ อาทิลดปVญหาความยากจน และมอบรายได'พื้นฐานหลังวัยเกษียณให'แก"ประชาชนชาวไทย ถึงแม'ว"า
ระบบบํานาญหลายชั้นในปVจจุบันนั้นจะสามารถแก'ไขปVญหาที่เกิดจากระบบบํานาญแบบเก"าได' แต"ก็ยังคงมีปVญหาบางจุดที่ยังคงแก'ไม"ตกนั้น
คือความม่ันคงทางการเงินของประชาชนในตลาดแรงงานนอกระบบ นอกจากนี้แล'วกลับมีปVญหาใหม"ที่เกิดข้ึนจากโครงของระบบบํานาญ
แบบหลายชั้นในปVจจุบันอีกด'วย นั้นคือการท่ีโครงการบางโครงการในระบบไม"สามารถตอบสนองความต้ังใจของภาครัฐได'อย"างมี
ประสิทธิภาพจนส"งผลให'กับปVญกาของโครง สร'างทางสถาบันโดยรวม อย"างไรก็ตามปVญหาที่เกิดข้ึนกับประชาชนในกลุ"มแรงงานนอก
ระบบคือปVญหาหลักที่ต'องการการแก'ไขโดยเร็วที่สุด ดังนั้นแล'วจึงจําเปRนอย"างที่จะต'องให'ความสําคัญและดูแล ด'วยเหตุนี้เองงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้จึง
ให'ความสําคัญกับกลุ"มชนช้ันแรงงานนอกระบบ 
 
การเข6าร7วมของท7าน 
ในฐานะที่ท"านทํางานในหน"วยงานหรือมีเปRนบุคคลมีความเกี่ยวของกับระบบบํานาญในประเทศไทยท"านจัดเปRนผู'มีความรู'และ
ประสบการณGที่เกีย่วของการระบบบํานาญในประเทศไทย ซ่ึงเปRนบุคคลที่มีความสําคัญต"องานวิจัยชิ้นนี้เปRนอย"างมาก การเข'าร"วมงานวิจัยใน
ครั้งนี้ของท"านจะเปRนไปด'วยความสมัครใจ ท"านมีสิทธ์ิที่จะถอนตัวจากการเข'าร"วมงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้ได'ทุกเวลาโดยไม"มีความจําเปRนที่จะต'อง
แสดงเหตุผล และการถอนตัวของท"านจะไม"มีผลกระทบอันเสียหายแก"ตัวท"านหรือองคGกรของท"านแต"อย"างใด ข'อมูลของท"านจะถูกแทนโดย
สัญลักษณGอื่น อาทิ A, B, C หรือ I1, I2, I3 หากท"านมีความประสงคGจะเข'าร"วมในการวิจัยครั้งนี้ การทําแบบสอบถามจะอยู"ที่ประมาณ 10 
นาที และการสัมภาษณGจะใช'เวลาประมาณ 30-50 นาท ีและหากท"านยินดีที่จะเข'าร"วมการสัมภาษณGนั้น การสัมภาษณGจะมีการบันทึกเสียง
ระหว"างการสัมภาษณGด'วย ก"อนที่จะเริ่มการสัมภาษณGนั้น  
 
ประโยชน,ที่ท7านอาจได6รับ 
การเข'าร"วมงานวิจัยของท"านถือเปRนโอกาสที่ท"านจะได'แบ"งปVนความรู'และประสบการณGของท"านจะถูกนําเสนอออกมาให'ปรากฎชัดแจ'งสู"
สาธารณะในรูปแบบของงานวิจัยเชิงวิชาการ โดยงานวิจัยชิ้นนี้จะช"วยให'เกิดความเข'าใจในเชิงลึกเกี่ยวกับปVญหาและประสิทธิภาพของระบบ
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บํานาญไทยที่เกิดข้ึนในปVจจุบัน โดยผ"านมุมมองของท"านได'ไม"มากก็น'อย นอกจากน้ีแล'วการเข'าร"วมเปRนส"วนหนึ่งของงานวิจัยในคร้ังนี้ของ
ท"านยังอาจมีส"วนในการเสนอแง"มุมใหม"ๆ ที่เกี่ยวของกับระบบ บํานาญไทย ทั้งในเชิงนโยบายภาคทฤษฎีและภาคปฎิบัติ 
 
ข6อมูลที่ท7านให6ในงานวิจัย 
ข'อมูลที่ท"านให'ในงานวิจัยครั้งนี้นั้น จะถูกนํามาถอดคําสัมภาษณGและนํามาเขียนเปRนลายลักษณGอักษร งานเขียนที่เกิดจากการทอดคํา
สัมภาษณGจะถูกจัดเก็บไว'เปRนอย"างดีโดยนักวิจัย โดยจะจัดเก็บอย"างเปRนความลับที่มีการปWองกันโดยรหัสคอมพิวเตอรG มีเพียงนักวิจัยและ
คณะผู'วิจัยท่ีเกี่ยวข'องเท"านั้นท่ีจะสามารถเข'าถึงข'อมูลของท"านได' การจัดเก็บข'อมูลและการทําลายข'อมูลนั้นจะเกิดข้ึนหลังจากที่งานวิจัยน้ี
เสร็จส้ินลง โดยจะเปRนไปตามกฎระเบียบของทางมหาวิทยาลัยอย"างเคร"งครัด เม่ือจบการศึกษาข'อมูลที่ท"านให'ระหว"างการสัมภาษณGจะถูกใช'
ในการเขียนดุษฎีนิพนธG และอาจนํามาแสดงในงานตีพิมพGหรือนําเสนอผลงานเชิงวิชาการในอนาคต แต"ชื่อของท"าน หรือบุคคลที่เข'าร"วมงาน
วิจัย ตลอดจนข'อมูลต"างๆท่ีสามารถระบุบถึงตัวท"านได'น้ัน จะไม"ถูกนําออกมาเผยแพร"หรือตีพิมพGในงานวิจัยหรือในการศึกษาใดๆในอนาคต 
 
หากท"านมีความประสงคGที่จะรับข'อมูลผลสรุปจากงานวิจัยในคร้ังนี้ ท"านมีสิทธฺGที่จะได'รับผลสรุปของการวิจัยดังกล"าวภายหลังจากงานวิจัย
เสร็จส้ินลง และเม่ืองานวิจัยเสร็จส้ินลงนั้น ข'อมูลของท"านจะถูกเก็บไว'ในห'องเก็บฐานข'อมูลเพื่องานวิจัยของคณะปรัชญา เศรษฐศาสตรGและ
การเมือง ภาควิชารัฐศาสตรG มหาวิทยาลัยยอรGก เปRนระยะเวลาทั้งส้ินรวม 5 ป` และเม่ือถึงกําหนดครบตามเวลาดังกล"าวแล'วนั้น ข'อมูลทั้งหมด
ที่เกี่ยวข'องกับงานวิจัยก็จะถูกทําลาย 
 
ท7านจะต6องทําอะไรในขั้นตอนต7อไป 
หากท"านประสงคGท่ีจะเข'าร"วมงานวิจัยในคร้ังนี้ ขอความกรุณาท"านตอบกลับโดยใบแจ'งตอบ หรือแจ'งให'นักวิจัยทราบ 
ทางนักวิจัยจะติดต"อกลับไปหลังจากท่ีได'รับใบตอบกลับของท"านเพื่อทําการนัดหมายวันและเวลาในการสัมภาษณG ท"านจะได'รับใบแสดง
ความยินยอมเข'าร"วมการวิจัยในวันสัมภาษณG และใบแสดงความยินยอมเข'าร"วมการวิจัยจะไม"ถูกนํามาใช'เพื่อระบุท"านเปRนใคร แต"ใบแสดง
ความยินยอมนี้จะถูกนําไปจัดเก็บไว'อย"างดี โดยแยกจากข'อมูลที่ได'ในการสัมภาษณG และท"านมีสิทธิที่จะเก็บใบแสดงความจํานงนี้ไว'ได'หาก
ท"านต'องการ 
 
ต6องการสอบถามข6อมูลเพ่ิมเติม 
โปรดติดต"อ นางสาวพรทิพยG สมิทธGศราการยG 
โทร +44 (0)7 519 557 459  
อีเมลG ps811@york.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX 5 Reply slip for participants (English version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REPLY SLIP 
Reference number: <Ref_Number>  School of Philosophy, Economics and Politics (PEP) 
      Department of Politics 
      University of York 
      Heslington, York 
      YO10 5DD, The UK 
      Tel: +44 (0) 1904 323542 
      Fax: +44 (0) 1904 323563 
 
Researcher: Phohnthip Smithsarakarn 
 
Thesis Title:  
The Thai Multi-Pillar Pension System: Extending Pension and Savings Scheme 
Coverage to Informal Workers 
 
Name: <First_Name> <Last_Name> 
Phone Number:  <Phone_Number> 
Email Address:  <Email_address> 
Address:   <Address_Line_1> 
    <Address_Line_2> 
    <City> 
    <Postcode> 
 
 
I am interested in taking part of the research project and willing to be contacted by 
phone or email to discuss possible participation.   
          
         (Please tick box) 
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APPENDIX 6 Reply slip for participants (Thai version)
 
 
 
 
ใบตอบกลับ  
เลขที& อ้างอิง                     โรงเรียนปรัชญา เศรษฐศาสตร์ และการเมือง 
มหาวิทยาลัยยอร์ก 
    เฮสลิงตัน ประเทศอังกฤษ                            
รหัสไปรษณีย์ YO10 5DD 
                     โทร 44 (0) 1904 323843 
        +44 (0) 1904 323542, +44 (0) 1904 323556 
                    โทรสาร+44 (0)1904 424563 
 
ชื#อนกัวจิยั นางสาวพรทิพย ์สมิทธ์ศราการย ์
 
หัวข้องานวิจัย 
วิเคราะห์การเปลี& ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางสถาบันของ ระบบบํานาญแบบหลายชัLนในประเทศไทย: การครอบคลุมแรงงานนอกระบบ 
 
ชื่อ นามสกุล: 
เบอร/โทรศัพท/: 
อีเมล/: 
ที่อยู8: บ"านเลขที_่_______ เขต__________ แขวง__________ 
 จังหวัด__________ 
 รหัสไปรษณีย:_________ 
 
ข"าพเจ"ามีความสนใจเข"าร?วมการศึกษานี้และยินดีที่จะได"รับการติดต?อกลับโดยทางโทรศัพท:หรืออีเมล:  
 
(โปรดกากบาทในช?อง) 
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APPENDIX 7 Questionnaire form (English version) 
 
APPENDIX 7- Questio naire for  ( nglish version) 
 
 
 
The Thai Multi-Pillar Pension System: Extending Pension and Savings Scheme 
Coverage to Informal Workers 
 
 
 
 
********************************************************************************************* 
 
 
 1 General Information about the participant  
Please read all the questions carefully before completing this form and please tick the 
appropriate box relevant to your circumstances ⬜  
1.1 Gender    
⬜ Male   ⬜ Female  
1.2 Age   
⬜ 50-59    ⬜ 60-69 
⬜ 70-79    ⬜ 80-89       ⬜ 90 and above 
1.3 Marital status   
⬜ Singled                                 ⬜ Married                                   ⬜ Widowed/Divorced    
1.4 Educational background 
⬜ No education   
⬜ High school  
⬜ Diploma 
⬜ Primary school  
⬜ Undergraduate 
⬜ Postgraduate  
1.5 Residential area 
Current area (district)________________________ Hometown____________________________ 
1.6 Occupation       _________________________ 
If your current residential area is not your hometown regarding your occupation, could you 
kindly please inform us your previous job? _____________________________________ 
 No............ 
 
The survey is being conducted as a part of a Doctoral Research Degree at 
the University of York, England, the United Kingdom by Miss Phohnthip 
Smithsarakarn under the supervision of Dr. Louise Haagh  
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1.7 Income per month (Baht)  
⬜ No income    ⬜ less than 12,500 Baht 
⬜ 12,500-62,500 Baht  ⬜ more than 62,500 Baht 
1.8 Living arrangement 
⬜ Alone 
⬜ With spouse                         
⬜ With family members (spouse/children/grandchildren and relatives) 
⬜ With unrelated persons _____________ 
⬜ Others _____________ 
 
 2 Financial status 
 
2.1 From your perspective, is your income enough for you to live in your daily life? 
 ⬜  Yes  
  ⬜ More than sufficient 
  ⬜ Just okay 
 ⬜  No   
_______________________________________________________________ 
2.2 Could you please inform your primary source of income as well as inform how much 
the income comes from each category? 
⬜ Occupation ___________________________________________________________ 
⬜ Allowance of the pension programme 
___________________________________________ 
⬜ Family support       
________________________________________________________ 
⬜ Others        
________________________________________________________ 
 
2.3 Are you pleased with your current income? 
 ⬜ Yes  
 ⬜ No
 ___________________________________________________________________ 
2.4 Are you currently taking care of anyone? How many of them? Does it cause you any 
difficulties in terms of financial status and savings arrangements? 
    ⬜ Yes ____________________________________________________________ 
  ⬜ No  
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 3 
2.5 Do you personally agree that saving for retirement is important to your life? 
 ⬜ Yes 
 ⬜ No 
2.6 At what age/ in what year did you start saving money for your retirement? 
_________ 
2.7 Do you have any savings or take any financial preparation action? 
       ⬜ Yes 
      ⬜ No 
2.8 If you have saved for your retirement, how have you saved your retirement savings? 
      ⬜   By myself    
      ⬜   With my family  
      ⬜   With the state  
      ⬜   With the public 
      ⬜   Others__________________________ 
2.9 If you have had financial preparation, how much do you normally save for your 
retirement per month? 
⬜   I make regular monthly contributions   
⬜ 1-5% of the salary  
⬜ 6-10% of the salary 
⬜ 11-15% of the salary 
⬜ more than 15% of the salary  
⬜    I do not make regular monthly contributions 
 
3. Attitude towards the current multi-pillar pension system in Thailand 
3.1 Are you currently joining any programmes related to state pension programmes or 
not? 
 ⬜    Yes         
⬜ OAA   
  ⬜ RMF 
  ⬜ NSF 
⬜ SSA 40 
⬜   No 
3.2 Are you currently participating in any savings for retirement programmes? 
      ⬜   Yes__________________________________________________ 
      ⬜   No     
3.3 Have you heard about the Old Age Allowance (OAA)?   
 ⬜   Yes     ⬜   No 
3.4 Have you heard about the Retirement Mutual Fund (RMF) ? 
 ⬜   Yes     ⬜   No 
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 4 
3.5 Have you heard about the National Savings Fund (NSF) ? 
 ⬜   Yes     ⬜   No 
3.6 Have you heard about the Social Security Office Article 40 (SSA 40)? 
 ⬜   Yes Option_______   ⬜   No 
3.7 Within the past few months, have you heard any information relevant to informal 
workers or retirement aged citizens?  
 ⬜ Yes 
       ⬜ Radio     ⬜ Broadcast in local district area 
      ⬜ Television          ⬜ Brochure 
      ⬜ Billboard    ⬜ Social media  
      ⬜ Newspaper/ magazines   
      ⬜ People (leader of the community, family members friends etc.)/ 
⬜ No 
4. Please rate your satisfaction with the multi-pillar pension system in Thailand   
Degree  
5= Very satisfied 
4= Satisfied 
3= Neutral 
2= Unsatisfied 
1= Very unsatisfied 
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Information Ranking scale 5 4 3 2 1 
1. Satisfaction with policy design 
1.1 How satisfied are you with the vision of the OAA? (pension provision)       
1.2 How satisfied are you with the vision of the RMF? (tax deduction) 
 
     
1.3 How satisfied are you with the vision of the NSF? (government contributions) 
 
     
1.4 How satisfied are you with the vision of the SSA 40? (government 
contributions) 
 
     
2. Satisfaction with local bureaucrats’ actions 
2.1 Have the local bureaucrats/staff sufficiently explained the OAA to you?      
2.2 Have the local bureaucrats/staff sufficiently explained the RMF to you?      
2.3 Have the local bureaucrats/staff sufficiently explained the NSF to you?      
2.4 Have the local bureaucrats/staff sufficiently explained the SSA 40 to you?      
3. Perspectives towards the effectiveness of the Thai pension system 
3.1 From your perspective, is the OAA allowance that the state provides 
effective enough for you?      
L.M Has the savings pension scheme incentivized your savings behavior?      
L.3 Have your savings behavior changed from the past (before the multi-pillar 
pension system was introduced)?      
3.4 From your perspective, to what extent do you foresee the pension system 
changing your economic security?      
 
5 Open-ended questions 
Do you have any further comments that you would like to share? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR YOUR KIND COOPERATION 
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 1 
 
 
วิเคราะห์การเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางสถาบันของ ระบบบ านาญแบบหลายช้ันใน
ประเทศไทย: การครอบคลุมแรงงานนอกระบบ 
 
 
  
 
 
 
********************************************************************************************* 
 1 General Information about the participant ข้อมูลส่วนบุคคลของผู้ถูกสัมภาษณ์ 
โปรดท ำเคร่ืองหมำย  u  ลงในช่อง   หนำ้ขอ้ควำม หรือเขียนตอบตำมควำมเป็นจริงเก่ียวกบัตวัท่ำน 
1.1 เพศ    
 ชำย    หญิง  
1.2 อาย ุ  
 50-59     60-69 
 70-79     80 and above/ 80 ปีข้ึนไป 
1.3 สถานภาพ    
 โสด                                       สมรส                                          หมำ้ย หยำ่ร้ำง    
1.4 ระดับการศึกษา 
 
 
แบบสอบถามข้อมูลระบบบ านาญหลายช้ันในประเทศไทย 
 
 ไม่มีวุฒิทำงกำรศึกษำ   
 มธัยมศึกษำ  
 ปวช ปวส ประกำศนียบตัรหรือเทียบเท่ำ 
 ประถมศึกษำ  
 ระดบัปริญญำตรี 
 ระดบัสูงกว่ำปริญญำตรี 
เลขท่ี No............ 
งานวิจัยในคร้ังนีจั้ดต้ังขึ้นเพ่ือประกอบงานวิจัยในวิทยานิพนธ์ระดับช้ันปริญญาเอกดุษณียบัตรดิต ของ
นางสาวพรทิพย์ สมิทธ์ศราการย์ มหาวิทยาลยัยอร์ค ประเทศอังกฤษ แห่งสหราชอาณาจักร ภายใต้การ
ควบคุมดูแลของดร. หลุยส์ ฮาค์ก 
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 2 
1.5 บริเวณท่ีอยู่อาศัย 
บริเวณท่ีอยูปั่จจุบนั________________________  เขต_______________________________ 
1.6 อาชีพ_______________________________ 
หากกรุงเทพมิใช่แหล่งภูมิล าเนาของท่านโปรดแจ้งว่าท่านเคยประกอบอาชีพใดมาก่อน 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.7 รายได้ต่อเดือน (บาท)  
   ไม่มีรำยได ้     นอ้ยกว่ำ 12,500 บำท 
 12,500-62,500   มำกกว่ำ 62,500 บำท 
1.8 Household income per month (Baht)  รายได้ครอบครัวต่อเดือน (บาท) 
   ไม่มีรำยได ้     _______________________________ 
1.9 ลกัษณะการอยู่อาศัย  โปรดแจ้งให้ทราบว่าท่านอาศัยอยู่กบัผู้ใดบ้าง และมีจ านวนกี่คน 
 อำศยัล ำพงั 
 อำศยักบัคู่สมรสเท่ำนั้น                           __________________________ 
 อำศยัอยูก่บัลูกหลำนและครอบครัว          __________________________ 
 อำศยัอยูก่บัผูท่ี้ไม่เก่ียวขอ้ง                      __________________________ 
 อ่ืนๆ                                                      __________________________ 
 
 2 สถานะภาพทางการเงิน 
2.1 จากมุมมองของท่าน ท่านคิดว่ารายได้ท่ีท่านได้รับน้ันเพียงพอต่อการด ารงชีพหรือไม่ 
   เพียงพอ  
   มำกกว่ำเพียงพอ 
   พอมีพอกิน 
  ไม่
เพียงพอ_____________________________________________________________________ 
2.2 แหล่งใดคือแหล่งรายรับของท่านบ้าง (โปรดระบุจ านวน) 
 กำรท ำงำน     _________________________________________ 
 เบ้ียเล้ียงชีพเพื่อผูสู้งอำยหุลงัวยัเกษียณ  __________________________________________ 
 ครอบครัว   _  __________________________________________ 
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 อ่ืนๆ     __________________________________________ 
2.3 ท่านพอใจกับรายได้ของท่านหรือไม่ 
   พอใจ  
  ไม่พอใจ    __________________________________________ 
2.4 ปัจจุบันท่านต้องเป็นผู้ดูแลผู้อ่ืนใช่หรือไม่  
      ใช่    ถำ้ใช่ท่ำนตอ้งดูแลทั้งหมดก่ีคน ________________      
    ไม่ใช่  
2.5 จากทัศนคติของท่านท่านเช่ือว่าการออมทรัพย์ก่อนวัยเกษียณน้ันเป็นเร่ืองท่ีส าคัญต่อชีวิตของท่าน 
หรือไม่ 
  ส ำคญั 
  ไม่ส ำคญั 
2.6 ท่านได้เร่ิมออมเพ่ือวัยเกษียณต้ังแต่ช่วงอายุประมาณเท่าใด   _________________ 
2.7 ท่านมีการออมหรือไม่ 
 มี 
 เงิดสด  ท่ีดิน 
 หุ้นสหกรณ์     
 การลงทนุ 
 พนัธบตัรรัฐบาล 
 อ่ืนๆระบุ___________________ 
       ไม่มี 
2.8 หากท่านได้มีการออมเงิน ท่านมีวิธีการออมเงินผ่านทางกระบวนการใด 
         ด้วยตวัทา่นเอง     
         โดยครอบครัวของทา่น  
         โดยองค์กรภาครัฐ  
         โดยบริษัทเอกชน 
         อ่ืนๆ__________________________ 
2.9  หากท่านมีการออมเงิน โดยปกติแล้วท่านมีการออมเช่นไร 
   สม ่าเสมอ  _________________________________  
    ไม่สม ่าเสมอ _________________________________ 
3. ทัศนะคติของท่านต่อระบบบ านาญแบบหลายชัน้ในไทย 
3.1 ขณะนีท่้านก าลังเข้าร่วมโครงการสวัสดิการหลังวัยเกษียณโครงการใดจากภาครัฐหรือไม่ 
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 4 
     ใช ่         
   เบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้สงูอายุ  600 บาท ส าหรับ 60-69, 700บาทส าหรับ 70-79 
         800 (ส าหรับ80-89, 1,000 บาท ส าหรับ 90ปีขึน้ไป 
      กองทุนรวมเพื่อกำรเล้ียงชีพ  
       กองทนุการออมแหง่ชาติ กอช. 
       โครงการประกนัสงัคม มาตรา 40  
       อ่ืน___________________________________________________ 
   ไม ่
3.2  ขณะนีท่้านได้เข้าร่วมโครงการออมทรัพย์เพ่ือวัยเกษียณใดบ้างหรือไม่ 
         เข้าร่วม__________________________________________________ 
         ไม่ได้เข้าร่วม     
3.3 ท่านทราบเก่ียวกับโครงการเบีย้ยังชีพเพ่ือผู้สูงอายุหรือไม่ (600 บาท ส าหรับ 60-69, 700บาท
ส าหรับ   
     70-79 800 ส าหรับ80-89, 1,000 บาท ส าหรับ 90ปีขึน้ไป) 
    ทราบ        ไม่ทราบ 
3.4 ท่านทราบเก่ียวกับโครงการกองทุนรวมเพื่อการเลีย้งชีพ (Retirement Mutual Fund/ RMF) 
หรือไม่ 
    Yes/ ทราบ        No/ ไม่ทราบ 
3.5  ท่านทราบเก่ียวกับโครงการออมแห่งชาติ (National Savings Fund/NSF) หรือไม่ 
    ทราบ        ไม่ทราบ 
3.6  ท่านทราบเก่ียวกับโครงการประกันสังคม ผู้ประกันตนมาตรา 40 (1), (2), และ (3) หรือไม่ 
(ส าหรับผู้ที่มีอายุ 15-60 ปีบริบูรณ์) 
    ทราบ ทางเลือก_____      ไม่ทราบ 
3.7   ท่านทราบเก่ียวกับโครงการประกันสังคม ผู้ประกันตนมาตรา 40 (3) หรือไม่ (ส าหรับผู้ที่มี
อายุ 60 ปีบริบูรณ์ขึน้ไป) 
    ทราบ        ไม่ทราบ 
3.8   ก่อนสัมภาษณ์ท่านได้รับข้อมูลข่าวสารเก่ียวกับโครงการผู้สูงอายุหลังวัยเกษียณที่เป็น   
     ประโยชน์ต่อผู้สูงอายุหลังวัยเกษียณ โดยเฉพาะผู้ที่ท างานนอกระบบ(พนักงานอิสระ)หรือไม่  
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  5 
  ได้รับ 
        วิทย ุ      เสียงตามสาย 
       โทรทศัน์           แผน่พบั ใบปลิว 
       ป้ายโฆษณา     Social media สื่อทางsocial  
       หนงัสือพิมพ์หรือนิตยสาร   
       บุคคลต่างๆ     ผู้น าชมุชน สมาชิกครอบครัว เพ่ือน ฯลฯ 
 ไม่ได้รับ 
4 กรุณาเลือกระดับความพึงพอใจของท่านที่มีต่อระบบบ านาญแบบหลายชัน้ 
 
ระดับ 5= ประทับใจที่สุด ดีมาก พึงพอใจมากที่สุด 
4= ประทับใจ ดี พึงพอใจมาก 
3= เฉยๆ ปานกลาง พอใช้ พึงพอใจ 
2= ไม่ประทับใจ ไม่พึงพอใจ 
1= ไม่ประทับใจอย่างย่ิง ไม่พึงพอใจอย่างย่ิง 
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รายละเอียด ระดับความพึงพอใจ 
5 4 3 2 1 
1. ความพึงพอใจต่อนโยบายโครงการต่างๆ 
1.1ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อนโยบายโครงการเบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้สงูอายุ (OAA)      
 1.2 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อนโยบายโครงการกองทนุรวมเพ่ือการเลีย้งชีพ (RMF) 
 
     
1.3 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อนโยบายโครงการการออมแหง่ชาติ (NSF) 
 
     
1.4 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อนโยบายโครงการประกนัสงัคม มาตรา40 (SSA 40) 
 
     
2. ความพึงพอใจต่อการท างานของภาครัฐในส่วนท้องถิ่น 
2.1 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อการอธิบายและให้ข้อมลูเก่ียวกบัโครงการเบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้
สงู อายุ (OAA) ของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต่อทา่น 
     
2.2 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อการอธิบายและให้ข้อมลูเก่ียวกบั โครงการกองทนุรวมเพ่ือ
การเลีย้งชีพ (RMF) ของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต่อทา่น 
     
2.3 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อการอธิบายและให้ข้อมลูเก่ียวกบั โครงการการออม
แหง่ชาติ (NSF) ของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต่อทา่น 
     
2.4 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อการอธิบายและให้ข้อมลูเก่ียวกบั โครงการประกนัสงัคม 
(SSA 40) ของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต่อทา่น 
     
3. ความพึงพอใจต่อการท างานของภาครัฐในส่วนท้องถิ่น 
3.1 ทา่นพึ่งพอใจเพียงใดต่อการอธิบายและให้ข้อมลูเก่ียวกบัโครงการเบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้
สงู อายุ (OAA) ของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต่อทา่น 
     
3.2 ทา่นมีการออมท่ีเปล่ียนไปหรือไม่หลงัจากท่ีรัฐบาลได้ออกโครงการออมทรัพย์ต่างๆ       
3.3 หากทา่นได้เข้าร่วมโครงการเบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้สงูอายุและโครงการออมของภาครัฐ
แล้ว ชีวิตของทา่นมีความเป็นอยู่ท่ีดีขึน้มากน้อยเพียงใด 
     
 
5 ค าถามปลายเปิด 
ท่านมีข้อเสนอแนะอื่นใดหรือไม่ที่อยากแบ่งปัน 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
    ขอขอบพระคุณค่ะ 
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**** หำกผูก้รอกแบบสอบถำมสงสัยขอ้มูลใดเกีย่วกบัโครงกำรต่ำงๆของรัฐบำล ท่ำนสำมำรถค  ำอธิบำยขำ้งล่ำงน้ีได ้
• กองทุนรวมเพ่ือการเลีย้งชีพ   
กองทุนรวมเพ่ือการเลีย้งชีพเป็นกองทุนรวมรูป แบบหนึ่งท่ีรัฐส่งเสริมให้มีขึน้โดยมีวัตถุประสงค์เพ่ือเป็นหลกัประกนัแก่ ตนเองหรือครอบครัว
เม่ือเกษียณอาย ุ โดยมีข้อก าหนดพิเศษแตกตา่งจากกองทุนรวมทัว่ไป คือ ผู้ลงทุนท่ีได้รับสิทธิประโยชน์ทางภาษีจะไถ่ถอนเงินลงทุนได้ เม่ือผู้
ลงทุนอายไุม่น้อยกว่า 55 ปี และมีการลงทุนมาแล้วไม่น้อยกว่า 5 ปี โดย RMFจะไม่มีการจา่ยเงินปันผล หรือเงินอ่ืนใดให้แก่ผู้ลงทุนในระหว่าง
การลงทุน 
• เบีย้ยังชีพเพื่อผู้สูงอายุ 
เบีย้ยงัชีพเพ่ือผู้สูงอายคุือ เงินช่วยเหลือท่ีรัฐบาลมีให้แก่ประชาชนสญัชาติไทยท่ีมีอายุตัง้60 ปีบริบูรณ์ขึน้ ผู้ ท่ีประสงค์จะรับเงิน สามารถขึน้
ทะเบียนความประสงค์ได้ตัง้แตอ่าย ุ59 ปีบริบรูณ์ โดยจ านวนเงินจะแบง่ตามเกณฑ์อาย ุดงันี  ้
     อาย ุ60 -69 ปี        จะได้รับ   600  บาท 
      อาย ุ70 -79 ปี        จะได้รับ   700  บาท 
      อาย ุ80 -89 ปี        จะได้รับ   800  บาท 
      อาย ุ90 ปีขึน้ไป       จะได้รับ  1,000  บาท 
• การออมแห่งชาต ิกอช 
กองทุนการออมแห่งชาติ เป็นเคร่ืองมือในการสร้างเงินบ านาญยามชราภาพโดยสมคัรใจของประชากรภาคแรงงาน สว่นใหญ่ของประเทศ ท่ีมี
รายได้น้อย ไม่เคยออม หรือต้องการออมเงินเพ่ือหลกัประกนัยามชราภาพ เพราะไม่สามารถถอนเงินออกมาใช้ได้ยามฉกุเฉิน เหมือนการออม
เงินทัว่ไป นอกจากจะลาออกจากการเป็นสมาชิกเท่านัน้ ข้อดี คือ สามารถกลบัเป็นสมาชิกได้อีกเม่ือต้องการ 
(1) ผู้มีสทิธิเป็นสมาชิก 
- เป็นบคุคลสญัชาติไทย   
- อายไุม่ต ่ากว่า 15 ปีบริบรูณ์ และไม่เกิน 60 ปีบริบรูณ์ 
- ไม่เป็นสมาชิกของกองทุนเพ่ือการชราภาพใด ๆ ท่ีมีการสมทบเงินจากรัฐหรือนายจ้าง  
  
(2) ตามบทเฉพาะกาลในกฎหมาย ก าหนดให้ 1 ปีแรก เปิดรับสมาชิกภายใน (8 พฤษภาคม 2555 – 6 พฤษภาคม 2556) เปิด
โอกาสให้ผู้สงูอายท่ีุมีอาย ุ50 ปีขึน้ไปท่ีไม่อยูใ่นระบบบ าเหน็จบ านาญใดๆ สามารถออมตอ่ไปได้อีก 10 ปี โดยมีสิทธิขอรับบ านาญ
ได้เม่ืออายคุรบ 60 ปีเป็นต้นไป 
(3) การจ่ายเงนิเข้ากองทุนมาจาก 2 ฝ่าย คือ  
- สมาชิกจ่ายเงนิสะสมเข้ากองทุนไม่ต า่กว่าเดือนละ 50 บาท แต่ไม่เกนิจ านวนท่ีจะก าหนดในกฎกระทรวง ซึง่จะก าหนด
ไว้ 1,100 บาทต่อเดือน (ทั้งนี้ สมาชิกไม่จ าเป็นต้องส่งเงินสะสมทุกเดือน และไม่จ าเป็นต้องส่งเงินจ านวนเท่ากันทุกเดือน
นอกจากนี้ หากในปีใดไม่สามารถส่งเงินสะสมได้ กอช. จะยงัคงสิทธิความเป็นสมาชิกไว้ แต่รัฐก็จะไม่ส่งเงินสมทบให้)  
รัฐบาลจ่ายเงนิสมทบให้แก่สมาชิกตามระดับอายุของสมาชิกและเป็นอัตราส่วนกับจ านวนเงนิท่ีสมาชิกสะสมเข้า กองทุน คือ  
- 15-30 ปี รัฐจา่ยให้ 50% ของเงินสะสม แตไ่ม่เกิน 600 บาทตอ่ปี  
-  30-50 ปี รัฐจา่ยให้ 80% ของเงินสะสม แตต้่องไม่เกิน 960 บาทตอ่ปี  
- อายมุากกว่า 50 ปี แตไ่ม่เกิน 60 ปี รัฐจะสมทบจา่ยให้ 100% ของเงินสะสม แตไ่ม่เกิน 1,200 บาทตอ่ปี  
การก าหนดเพดานการสมทบเงินสูงสุดไว้ในแต่ละปี เพ่ือไม่ให้เป็นภาระทางการคลงัของประเทศมากจนเกินไป ทัง้นีรั้ฐบาลยงัได้ค า้ประกนั
ผลตอบแทนขัน้ต ่าว่า ต้องไม่น้อยกว่าดอกเบีย้เงินฝากประจ า 12 เดือนเฉล่ียของธนาคารออมสิน ธนาคารเพ่ือการเกษตรและสหกรณ์เกษตร 
(ธ.ก.ส.) และธนาคารพาณิชย์ใหญ่อีก 5 แห่ง ด้วยเชน่เดียวกนั 
• ประกนัสงัคมประกนันอกระบบ มาตรา 40 
ประกนัตนนอกระบบ ตามมาตรา 40 วรรค 1 และ 2 คอืประกนัสงัคมส าหรบัประชาชนที่เป็นพนกังานอสิระ โดยผูส้มคัรตอ้งมอีายุ 15-60 ปี
บรบิูรณ์ และการจ่ายเงนิสบทบมไีด ้5 ทาง 
1 จ่าย 100 บาท/เดอืน (จ่ายเอง 70 บาท รฐัสนบัสนุน 30 บาท) 
2 จ่าย 150 บาท/เดอืน (จ่ายเอง 100 บาท รฐัสนบัสนุน 50 บาท)  
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3 จ่าย 150 บาท/เดอืน (จ่ายเอง 100 บาท รฐัสนบัสนุน 100 บาท)  
4 จ่าย 150 บาท/เดอืน (จ่ายเอง 170 บาท รฐัสนบัสนุน 30 บาท)  
5 จ่าย 150 บาท/เดอืน (จ่ายเอง 200 บาท รฐัสนบัสนุน 150 บาท) 
 
Source: Social Security Office (2015) 
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APPENDIX 9 Semi-structured interview topic guide 
 
 
I. Interview topic guide (To be used by the researcher) 
Researcher:  Phohnthip Smithsarakarn 
Research title: The Thai Multi-Pillar Pension System: Extending Pension and 
Savings Scheme Coverage to Informal Workers 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews  
  The semi-structured interview is employed to obtain rich information about the 
pension system’s performance from the different perspectives of the selected 
interviewees.  
  The participants are allowed to talk freely; and the participants can discuss any topic 
they like following the key questions that the interviewer has prepared.  
  The key concepts of the interview are to determine why the system is still having 
benefit adequacy and financial sustainability problems, mainly with informal 
working population.  
Assurance of ethical conduct  
  All information will be treated confidentially, and no information will be transmitted 
to any third party.  
  Respondents’ names will not be revealed in any part of the research project, and their 
identity will be obscured.  
  The respondent may choose not to answer any particular question.  
 
Themes and issues for interviews As there are three groups of interviewees, the researcher 
will prepare different types of questions for each group. By the end of the interviews, the 
researcher will combine all the information from every interview so as to see the similarities 
and differences among the participants’ answers. Further, the researcher will then triangulate 
the interviews’ outcomes to the questionnaire survey data and previous studies. 
After completing the questions which are prepared, other related questions will be asked 
individually according to the details in each interview.  
 
Interview topic guide 
Thai senior citizens group (sample questions) 
1. Are you aware of any pension programmes that relate to your life? (OAA, NSF, and SSA 
40) If so, where did you get the information from? 
2. You have not joined the OAA yet, but have you considered joining?  
3. Will you join the OAA next year? And will you join the savings programme in the near 
future? 
4. You are now joining the OAA (non-contributory scheme). Are you currently in any 
pension programmes in the voluntary savings scheme? The RMF, NSF or SSA 40? Or the 
SSA 39 maybe, as you used to work in the formal sector? 
5. Have you considered preparing your financial income before retirement? Has the savings 
pension programme(s) incentivised your savings behaviour? Has your savings behaviour 
changed from the past (before the multi-pillar system was instituted)?  
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6. What is your opinion about expanding old-age social protection in the form of pensions 
to informal workers?  
7. From your perspective, to what extent do you foresee the pension system changing your 
income security?  
8. Are you originally from Bangkok (urban area)? 
9. Have you ever heard or received any information from the local government in your 
hometown/local area before? 
10. Do you have any further comments that you would like to share? 
 
Local and national bureaucrats/staff group (sample questions) 
1. There has been a lot of discussion surrounding the pension system since Thailand adopted 
the new approach on pension scheme(s) for Thai senior citizens, especially informal 
workers. What is your perspective on this issue? (This is the open-ended question) 
2. Do you find it is difficult to work on the programme that was transformed from the former 
pension system or shifted from other pension programmes/schemes? 
3. The current pension system transformed the OAA from means-tested (first used in 1993) 
to universal coverage benefits (in 2009) in order to cover the informal workers. What is your 
point of view on the present scheme?  
4. How well the programme that you are woking on has been developed since it was first 
introduced? 
5. From your perspective, do you find it is difficult to get the citizens to understand pension 
programmes or pension schemes provided for them? 
6. To what extend how do you find working with both citizens and national bureaucrats? 
Could you explain any differences between RMF and the other two programmes (NSF and 
SSA 40)? 
7. The NSF has just been introduced again. What is the reaction to the programme like 
among citizens? 
8. As the NSF was just introduced, was there lots of work to do? 
9. Were there any difficulties regarding the shift of the SSA 40 to the NSF? 
10. As the news reported, citizens aged 15–59 in the informal sector are eligible to register 
to the programme, and those who are older than 60 are eligible to register only the first year 
after the programme was introduced. Is that correct? 
11. The SSA 40 was just cancelled. What is the reaction of the contributors? Was it hard for 
you to communicate/explain this to citizens? Were there any confusing issues that citizens 
noted? 
12. Does it mean that you have to work with those in charge of the NSF at all? Do you have 
to provide information about the NSF to the citizens who inquire information? 
14. Do you see providing two different savings programmes under the same savings pension 
scheme might be one of the reason why the system’s outcome was not successfully 
achievable? 
15. Do you have any further comments that you would like to share? 
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APPENDIX 10 Data analysis from SPSS 
Results of Cronbach’s alpha: Reliability statistics 
 
  
1 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 204 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 204 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items N of Items 
.832 .838 12 
 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
SattisfactionWithPolOAA 4.09 .744 204 
SattisfactionWithPolRMF 2.67 .840 204 
SattisfactionWithPolNSF 3.39 .757 204 
SattisfactionWithPolSSA40 2.90 .850 204 
SattisfactionWithLocOAA 3.78 .913 204 
SattisfactionWithLocRMF 2.45 .675 204 
SattisfactionWithLocNSF 2.75 .796 204 
SattisfactionWithLocSSA40 2.75 .884 204 
OverallSatisfactionOAA 3.93 .742 204 
OverallSatisfactionRMF 2.56 .669 204 
OverallSatisfactionNSF 3.07 .617 204 
OverallSatisfactionSSA40 2.82 .782 204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thPolO
AA 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thPolR
MF 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thPolN
SF 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thPolS
SA40 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thLocO
AA 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thLocR
MF 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thLocN
SF 
Sattisfa
ctionWi
thLocS
SA40 
Overall
Satisfa
ctionO
AA 
Overall
Satisfa
ctionR
MF 
Overall
Satisfa
ctionN
SF 
Overall
Satisfa
ctionS
SA40 
Sattisfaction
WithPolOAA 
1.000 -.008 .193 .170 .602 -.040 .055 .139 .871 -.025 .153 .171 
Sattisfaction
WithPolRMF 
-.008 1.000 .351 .248 .006 .553 .653 .130 .000 .907 .636 .209 
Sattisfaction
WithPolNSF 
.193 .351 1.000 .269 .146 .071 .263 -.014 .186 .256 .783 .138 
Sattisfaction
WithPolSSA4
0 
.170 .248 .269 1.000 .098 .210 .230 .626 .145 .262 .313 .898 
Sattisfaction
WithLocOAA 
.602 .006 .146 .098 1.000 .010 .187 .247 .916 .009 .210 .193 
Sattisfaction
WithLocRMF 
-.040 .553 .071 .210 .010 1.000 .591 .185 -.014 .852 .425 .219 
Sattisfaction
WithLocNSF 
.055 .653 .263 .230 .187 .591 1.000 .201 .142 .708 .806 .239 
Sattisfaction
WithLocSSA4
0 
.139 .130 -.014 .626 .247 .185 .201 1.000 .222 .175 .121 .906 
OverallSatisf
actionOAA 
.871 .000 .186 .145 .916 -.014 .142 .222 1.000 -.007 .206 .204 
OverallSatisf
actionRMF 
-.025 .907 .256 .262 .009 .852 .708 .175 -.007 1.000 .614 .241 
OverallSatisf
actionNSF 
.153 .636 .783 .313 .210 .425 .806 .121 .206 .614 1.000 .239 
OverallSatisf
actionSSA40 
.171 .209 .138 .898 .193 .219 .239 .906 .204 .241 .239 1.000 
 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SattisfactionWithPolOAA 33.05 27.326 .350 . .830 
SattisfactionWithPolRMF 34.47 25.449 .525 . .817 
SattisfactionWithPolNSF 33.75 27.085 .374 . .829 
SattisfactionWithPolSSA40 34.24 25.314 .534 . .816 
SattisfactionWithLocOAA 33.36 26.144 .389 . .830 
SattisfactionWithLocRMF 34.69 27.039 .443 . .823 
SattisfactionWithLocNSF 34.39 25.202 .596 . .811 
SattisfactionWithLocSSA40 34.39 25.734 .456 . .823 
OverallSatisfactionOAA 33.21 26.593 .452 . .823 
OverallSatisfactionRMF 34.58 26.110 .592 . .813 
OverallSatisfactionNSF 34.07 25.921 .685 . .808 
OverallSatisfactionSSA40 34.32 25.383 .585 . .812 
 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
37.14 30.605 5.532 12 
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Results of respondents’ characteristics 
Table 4.1 
 
1 
 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of respondents 
 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 86 42.2 42.2 42.2 
Female 118 57.8 57.8 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Age 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 50-59 111 54.4 54.4 54.4 
60+ and above 93 45.6 45.6 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Single 34 16.7 16.7 16.7 
Married 111 54.4 54.4 71.1 
Divorced/ widowed 59 28.9 28.9 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Education 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No schooling 22 10.8 10.8 10.8 
Primary 56 27.5 27.5 38.2 
Secondary 68 33.3 33.3 71.6 
University 58 28.4 28.4 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Hometown 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Rural 69 33.8 33.8 33.8 
Urban 135 66.2 66.2 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Financial Supports 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 93 45.6 45.6 45.6 
Yes 111 54.4 54.4 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Looking After Someone Else 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 111 54.4 54.4 54.4 
Yes 93 45.6 45.6 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
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LivingArrangement 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Alone 40 19.6 19.6 19.6 
With spouse 26 12.7 12.7 32.4 
With family 115 56.4 56.4 88.7 
With unrelated persons 23 11.3 11.3 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
ReceivedOAA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid no 114 55.9 55.9 55.9 
yes 90 44.1 44.1 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
LabourMarket 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Informal 174 85.3 85.3 85.3 
Formal 30 14.7 14.7 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
Income 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Low income 70 34.3 34.3 34.3 
Middle income 91 44.6 44.6 78.9 
High income 43 21.1 21.1 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
TypesOfJob 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Formal 30 14.7 14.7 14.7 
Multiple/ Street jobs 35 17.2 17.2 31.9 
Service sector 36 17.6 17.6 49.5 
Family worker/ retired 71 34.8 34.8 84.3 
Self-employed 32 15.7 15.7 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
SavingsBehaviour 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 96 47.1 47.1 47.1 
Yes 108 52.9 52.9 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
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Results of cross tabulations and chi-square tests 
Table 4.2 
 
 
1 
 
Table 4.2: Percentage distribution of Thai senior citizens in savings: Chi-square tests and cross tabulations 
Gender * Savings Behaviour 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Gender Male Count 17 69 86 
% within Gender 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 17.7% 63.9% 42.2% 
% of Total 8.3% 33.8% 42.2% 
Female Count 79 39 118 
% within Gender 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 82.3% 36.1% 57.8% 
% of Total 38.7% 19.1% 57.8% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Gender 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.449a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 42.575 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 46.835 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 44.231 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.47. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Age * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Age 50-59 Count 69 42 111 
% within Age 62.2% 37.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 71.9% 38.9% 54.4% 
% of Total 33.8% 20.6% 54.4% 
60+ and above Count 27 66 93 
% within Age 29.0% 71.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 28.1% 61.1% 45.6% 
% of Total 13.2% 32.4% 45.6% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Age 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.294a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 20.984 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 22.799 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.184 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.76. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Status * Savings Behaviour 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Status Single Count 32 2 34 
% within Status 94.1% 5.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 33.3% 1.9% 16.7% 
% of Total 15.7% 1.0% 16.7% 
Married Count 16 95 111 
% within Status 14.4% 85.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 16.7% 88.0% 54.4% 
% of Total 7.8% 46.6% 54.4% 
Divorced/ widowed Count 48 11 59 
% within Status 81.4% 18.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 50.0% 10.2% 28.9% 
% of Total 23.5% 5.4% 28.9% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Status 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 105.559a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 118.568 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .797 1 .372 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 16.00. 
Education * Savings Behaviour 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Education No schooling Count 21 1 22 
% within Education 95.5% 4.5% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 21.9% 0.9% 10.8% 
% of Total 10.3% 0.5% 10.8% 
Primary Count 51 5 56 
% within Education 91.1% 8.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 53.1% 4.6% 27.5% 
% of Total 25.0% 2.5% 27.5% 
Secondary Count 21 47 68 
% within Education 30.9% 69.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 21.9% 43.5% 33.3% 
% of Total 10.3% 23.0% 33.3% 
University Count 3 55 58 
% within Education 5.2% 94.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 3.1% 50.9% 28.4% 
% of Total 1.5% 27.0% 28.4% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Education 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 112.212a 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 132.581 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 95.242 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 10.35. 
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Hometown * Savings Behaviour 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Hometown Rural Count 47 22 69 
% within Hometown 68.1% 31.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 49.0% 20.4% 33.8% 
% of Total 23.0% 10.8% 33.8% 
Urban Count 49 86 135 
% within Hometown 36.3% 63.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 51.0% 79.6% 66.2% 
% of Total 24.0% 42.2% 66.2% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Hometown 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.557a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 17.302 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 18.833 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 18.466 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 32.47. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Financial Support * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
FinancialSupport No Count 61 32 93 
% within FinancialSupport 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 63.5% 29.6% 45.6% 
% of Total 29.9% 15.7% 45.6% 
Yes Count 35 76 111 
% within FinancialSupport 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 36.5% 70.4% 54.4% 
% of Total 17.2% 37.3% 54.4% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within FinancialSupport 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.563a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 22.216 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 23.998 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 23.447 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.76. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Looking After Someone Else * Savings Behaviour 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
LookingAfterSomeoneElse No Count 45 66 111 
% within 
LookingAfterSomeoneElse 
40.5% 59.5% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 46.9% 61.1% 54.4% 
% of Total 22.1% 32.4% 54.4% 
Yes Count 51 42 93 
% within 
LookingAfterSomeoneElse 
54.8% 45.2% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 53.1% 38.9% 45.6% 
% of Total 25.0% 20.6% 45.6% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within 
LookingAfterSomeoneElse 
47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.152a 1 .042   
Continuity Correctionb 3.598 1 .058   
Likelihood Ratio 4.163 1 .041   
Fisher's Exact Test    .049 .029 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.132 1 .042   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.76. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Received OAA * Savings Behaviour 
 
ReceivedOAA * SavingsBehaviour Crosstabulation 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
ReceivedOAA no Count 70 44 114 
% within ReceivedOAA 61.4% 38.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 72.9% 40.7% 55.9% 
% of Total 34.3% 21.6% 55.9% 
yes Count 26 64 90 
% within ReceivedOAA 28.9% 71.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 27.1% 59.3% 44.1% 
% of Total 12.7% 31.4% 44.1% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within ReceivedOAA 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.342a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 20.057 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 21.835 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.238 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 42.35. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Living Arrangement * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
LivingArragnement Alone Count 38 2 40 
% within LivingArragnement 95.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 39.6% 1.9% 19.6% 
% of Total 18.6% 1.0% 19.6% 
With spouse Count 12 14 26 
% within LivingArragnement 46.2% 53.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 12.5% 13.0% 12.7% 
% of Total 5.9% 6.9% 12.7% 
With family Count 24 91 115 
% within LivingArragnement 20.9% 79.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 25.0% 84.3% 56.4% 
% of Total 11.8% 44.6% 56.4% 
With unrelated persons Count 22 1 23 
% within LivingArragnement 95.7% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 22.9% 0.9% 11.3% 
% of Total 10.8% 0.5% 11.3% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within LivingArragnement 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 90.369a 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 104.289 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.545 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 10.82. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Income * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Income Low income Count 55 15 70 
% within Income 78.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 57.3% 13.9% 34.3% 
% of Total 27.0% 7.4% 34.3% 
Middle income Count 39 52 91 
% within Income 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 40.6% 48.1% 44.6% 
% of Total 19.1% 25.5% 44.6% 
High income Count 2 41 43 
% within Income 4.7% 95.3% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 2.1% 38.0% 21.1% 
% of Total 1.0% 20.1% 21.1% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Income 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 59.587a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 68.890 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 59.264 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 20.24. 
 
Labour Market * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
LabourMarket Informal Count 96 78 174 
% within LabourMarket 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 72.2% 85.3% 
% of Total 47.1% 38.2% 85.3% 
Formal Count 0 30 30 
% within LabourMarket 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 27.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 14.7% 14.7% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within LabourMarket 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.264a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 29.089 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 42.748 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 31.111 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Income * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Income Low income Count 55 15 70 
% within Income 78.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 57.3% 13.9% 34.3% 
% of Total 27.0% 7.4% 34.3% 
Middle income Count 39 52 91 
% within Income 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 40.6% 48.1% 44.6% 
% of Total 19.1% 25.5% 44.6% 
High income Count 2 41 43 
% within Income 4.7% 95.3% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 2.1% 38.0% 21.1% 
% of Total 1.0% 20.1% 21.1% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Income 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 59.587a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 68.890 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 59.264 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 20.24. 
 
Labour Market * Savings Behaviour 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
LabourMarket Informal Count 96 78 174 
% within LabourMarket 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 72.2% 85.3% 
% of Total 47.1% 38.2% 85.3% 
Formal Count 0 30 30 
% within LabourMarket 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 27.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 14.7% 14.7% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within LabourMarket 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.264a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 29.089 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 42.748 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 31.111 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.12. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Types Of Jobs * Savings Behaviour 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 30 30 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 27.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 14.7% 14.7% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 27 8 35 
% within TypesOfJob 77.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 28.1% 7.4% 17.2% 
% of Total 13.2% 3.9% 17.2% 
Service sector Count 23 13 36 
% within TypesOfJob 63.9% 36.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 12.0% 17.6% 
% of Total 11.3% 6.4% 17.6% 
Family worker/ retired Count 23 48 71 
% within TypesOfJob 32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 44.4% 34.8% 
% of Total 11.3% 23.5% 34.8% 
Self-employed Count 23 9 32 
% within TypesOfJob 71.9% 28.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 8.3% 15.7% 
% of Total 11.3% 4.4% 15.7% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within TypesOfJob 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 57.513a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 69.921 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.198 1 .013 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 14.12. 
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Table 4.3 
 
  
Table 4.3 Types of job and income levels  
 
 
TypesOfJob * Income Crosstabulation 
 
Income 
Total Low income Middle income High income 
TypesOfJob Formal Count 1 8 21 30 
% within TypesOfJob 3.3% 26.7% 70.0% 100.0% 
% within Income 1.4% 8.8% 48.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.5% 3.9% 10.3% 14.7% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 23 12 0 35 
% within TypesOfJob 65.7% 34.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Income 32.9% 13.2% 0.0% 17.2% 
% of Total 11.3% 5.9% 0.0% 17.2% 
Service sector Count 15 21 0 36 
% within TypesOfJob 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Income 21.4% 23.1% 0.0% 17.6% 
% of Total 7.4% 10.3% 0.0% 17.6% 
Family worker/ retired Count 20 32 19 71 
% within TypesOfJob 28.2% 45.1% 26.8% 100.0% 
% within Income 28.6% 35.2% 44.2% 34.8% 
% of Total 9.8% 15.7% 9.3% 34.8% 
Self-employed Count 11 18 3 32 
% within TypesOfJob 34.4% 56.3% 9.4% 100.0% 
% within Income 15.7% 19.8% 7.0% 15.7% 
% of Total 5.4% 8.8% 1.5% 15.7% 
Total Count 70 91 43 204 
% within TypesOfJob 34.3% 44.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
% within Income 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 34.3% 44.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 77.489a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 83.544 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.416 1 .036 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 
count is 6.32. 
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Table 4.4 
 
 
Table 4.4 Financial support from family members, savings and types of jobs 
 
TypesOfJob * SavingsBehaviour * FinancialSupport Crosstabulation 
FinancialSupport 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
No TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 19 19 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 59.4% 20.4% 
% of Total 0.0% 20.4% 20.4% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 21 2 23 
% within TypesOfJob 91.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 34.4% 6.3% 24.7% 
% of Total 22.6% 2.2% 24.7% 
Service sector Count 18 2 20 
% within TypesOfJob 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 29.5% 6.3% 21.5% 
% of Total 19.4% 2.2% 21.5% 
Family worker/ retired Count 8 8 16 
% within TypesOfJob 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 13.1% 25.0% 17.2% 
% of Total 8.6% 8.6% 17.2% 
Self-employed Count 14 1 15 
% within TypesOfJob 93.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 23.0% 3.1% 16.1% 
% of Total 15.1% 1.1% 16.1% 
Total Count 61 32 93 
% within TypesOfJob 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
Yes TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 11 11 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 14.5% 9.9% 
% of Total 0.0% 9.9% 9.9% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 6 6 12 
% within TypesOfJob 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 17.1% 7.9% 10.8% 
% of Total 5.4% 5.4% 10.8% 
Service sector Count 5 11 16 
% within TypesOfJob 31.3% 68.8% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 14.3% 14.5% 14.4% 
% of Total 4.5% 9.9% 14.4% 
Family worker/ retired Count 15 40 55 
% within TypesOfJob 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 42.9% 52.6% 49.5% 
% of Total 13.5% 36.0% 49.5% 
Self-employed Count 9 8 17 
% within TypesOfJob 52.9% 47.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 25.7% 10.5% 15.3% 
% of Total 8.1% 7.2% 15.3% 
Total Count 35 76 111 
% within TypesOfJob 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
Total TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 30 30 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 27.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 14.7% 14.7% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 27 8 35 
% within TypesOfJob 77.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 28.1% 7.4% 17.2% 
% of Total 13.2% 3.9% 17.2% 
Service sector Count 23 13 36 
% within TypesOfJob 63.9% 36.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 12.0% 17.6% 
% of Total 11.3% 6.4% 17.6% 
Family worker/ retired Count 23 48 71 
% within TypesOfJob 32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 44.4% 34.8% 
% of Total 11.3% 23.5% 34.8% 
Self-employed Count 23 9 32 
% within TypesOfJob 71.9% 28.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 8.3% 15.7% 
% of Total 11.3% 4.4% 15.7% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within TypesOfJob 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
FinancialSupport Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
No Pearson Chi-Square 55.075b 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.608 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.670 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 93   
Yes Pearson Chi-Square 11.034c 4 .026 
Likelihood Ratio 13.897 4 .008 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.821 1 .093 
N of Valid Cases 111   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 57.513a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 69.921 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.198 1 .013 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
14.12. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
5.16. 
c. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.47. 
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Table 4.5 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
Table 4.5: Gender, savings and types of jobs  
 
TypesOfJob * SavingsBehaviour * Gender Crosstabulation 
Gender 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Male TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 18 18 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 26.1% 20.9% 
% of Total 0.0% 20.9% 20.9% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 5 4 9 
% within TypesOfJob 55.6% 44.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 29.4% 5.8% 10.5% 
% of Total 5.8% 4.7% 10.5% 
Service sector Count 3 9 12 
% within TypesOfJob 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 17.6% 13.0% 14.0% 
% of Total 3.5% 10.5% 14.0% 
Family worker/ retired Count 2 31 33 
% within TypesOfJob 6.1% 93.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 11.8% 44.9% 38.4% 
% of Total 2.3% 36.0% 38.4% 
Self-employed Count 7 7 14 
% within TypesOfJob 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 41.2% 10.1% 16.3% 
% of Total 8.1% 8.1% 16.3% 
Total Count 17 69 86 
% within TypesOfJob 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
Female TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 12 12 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 30.8% 10.2% 
% of Total 0.0% 10.2% 10.2% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 22 4 26 
% within TypesOfJob 84.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 27.8% 10.3% 22.0% 
% of Total 18.6% 3.4% 22.0% 
Service sector Count 20 4 24 
% within TypesOfJob 83.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 25.3% 10.3% 20.3% 
% of Total 16.9% 3.4% 20.3% 
Family worker/ retired Count 21 17 38 
% within TypesOfJob 55.3% 44.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 26.6% 43.6% 32.2% 
% of Total 17.8% 14.4% 32.2% 
Self-employed Count 16 2 18 
% within TypesOfJob 88.9% 11.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 20.3% 5.1% 15.3% 
% of Total 13.6% 1.7% 15.3% 
Total Count 79 39 118 
% within TypesOfJob 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
Total TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 30 30 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 27.8% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 14.7% 14.7% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 27 8 35 
% within TypesOfJob 77.1% 22.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 28.1% 7.4% 17.2% 
% of Total 13.2% 3.9% 17.2% 
Service sector Count 23 13 36 
% within TypesOfJob 63.9% 36.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 12.0% 17.6% 
% of Total 11.3% 6.4% 17.6% 
Family worker/ retired Count 23 48 71 
% within TypesOfJob 32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 44.4% 34.8% 
% of Total 11.3% 23.5% 34.8% 
Self-employed Count 23 9 32 
% within TypesOfJob 71.9% 28.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 24.0% 8.3% 15.7% 
% of Total 11.3% 4.4% 15.7% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within TypesOfJob 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Gender Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Male Pearson Chi-Square 23.887b 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 25.153 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.292 1 .130 
N of Valid Cases 86   
Female Pearson Chi-Square 37.147c 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 40.984 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.578 1 .018 
N of Valid Cases 118   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 57.513a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 69.921 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.198 1 .013 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
14.12. 
b. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.78. 
c. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.97. 
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Table 4.6: Gender, savings and financial support 
 
Gender * SavingsBehaviour * FinancialSupport Crosstabulation 
FinancialSupport 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
No Gender Male Count 11 21 32 
% within Gender 34.4% 65.6% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 18.0% 65.6% 34.4% 
% of Total 11.8% 22.6% 34.4% 
Female Count 50 11 61 
% within Gender 82.0% 18.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 82.0% 34.4% 65.6% 
% of Total 53.8% 11.8% 65.6% 
Total Count 61 32 93 
% within Gender 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 65.6% 34.4% 100.0% 
Yes Gender Male Count 6 48 54 
% within Gender 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 17.1% 63.2% 48.6% 
% of Total 5.4% 43.2% 48.6% 
Female Count 29 28 57 
% within Gender 50.9% 49.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 82.9% 36.8% 51.4% 
% of Total 26.1% 25.2% 51.4% 
Total Count 35 76 111 
% within Gender 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
Total Gender Male Count 17 69 86 
% within Gender 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 17.7% 63.9% 42.2% 
% of Total 8.3% 33.8% 42.2% 
Female Count 79 39 118 
% within Gender 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 82.3% 36.1% 57.8% 
% of Total 38.7% 19.1% 57.8% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Gender 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
FinancialSupport Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
No Pearson Chi-Square 21.065c 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 19.009 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 20.976 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 20.838 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 93     
Yes Pearson Chi-Square 20.311d 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 18.511 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 21.695 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 20.128 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 111     
Total Pearson Chi-Square 44.449a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 42.575 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 46.835 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 44.231 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 204     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.47. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.01. 
d. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.03. 
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Table 4.7 Gender, savings and income levels 
Income * SavingsBehaviour * Gender Crosstabulation 
Gender 
SavingsBehaviour 
Total No Yes 
Male Income Low income Count 7 8 15 
% within Income 46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 41.2% 11.6% 17.4% 
% of Total 8.1% 9.3% 17.4% 
Middle income Count 8 35 43 
% within Income 18.6% 81.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 47.1% 50.7% 50.0% 
% of Total 9.3% 40.7% 50.0% 
High income Count 2 26 28 
% within Income 7.1% 92.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 11.8% 37.7% 32.6% 
% of Total 2.3% 30.2% 32.6% 
Total Count 17 69 86 
% within Income 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 19.8% 80.2% 100.0% 
Female Income Low income Count 48 7 55 
% within Income 87.3% 12.7% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 60.8% 17.9% 46.6% 
% of Total 40.7% 5.9% 46.6% 
Middle income Count 31 17 48 
% within Income 64.6% 35.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 39.2% 43.6% 40.7% 
% of Total 26.3% 14.4% 40.7% 
High income Count 0 15 15 
% within Income 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 0.0% 38.5% 12.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 12.7% 12.7% 
Total Count 79 39 118 
% within Income 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.9% 33.1% 100.0% 
Total Income Low income Count 55 15 70 
% within Income 78.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 57.3% 13.9% 34.3% 
% of Total 27.0% 7.4% 34.3% 
Middle income Count 39 52 91 
% within Income 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 40.6% 48.1% 44.6% 
% of Total 19.1% 25.5% 44.6% 
High income Count 2 41 43 
% within Income 4.7% 95.3% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 2.1% 38.0% 21.1% 
% of Total 1.0% 20.1% 21.1% 
Total Count 96 108 204 
% within Income 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% within SavingsBehaviour 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Gender Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Male Pearson Chi-Square 9.694b 2 .008 
Likelihood Ratio 9.056 2 .011 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.702 1 .003 
N of Valid Cases 86   
Female Pearson Chi-Square 40.773c 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 45.424 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 35.751 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 118   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 59.587a 2 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 68.890 2 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 59.264 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
20.24. 
b. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
2.97. 
c. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
4.96. 
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Table 4.8 Genders, types of jobs and educational levels  
 
 
TypesOfJob * Education * Gender Crosstabulation 
Gender 
Education 
Total No schooling Primary Secondary University 
Male TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 0 1 17 18 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 94.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 42.5% 20.9% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 19.8% 20.9% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 2 1 6 0 9 
% within TypesOfJob 22.2% 11.1% 66.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 50.0% 10.0% 18.8% 0.0% 10.5% 
% of Total 2.3% 1.2% 7.0% 0.0% 10.5% 
Service sector Count 0 5 7 0 12 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 41.7% 58.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 50.0% 21.9% 0.0% 14.0% 
% of Total 0.0% 5.8% 8.1% 0.0% 14.0% 
Family worker/ retired Count 2 2 9 20 33 
% within TypesOfJob 6.1% 6.1% 27.3% 60.6% 100.0% 
% within Education 50.0% 20.0% 28.1% 50.0% 38.4% 
% of Total 2.3% 2.3% 10.5% 23.3% 38.4% 
Self-employed Count 0 2 9 3 14 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 14.3% 64.3% 21.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 20.0% 28.1% 7.5% 16.3% 
% of Total 0.0% 2.3% 10.5% 3.5% 16.3% 
Total Count 4 10 32 40 86 
% within TypesOfJob 4.7% 11.6% 37.2% 46.5% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 4.7% 11.6% 37.2% 46.5% 100.0% 
Female TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 0 2 10 12 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 55.6% 10.2% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 8.5% 10.2% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 4 16 6 0 26 
% within TypesOfJob 15.4% 61.5% 23.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 22.2% 34.8% 16.7% 0.0% 22.0% 
% of Total 3.4% 13.6% 5.1% 0.0% 22.0% 
Service sector Count 1 11 12 0 24 
% within TypesOfJob 4.2% 45.8% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 5.6% 23.9% 33.3% 0.0% 20.3% 
% of Total 0.8% 9.3% 10.2% 0.0% 20.3% 
Family worker/ retired Count 8 10 13 7 38 
% within TypesOfJob 21.1% 26.3% 34.2% 18.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 44.4% 21.7% 36.1% 38.9% 32.2% 
% of Total 6.8% 8.5% 11.0% 5.9% 32.2% 
Self-employed Count 5 9 3 1 18 
% within TypesOfJob 27.8% 50.0% 16.7% 5.6% 100.0% 
% within Education 27.8% 19.6% 8.3% 5.6% 15.3% 
% of Total 4.2% 7.6% 2.5% 0.8% 15.3% 
Total Count 18 46 36 18 118 
% within TypesOfJob 15.3% 39.0% 30.5% 15.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 15.3% 39.0% 30.5% 15.3% 100.0% 
Total TypesOfJob Formal Count 0 0 3 27 30 
% within TypesOfJob 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 46.6% 14.7% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 13.2% 14.7% 
Multiple/ Street jobs Count 6 17 12 0 35 
% within TypesOfJob 17.1% 48.6% 34.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 27.3% 30.4% 17.6% 0.0% 17.2% 
% of Total 2.9% 8.3% 5.9% 0.0% 17.2% 
Service sector Count 1 16 19 0 36 
% within TypesOfJob 2.8% 44.4% 52.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 4.5% 28.6% 27.9% 0.0% 17.6% 
% of Total 0.5% 7.8% 9.3% 0.0% 17.6% 
Family worker/ retired Count 10 12 22 27 71 
% within TypesOfJob 14.1% 16.9% 31.0% 38.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 45.5% 21.4% 32.4% 46.6% 34.8% 
% of Total 4.9% 5.9% 10.8% 13.2% 34.8% 
Self-employed Count 5 11 12 4 32 
% within TypesOfJob 15.6% 34.4% 37.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Education 22.7% 19.6% 17.6% 6.9% 15.7% 
% of Total 2.5% 5.4% 5.9% 2.0% 15.7% 
Total Count 22 56 68 58 204 
% within TypesOfJob 10.8% 27.5% 33.3% 28.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.8% 27.5% 33.3% 28.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Gender Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Male Pearson Chi-Square 54.515b 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 61.963 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.812 1 .051 
N of Valid Cases 86   
Female Pearson Chi-Square 67.899c 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.431 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.521 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 118   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 103.865a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 121.909 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.611 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 4 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.24. 
b. 13 cells (65.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
.42. 
c. 10 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.83. 
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Income * Education * LabourMarket * Hometown Crosstabulation 
Hometown LabourMarket 
Education 
Total No schooling Primary Secondary University 
Rural Informal Income Low income Count 6 13 12 0 31 
% within Income 19.4% 41.9% 38.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 54.5% 48.1% 48.0% 0.0% 48.4% 
% of Total 9.4% 20.3% 18.8% 0.0% 48.4% 
Middle income Count 5 14 13 0 32 
% within Income 15.6% 43.8% 40.6% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 45.5% 51.9% 52.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
% of Total 7.8% 21.9% 20.3% 0.0% 50.0% 
High income Count 0 0 0 1 1 
% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 1.6% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 
Total Count 11 27 25 1 64 
% within Income 17.2% 42.2% 39.1% 1.6% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 17.2% 42.2% 39.1% 1.6% 100.0% 
Formal Income Middle income Count    1 1 
% within Income    100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education    20.0% 20.0% 
% of Total    20.0% 20.0% 
High income Count    4 4 
% within Income    100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education    80.0% 80.0% 
% of Total    80.0% 80.0% 
Total Count    5 5 
% within Income    100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education    100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total    100.0% 100.0% 
Total Income Low income Count 6 13 12 0 31 
% within Income 19.4% 41.9% 38.7% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 54.5% 48.1% 48.0% 0.0% 44.9% 
% of Total 8.7% 18.8% 17.4% 0.0% 44.9% 
Middle income Count 5 14 13 1 33 
% within Income 15.2% 42.4% 39.4% 3.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 45.5% 51.9% 52.0% 16.7% 47.8% 
% of Total 7.2% 20.3% 18.8% 1.4% 47.8% 
High income Count 0 0 0 5 5 
% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 83.3% 7.2% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 7.2% 
Total Count 11 27 25 6 69 
% within Income 15.9% 39.1% 36.2% 8.7% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 15.9% 39.1% 36.2% 8.7% 100.0% 
Urban Informal Income Low income Count 8 19 8 3 38 
% within Income 21.1% 50.0% 21.1% 7.9% 100.0% 
% within Education 72.7% 65.5% 20.0% 10.0% 34.5% 
% of Total 7.3% 17.3% 7.3% 2.7% 34.5% 
Middle income Count 3 10 30 8 51 
% within Income 5.9% 19.6% 58.8% 15.7% 100.0% 
% within Education 27.3% 34.5% 75.0% 26.7% 46.4% 
% of Total 2.7% 9.1% 27.3% 7.3% 46.4% 
High income Count 0 0 2 19 21 
% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 90.5% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 63.3% 19.1% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 17.3% 19.1% 
Total Count 11 29 40 30 110 
% within Income 10.0% 26.4% 36.4% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.0% 26.4% 36.4% 27.3% 100.0% 
Formal Income Low income Count   1 0 1 
% within Income   100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   33.3% 0.0% 4.0% 
% of Total   4.0% 0.0% 4.0% 
Middle income Count   2 5 7 
% within Income   28.6% 71.4% 100.0% 
% within Education   66.7% 22.7% 28.0% 
% of Total   8.0% 20.0% 28.0% 
High income Count   0 17 17 
% within Income   0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   0.0% 77.3% 68.0% 
% of Total   0.0% 68.0% 68.0% 
Total Count   3 22 25 
% within Income   12.0% 88.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total   12.0% 88.0% 100.0% 
Total Income Low income Count 8 19 9 3 39 
% within Income 20.5% 48.7% 23.1% 7.7% 100.0% 
% within Education 72.7% 65.5% 20.9% 5.8% 28.9% 
% of Total 5.9% 14.1% 6.7% 2.2% 28.9% 
Middle income Count 3 10 32 13 58 
% within Income 5.2% 17.2% 55.2% 22.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 27.3% 34.5% 74.4% 25.0% 43.0% 
% of Total 2.2% 7.4% 23.7% 9.6% 43.0% 
High income Count 0 0 2 36 38 
% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 69.2% 28.1% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 26.7% 28.1% 
Total Count 11 29 43 52 135 
% within Income 8.1% 21.5% 31.9% 38.5% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 8.1% 21.5% 31.9% 38.5% 100.0% 
Total Informal Income Low income Count 14 32 20 3 69 
% within Income 20.3% 46.4% 29.0% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 63.6% 57.1% 30.8% 9.7% 39.7% 
% of Total 8.0% 18.4% 11.5% 1.7% 39.7% 
Middle income Count 8 24 43 8 83 
% within Income 9.6% 28.9% 51.8% 9.6% 100.0% 
% within Education 36.4% 42.9% 66.2% 25.8% 47.7% 
% of Total 4.6% 13.8% 24.7% 4.6% 47.7% 
High income Count 0 0 2 20 22 
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% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 90.9% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 64.5% 12.6% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 11.5% 12.6% 
Total Count 22 56 65 31 174 
% within Income 12.6% 32.2% 37.4% 17.8% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 12.6% 32.2% 37.4% 17.8% 100.0% 
Formal Income Low income Count   1 0 1 
% within Income   100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   33.3% 0.0% 3.3% 
% of Total   3.3% 0.0% 3.3% 
Middle income Count   2 6 8 
% within Income   25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   66.7% 22.2% 26.7% 
% of Total   6.7% 20.0% 26.7% 
High income Count   0 21 21 
% within Income   0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   0.0% 77.8% 70.0% 
% of Total   0.0% 70.0% 70.0% 
Total Count   3 27 30 
% within Income   10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
% within Education   100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total   10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
Total Income Low income Count 14 32 21 3 70 
% within Income 20.0% 45.7% 30.0% 4.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 63.6% 57.1% 30.9% 5.2% 34.3% 
% of Total 6.9% 15.7% 10.3% 1.5% 34.3% 
Middle income Count 8 24 45 14 91 
% within Income 8.8% 26.4% 49.5% 15.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 36.4% 42.9% 66.2% 24.1% 44.6% 
% of Total 3.9% 11.8% 22.1% 6.9% 44.6% 
High income Count 0 0 2 41 43 
% within Income 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 95.3% 100.0% 
% within Education 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 70.7% 21.1% 
% of Total 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 20.1% 21.1% 
Total Count 22 56 68 58 204 
% within Income 10.8% 27.5% 33.3% 28.4% 100.0% 
% within Education 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.8% 27.5% 33.3% 28.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
Hometown LabourMarket Value df 
Asymptotic 
Significance (2-
sided) 
Rural Informal Pearson Chi-Square 64.155e 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 10.454 6 .107 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.142 1 .143 
N of Valid Cases 64   
Formal Pearson Chi-Square .f   
N of Valid Cases 5   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 56.951d 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 31.960 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.311 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 69   
Urban Informal Pearson Chi-Square 74.265h 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 71.164 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 47.039 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 110   
Formal Pearson Chi-Square 11.472i 2 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 9.970 2 .007 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.989 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 25   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 97.147g 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 101.976 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 68.766 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 135   
Total Informal Pearson Chi-Square 104.992b 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 86.364 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 59.649 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 174   
Formal Pearson Chi-Square 13.333c 2 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 10.508 2 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.154 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 30   
Total Pearson Chi-Square 136.298a 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 138.613 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 94.436 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 204   
a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.64. 
b. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.78. 
c. 4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .10. 
d. 7 cells (58.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .43. 
e. 6 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .02. 
f. No statistics are computed because Education is a constant. 
g. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.10. 
h. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.10. 
i. 4 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .12. 
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Table 4.11 The overall satisfaction  
 
Statistics 
 
OverallSatisfaction
NSF 
OverallSatisfaction
SSA40 
N Valid 174 174 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 2.80 2.85 
Std. Deviation .620 .809 
 
Frequency Table 
 
OverallSatisfactionOAA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3 60 29.4 29.4 29.4 
4 11 5.4 5.4 34.8 
4 77 37.7 37.7 72.5 
5 8 3.9 3.9 76.5 
5 48 23.5 23.5 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
OverallSatisfactionRMF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 8 3.9 3.9 3.9 
2 3 1.5 1.5 5.4 
2 74 36.3 36.3 41.7 
3 18 8.8 8.8 50.5 
3 85 41.7 41.7 92.2 
4 7 3.4 3.4 95.6 
4 7 3.4 3.4 99.0 
5 2 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
OverallSatisfactionNSF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
2.00 42 24.1 24.1 25.3 
2.50 15 8.6 8.6 33.9 
3.00 93 53.4 53.4 87.4 
3.50 9 5.2 5.2 92.5 
4.00 11 6.3 6.3 98.9 
4.50 1 .6 .6 99.4 
5.00 1 .6 .6 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
OverallSatisfactionSSA40 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.00 2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
2.00 52 29.9 29.9 31.0 
2.50 8 4.6 4.6 35.6 
3.00 86 49.4 49.4 85.1 
3.50 7 4.0 4.0 89.1 
4.00 7 4.0 4.0 93.1 
4.50 1 .6 .6 93.7 
5.00 11 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
Statistics 
 
OverallSatisfaction 
OAA 
OverallSatisfaction
RMF 
N Valid 204 204 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 3.93 2.56 
Std. Deviation .742 .669 
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Table 4.12 Satisfaction with the policy design  
 
 
Statistics 
 
SattisfactionWith
PolNSF 
SattisfactionWith
PolSSA40 
N Valid 174 174 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 2.99 2.91 
Std. Deviation .745 .835 
 
 
Frequency Table 
SatisfactionWithPolOAA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid moderately satisfied 48 23.5 23.5 23.5 
satisfied 90 44.1 44.1 67.6 
very satisfied 66 32.4 32.4 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
SatisfactionWithPolRMF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 11 5.4 5.4 5.4 
less satisfied 78 38.2 38.2 43.6 
moderately satisfied 89 43.6 43.6 87.3 
satisfied 20 9.8 9.8 97.1 
very satisfied 6 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
SatisfactionWithPolNSF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 3 1.7 1.7 1.7 
less satisfied 38 21.8 21.8 23.6 
moderately satisfied 93 53.4 53.4 77.0 
satisfied 38 21.8 21.8 98.9 
very satisfied 2 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
 
SatisfactionWithPolSSA40 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
less satisfied 51 29.3 29.3 30.5 
moderately satisfied 94 54.0 54.0 84.5 
satisfied 15 8.6 8.6 93.1 
very satisfied 12 6.9 6.9 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Statistics 
 
SattisfactionWith
PolOAA 
SattisfactionWith
PolRMF 
N Valid 204 204 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 4.09 2.67 
Std. Deviation .744 .840 
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Table 4.13 Satisfaction with the local bureaucrats’ actions  
 
 
Statistics 
 
SattisfactionWith
LocNSF 
SattisfactionWith
LocSSA40 
N Valid 174 174 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 2.61 2.79 
Std. Deviation .718 .908 
 
Frequency Table 
 
SatisfactionWithLocOAA 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 1 .5 .5 .5 
less satisfied 13 6.4 6.4 6.9 
moderately satisfied 67 32.8 32.8 39.7 
satisfied 72 35.3 35.3 75.0 
very satisfied 51 25.0 25.0 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
SatisfactionWithLocRMF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 15 7.4 7.4 7.4 
less satisfied 88 43.1 43.1 50.5 
moderately satisfied 95 46.6 46.6 97.1 
satisfied 6 2.9 2.9 100.0 
Total 204 100.0 100.0  
 
 
SatisfactionWithLocNSF 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 6 3.4 3.4 3.4 
less satisfied 71 40.8 40.8 44.3 
moderately satisfied 83 47.7 47.7 92.0 
satisfied 12 6.9 6.9 98.9 
very satisfied 2 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
 
SatisfactionWithLocSSA40 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid least satisfied 6 3.4 3.4 3.4 
less satisfied 62 35.6 35.6 39.1 
moderately satisfied 81 46.6 46.6 85.6 
satisfied 12 6.9 6.9 92.5 
very satisfied 13 7.5 7.5 100.0 
Total 174 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Statistics 
 
SattisfactionWith
LocOAA 
SattisfactionWith
LocRMF 
N Valid 204 204 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 3.78 2.45 
Std. Deviation .913 .675 
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